In light of Assembly Bill No. 177, which eliminated certain fees in criminal cases and rendered the unpaid balance of any such fees unenforceable and uncollectible, the Court of Appeal vacated the trial court’s imposition of interest pursuant to former Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l) and collection cost fees pursuant to former Penal Code section 1214.5.
**Between March and November 2024, there were many important unpublished panel victories in the First District. Unfortunately, we were not able to update our First District victories page during that time. Even though the victories are not on the website, we appreciate all of the hard work done by the panel and continued dedication to our clients.**
A163106
- July 28, 2022
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Donald Lipmanson
- Categories: Criminal, Fines, Fees, and Victim Restitution
A164016
- July 26, 2022
- Division: One
- Attorney: Maggie Shrout
- Categories: Criminal, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision, Retroactivity of Changes in Law
In this case, the defense filed a motion under Assembly Bill No. 1950, which limited the probation term for felony offenses to two years, with exceptions that do not apply here, and the trial court terminated appellant’s probation as of AB 1950’s effective date. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the trial court should have given the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the original plea deal before reducing the probation term. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the change in appellant’s probation term did not deprive the prosecution of the benefit of the plea bargain and did not permit the prosecution to withdraw from bargain.
A162896
- July 26, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Erin Keefe
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to Penal Code section 1170, which (1) now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction; and (2) created a presumption in favor of the low term where the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma and those factors contributed to the commission of the offense.
A164102
- July 25, 2022
- Division: Five
- Attorney: Aida Aslanian
- Categories: Dependency, ICWA
The Department conceded that the juvenile court failed to make any ICWA findings prior to terminating parental rights. The Court remanded the proceedings to determine if the Department discharged its duty of inquiry and notice under WIC sections 224.2 and 224.3.
A161139
- July 22, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Alan Siraco
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
A jury found appellant guilty of, among other things, two counts of first-degree murder and found true the special circumstance that he was convicted of more than one murder within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole for the special circumstance of multiple murders in addition to two terms of 25 years to life for the murder convictions. The Court of Appeal held that, since section 190.2 applied, life without the possibility of parole is the only authorized punishment; therefore, the imposition of two additional terms of 25 years to life is unauthorized. The Court vacated the sentence and remanded the matter for a full resentencing.
A164230
- July 22, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Sibyl Day
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to Penal Code section 1170, which limited the court’s ability to impose a sentence exceeding the middle term and created a presumption in favor of the low term where the defendant was a youth or experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma and those factors contributed to the commission of the offense.
A162984
- July 21, 2022
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Michael Sampson
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
In a case in which appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed, loaded, and unregistered firearm (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (c)), the Court of Appeal held that, because appellant had not been convicted of a qualifying “strike” felony, the trial court erred by sentencing appellant to state prison instead of to a county jail term under section 1170, subdivision (h)(1).
A162696
- July 13, 2022
- Division: Five
- Attorney: David Polsky
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
Because Penal Code section 1170.95, as amended by Senate Bill 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), now provides resentencing relief for individuals convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder under certain circumstances, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order summarily denying appellant’s 1170.95 petition and remanded the matter for the court to reconsider the petition in light of SB 775.
A163567
- July 12, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Helen Hoeffel
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. The A.G. agreed the new version of section 1170 applies retroactively and that the matter should be remanded for resentencing “[b]ecause the trial court may have relied on factors that were neither admitted by [appellant] nor found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A162151
- July 12, 2022
- Attorney: Amanda Roze
- Categories: Credits, Criminal, Delinquency
[Published Opinion] Disagreeing with In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, the Court of Appeal held that when a minor is committed to DJJ, the juvenile court must apply the minor’s pre-commitment credits against the “actual maximum custodial term” set under Welfare and Institutions Code, § 731(b), not the “theoretical maximum exposure term” set under section 726(d)(1).