The Court of Appeal struck the term “improper sexual relations” as used in an electronics search condition on the ground that it was unconstitutionally vague and unnecessary to comport with the trial court’s stated intent – to determine whether the minor was engaging in solicitation and prostitution.

The Court of Appeal found that the terms of appellant’s mandatory supervision that required him “to participate in and complete programs [and counseling] as directed by probation” and prohibited him from leaving any such program without the probation office’s approval amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The court, therefore, remanded the matter to the trial court with direction to either strike the conditions or amend them by specifying each kind of required program, service, and counseling.

The Court of Appeal modified the probation condition prohibiting appellant from associating with drug users and traffickers to include an express knowledge requirement. The court also modified that abstract of judgment to include an additional day of presentence credit, which was originally left out due to a mere arithmetic miscalculation.

The Court of Appeal modified the probation condition requiring appellant to comply with an individualized substance abuse treatment plan as ordered by the probation department to clarify that his substance abuse treatment was to be on an outpatient basis. The Court further held that the judgment should be clarified to indicate that the restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4(b) was stayed based on appellant’s inability to pay under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.

The Court of Appeal held that the following probation conditions must be stricken or narrowed: (1) condition requiring appellant to “report any law enforcement contact to the Probation Officer within 24 hours for any reason” because it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in that it can be triggered by even the most insignificant contacts; (2) the condition requiring appellant to “[c]ooperate with the Probation Officer in a plan for psychological, psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment, or other rehabilitation, and follow all directions of the Probation Officer,” because it amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in that it allows the probation department to insist appellant participate in any type of plan for rehabilitation; (3) the condition requiring appellant to “[p]rovide a copy of any medical prescription to the Probation Department within 2 business days of its receipt” because it was overbroad in that it was not limited to psychotropic drugs or any other drugs that might be connected to defendant’s rehabilitation; and (4) the condition that prohibits appellant from associating with any “ ‘person, as designated by your probation officer,’ “ because it is unconstitutionally overbroad.  

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not have a sufficient basis to toll appellant’s PRCS because he had not “absconded” from supervision (Pen. Code, § 3456(b)), but rather was incarcerated during the tolling periods. The Court, therefore, reversed the trial court’s order extending appellant’s PRCS and, since appellant’s three-years PRCS term had expired, directed the trial court to enter an order terminating it.   

The Court of Appeal held that the electronic search condition and the condition prohibiting the use of encrypted data, files, disks or volumes were unreasonable under Lent where there was no relationship between appellant’s crimes and his use of electronic devices, social media, or encrypted data. The Court further held that the conditions prohibiting in-person and internet contact with minors or persons appellant believes to be minors were unconstitutionally overbroad. Specifically, the Court reasoned that while there was a compelling state interest in preventing appellant from committing further sexual assaults against minors, the no-contact conditions  were not narrowly tailored in that they exposed the minor to possible probation violations for interactions that – especially give his young age – are a frequent part of life.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in refusing to consider and rule on the merits of appellant’s claims of error in the probation report.

The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose probation conditions, including an electronics search condition, after committing the minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.

The Court of Appeal struck the following three probation conditions, finding that they each amounted to an improper delegation of judicial authority: (1) “Enroll in and successfully complete the Community Corrections Service Center program if required by the Probation Officer…”; (2) “Immediately enroll in, pay for, and successfully complete an alcohol and drug problem assessment program, if directed by the Probation Officer”; and (3) “Enroll in, pay for, and successfully complete an outpatient treatment program or a residential treatment program if required and as chosen by the Probation Officer…”