Pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), the Court of Appeal ordered that appellant’s probation be reduced to a two-year term.
A159877
- October 28, 2021
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Leah Spero
- Categories: Criminal, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision
A161325
- October 25, 2021
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Larenda Delaini
- Categories: Criminal, Fines, Fees, and Victim Restitution
In this case appellant broke the victim’s iPhone 7. In calculating the amount of victim restitution appellant would be ordered to pay, the trial court split the difference between the actual cost of the victim’s phone and the newer model the victim purchased. The court then tacked on an additional amount to account for the “time and effort” the victim expended to obtain the phone. The Court of Appeal reversed the order, finding that restitution for the damaged cellphone was the replacement cost of a like cellphone, not a cellphone costing more than twice as much. In addition, while the court noted that trial courts may account for time and lost wages, splitting the difference between the cost of two cellphones was not a “rational method” of determining the value of lost time, and there was no evidence at all to establish the existence, amount, or value of any time lost by the victim to replace the cellphone.
A161646
- October 22, 2021
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Jason Stenson
- Categories: Criminal, Sufficiency of the Evidence
[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal held that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the weapon the minor used to threaten another student with was capable of temporarily immobilizing a person and, therefore, that it qualified as a stun gun within the meaning of Penal Code sections 626.10, subdivision (a) and 244.5, subdivision (a).
A160959
- October 20, 2021
- Division: Five
- Attorney: George Schraer
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in adding three years for a great bodily injury enhancement because, under section 1170.1, subdivision (a), the applicable enhancement for a subordinate term is one-third the normal term, or in this case, one year.
A157670
- October 18, 2021
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Gene Vorobyov
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing, finding that the trial court erroneously relied on Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (d) to impose fully consecutive terms for three sex offenses when one of the offenses (Penal Code § 288.7) did not fall within the umbrella of section 667.6, subdivision (d).
A161197
- October 18, 2021
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Joseph Shipp
- Categories: Criminal, Fines, Fees, and Victim Restitution
Pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 2), the Court of Appeal struck the probation investigation fee.
A156198
- October 15, 2021
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Clifford Gardner
- Categories: Criminal, Jury Instructions
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of conviction for four counts of attempted murder, finding that insufficient evidence supported giving the CALCRIM 600 kill zone instruction. According to the Court, based on the scope and nature of the attack – appellant used a single, nine-millimeter handgun, fired nine shots from about 10 feet away, and did not shoot in area from which victims would have limited means of escape –, the Court could not conclude that the only reasonable inference was that appellant or his co-defendant specifically intended to kill everyone around the alleged target as a means of killing him.
A161062
- September 30, 2021
- Division: One
- Attorney: Jeffrey Glick
- Categories: Criminal, Delinquency, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal reduced a minor’s maximum term of confinement at DJJ by one year, finding that the minor was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of amended Welfare and Institutions Code sections 730, subdivision (a)(2) and 731, subdivision (c), which states that a juvenile court “shall not commit a ward to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a period that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c).)
A161303
- September 29, 2021
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Sibyl Day
- Categories: Criminal, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision, Retroactivity of Changes in Law
The Court of Appeal remanded the case for reconsideration of various probation conditions that required appellant to enroll in and complete various assessments and treatment programs “if required by the Probation Officer.” According to the Court, the use of the “if required by the probation officer” language improperly granted to “the probation officer unfettered authority to decide in the first instance whether [appellant] should be required to participate in multiple treatment programs and/or mental health and drug and alcohol assessments, not merely to select a particular program that has been ordered by the court.” The Court further held that, upon remand, the trial court must comply with AB1950, which limited the probation term for felony offenses to two years (except in cases of certain violent felonies), in imposing any period of probation. Finally, because the Court was remanding the matter for resentencing, the Court also directed the trial court to entertain any inability-to-pay objection.
A153332
- September 29, 2021
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Janice Lagerlof
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in several ways in imposing appellant’s sentence. First, the Court held that the Three Strikes Law excludes LWOP sentences from being doubled or tripled. (See People v. Smithson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 480, 503; People v. Coyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 209, 219; People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 368-369 [all holding that the Three Strikes Law permits doubling (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)) or tripling (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)) only of the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term.) Second, the Court struck two (of four) prior prison term enhancements, finding that prior convictions cannot serve as the basis for both a five-year prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a three-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (a)). Third, the Court held that the trial court erred by imposing a minimum parole eligibility term (and tripling it) because appellant was sentence to life without parole. Finally, upon remand, the Court held that the trial court should consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.