First District Panel Victories

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A161973

[Published decision] The Court reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded the matter for a new section 366.26 hearing in light of the legal standards articulated in Caden C. The Court stated that to prove the existence of a beneficial relationship, the parent was not required to prove that the child’s attachment to her was his primary bond. The quality of the parent-child attachment must be evaluated in the context of the contact the parent was permitted to have with the child during the course of the dependency proceedings. Based on the record, the Court could not be certain whether the juvenile court relied on improper factors in assessing the Caden C. elements.

A160563

Appellant contended that his three-year probationary term must be reduced to two years pursuant to AB 1950 and that his fines and fees should be stricken or stayed or an ability-to-pay hearing should be held. The Attorney General agreed that remand was appropriate for resentencing and an ability-to-pay-hearing. Given the  parties’ agreement, the record of appellant’s financial conditions, and the fact that the matter must be remanded to the trial court anyway for adjustment of the probationary period, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to hold a hearing on appellant’s ability to pay.

A157778

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not affirmatively show that appellant’s jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. While the Court noted that the record showed appellant may have had some discussion with trial counsel prior to the jury waiver, and that trial counsel indicated to the trial court that appellant wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, the record did  not show whether the attorney ever discussed the nature of a jury trial with his client.  Nevertheless, the trial court took “no steps” to ensure appellant comprehended what a jury trial entailed, which was especially concerning considering appellant’s mental competency had been questioned at one point.

A160460

Relying on Conservatorship of A.B. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 384, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred when it improperly delegated to the County its duty to consider whether granting the County’s petition for compensation under Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b) would be a hardship on the conservatee.

A162067

In violation of Welfare and Institutions Cede section 700.1, the juvenile court held a suppression hearing at the same time as a jurisdictional hearing. Defense counsel did not object to the unitary hearing or request a deferred entry of judgment although the minor was eligible for such relief. Thus, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to evaluate the minor for a deferred entry of judgment.

A158256

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred by summarily denying appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95  without issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing.

A160911

In a case in which appellant entered into a negotiated disposition that involved admitting six prior prison terms and resulted in a 10-year split sentence, the Court of Appeal held that, pursuant to People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671 and People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, appellant’s case was not final for purposes of retroactive application of SB 136 – which restricted one-year prison term enhancements to terms served for violent sexual offenses – under Estrada. However, after noting that “Courts of Appeal are split as to whether remand under [People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685] is required where, as here, legislation has eliminated (rather than left to the trial court’s discretion) a sentencing enhancement imposed in connection with a negotiated disposition that included a specific, agreed-to sentence,” the Court held that the case must be remanded. But the Court ordered that, upon remand, the trial court may not impose a longer term than that to which the parties originally agreed.

A150512

[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal found that the Batson/Wheeler motion involving a prospective juror who expressed support for Black Lives Matter was improperly denied. In so holding, the Court found that the record does not support the trial court’s view that the juror had “a myriad of anti-prosecution issues” justifying a peremptory challenge, “given the prosecutor’s inappropriate questioning about Black Lives Matter, the absence of any clear and legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the juror, and the evidence of at least some historical discrimination by the prosecutor and other district attorneys in her office. . . .” The Court also found that insufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the peremptory challenge of the juror was not motivated by discriminatory intent (third-stage ruling).

A151534

In a case in which appellant was found guilty of dissuading a witness by force or threat under Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1), the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by failing to instruct with CALCRIM No. 2623. Because the court further held that it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt what the jury might have decided if properly instructed, the Court modified the judgment to reduce appellant’s conviction to a violation of section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1). The court also remanded the case to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion with respect to the firearm and prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

A160850

The Court of Appeal held that appellant’s excess presentence custody credits should be applied to eliminate appellant’s three-year parole period, and that the parole revocation fine under Penal Code section 1202.45 should be stricken as a result.