ࡱ> xRoot EntrysQ- 7y`PerfectOffice_MAIN&PerfectOffice_OBJECTS,ؤؤ  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwyz{|}~WPC  -0}ceY79|MQ"-3Ά L">#w&t O9ii:5k5 cBHg0p** $ZrC D Zx`={l]"arWIiw0sx~ȔCCI+Ŝ(ўS\0n} <e*Xx\ FX>\BM O2iRe ~э8 x{0#g$攐Z!m,ir' ?0<)&%';Wdk"\%7a d ã^EG`=&>6g!dp "Di[xL^12>93sOutiw b渁U. n, %/5 0 0Z 0A 0] 0K/ 0?z 0G 05 0_5 0M 0q 0qR 0 0q 0_ 0\f 0K 0?  0L 00 08 0 0n 0 0 0` 05!e! 0! 0" 0n# 0$ 0$ 0% 0R& 0E' 0b(_) 0)U:* 0'C*U!N+U0d+w+ -/M?1*2X379~<>A+AC&E 0<IT $J`xTU|W:Y 0[\ 0S\#](_N`^ `w`4`&` m(`?`Ue@bBb=XbeAim Bo{oGq 0Us 0ns 0Qt 0u 0u 0v 0Aw 0w 0x 06y 0y 0z 0{ 0,| 0| 0t} 0~ 0~ 01 0 0 0q 0 0 0] 0 0 0 0Å 0 0>? 0} 0u 0W 09 0 0 0ߌ 0 02k 0 0: 0Yӏ 0_, 0  0 0 B* D/G D+v 0 D/ 0֗ 06 0ژ 0: 0^ 0<z 1eU6U>QU* 1u 72. 0c`Ü 0w| 0 0 0(r 0N 0 0 0 0Dy 1 72FyxX heb͹չ w^ <U>AAAAAAAAAAAAAz<6X9`(Courier<6X9`(CourierXx6X@`7X@)\  `"TmsRmn 12ptACXXt\  PZuXP) `CG TimesACc PE37PX'  habeas, seminar materials 2cov bo 0 .   p0EnvDJetEnvelope Style for DeskJet Plus    \RV,\   X `  X x6Label3DJetLabels, 3 up for HP DeskJet Plus    \R+\nd+p HxX,x,nx:EnvelopeDJetEnvelope #10, for DeskJet Plus    \RV,\   X `  X dJ$,QuoteL/R Indented, Single Spaced    8.. 8` ..    64In Cameraincamera4 *IbidIbidIbid.8,Suprasupra,supra,, &IdIdId.V *Sec2Double section symbolH*Sec1Section symbolL%*Lab3Label Position 3   h  (# L%*Lab2Label Position 2   h   :(EnvEnvelope    \RV,\   X  ` L%*Lab1Label Position 1   h   X2Elipsis3Elipsis three dots...T2Elipsis4Elipsis - 4 dots....64In Limineinlimine6 4voir direvoirdire4Und-SpaceUnderline but not with spaces on, then off        ,*Dash--x#.Label3Labels, 3-Down FDAP, for HP LaserJet  0          \Rx\    \Rx AL MAIL \Tj6PleadFinalFinal Pleading        X     =  ~ )       X @D..    ڀ(F2$ G_!QX2XXX   0ElipsisElipsis (using hard spaces) with period....xO2ParaNumsParagraph Numbers 1., 2., 3., etc... 21.3  Ԁ  0..R41 SpacingSingle Spacing\54Date/TimeDate and Time Stamp"US[ :!] ! !  nt2EnvelopeEnvelope #10, for HP LaserJet    \RV,\tO 4Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers.. 2I.3  Ԁ  0..PB0HeadingChapter Heading@..  2I.3  Ԁ   Ԉ b=6SubheadingSubheadings in briefs 2A.3  ..    xn2SectionASection A, B etc. with TOC Level 2  8.. 8` ..2A.3  0 ..  zn2SectionISection I, II etc. with TOC Level 1  8.. 8` ..2I.3  0 ..  R42 SpacingDouble Spacing~2Label3iiLabels, 3-down, FDAP for HP Series II      \R >\         X x2PleadingPleading Style (Margins, Tabs etc)           X &X` (&+ =  )   X &X` (&@..     ڀ8DoubleSpaceDouble space text between style on/off)\  `"TmsRmn 12ptAC($    (  Z6Times New Roman Regular) `CG Times m G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  1  /7 05/X2X /7E.g.,_McCleskey_v._Zant_(1991)499U.S.467.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  2  /7 05/X2X /7Ahabeaspetitionfiledwithinanappellatecourt'soriginaljurisdictiontoobtainreviewofa  superiorcourt'sdenialofapetitionraisingthesameclaimsisnotconsidereda"successivepetition" x withinthemeaningofClark,norisaSupremeCourthabeaspetitionfollowinganappellatecourt's @ denial.(Clark,supra,atp.767n.7.)  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  3  0XX05/X2XX0XԀSeeCal.SupremeCourtPoliciesRegardingCasesArisingFromJudgmentsofDeath,std.11.1  (asrevisedthroughNov.20,2002). C G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  6  /7 05/X2X /7SeeInre_Waltreus_(1965)62Cal.2d218.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  7  0XX05/X2XX0XSeeInreDixon(1953)41Cal.2d756. N G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  8  /7 05/X2X /7Harrisemphasizesthatmerelycharacterizingaconstitutionalclaimas"fundamental"isnot  enoughtobringitwithinthisnarrowcategory.Byitscitationandshortparentheticaldescriptionof x Arizonav._Fulminante_(1991)499U.S.279,309,theHarrisopinionimpliesthatthe"fundamental @ constitutionalerror"exceptionisequivalentto_Fulminante_'sconceptof"structuraldefect."(Harris, X supra,atp.834.)  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  10  /7 05/X2X /7ԀNumerouscasesoutsidethehabeascontext,includingtheSupremeCourt'sScottopinion,  elaborateonthedistinctionsbetweenan"unauthorizedsentence,"whichcanbecorrectedatany x time,andordinarysentencingerror,whichcanbewaived.(Peoplev.Scott(1994)9Cal.4th331; @ seealso,e.g.,X2XX/X2Peoplev.Smith(2001)24Cal.4th849#/X2XXX2o#.) x G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  11  0XX05/X2XX0XHowever,thislimitationdoesnotbarhabeasconsiderationofanineffectiveassistanceclaim,  basedoncounsel'sfailuretoraiseaFourthAmendmentargument.(E.g.,Peoplev.Howard(1987) x 190_Cal.App_.3d41;see_Kimmelman_v.Morrison(1986)477U.S.365.)  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  12  0XX05/X2XX0XNotethatastatutory"falseevidence"claimrequiresneitherproofthatthefalsityamountedto  perjurynoranyshowingthattheprosecutorkneworshouldhaveknownofthefalsity.(Pen.Code, x 1473(c);Hall,supra,atp.424.)  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  13  /7 05/X2X /7ԀAhabeasclaimof"newlydiscoveredevidence"facesamoredauntingstandardthanasimilar  claiminanewtrialmotion.Onhabeas,thenewevidencemust"undermine[]theentireprosecution x case"(Hall,supra,atp.417;Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.766)thatis,itmust"cast[]fundamental @ doubtontheaccuracyandreliabilityoftheproceedings"(Peoplev.Gonzalez(1990)51Cal.3d1179, X 1246).    ! G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  15  0XX05/X2XX0XGarciaitselfdidnotinvolveaformalwrittenrequestfromthedefensesuchastheoneattached,  buttheopiniondoesprovidestrongauthorityfortheprosecutors'ethicalobligationtodisclose x exculpatoryevidence,withorwithoutaspecificrequest.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  16  /7 05/X2X /7Thus,forinstance,forajurormisconductclaim,thepetitionshouldincludeadeclarationfrom  oneofthejurors,ratherthanjustaninvestigator'sdeclarationdescribinghisinterviewwiththejuror.