The trial court erred in finding a defense expert was unqualified to testify regarding the psychological testing of appellant for “susceptibility to false confession.” The proposed expert was a practicing psychologist whose testimony, the A.G. argued, did not demonstrate an expertise in police interrogation techniques. The Court of Appeal determined that there is no requirement that a witness be a “researcher or nationally recognized authority” to testify as an expert on a given subject. Further, the court found that neither the trial court nor respondent explained how an ability to interpret the results of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales test depends on an expertise in police interrogation tactics. And, in any event, the testimony of the witness showed he did have some knowledge of interrogation techniques.
A152810
- March 19, 2019
- Division: Five
- Attorney: Victor Blumenkrantz
- Categories: Criminal, Evidentiary
A151408
- March 18, 2019
- Division: Four
- Attorney: James Donnelly-Saalfield
- Categories: Criminal, General, Sentencing
Court of Appeal reduced a felony conviction for identify theft to a misdemeanor finding that, under the provisions of Proposition 47, identity theft must be treated as a misdemeanor – either as shoplifting under section 459.5 or as petty theft under section 490.2 – if the value of the personal identifying information at issue does not exceed $950.
A148197
- March 13, 2019
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Peter Goldscheider
- Categories: Competency, Criminal
Trial court erred in failing to reinstate competency proceedings because defense counsel had presented substantial evidence that he was experiencing new and worsened symptoms constituting a substantial change of circumstances in his mental condition. Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of conviction.
A151035
- March 13, 2019
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Robert Bryzman
- Categories: Criminal, Jury Instructions
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a defense of unconsciousness. A jury found the defendant guilty of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Penal Code section 245, subd. (b)). The victim was her daughter. The evidence at trial showed that appellant had exhibited bizarre behavior, including paranoia and disorganized thinking, ever since the father of her children physically assaulted her three months before. An expert witness testified that her behavior was consistent with posttraumatic stress disorder. The Attorney General argued that any error in omitting the instruction was harmless because the jury was instructed that to find defendant guilty of assault with a firearm, it must find she acted willfully. The Court was not persuaded and reversed the judgment.
A154526
- March 13, 2019
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Leila Moncharsh
- Categories: Criminal, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision
The Court of Appeal struck the probation condition requiring appellant to “be of good citizenship and good conduct.” The condition was vague and redundant of other conditions of the minor’s probation.
A138649
- March 12, 2019
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Jeremy Price
- Categories: Criminal, Delinquency, General, Sentencing
Because the defendant committed his offense when he was 15 years old and his case was not yet final, the defendant was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 1391. The Court of Appeal, therefore, remanded the matter to the juvenile court, instructing the court to deem the criminal convictions and enhancements to be juvenile adjudications as of the date of the verdict. At that time, the juvenile court should also consider exercising its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements (pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620).
A153881
- March 12, 2019
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Ean Vizzi
- Categories: Criminal, Delinquency, General
The trial court erred in denying a motion to seal portions of a juvenile record on the basis that the appellant did not qualify as satisfactorily completing his probation under section 786, subdivision (c)(1). At the time of the adult conviction of appellant, he was on probation as a result of the first two juvenile petitions, but he was not yet on probation for the third. This means that appellant met the first part of the section 786, subdivision (c)(1). The court should have, therefore, addressed the second part of the test: determining whether appellant had substantially complied with the reasonable orders of his probation. The court did not reach this issue, so the Court of Appeal remanded the matter.
A153658
- March 4, 2019
- Division: Five
- Attorney: Karlene Navarro
- Categories: Criminal, Evidentiary, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision
At appellant’s probation revocation hearing, the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony without good cause. The basis for the revocation was appellant’s parole agent testifying that appellant had tested positive for drug use, but the People never presented any documentation confirming drug usage, nor was the parole agent’s testimony based on any documentation. Under such circumstances, the Court of Appeal found a showing of good cause was required under People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144 before appellant’s right of confrontation could be dispensed with and the hearsay testimony admitted.
A154140
- February 28, 2019
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Jennifer Sheetz
- Categories: Criminal, Delinquency, Probation, Parole, PRCS, and Mandatory Supervision
The probation condition authorizing police officers to search the minor’s electronic devices was unconstitutionally overbroad because, as phrased, it imposed no limit on the type of data subject to search. The court modified the probation condition so as to allow officers to only search text and voicemail messages, call logs, email and social media accounts, including any photographs or videos appended or attached to communications.
A153191
- February 27, 2019
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Paul Couenhoven
- Categories: Criminal, Pleading and Proof, Sentencing
Aggregating the value of stolen property taken in two distinct transactions and charging the defendant with a single felony (as opposed to multiple misdemeanor counts) based on that value was improper in light of the receipt theory of liability elected by the People at trial. Matter remanded to the trial court to reduce the receiving stolen property (Pen. Code § 496, subd. (a)) conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor and for resentencing.