First District Panel Victories

Results: 171 - 180 of 630
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A162298

In accordance with People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, the Court of Appeal held that, where a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition is otherwise adequate, a pre-Banks/Clark felony-murder special-circumstance finding is not a basis to deny an order to show cause.

A161419

In accordance with People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, holding that, where a petition is otherwise adequate, a pre-Banks/Clark felony-murder special-circumstance finding is not a basis to deny an order to show cause.

A163211

The Court of Appeal held that Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to gang enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) insofar as it amends the substantive elements of the enhancement so that the true finding on the enhancement must be vacated and remanded for retrial.

A164229

In this case, the record established that the trial court was unaware it had the discretion to strike appellant’s five-year terms for prior serious felony convictions imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). The Court of Appeal concluded that remand is appropriate to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike appellant’s prior serious felony convictions for sentencing purposes.

A160784

The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, once again, in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which, among other things, created a presumption in favor of a low prison term for certain youthful offenders.

A163837

The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of recent amendments (Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.)) to Penal Code section 1170, which limited the court’s ability to impose a sentence exceeding the middle term and created a presumption in favor of the low term where the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma and those factors contributed to the commission of the offense.

A164836

The Court of Appeal held that, in denying appellant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition, the trial court improperly relied on portions of the Court’s prior unpublished opinion that were premised on the weighing of evidence presented at trial, and that the record of conviction did not conclusively establish the jury’s verdict was premised on a theory of implied malice second degree murder.  Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying appellant’s 1172.6 petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

A163874

The Court of Appeal held that appellant, who was a minor when he was convicted in adult court of second-degree murder, was entitled to a transfer-fitness hearing before the juvenile court after his conviction was vacated and reduced to attempted robbery pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).

A164945

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition, finding insufficient evidence that appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life. While the Court noted that appellant’s statement that “he didn’t want to kill the [victim], however if he had to, he would,” might constitute substantial evidence of reckless indifference under different circumstances, here, there was no evidence that appellant was armed, knew the actual killer was armed, had previously talked to the actual killer about the use or a gun, or knew the actual killer had access to guns. Nor was it even apparent that appellant knowingly participated in an armed robbery. The Court, therefore, remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant the petition and resentence appellant.   

A164028

The Court of Appeal reversed appellant’s involuntary manslaughter conviction (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) where the trial court erred in admitting extensive hearsay evidence describing the decedent’s attack and failed to provide a limiting instruction, despite correctly ruling in limine that only statements describing the decedent’s past or present pain (and not how he was injured and what happened) could be admitted for their truth under Evidence Code sections 1250 and 1251. The Court further held that the error was not harmless where the primary disputed issue at trial was the cause of the decedent’s death and where the prosecution heavily relied on the hearsay evidence at trial.