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  17  0XX05/X2XX0XHowever,the_Duvall_Courtnotedthattherelaxedpleadingruleforarespondent"doesnot  relievethepetitioner,inhisorherpetitionforawritofhabeascorpus,fromallegingfactsthat,if x true,wouldentitlethepetitionertorelief."(_Duvall_,supra,atp.486n.8.)Nonetheless,inlightof @ theCourt'spreviouscommentthatthepetitionshouldincludesupportingaffidavitsif reasonably X available"(id.atp.474),the_Duvall_footnoteappearstoapplytothespecificityofthepetition's   factualallegationsratherthantheformwhichthesupportingprooftakes.<:Default Para J G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  18  /7 05/X2X /7Whereanappellatecourtissuesan_OSC_Ԁbutlaterdeniesthepetitioninanopinion,thetimefor  petitioningforSupremeCourtreviewisthesameasforaregularopinioninadirectappeali.e.,40 x daysaftertheopinioneveniftheopiniondealsonlywiththehabeasproceeding.However,the @ deadlineforapetitionforreviewfollowingasummarydenialofahabeaspetitiondependsonthe X timingofthesummarydenialvisavisthedispositionofthedirectappeal.Ifthehabeasdenialif   filedonthesamedateastheopinionintherelateddirectappeal,itwillbecome"final"onthesame  schedule,sothepetitionforreviewshouldbefiledwithin40daysofthedenial.(SeeCal.Rulesof `  Court,rule24(b)(4).)(Note,however,thatifthepetitionwasdeniedinaseparateorder,filedthe ( x samedateastheappellateopinion,andcounselwishestopetitionforreviewinbothproceedings,  @ itwillbenecessarytofileseparatepetitionsforreviewfortheappealandforthehabeas.(Rule    28(d).)Ifthesummaryhabeasdenialwasonadifferentdatethantheopinioninthedirectappeal,    thenthepetitionforreviewmustbefiledwithin10daysofthedenialorder.  H     TherearenostrictdeadlinesassuchforfilinganoriginalSupremeCourthabeaspetition (  followingtheappellatecourt'sdenialofhabeasrelief.However,likeanyhabeaspetition,thepetition   mustbefiledwithout"substantialdelay."(SeePartIB,supra.)Tobeonthesafeside,counsel h  wouldbewelladvisedtofileanysuchhabeaspetitionwithinthepetitionforreviewdeadlines 0  describedabove.AsdiscussedinPartVIIIB,ifaCaliforniareviewingcourtexplicitlyfinds H   substantialdelayinrefilingapetitionafteradenialbyalowercourt,thatrulingmayalsoaffect  whetherthestatehabeasproceedingisconsidered pendingduringthatintervalforpurposesof  tollingthefederalstatuteoflimitations. V G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  19  0XX05/X2XX0XSeee.g.,Inre_Lewallen_(1979)23Cal.3d274,278&n.2.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  21  0XX05/X2XX0XHowever,whatitispetitionermustprovebyapreponderancewilldependuponthesubstantive  standardapplicabletotheunderlyinglegalclaim.  G_!QX2XXX   _Q7 XQX205 Q7Ԁ  28  0XX05/X2XX0XForacomprehensivetreatmentoffederalhabeaslaw,see_Liebman_Ԁ&Hertz,FederalHabeas  CorpusPractice&Procedure(4thed.2001).  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  30    _ԀForthisauthors_analysisof_Ԁthenewcourtruleallowingasupposedlystreamlined exhaustion  petitionforreview(Cal.RulesofCourt,rule33.3),seetheJanuary2004seminarmaterialsposted x on_FDAP_swebsite,4 b O  5  www.fdap.org6O E  7 8.(w!2\I$ G_!QX2XXX   Q2XXQX2Ԁ  0  #|x (+_$QX0XXX  HP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL 60!w0 Wd0:i+00U  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  14    _Ԁ-XXQ2-XXX-Eitherpartymayseekappellatereviewofthesuperiorcourtsdiscoveryrulingviaapetition  forwritofmandate#QX2XX-Xë##Q2XXQX2#.(9 Z(Times New Roman    3 E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  31    _ԀTherearethreeotherpotentialtriggeringevents:thedateonwhichastatecreated impediment  tofiling,inviolationofthefederalconstitution,isremoved; thedateonwhichconstitutionalright x assertedwasinitiallyrecognizedbythe[U.S.]SupremeCourt...,ifthatrightismade retroactively @ applicabletocasesoncollateralreview;or thedateonwhichthefactualpredicatefortheclaim X orclaims...couldhavebeendiscoveredthroughtheexerciseofduediligence.(28U.S.C.   2244(d)(1)(B)(D))  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  32    _ԀQX2XXQ2Twoimportantcaveats:(1)Incalculatingthedeadlineforfilingacert.petition(andthusthe  dateonwhichacasebecomes finalintheabsenceofacert.petition),the90daysrunsfromthe x  dateoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsreviewdenialorder,notfromthedateof_remittitur_.(2)A  cert.petitionorthetimeinwhichacert.petitioncouldhavebeenfiledisonlyrelevanttocalculation x ofthedateonwhichthecasebecomefinalondirectreview.Thependencyofacert.petitionorthe @ timeinwhichonecouldhavebeenfiledfromthedenialofastatehabeaspetitiondoesnot toll X thestatuteoflimitations. 7 E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  24    _ԀAshortlivedversionofthisrule(eff.20012003)actuallyprovidedthat,ifthesuperiorcourt  failedtotakeanyoftheseactionswithinthespecifiedtime,an_OSC_Ԁwasdeemedtohaveissuedby x operationoflaw.(Formerrule4.551(a)(3).)Themostrecentroundofrevisions,however,provides @ afarlesssubstantiveremedyifthesuperiorcourtfailstoact.Thepetitionermayfile anoticeand X requestforrulingstatingthathehasnotreceivedatimelyruling.Uponreceiptofthatnotice,the   presidingjudge mustassignthepetitiontoajudgeandcalendarthematterforadecisionwithout  appearanceswithin30daysofthefilingofthenoticeandrequestforruling.(Currentrule `  4.551(a)(3)(B)(ii).)  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  23    _ԀLikeanappellatecourt(rule60(1)),asuperiorcourtisalsoauthorizedtoobtainrelevant  records pertainingtothepetitionerscasefromtheresponsible custodianofthoserecords.(Rule x 4.551((b)(1)(b)) d q E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  25    _ԀUnliketheotherpointscoveredhere,this statementofreasonsrequirementisnotnew.It  isacarryoverfromthepre2001superiorcourthabeasrule,formerrule260.  