The Court of Appeal remanded for a new hearing on the motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a criminal court in light of A.B. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which requires the prosecution to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the evidence, that “the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” before transferring a minor’s case to adult criminal court, and requires a court ordering a transfer to recite the basis for its decision. In so doing, the court agreed with the parties that A.B. 2361 applies retroactively to non-final cases.

[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 1179, subdivision (d) requires a juvenile court to dismiss the minor’s wardship petition when the minor receives an honorable discharge from DJJ.

The Court of Appeal held that the condition prohibiting a minor from being in Alameda County unless with a parent or guardian was overbroad because it failed to permit travel authorized by a probation officer.

[Published Opinion] Disagreeing with In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, the Court of Appeal held that when a minor is committed to DJJ, the juvenile court must apply the minor’s pre-commitment credits against the “actual maximum custodial term” set under Welfare and Institutions Code, § 731(b), not the “theoretical maximum exposure term” set under section 726(d)(1).

Although the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an electronic search condition, the Court held that the condition imposed was not proportionate to the legitimate interests it served (ensuring adherence to some of the minor’s other probation conditions). Therefore, the court struck the condition and remanded the matter to the juvenile court to consider whether to impose a narrower electronic search condition.

Finding the record contained no evidence that appellant was provided notice of his eligibility for deferred entry of judgment as required under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790, the Court of appeal conditionally vacated the juvenile court’s findings and disposition order and remanded that matter for further proceedings, including notice to appellant of his eligibility for a DEJ.

The Court of Appeal held that the probation condition prohibiting appellant from being present in a building that he knows contains firearms or weapons was invalid because the condition’s proximity limitation was not narrowly tailored or reasonably related to the state’s interest in protecting the public, preventing appellant’s future criminality, or rehabilitating appellant. The Court modified the condition as follows: “The Minor shall not be present in any building or vehicle in which he knowingly has ready access to a firearm, ammunition, or other dangerous or deadly weapon, whether it is lawfully possessed or was unlawfully acquired.”

Former Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (c) authorized the juvenile court to commit a ward to the DJJ for a period not to exceed “the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult for the same offense.” (Former § 731, subd. (c), italics added.) However, Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended the statute to limit the maximum time of confinement to “the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” In this case, the juvenile court calculated the minor’s maximum time of confinement in accordance with former section 731, subdivision (c). Thus, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter for the juvenile court to redetermine the minor’s maximum time of confinement and to prepare a corrected record of commitment.

The Court of Appeal struck the probation condition requiring the minor to “[b]e of good conduct” as unconstitutionally vague and remanded the matter to the juvenile court. On remand, the Court directed the juvenile court to make an express declaration as to whether the minor’s wobbler offenses are felonies or misdemeanors, to calculate and record the minor’s maximum term of confinement, and to reconsider the calculation of the minor’s predisposition custody credits.

As a condition of the minor’s probation, the juvenile court ordered the minor to pay a $200 restitution fine, which exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the applicable statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subds. (b), (b)(2).) The Court of Appeal, therefore, modified the disposition order to reduce the restitution fine.