Approximately six months after the trial court denied appellant's Fourth Amendment suppression motion, the trial court granted appellant's motion to replace his appointed counsel with retained counsel. Retained counsel then filed a new suppression motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of appellant's previous appointed counsel for failure to call material witnesses at the first suppression hearing. The trial court refused to hold a second suppression hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that alleged ineffectiveness of counsel, if established, provides a basis for a second consideration of a motion to suppress under PC 1538.5(h). Because the trial court refused to hear any evidence concerning prior counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Court of Appeal remanded with instructions for the trial court to hear appellant's offer of proof.

The Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's four convictions for committing lewd and lascivious acts against two girls under 14. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting evidence of an alleged prior molestation for which the defendant had previously been tried and acquitted. Although Evidence Code section 1108 did apply to the prior act evidence, it was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 as it was more prejudicial than probative. The court observed that the testimony concerning the prior incident was of limited probative value because it was unsupported by independent evidence of other instances of similar misconduct. It was also highly prejudicial because the alleged conduct was more inflammatory than the current charged offenses and because of the possibility the jury would seek to punish the defendant for conduct for which he had previously not been punished.

Appellant was convicted of one count of spousal battery but acquitted of making a terrorist threat against one Cynthia Stephens. Nevertheless, upon placing appellant on probation, the trial court imposed a condition ordering that appellant have no physical contact with Ms. Stephens and her husband. The Court of Appeal concluded that the probation condition prohibiting all contact with the Stephenses was not reasonably related to the crime of which appellant was convicted or to future criminality. Therefore, the Court of Appeal ordered that probation condition stricken.

In 1997, appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of burglary and receiving stolen property. He was committed to the state hospital for 6 years, which was the maximum prison time he could have received for those offenses had he been found guilty. When the charges were filed against him, the state also alleged one prior strike and one prior serious felony conviction, which could have increased his commitment by 11 years. However, the state never introduced any evidence in support of those allegations, and the court did not find them true or impose any commitment time attributable to them when it pronounced its final judgment in 1997. Over a year later, the state hospital sent a letter to the trial court asking, among other things, whether the prior conviction enhancements had in fact been found true and imposed. In early 1999, approximately 18 months into appellant's commitment, the trial court held a "sentencing clarification" hearing. The district attorney informed the court that his notes indicated that the prior conviction allegations had been sustained and that appellant''s commitment was supposed to be for 17 years (instead of 6 years). Defense counsel did not object, and the trial court "corrected" its original commitment order and issued a new one increasing appellant's commitment to 17 years. Once again, the state presented no evidence in support of the prior conviction allegations, and appellant did not admit them. In 2007, appellant, now 10 years into his commitment, filed a petition for release from the hospital. The trial court denied it, and he appealed. The Court of Appeal vacated the order increasing appellant's commitment from 6 to 17 years, holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to recall appellant's original sentence and impose a new, greater one. In addition, the Court of Appeal held that on remand the trial court was barred from holding a new trial on the prior conviction allegations.

After hearing evidence at a contested jurisdictional hearing that appellant refused to sit down when ordered to by the police and repeatedly demanded that he be read his rights, the juvenile court sustained the allegation that appellant had resisted, delayed, or obstructed a police officer (PC 148). The Court of Appeal reversed for insufficient evidence, concluding that appellant's failure to respond with alacrity to police orders and insistence on being informed of his rights were protected First Amendment speech and conduct.