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  26    _ԀAsapracticalmatter,iftheexhibitsareclearlyindextabbedandinternallypaginated(allowing  foreasyreference),itisdoubtfulthattheappellateclerkswillinsistupontheadditionalstepof x consecutivepaginationoftheentirevolume.*+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   0AA.Normal  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition T  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(hh&H1  5+ ` hp x 5      5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H2  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H3  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H4  5+ ` hp x 5 XXX 5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H5  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H6  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  2DD0Address  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted  /%  ,Kk %#/K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/  <:zBottom of 7(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7(X75+ ` hp x 5  &  d d)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7(X75+ ` hp x 5  )2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  cdefghij 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0    E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  27    _ԀThoughthechoiceofJanuary1,1992,asthecutoffdateisunderstandable,thatdaterepresents  lessofademarcationinthestateofCalifornialawthantheenactmentofEvidenceCodesection x 1107mightimply.Bythetimeoftheenactmentofthatstatute,caselawhadalreadyrecognizedthe @ admissibilityof_BWS_Ԁtestimonybyanalogytootherrecognizedformsof syndromeevidence,so X thestatutewaslargelydeclaratoryofexistinglaw.(Cf.Peoplev._Aris_(1989)215_Cal.App_.3d1178   [disapprovedinpart,Peoplev.Humphrey(1996)13Cal.3d1073].)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  29    _ԀTheBaldwinopiniondidleaveopenthepossibilitythatreferencestostateauthoritiesmust  sufficeifthestatestandardisidenticaltothefederalone.Ifcounselfindshimorherselfinfederal x courtdefendingapoorlyexhaustedclaim,thatargumentmayprovidearayofhope.Butwhenone @ isstillintheprocessofexhaustingstateremedies,thereisnoreasontotakethatrisk.Counsel X shouldsimplytakecaretocitefederalauthorities,aswellasanystateones.(Also,evenassuming    thatrelianceonstateauthoritiesapplyinganidenticalstandardwillsuffice,itisnotclearthat  Californiaandfederalstandardsarenecessarilyidenticalinsomecrucialareas.Forexample,Pope x andotherpre_Strickland_Californiacases(aswellasafewpost_Strickland_ones)framethe @ ineffectiveassistancetestintermsthatdonotneatlycorrespondto_Strickland_.(suchas withdrawal X ofapotentiallymeritoriousdefense).(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#http://www.fdap.org(O$(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(# xCGaeimquy}Bullet ListBullets List o E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  35    _ԀThecalculationbecomesstillmorecomplicatedwherethereisanoverlapbetweenthedifferent   rounds!e.g.,wherethedefendantbeginsa secondroundastoanewhabeasclaims,whilehe x isstillinthemidstofhisfirst roundofreviewastohisinitialclaims.(Cf._Delhomme_Ԁv.Ramirez @ (9thCir.2003)340F.3d817.)  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  36    _ԀTheAdvisoryCommitteeCommenttotherevisedrulestatesthatthe immediatefinality  provision reflectssettledSupremeCourtpractice(citingunpublishedSupremeCourtminutes x concerninglackofjurisdictiontoconsiderarehearingpetitionfromasummaryhabeasdenial).But @ theCommentssuggestionthattherevisiondoesnotchangeanythingisflatlywrong,sincetheonly X publishedopiniononthetopic,_Bunney_,hadheldthatsuchadenialisnotfinalimmediately. N E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  38    _ԀAstheNinthCircuitrecognizedinBennett,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtsstandardsfor  capitalhabeaspetitionsprovidepresumptivetimelinessguidelines,butthereisnocounterpartfor x measuringthetimelinessofanoncapitalpetition.Consequently,evenassumingthattheCalifornia @ SupremeCourthasbeendemonstratingconsistencyinitspostRobbinsapplicationofthose X standardsincapitalcases(anotherunresolvedquestion),thatwouldnotanswerthequestionwhether   theCaliforniacourtshaveshownsimilarconsistencyininvokingthetimelinessrulesonnoncapital  petitions.(See-XXQ2-XXX-Bennettv.Mueller,supra,322F.3datpp.#QX2XX-XÊ##Q2XXQX2#583584.) ^ E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  37    _ԀOfcourse,evenifthestateruleisconsidered adequateandindependent,thatfindingonly  leadstoanothermorecasespecificinquiryintowhethertherearegroundsforovercomingthe x  proceduraldefault( causeandprejudice, miscarriageofjustice,etc.).Thosetopicsarebeyond @ thescopeofthesematerialsonCaliforniahabeasstandards.- -  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  22    _ԀAsapracticalmatter,therighttoasserttheprivilege astoindividualquestionsshouldbar  theprosecutorfromexaminingthedefendantonthefactsoftheunderlyingcriminalcase.Butthe x prosecutorsrighttoquestionthedefendantonnominallynonincriminatingmattersstillcanpose @ seriousproblems.Amongotherthings,inahearingonanineffectiveassistanceclaim,Scottwould X probablyallowaprosecutortoexamineadefendantoncertainaspectsofhisdiscussionswithtrial   counsel(evenifthedefensewasnototherwiseplanningtoputonthedefendantsowntestimony  duringthehearing).SearchTerm T E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  34    _Ԁ-XXQ2-XXX-Adenialongroundsofunreasonabledelayinfilingtheinitialpetitionwouldrepresenta   proceduraldefault(Clark,Robbins)butwouldnotaffectthestatuteoflimitationscalculation, x becauseCaliforniastimelinessrulesarenota conditiontofiling.Soastatepetitionisstill @ considered properlyfiledandpending,evenifitislaterdeniedasuntimely.(Cf.Smithv. X Duncan(9thCir.2002)297F.3d809.)