First District Panel Victories

Results: 371 - 380 of 630
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A160663

In a case in which appellant was convicted of both possession of a firearm by a felon and unlawful possession of ammunition, the Court of Appeal held that the sentence for the unlawful possession of ammunition conviction must be stayed under Penal Code section 654. In so holding, the Court noted that, while there may be instances when multiple punishment is lawful for possession of a firearm and ammunition, the facts of this case showed an “indivisible course of conduct” in that all of the ammunition was loaded into the firearm.   

A159955

Although the Court of Appeal found that appellant could be sentenced to four years of probation even after Assembly Bill No. 1950 (appellant was convicted of a domestic violence offense and misdemeanor offenses that carry specific probation terms), the Court also found that appellant was entitled to a slight clarification of his sentence pursuant to A.B. 1950.  Specifically, the court modified the order suspending imposition of appellant’s sentence and ordering him to serve four years of probation by: (1) clarifying appellant can face felony punishment consequences for a probation violation only during the first three years of his probation term because that is the maximum possible term for appellant’s domestic violence conviction; and (2) noting that any probation violation that occurs during the fourth year of his probation term can carry only misdemeanor consequences. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (m)(1))

A160737

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s Penal Code section 1170.95 petition to vacate appellant’s first-degree murder conviction without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. In so holding, the court explained that appellant alleged facts sufficient to state a prima facie case of eligibility because appellant was not ineligible as a matter of law based upon the record of conviction.

A161097

The Court of Appeal held that the police contact reporting condition was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define what type of law enforcement contacts appellant must report. The Court further held that the written probation order must be modified to reflect that the trial court did not order appellant to reimburse the cost of preparing the presentence report, since the trial court explicitly found appellant did not have the financial ability to do so. Pursuant to the recent enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which repealed the statute that had authorized collection of the probation supervision fee, the Court struck the $21 monthly probation supervision fee. Finally, the Court reduced appellant’s probation period to two years pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which limits felony probation to a maximum term of two years for most felony offenses. In so doing, the Court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case should be remanded so that the trial court may modify appellant’s probation term.

A159822

[Published Opinion] In a case in which appellant was charged with committing two unrelated murders (the Oakland and Hayward murders), the Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a mistrial after the jury was allowed to hear inadmissible evidence regarding the Oakland murder in the Hayward murder case.  In reaching this decision, the Court found that the trial court’s admonishment was inadequate to cure the prejudice, especially considering that the success of appellant’s defense depended largely on the jury accepting his credibility when he testified —credibility that was surely damaged by evidence this was not the first time he shot and killed an unarmed man for no apparent reason.

A161491

The Court of Appeal held that the condition requiring the minor to obey a daily curfew between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. was unconstitutionally overbroad because it swept too broadly in light of the purpose it was designed to serve, and was not narrowly tailored for the purposes of public safety and rehabilitation. Here, the minor was involved in pro-social activities outside of school, his offense was not committed during night time hours, he was not a runaway, and he was not involved in a gang. The Court, therefore, modified the curfew to state: “You are required to be at your legal residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian.”

A157756

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to strike the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53(d), in connection with his conviction for second degree murder, considering the court made extensive findings related to appellant’s particular circumstances (low cognitive ability, brain-based deficits, and history of trauma), which the court then used as the reason to strike the firearm enhancement in connection with another conviction.

A159806

The Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence does not support appellant’s conviction of rape of a child (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1)), specifically because there was insufficient evidence of sexual penetration. The Court further held that the trial court committed legal error by awarding restitution for noneconomic losses caused by appellant’s Penal Code section 311.11 conviction (possession of child pornography), although section 311 falls outside the noneconomic restitution provisions of Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F).

A162909

The Court of Appeal held, and the Attorney General conceded, that the trial court failed to specify the minor’s maximum period of physical confinement as required under section 726, subdivision (d)(1).  

A162298

Agreeing with People v. Secrease (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 231, the Court of Appeal held that a pre-Banks/Clark special circumstance finding does not automatically bar a defendant from obtaining resentencing relief under section 1170.95, and that a defendant may challenge a jury’s special circumstance finding under Banks/Clark when petitioning for section 1170.95 relief even if he or she has not first done so by habeas corpus.