As a condition of the minor’s probation, the juvenile court ordered the minor to pay a $200 restitution fine, which exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the applicable statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subds. (b), (b)(2).) The Court of Appeal, therefore, modified the disposition order to reduce the restitution fine.

Because the domestic violence fund fee (Penal Code, § 1203.097) only applies to criminal defendants who are placed on probation and appellant was sentence to prison, the Court of Appeal struck this fee.

The Court of Appeal held that the presentence report fee must be stricken in light of Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, makes the unpaid balance of that fee unenforceable and uncollectible as of July 1, 2021, and requires that any portion of the judgment imposing such a fee be vacated.

The Court of Appeal held that the electronics search condition the court imposed as a condition of appellant’s probation was invalid where the record did not indicate that appellant’s current or past offenses involved the use of electronic devices, and the court’s belief that the nature of appellant’s offenses (forgery and possession of personal identification) made it likely that she had or would use stolen personal identifying information online was purely speculative.  The Court further held that two fees imposed under former Penal Code section 1203.1ab must be vacated pursuant to recently effective legislation (Assembly Bill No. 177), and that the probation conditions requiring payment of these fees must be stricken.

The Court of Appeal held (and the A.G. conceded) that the court erred by imposing a parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)) because a court cannot impose a parole revocation fine that exceeds the restitution fine imposed under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), which, in this case, was zero.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence does not support appellant’s conviction of rape of a child (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1)), specifically because there was insufficient evidence of sexual penetration. The Court further held that the trial court committed legal error by awarding restitution for noneconomic losses caused by appellant’s Penal Code section 311.11 conviction (possession of child pornography), although section 311 falls outside the noneconomic restitution provisions of Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F).

The Court of Appeal held that the police contact reporting condition was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define what type of law enforcement contacts appellant must report. The Court further held that the written probation order must be modified to reflect that the trial court did not order appellant to reimburse the cost of preparing the presentence report, since the trial court explicitly found appellant did not have the financial ability to do so. Pursuant to the recent enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which repealed the statute that had authorized collection of the probation supervision fee, the Court struck the $21 monthly probation supervision fee. Finally, the Court reduced appellant’s probation period to two years pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which limits felony probation to a maximum term of two years for most felony offenses. In so doing, the Court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case should be remanded so that the trial court may modify appellant’s probation term.

Pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 2), the Court of Appeal struck the probation investigation fee.

In this case appellant broke the victim’s iPhone 7. In calculating the amount of victim restitution appellant would be ordered to pay, the trial court split the difference between the actual cost of the victim’s phone and the newer model the victim purchased. The court then tacked on an additional amount to account for the “time and effort” the victim expended to obtain the phone. The Court of Appeal reversed the order, finding that restitution for the damaged cellphone was the replacement cost of a like cellphone, not a cellphone costing more than twice as much. In addition, while the court noted that trial courts may account for time and lost wages, splitting the difference between the cost of two cellphones was not a “rational method” of determining the value of lost time, and there was no evidence at all to establish the existence, amount, or value of any time lost by the victim to replace the cellphone.

Appellant contended that his three-year probationary term must be reduced to two years pursuant to AB 1950 and that his fines and fees should be stricken or stayed or an ability-to-pay hearing should be held. The Attorney General agreed that remand was appropriate for resentencing and an ability-to-pay-hearing. Given the  parties’ agreement, the record of appellant’s financial conditions, and the fact that the matter must be remanded to the trial court anyway for adjustment of the probationary period, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to hold a hearing on appellant’s ability to pay.

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