#QX2XX-Xë##Q2XXQX2#  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  4    _ԀConstitutionalerrorresultingintrial sofundamentallyunfairthatabsenttheerrorno  reasonablejudgeorjurywouldhaveconvictedthepetitioner;actualinnocence;anderrorresulting x insucha grosslymisleadingprofileofthepetitioner...thatabsenttheerrororomissionno @ reasonablejudgeorjurywouldhaveimposedasentenceofdeath.(-XXQ2-XXX-Clark,supra,5#QX2XX-XY#/X2XXQX2Cal.4th#QX2XX/X2#-XXXQX2Ԁatpp. X 797798.#QX2XX-X##Q2XXQX2x#)  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  5    _Evenifthestatecourtdoescomplainaboutthetimingofthepetition,thosestatementswill  representa proceduraldefaultonlyifthecourtexplicitlyinvokesthedelayasagroundfordenial x ofthepetition.(Cf.Harrisv.Reed(1989)489U.S.255(federalcourtwillfindstate procedural @ defaultonlyifstatecourt clearlyandexpresslyreliedonproceduralbarasgroundfordenial).) E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  9    _ԀTworecentU.S.SupremeCourtdecisionshaveprovidedopportunitiesforinvocationofthe  lastofthesegrounds.First,ofcourse,lastyeartheSupremeCourtstruckdown,asaviolationofthe x expostfactoclause,theCaliforniastatutewhichhad revivedtheprosecutionofsexoffenseson @ whichthestatuteoflimitationshadrunpriortotherevivalstatutesenactment/2XXQ2/X2XX/2(Pen.Code#QX2XX/X2h##Q2XXQX2#Ԁ803(g)). X (2XXQ2X2XX2_Stogner_Ԁv.California(2003)539U.S.____,123_S.Ct_.2446.)FormanyCaliforniadefendants   whosecaseshadotherwisebecomefinal,astatehabeaspetitionprovidedthemechanismthrough  whichtheyobtainedreliefunder_Stogner_.Thoughnotyetaswellknownasthe_Stogner_decision, `  theU.S.SupremeCourtsdecisionthismonthinCrawfordv.Washington(March8,2004;No.02 ( x 9410)541U.S.___,2004WL413301,mayprovideasimilarbasistoreopenthecasesofanumber  @ ofCaliforniadefendantswhoseappealsarelongover.TheCrawford#QX2XXX2##Q2XXQX2=#Ԁopinionoverhaulsthe    confrontationclauseanalysisofadmissionofoutofcourt testimonialstatementsbyabsent    witnesses.Anumberofnewhearsayexceptionsenactedoverthepastdecadeorsomaywellbe H   deemedunconstitutionalunderCrawfordsanalysis,includingthespecialstatutesallowing `  admissionof reliableor trustworthyextrajudicialstatementsconcerning childabuse, elder (  abuseordomesticviolence.(Cf._Evid_.Code/2XXQ2/X2XX/2#QX2XX/X22 ##Q2XXQX2Q #/2XXQ2/X2XX/2#QX2XX/X2 ##Q2XXQX2 #Ԁ1360,1370,1380.)Attorneysshouldconsider   whethertheCrawfordanalysiscouldchangetheresultofanypriorappealsinvolvingtheadmission h  ofevidenceunderoneofthosestatutes.Ifso,the changeinthelawexceptiontoDixonand 0  _Waltreus_shouldprovideanavenueforreopeningthosecasesviaahabeaspetition.<  9p`(&Times New Roman p E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  20    _ԀThesuperiorcourthabeasrules(seePartVIIA,infra)describethispleadingasa denial,  ratherthana traverse.(Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.550(b)(4).)  E\I$QX2XXX  Q2XXQX2Ԁ  33    _ԀTheU.S.SupremeCourthasgrantedcertiorariinaNinthCircuitcaseconcerningwhetherthe  federalcourtmustadviseapro.per.petitionoftheoptionofdeletingunexhaustedclaimsfroma x mixedpetitionandthenaskingthefederalcourttostayproceedingswhilehereturnstostatecourt @ toexhausttheremainingclaims.(Fordv._Hubbard_(9thCir.2003)330F.3d1086,cert.granted,Jan. X 9,2004,sub.nom.,_Pliler_Ԁv.Ford,No.03221.) G_!QX2XXX   _  -XXXQX2ROY8XXXdd8;[@ -bX-XSTATEHABEASCORPUSUPDATEANDPRACTICETIPS   #-XX-b#-CX-X@  #-XX-C#- X-XJ.BradleyO'Connell   @  StaffAttorney,FirstDistrictAppellateProject  l #-XX -#-CX-X  March2004#-XX-C#  . ~ @(*****    QX2XX-XINTRODUCTION  ^     Thesematerialsprovideashortsketchofthevariousstagesofstatehabeascorpus  >  proceedings.Amongotherpoints,theytouchonCaliforniaSupremeCourtcaseswhichhavealtered   orclarifiedsomeoftheproceduralrulesgoverninghabeasproceedings,includingstateprocedural ~  defaults(Clark,etc.,PartIB,infra)andtherulesgoverningOSC'sandpostOSCpleadings(Romero F  andDuvall,PartsIVBandVB,infra).However,thisisnotintendedtobeacomprehensiveprimer ^  onstatehabeaspractice.Numeroustopics(e.g.,formatofthepetition,logisticsofanevidentiary &  hearing)arenotcoveredorarenotedonlypassingly.     ThesematerialswereoriginallypreparedforaseminarsponsoredbytheFirstDistrict .~ AppellateProjectin1996.TheyhavebeenupdatedinMarch2004,withparticularemphasison F recentchangesinCaliforniashabeasstatutesandcourtrules(PartVII,infra)andontheinterplay  betweenCaliforniasuniquehabeasproceduresandcrucialfederalhabeasdoctrines,including  exhaustion,calculationoftheAEDPAstatuteoflimitations,andthefederalstatusofCalifornia N proceduraldefaultrules(PartVIII,infra). f  I.  JURISDICTIONANDPROCEDURALBARS     A. ` WheretoFile  6    ` 1. DuringPendencyofDirectAppeal     Thesuperiorcourts,theCourtsofAppeal,andtheSupremeCourtallhaveoriginal V  jurisdictionoverhabeascorpusproceedings.Wherethedefendantalreadyhasadirectappeal n! pending,ahabeaspetitionshouldgenerallybefiledintheCourtofAppeal.IntheFirstDistrictand 6" someotherdistricts,theusualpracticeisfortheappellatecourttoacceptjurisdictionoverthe  # petitionandtoconsideritconcurrentlywiththedirectappeal(thoughthecourtwillnotnecessarily v!$ "consolidate"thepetitionwiththeappeal).Thepracticesvaryinotherdistricts.Sometimesan >"% appellatecourtwilldeclinetoexerciseitsoriginaljurisdiction,despitethependencyofanappeal, #V& andwilldirectcounseltorefilethepetitioninsuperiorcourt.(Seee.g.,InreBaker(1988)206 #' Cal.App.3d493.) $(   UsuallyappellatecounselwillprefertofilethehabeaspetitionintheCourtofAppealinthe &&v!