First District Panel Victories

Results: 61 - 70 of 630
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A166529

Pursuant to WIC 241.1(a), when a minor qualifies as both a dependent and a ward of the juvenile court, all the attorneys of record must be notified of the date of the disposition hearing, where the court will determine which status is appropriate, and provided a copy of the WIC 241.1 report in which the probation department and child welfare services provided their recommendations, and they must be given an opportunity to be heard at the hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s determination under WIC 241.1 declaring the minor a ward of the court and terminating dependency jurisdiction because the record did not show that the minor’s dependency attorney was given the requisite notice.

A165504

Appellant, along with four others, stole $17,000 worth of leggings from Lululemon that were recovered in perfect condition within an hour of the theft. The Court of Appeal reversed the victim restitution award, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for the full retail price of the items because: (1) substantial evidence did not support that the items could not be resold for full value; and (2) even if substantial evidence supported the determination of an economic loss, the proper valuation for the items was their wholesale, rather than retail, value.

A165925

[Published Opinion] Following the recall of the San Francisco DA, the trial court granted the new DA’s motion to withdraw a PC 1172.1 resentencing request filed under the former DA, even though the new DA did not offer a reason for the motion except to state that the PC 1172.1 request was “very thin on the record.” The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, explaining that, while a trial court may grant a DA’s motion to withdraw a PC 1172.1 request, the motion “must be based on a legitimate reason,” and the court’s ruling on the motion “must be guided by PC 1172.1’s objectives and the defendant’s due process rights.”

A165449

[Published Opinion] The juvenile court granted appellant’s initial petition to seal his juvenile records under WIC 781. But when appellant filed another petition, this time listing additional agencies that had access to his records yet were not listed in the initial petition or sealing order, the court denied the petition on the ground that it lacked the authority to grant a subsequent petition. The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that WIC 781 does not bar a subsequent petition, and that where “a rehabilitated juvenile offender is eligible for WIC 781 relief, no purpose is served by permanently barring them from correcting an omission in the initial petition.”

A165499

The juvenile court granted appellant’s initial petition to seal his juvenile records under WIC 781. But when appellant filed another petition, this time listing additional agencies that had access to his records yet were not listed in the initial petition or sealing order, the court denied the petition on the ground that it lacked the authority to grant a subsequent petition. The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that WIC 781 does not bar a subsequent petition, and that where “a rehabilitated juvenile offender is eligible for WIC 781 relief, no purpose is served by permanently barring them from correcting an omission in the initial petition.”

A165312

In an appeal from the termination of reunification services, the Court conditionally affirms the orders pertaining to two of the children and remands the matter for compliance with the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements. The Court finds that the Agency failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry. In addition, the record did not contain adequate information to determine whether notice provided to the tribes was adequate.

A165298

[Published Opinion] The trial court placed defendant on probation for possession of child pornography and imposed a condition prohibiting him from possessing any “pornographic” materials. The Court of Appeal held that the condition is unconstitutionally vague and orders that it be stricken or modified. The court does not rule on defendant’s argument that the condition is overbroad (in that it infringes on his right to possess sexual materials involving adults) but encourages the trial court on remand to consider whether prohibiting defendant from possessing such materials is closely tailored to the interests of public safety and rehabilitation.

A162855

In an appeal from an SVP commitment, appellant argued that the lack of a requirement that SVPs personally waive their jury trial right violates equal protection given that there is such a requirement for MDOs and NGIs. Consistent with People v. Cannon (2023) 85 Cal.App.5th 786 and People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310, the Court of Appeal holds that SVPs are similarly situated to MDOs and NGIs in this context. The Court also follows the Cannon and Magana courts on the second prong of the equal protection analysis, concluding that the rational basis test governs any justification the prosecution may offer by way of explanation for the differential treatment. The Court remanded for the trial court to apply that test.

A165204

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court sentenced appellant to the aggravated term for corporal injury on a child, without first obtaining a stipulation from defendant as to the circumstances in aggravation relied upon by the court to impose the upper term, in violation of SB 567’s amendments to PC 1170.

A166036

The Court of Appeal agreed that the juvenile court erred when it bypassed reunification services to mother pursuant to 361.5(b)(3). Focusing on the requirement of 361.5(b)(3) that the minor was removed “due to additional physical or sexual abuse,” the Court noted that the juvenile court never made a finding of a new incident of abuse. Instead, the court’s concern was preventing future abuse which was not sufficient to trigger the bypass provision.