Because Penal Code section 1170.95, as amended by Senate Bill 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), now provides resentencing relief for individuals convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder under certain circumstances, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order summarily denying appellant’s 1170.95 petition and remanded the matter for the court to reconsider the petition in light of SB 775.
A162696
- July 13, 2022
- Division: Five
- Attorney: David Polsky
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
A163567
- July 12, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Helen Hoeffel
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. The A.G. agreed the new version of section 1170 applies retroactively and that the matter should be remanded for resentencing “[b]ecause the trial court may have relied on factors that were neither admitted by [appellant] nor found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A162151
- July 12, 2022
- Attorney: Amanda Roze
- Categories: Credits, Criminal, Delinquency
[Published Opinion] Disagreeing with In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, the Court of Appeal held that when a minor is committed to DJJ, the juvenile court must apply the minor’s pre-commitment credits against the “actual maximum custodial term” set under Welfare and Institutions Code, § 731(b), not the “theoretical maximum exposure term” set under section 726(d)(1).
A162469
- July 11, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Janet Gray
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing. The Court held that appellant was eligible for relief under Senate Bill 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which afforded trial courts discretion to strike prior serious felony enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667, sub. (a)(1)), because his judgment was not final when the statute became effective, and any objection to the timeliness of appellant’s petition was forfeited by the prosecution’s failure to object below. Although the court recognized that nether Penal Code sections 1170, subdivision (d)(1) or 1170.03 authorize defendants to self-petition for resentencing, any objection to the form of the petition was forfeited by the prosecution’s failure to object below and the denial of appellant’s petition without the provision of section 1170.03 procedures constituted error.
A158608
- July 7, 2022
- Division: Four
- Attorney: Lauren Dodge
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider appellant’s sentence in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to Penal Code section 1170, which, among other things, created a presumption in favor of the low term where the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma and those factors contributed to the commission of the offense. Due to appellant’s plea agreement including a stipulated prison term, the Court further held that a limited remand in accordance with People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 was the appropriate remedy.
A161691
- July 7, 2022
- Division: Two
- Attorney: Dirck Newbury
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
[Published Opinion] The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which, among other things, created a presumption in favor of the middle term and requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. Here, the Court found that the trial court relied on several aggravating circumstances that were neither admitted by appellant nor found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also rejected the A.G.’s harmless error argument.
A164646
- July 5, 2022
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Suzanne Davidson
- Categories: Dependency, ICWA
The Court finds the Department did not discharge its ICWA duty of initial inquiry. The Department’s reports did not include “detailed descriptions” of any inquiries made of extended family members. In addition, the juvenile court did not meet its duty to ensure the Department adequately investigated possible Indian ancestry. The Department did not oppose a conditional reversal and remand for ICWA compliance.
A162105
- July 5, 2022
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Victor Morse
- Categories: Criminal, Retroactivity of Changes in Law, Sentencing
In accordance with People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, which held that a court could strike a greater firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and impose a lesser uncharged enhancement instead, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s request to strike or reduce his firearm enhancement based on the erroneous belief that it lacked authority to impose a lesser included enhancement in its place. The Court further held that, in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which “raised the bar of proof for the gang offense and gang enhancement in several ways,” appellant’s gang offense conviction (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) and true gang enhancement finding (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)) must be vacated. Upon remand, the Court noted that the prosecution may elect to retry appellant under the new law established by AB 333.
A161381
- June 30, 2022
- Division: One
- Attorney: Gene Vorobyov
- Categories: Criminal, Retroactivity of Changes in Law, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court twice erred under Penal Code section 654 by imposing separate punishments for both domestic violence and simple assault where those convictions arose from single incidents of domestic violence. The Court further found that the trial court erred by ordering appellant to pay a domestic violence fund fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.097, because appellant was committed to state prison and section 1203.097 only applies “[i]f a person is granted probation. . . .” Finally, the Court remanded the case for resentencing in light of AB 518, which amended Penal Code section 654 to provide that an act or omission punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under any such provision (as opposed to the provision that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment). Upon resentencing, the Court noted that “any applicable legislative changes can be considered by the trial court on remand.”
A161765
- June 30, 2022
- Division: Three
- Attorney: Matthew Watts
- Categories: Criminal, Sentencing
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. In this case, it was undisputed that the court relied on “several aggravating factors” without jury findings or a stipulation from appellant to support them.