* firstinstance,especiallyifthehabeasclaimsoverlaporcomplementargumentsraisedinthedirect &>"+ appeal.Occasionally,however,appellatecounselmaybelievethatthetrialcourtwillbemore '#, receptivetoaparticularhabeasclaimorcounselmayhaveothertacticalreasonsforpreferringa ~(#- superiorcourtforum.TworecentSupremeCourtdecisionshaveaddressedwhetherthependency F)$. ofanappealbarsthesuperiorcourtfromexercisingjurisdictionoverapetition. *^%/   Peoplev.Mayfield(1993)5Cal.4th220:Wherethehabeasclaimisalsoraisedorcould +&1 beraisedondirectappeal,onthebasisoftheappellaterecord,thesuperiorcourtlacksauthorityto f,'2 entertainthewritpetition.Inthatsituation,superiorcourtwritreliefwouldinterferewiththe  appellatecourt'sjurisdictionoverthependingappeal.AsMayfieldreflects,theassertedinclusion x of"newevidence"willnotnecessarilyremoveawritpetitionfromthisrule,wherethesamebasic @ issueisbeingraisedonappeal.Dictuminapreviouscasesuggeststhatthetestiswhetherthehabeas X claimis"inextricablyconnected"withanissueondirectappeal.(InreKetchel(1968)68Cal.2d   397,399n.2.)(TheMayfieldcourtfounditunnecessaryto"revisit"theKetcheldictumsinceit  foundthattheputative"newevidence"wasirrelevanttothelegalmeritsoftheissue.(Mayfield, `  supra,atp.226.)) ( x   InreCarpenter(1995)9Cal.4th634,645646:However,wherethehabeasclaimrestson    mattersoutsidetheappellaterecordandcouldnotberaisedondirectappeal,superiorcourt    considerationofahabeaspetitiondoesnotinterferewiththeappellatecourt'sjurisdiction.(E.g.,in H   Carpenter,ajurormisconductclaim"thatdidnotappearofrecord"(italicsomitted).) `    Carpentersimplyholdsthatahabeaspetitionmaybefiledinsuperiorcourtwheretheclaim   restsonmattersoutsidetherecordandisnotrelatedtothedirectappealissues;itdoesnotrequire h  asuperiorcourtfiling.Again,inseveraldistricts,theusualpracticeistofilethehabeaspetitionin 0  theappellatecourt,evenintheCarpentersituationwherethehabeasclaimdoesnotparalleloneof H  theappellatearguments.     ` 2. WhenNoDirectAppealisPending  P   Anappellatecourtmaydeclinetoexerciseitsoriginalhabeasjurisdictioninthefirstinstance, 0 especiallyifthereisnodirectappealcurrentlypendingbeforeit.(E.g.,InreRamirez(2001)89  Cal.App.4th1312.)Unlessacurrentlypendingappealprovidesa"hook"forappellatecourt p jurisdiction,thesuperiorcourtisconsideredtheplacetoinitiateahabeasproceeding.(Ofcourse, 8 wheretherewasnodirectappealorwheretheconvictionhasalreadybeenaffirmedonappeal,the P habeaspetitionmayalsohavetoovercomesomeoftheproceduralobstaclesdiscussedinPartIB,  infra.)Ontheotherhand,ifthehabeasclaimsrelatecloselytoapreviouslydecidedappeal(e.g.,  aclaimofineffectiveassistanceofappellatecounselorabidforreconsiderationofapreviously X rejecteddirectappealclaiminlightofinterveningSupremeCourtauthority),theappellatecourt  p wouldbethelogicalplacetofilethehabeaspetition.(Forexample,appellatecourtshaveentertained 8 postaffirmancehabeaspetitionsbasedonPeoplev.Lasko(2000)23Cal.4th101,whichheldthat   specificintenttokillisnotanelementofvoluntarymanslaughter(contrarytopriorcasesand x! standardCALJICinstructions).) @"   However,thereisalsotheoptionoffilingahabeaspetitioninthefirstinstanceintheoriginal  $ jurisdictionoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.AlthoughtheSupremeCourtisnothesitantabout !% invokingotherproceduralbars(e.g.,unreasonabledelay)initshabeasorders,anecdotalreports `"& suggestthattheSupremeCourtislesslikelythantheappellatecourtstodismissanoriginalpetition (#x' forfailuretofileitinthelowercourts.Thus,asapracticalmatter,wherenoappealiscurrently #@( pending,thereisachoicebetweenfilingfirstinsuperiorcourtandthengoing uptheladderwith $ ) petitionsintheappellatecourtandtheSupremeCourtorskippingthelowercourtsaltogetherand % * filingfirstintheSupremeCourt.Thelattercoursemaybeappropriatewhenthestatehabeaspetition H&!+ isviewedsimplyasan exhaustionvehicleandthemainobjectiveistoclearthewayforafederal '`", hearingontheclaims.Obviously,however,iftherearereasonstobelievethatasuperiorcourt '(#- judgemightbeespeciallyreceptivetoaparticularclaim(e.g.,thetrialjudgehasaverydimviewof (#. theattorneywhosthesubjectoftheIACclaimorhaspreviouslyfoundmisconductonthepartof h)$/ thesameprosecutororpoliceofficers),itmakessensetofollowthetraditionalrouteoffilinginthat 0*%0 courtfirst. *H&1  ,'3   B. ` DelayandOtherProceduralBars     Theworstfateforastatehabeaspetitionisaproceduraldefault"i.e.,adenialonsome @ groundotherthanthemerits"atleastifthefederalcourtsdeemthestaterule adequateand X independent.(SeePartVIIICfordiscussionofcurrentfederalstatusofCaliforniasprocedural   defaultrules.)Notonlydoesthepetitionerlosetheopportunityforstatecourtconsiderationofthe  meritsofhishabeasclaims,thestateproceduraldefaultwillcontinuetohaunthiminanysubsequent `  federalhabeasproceedingbasedonthesameclaims. ( x   Inapairofdecisionsissuedonthesamedayin1993,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt    summarizedtheprincipalstateproceduralbarstohabeasclaims,aswellastheexceptionstothose    rules.(InreClark(1993)5Cal.4th750;InreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813.) H      ` 1. Clark&RobbinsDelayedorSuccessivePetitions  (    InClark,supra,5Cal.4th750,theSupremeCourtdeclareditshostilityto"piecemeal h  presentation"ofhabeasclaimsandadoptedan"abuseofthewrit"doctrine,borrowedinpartfrom 0  U.S.SupremeCourtcaseslimitingsuccessivefederalwritpetitions.1 .  1      ׀Clarkbasicallyestablishesa H  "onebiteattheapple"policy.Apetitionerisexpectedtoincludeallhabeasclaimsinhisfirsthabeas  petition.Apetitionermustdemonstrate"duediligenceinpursuingpotentialclaims."(Id.atp.775.)  Asecondor"successive"petitionwillbeconsideredan"abuseofthewrit"ifthepetitionerorhis P counselkneworshouldhaveknownofthefactualbasesforthenewclaimsatthetimeoftheoriginal h petition.2X .  2      ׀"However,wherethefactualbasisfortheclaimwasunknowntothepetitionerandhehad 0 noreasontobelievethattheclaimmightbemade,orwherethepetitionerwasunabletopresenthis  claim,thecourtwillcontinuetoconsiderthemeritsoftheclaimifassertedaspromptlyas p reasonablypossible."