Before jury selection in appellant's kidnapping and robbery case, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could introduce evidence of appellant's prior arrest for robbery under EC 1101(b) to show appellant's intent and a common plan or scheme. Appellant was never prosecuted for this incident, and defense counsel objected to the admission of evidence concerning it. During voir dire, the trial court prohibited defense counsel from asking potential jurors about their ability to follow a judge's instructions about the limited purpose for which such prior acts evidence would come in. Following appellant's convictions, defense counsel brought a new trial motion based on the trial court's preclusion of defense counsel's proposed voir dire questions. Applying the federal Chapman standard, the Court of Appeal reversed appellant's convictions and sentence, holding that it was prejudicial error to restrict counsel from asking such questions in voir dire. Appellant had a right to explore whether jurors could remain fair and impartial arbiters if they heard he was involved in a similar uncharged incident, and could restrict their consideration of that incident to its proper evidentiary role or proof of intent and common plan or scheme but not his guilt of the charged offense.