April 3, 2018
Attorney: Maggie Shrout
Court of Appeal agreed with reasoning in People v. Abdallah (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 736., that it was error to impose Penal Code section 667.5, subd. (b), one-year prior prison term enhancement after underlying felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor. Noting that once felony is reduced to a misdemeanor, the imposition of the enhancement would be contrary to voter intent in enacting Prop 47.
December 12, 2018
Attorney: Clifford Gardner
Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court to exercise its discretion under SB 620, amended Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h), whether to strike gun-use enhancement.
October 5, 2018
Attorney: Juliana Drous
Court of Appeal stayed sentence for one assault and enhancements under Penal Code section 654 where totality of record showed jury based conviction on same act supporting mayhem. Court also remanded for exercise of discretion as to firearm enhancements.
March 19, 2019
Attorney: Geoff Jones
In a case where the defendant was convicted of the forcible rape and digital penetration of his 17-year-old niece, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a hearing under section 782 and in excluding evidence that the defendant threatened to disclose his niece was having an affair with the boyfriend of her mother, giving his niece a strong motive to falsely accuse him of rape. The Court therefore reversed the convictions.
December 11, 2018
Attorney: Shannon Chase
Convictions conditionally reversed and matter remanded, pursuant to SB 1391, to juvenile court for transfer hearing and determination whether juvenile court treatment is appropriate for any offenses committed. If so, juvenile court ordered to impose an appropriate juvenile disposition. If any offenses are found inappropriate for juvenile court treatment and after transfer hearing, matter is returned to adult criminal court, the trial court must resentence and consider striking the term imposed for the firearm enhancement (SB 620).
January 31, 2019
Attorney: John Schuck
A jury convicted appellant of sexual penetration of a person prevented from resisting by an intoxicating substance (Penal Code § 289, subd. (e)), as well as simple battery (Penal Code § 242). The Court of Appeal reversed the simple battery conviction, finding it was a lesser included offense of the unlawful sexual penetration as defined by section 289, subd. (k)(1).
December 12, 2018
Attorney: Cynthia Jones
Remand to trial court to determine whether to strike a five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) authorized by a recently enacted amendment to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (b).
November 16, 2018
Attorney: Victoria Stafford
The Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill No. 1393 newly vesting trial courts with discretion to dismiss 5-year serious prior felony conviction enhancements is retroactive under Estrada and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
July 17, 2017
Attorney: Mark D. Johnson
Court of Appeal reversed order for defendant to pay $250 for defense costs for representation. The defendant himself objected to the fee and Court found that the record was insufficient to support a finding of ability to pay where the defendant was sentenced to two years in prison.
June 12, 2018
Attorney: Stephen Bedrick
Court of Appeal reversed second degree murder conviction based on two trial court errors: 1) Evid Code section 352. Trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of an uncharged carjacking where the carjacking victim had not identified appellant and the carjacking had little to no probative value to issues at trial, but the evidence was extremely prejudicial as appellant was driving the car the next day which implicated him in the carjacking after the fact and suggested he was engaged in repeated, violent criminal activity. 2) Evid. Code section 1103. Trial court abused discretion by excluding all evidence of victim’s violent character, which gave a false aura of peaceableness. Also court lacked a basis for excluding some of the evidence where it did not hear proffered testimony. The evidence was prejudicial where there was enough uncertainty about [appellant’s] role in the shooting to heighten the importance of evidence that may have influenced the jury’s general perceptions of him.