(Ibid.) 8   ThoughClark's"successivepetition"rulehashadaprofoundeffectindeathpenaltycases,  ithashadrelativelylittleimpactonappellatepracticeintheCourtsofAppeal.Innoncapitalcases,  appointedcounsel'srolegenerallyendswiththe"firstround"ofhabeasproceedings,anditisrare X forcounseltoattempttofileasecondhabeaspetition,raisingnewclaimsorofferingnewevidence  p insupportofthepreviouslyrejectedclaims.Inanyevent,Clark'slessonforappellatecounselis 8 clear.Counselshouldmarshallallthehabeasclaimsinasinglepetition.     TheotherproceduralbardiscussedinClarkhasgreaterpotentialrelevancefornoncapital @" habeaspetitions."`[A]habeascorpuspetitionshouldbefiledaspromptlyasthecircumstancesof  X# thecaseallow....[O]newhoseeksextraordinaryrelief...mustpointtoparticularcircumstances  $ sufficienttojustifysubstantialdelay....'"(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.786[emphasisadded], !% quotingInreStankewitz(1985)40Cal.3d391,397n.1.) `"&   UndertheSupremeCourtsstandardsforcapitalcases,ahabeaspetitionispresumptively #@(  timelyiffiledwithin180daysofthefinalduedateforthereplybriefinthedirectappealorwithin $ ) 24monthsoftheappointmentofseparatehabeascounsel.3 .  3      ׀However,counselshouldnotassumethat   apetitionfiledwithinthatperiodwillautomaticallybeconsideredtimelyinanoncapitalcase. x Outsidethecapitalcontext,therearenobrightlinerulesfordeterminingthetimelinessofahabeas @ petition. X   Wheneverpossible,counselshouldattempttofilethehabeaspetitionconcurrentlywithor  withinashorttimeaftertheopeningbriefonappeal.Atanyrate,thepetitionshouldbefiledbefore `  thedirectappealisheardanddecided.Counsel"shouldnotawaittheoutcomeoftheappeal"to ( x determinewhethertofileahabeaspetition.(Clark,supra,atp.784n.20.)  @   ExceptionstoClark"FundamentalMiscarriageofJustice."Areviewingcourtwillstill    consideran"untimely"or"successive"petitiononthemerits,despitetheabsenceofjustificationfor H   thedelayedpresentationoftheclaim,wherethepetition'sallegations,ifproven,wouldestablisha `  "fundamentalmiscarriageofjustice"concerningeithertheconvictionorsentencingproceedings. (  (Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.797.)Forpurposesofthisrule,however,"fundamentalmiscarriage   ofjustice"isnarrowlydefinedasconsistingoffourcategories: h  8   ` (1)[T]haterrorofconstitutionalmagnitudeledtoatrialthatwasso H  fundamentallyunfairthatabsenttheerrornoreasonablejudgeorjurywouldhave  convictedthepetitioner;[fn.](2)thatthepetitionerisactuallyinnocentofthecrime  orcrimesofwhichthepetitionerwasconvicted;[fn.](3)thatthedeathpenaltywas P imposedbyasentencingauthoritywhichhadsuchagrosslymisleadingprofileofthe h petitionerbeforeitthatabsentthetrialerrororomissionnoreasonablejudgeorjury 0 wouldhaveimposedasentenceofdeath;[fn.](4)thatthepetitionerwasconvicted  orsentencedunderaninvalidstatute.(Id.atpp.797798.)p     Clark'scompanioncase,Harris,suggeststhatthejurisdictionalclaimsdiscussedthereare P alsoexceptionstothebarsondelayedorsuccessivepetitions.Inparticular,claimsof"lackof  fundamentaljurisdiction"(i.e.,subjectmatterjurisdiction)orjudicialacts"inexcessofjurisdiction"  mayberaisedatanytime,andthepetitionerisnotrequiredtojustifyanydelayinassertingthe X claim.(Harris,supra,5Cal.4thatpp.836842.)  p   Alsonotethata"substantialdelay"objectionisitselfsubjecttowaiverandestoppel   limitations.ThePeoplemayeffectivelywaivethisproceduralbarbyfailingtoassertthetimeliness x! objectioninatimelyfashion.(E.g.,InreMoser(1993)6Cal.4th342,350n.7;seealsoInre @" Sassounian(1995)9Cal.4th535,551n.15.)  X#   RobbinsRefinementoftheClarkrules.TheSupremeCourtrevisitedClarkinapairof1998 !% opinionsandattemptedtoexplainhowitmeasured substantialdelayandotheraspectsofthe `"& timelinessinquiry.(InreRobbins(1998)18Cal.4th770;InreGallego(1998)18Cal.4th825.) (#x' Bothopinionsareunusuallydenseandfactspecific,and(perhapscontrarytotheCourtsintention) #@( itisdifficulttoextractany brightlineprinciplesfromthem.However,severalaspectsofthe $ ) Robbinsopinionareparticularlynoteworthy:Theprimaryconsiderationinmeasuringwhethera % * petitionwasfiledwithout substantialdelayiswhenthedefendantorhiscounselkneworshould H&!+ haveknownof triggeringfactsputtingthedefenseonnoticeofapotentialhabeasclaimwarranting '`", furtherinvestigation.InRobbins,theCourtaddressedthe substantialdelayquestiononaclaim '(#- byclaimbasis.Infact,itsubdividedtheclaimsmuchmoreminutelythanthepetitionitselfhad. (#. Itbrokesomeclaimsintomultiple subclaims,basedonstatementsfromdifferentwitnessesand h)$/ separatelyanalyzedcounselsdiligenceininvestigatingandpresentingeach subclaim.(See  Robbins,supra,atpp.784815[breaking ClaimIofthepetitioninto4 subclaims].) x Throughouttheopinion,theCourtemphasizedthat thepetitionerhastheburdenofestablishing(i) @ theabsenceofsubstantialdelay,(ii)goodcauseforthedelay,or(iii)thattheclaimfallswithinan X exceptiontothebarofuntimeliness.(Id.atp.780,emphasisinoriginal.)     TheRobbinsCourtalsoaddressedtheroleofinvestigationofotherclaims(includingclaims `  whichdonotultimatelymaterialize)inassessingthetimelinessoftheclaimswhichareultimately ( x presentedinahabeaspetition.Ordinarily,aclaimwillbedeemeduntimelyifthepetitionerorhis  @ counselhadalreadyobtainedsufficientfactstostateaprimafaciecaseonthatclaimorcouldhave    obtainedsuchinformationthroughadiligentinvestigationatanearliertime.However,theCourt    alsoappearedtorecognizesometensionbetweentheobjectivesofpresentationofafullydeveloped H   claimattheearlieropportunityandavoidanceof piecemeallitigation. Aclaimorapartthereof `  thatissubstantiallydelayedneverthelesswillbeconsideredonthemeritsifthepetitionercan (  demonstrategoodcauseforthedelay.Goodcauseforsubstantialdelaymaybeestablishedif,for   example,thepetitionercandemonstratethatbecauseheorshewasconductingan%  %Qongoing h  investigationintoatleastonepotentiallymeritoriousclaim,thepetitionerdelayedpresentationof 0  oneormoreotherknownclaimsinordertoavoidthepiecemealpresentationofclaims..... H  (Robbins,supra,atp.780,emphasisinoriginal.)    Finally,inRobbins,theSupremeCourtannouncedachangeinthewayinwhichitapplied P the miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstothetimelinessbar.Itstatedthathenceforthitwouldlook h onlytoCalifornialaw,ratherthanfederallaw,inassessingwhetheraclaimcamewithinanyofthe 0 firstthreeexceptionsidentifiedinClark. .  4      ׀(Robbins,supra,atpp.811812&fn.32.)Asthe  Robbinsopinionacknowledged,thepurposeofthecuriousresortto statelawonlydeciding p whetherapetitionersfederalclaimsrisetoamiscarriageofjusticewastodisentanglethetimeliness 8 proceduralbarfromfederallaw,sothatthestaterulewouldbeconsidered adequateand P independentoffederallawforfederalhabeaspurposes.(SeePartVIIIC,infra,fordiscussionof  theimpactofRobbinsonfederalcourtsreviewofpreandpostRobbinshabeasdenials.)    AppellateapplicationsofClarkandRobbins.󀀀AlthoughsomeaspectsofClarksand  p Robbinstimelinessrulesapplytoallhabeaspetitions,capitalandnoncapital,bothwerecapital 8 casesandconcernedthemorewellestablisheddutiesofcapitalcounseltoconductahabeas   investigation.Additionally,asnotedearlier,bothcasesdealtwiththeSupremeCourts x!  presumptiveguidelinesformeasuringthetimelinessofacapitalhabeaspetition.Thereareno @" comparablebenchmarksfornoncapitalpetitions.Consequently,itisverydifficulttotranslatethose  X# theClarkandRobbinsholdingsintothenoncapitalcontext.Andthepublishedcaselawdoesnot  $ spelloutthespecificapplicationofthosestandardstothetimingofahabeaspetitionrelatedtoa !% conventionalnoncapitalappeal. `"&   AtleastintheFirstDistrict,itisrareforawritdenialtociteClarkandRobbinsorotherwise #@( refertoatimelinessbar.Ahabeaspetitionfiledduringthecourseofthebriefingorwithinashort $ ) timeafterthecompletionofbriefingwillgenerallybeconsideredtimely.Apetitionfiledmonths % *  afterbriefingoraroundthetimeoforalargumentmayencounterproblems,butitisdifficultto H&!+ predictwhetherthecourtwillsayanythingaboutthepetitionstiming. .  5      ׀Insomecases,ofcourse,   thecircumstancessurroundingthehabeasclaimwillalsoprovidethejustificationforitsdelayed x presentatione.g.,awitness'suddenrecantationorthefortuitousdiscoveryofnewexculpatory @ evidence. X   Evenwherethehabeaspetitionisfiledduringthebriefingofthecurrentappeal,itislikely  tofacelacheslikeobjectionsofunjustifieddelaywheretheclaimederroractuallyrelatestosome `  priorproceedinginthesamecaseratherthantheonewhichisthesubjectofthecurrentappeal. ( x (E.g.,inaprobationrevocationcase,ahabeaschallengetothevalidityoftheoriginalguiltyplea  @ underlyingtheconviction;inanextensionofanNGIcommitment(Pen.Code,1026.5),aclaim    ofdefectiveadvisementssurroundingtheoriginalNGIplea.Ineachsituation,itwillbenecessary    tojustifywhythepleachallengewasnotraisedatthetimeofthepreviousdisposition(theorder H   grantingprobationortheoriginalNGIcommitment).) `     ` 2.0 Dixon,Waltreus&HarrisClaimsWhichWereorCouldHaveBeen   RaisedonAppeal h  (# (#   TheSupremeCourthasoftensaidthat"`[habeascorpuswillnotserveasasecondappeal.' H  [Citations]"(InreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813,825.)First,areviewingcourtordinarilywillnot  consider,onhabeascorpus,aclaimwhichwasraisedandrejectedondirectappeal(the"Waltreus  rule"4 .  6      ).(Harris,supra,atpp.824829.)Neitherwillitconsiderahabeasclaimwhichcouldhave P beenbutwasnotraisedondirectappeal(the"Dixonrule"5@ .  7      ).(Id.atpp.825n.3,829.) h   RobbinsaddsanimportantqualificationtotheDixonandWaltreusrules.Becausehabeas  corpusisthepreferredvehicleforconsiderationofIACclaims, Wedonotapplythosebars[Dixon p &Waltreus[toclaimsofineffectiveassitanceoftrialcounsel,evenifthehabeascorpusclaimis 8 basedsolelyupontheappellaterecord.[Citation.](InreRobbins(1998)18Cal.4th770,814fn. P 34.)    LikeClark,theHarrisopinionalsoidentifiestheexceptionstotheseproceduralbars:(a)a X constitutionalerrorwhich"isbothclearandfundamentalandstrikesattheheartofthetrialprocess"  p (id.atp.834[emphasisadded]);6 .  8      ׀(b)"atruelackoffundamentaljurisdiction"(i.e.,subjectmatter 8  jurisdiction)(Harris,supra,5Cal.4thatpp.836838);(c)acts"inexcessof_jurisdiction;"and(d)   claimsaffectedbyachangeinthelaw(e.g.,aninterveningU.S.orCaliforniaSupremeCourt  decisionestablishinganewrule). .  9       x    The"inexcessofjurisdiction"exceptiondeservesspecialnote.Impositionofan X unauthorizedsentenceisanactinexcessofjurisdiction.(Id.atp.839.)JustastheAttorneyGeneral   (ortheappellatecourtitself)mayraisean"unauthorizedsentence"issueinthecontextofadefense  appeal,despitetheprosecution'sfailuretonoticeanappeal,adefendant's"unauthorizedsentence" `  claimiscognizableonhabeascorpusevenwhereitcouldhavebeenraisedonappeal.7 .  10      ׀However, ( x the"excessofjurisdiction"exceptiontotheWaltreusandDixonrulesappliesonlytopurelylegal  @ claimswhichdonotrequireany"redeterminationofthefactsunderlyingtheclaim."(Id.atpp.840    841.)     II.  ISSUESCOGNIZABLEONSTATEHABEASCORPUSCOMMONCLAIMS  `    Appellatecounselmostcommonlyutilizehabeaspetitionswhereaclaimrestsinpartonfacts   "outsidetherecord"ofthedirectappealorwheredirectappellatereviewisunavailableforsome h  otherreason(suchasadefaultedappeal).Justaswithfederalhabeaspractice,FourthAmendment 0  claimsarenotcognizableonstatehabeascorpus.(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.767,citingInre H  Sterling(1965)63Cal.2d486.)8 .  11      ׀Withthatexception,virtuallyanyotherclaimmayberaisedvia  ahabeaspetition(subject,ofcourse,totheprocedurallimitationsdiscussedinPartIB,supra.)  Unlikefederalhabeascorpusreview,statehabeasreviewisnotlimitedtofederalconstitutional P violations,butalsoincludesstatelawclaims.(Notably,someofthestatelawbasesforhabeasrelief h donotinvolveanyerrorormisconductonthepartofanyoftheparticipantsinthetrial.suchas 0 newlydiscoveredevidenceorthenewstatutoryprovisionon BatteredWomensSyndrome(Pen.  Code1473.5;seePartVIIB).)Counselshouldconsiderthepossibilityofawritpetition,notonly x whereaclaimrestsentirelyonmattersoutsidetherecord,butalsoinsituationswhereanadditional @ factualshowingcanprovidefurthersupportforanargumentbeingraisedondirectappeal(e.g.,to X establishprejudicefromBoykinTahlerrororotherdefectsinpleaadvisements).Thefollowinglist   notessomeofthemostcommonusesofhabeascorpuspetitionsinconjunctionwithcriminal  appeals;thelistisbynomeansexhaustive: `    Ineffectiveassistanceoftrialcounsel(e.g.,InreSixto(1989)48Cal.3d1247.)  @   Counsel'sconflictofinterest(e.g.,InreHochberg(1970)2Cal.3d870).      Ineffectiveassistanceofappellatecounsel(e.g.,InreSmith(1970)3Cal.3d192[failure `  toraisecrucialpotentiallymeritoriousissuesonappeal]). (    Reinstatementofalateorotherwisedefaultedappeal(e.g.,InreSerrano(1995)10Cal.4th h  447;InreJordan(1992)4Cal.4th116;InreVallery(1992)3Cal.App.4th1125). 0    Prosecutorialsuppressionofexculpatoryevidence("Bradyerror")orpresentationof  testimonywhichtheprosecutorknowsorshouldknowisfalseormisleading("Agurserror")(e.g.,  InreSassounian(1995)9Cal.4th535;InreJackson(1992)3Cal.4th578). P   Prosecutorialpresentationoffalseevidence(Pen.Code,1473;e.g.,InreHall(1981)30 0 Cal.3d408,424;seealsoSassounian,supra,9Cal.4thatp.546).9 .  12          Prosecutorialintimidationofdefensewitness(e.g.,InreMartin(1987)44Cal.3d1). 8   Vindictiveordiscriminatoryprosecution(e.g.,InreBower(1985)38Cal.3d865).    Newlydiscoveredevidence(e.g.,Hall,supra,30Cal.3datp.417).: .  13       X   Jurormisconduct(e.g.,InreHitchings(1993)6Cal.4th97). 8   Statuteoflimitations(e.g.,InreDemillo(1975)14Cal.3d598). x!   BoykinTahlerrororotherdefectsintheadvisementsandwaiversattendingapleaor  X# admission(e.g.,InreMoser(1993)6Cal.4th342).  $   Claimsthatthepriorconvictionsfailtosatisfytheenhancementstatute(e.g.,InreHarris `"& (1989)49Cal.3d131[erroneousimpositionoftwoenhancements(underPen.Code,667(a))where (#x' thepriorcaseswerenotbroughtandtriedseparately]). #@( Ї  Custodycreditsissues(e.g.,InreJoyner(1989)48Cal.3d487).    Appellatereviewofadenialofbail(eitherpretrialbailorbailpendingappeal)(e.g.,Inre @ Pipinos(1982)33Cal.3d189). X   !Sentencingjudgesmistakenbeliefthatheorshelackeddiscretionregardingimpositionof  a strikeorotherenhancement(in silentrecordcaseswherethatmistakeisnotevidentfromthe `  sentencingtranscript)(Peoplev.Fuhrman(1997)16Cal.4th930,945946); ( x   SeePartVIIBfordiscussionofnewstatuteauthorizinghabeasrelieffor Battered    WomensSyndromeinpre1992murdercases.(Pen.Code1473.5)      III.  INVESTIGATIVETOOLS  b    A. ` ObtainingInformationfromTrialCounsel      Trialcounselisethicallyobligedtocooperatewithsuccessorcounselincludingappellate 2  counselinvestigatingapossiblehabeasissueofineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.(StateBarof J  California,StandingCommitteeonProfessionalResponsibility&Conduct,FormalOpinionNo.  1992127)Uponrequest,"theattorneymustturnoverallpapersandpropertyintheclient'sfileto  theclientorsuccessorcounsel.[Fn.]"(Id.,p.2)Trialcounselhasno"workproductprivilege"vis R avishisformerclient;consequently,successorcounselisentitledto"theentirecontentsofthefile, j notjustthepleadings,depositionsandexhibits."(Ibid.)  2   TheSupremeCourtsrecentSteeleopinion(discussedfurtherbelow)alsolendssomesupport r tothatview. Atrialattorneyisobligatedtoturnoverthelitigationfiletotheclientornewcounsel : oncethatattorneysrepresentationhasterminated.[Citation.]  (InreSteele(Mar.8,2004;S114551) R 32Cal.4th__,slipopn,pp.89.)     Finally,trialcounselshouldalsocooperatewithappellatecounselinprovidinganyrequested Z informationwhichhasnotbeenreducedtowriting.(StateBar,StandingCom.,etc.,supra,Formal "r Opn.1992127atpp.23.)AlthoughtheStateBarOpiniondidnotspecificallymentionthispoint, : thisprincipleappearsespeciallyapplicabletoacommonproblemencounteredbyappellatecounsel:   Underthereasoningoftheopinion,trialcounselshouldbeobligedtorespondtoappellatecounsels z! inquiriesconcerningcounsel'sreasons(ifany)forparticularactsoromissionsbeforeorduringtrial B" (e.g.,failuretoobjecttoparticularevidence).Also,ofcourse,appellatecounselisentitledto  Z# informationontheextentoftrialcounsel'soutofcourtpreparationandinvestigation.  "$   B. ` ObtainingInformationfromtheProsecution  b"&   Generalrule:nopostjudgment,preOSCdiscoverymechanism:Sometypesofhabeas #B( claimsfrequentlydependonextractingadditionalmaterialsfromprosecutorsandpolicee.g.,a $ ) Bradyclaimconcerningsuppressionofexculpatoryevidencesuchasinducementsofferedtoan % * informant.InPeoplev.Gonzalez1990)51Cal.3d1179,12551261,theSupremeCourtsquarely J&!+ heldthatthetrialcourthasnojurisdictiontoentertainapostjudgment"discovery"motionduring 'b", thependencyofanappeal.Moreover,Gonzalezalsoappearstoforecloseaprepetitiondiscovery '*#- motionintheCourtofAppealasameansofobtainingevidencetobeincludedinthepetition.Under (#. Gonzalez,areviewingcourthasnoauthoritytoorderdiscoveryunlessthepetitionisalreadyonfile j)$/ andthecourthasalreadyfoundaprimafaciecasethestandardforissuanceofanordertoshow 2*%0 cause(OSC). *J&1  +'2   NewstatutoryprocedureforpostjudgmentdiscoveryincapitalandLWOPcases.󀀀In2002,  theLegislaturepartiallyabrogatedGonzalezbyenactinganewstatuteforpostjudgmentdiscovery x byappellatecounselofanymaterialsthatwereorcouldhavebeenprovidedindiscoveryduringtrial. @ (Pen.Code1054.9.)However,thediscoverystatuteislimitedtocasesinwhichadefendant X receivedeitherthedeathpenaltyoranLWOPsentence(i.e.,specialcircumstancecases).󀀀Upona   showingthat goodfaitheffortstoobtaindiscoverymaterialsfromtrialcounselhavebeenmadeand  wereunsuccessful,adefendantmayfileamotionseekingdiscoveryofany materialsinthe `  prosecutionandlawenforcementauthoritiestowhichthesamedefendantwouldhavebeenentitled ( x attimeoftrial.  @   Inadecisionfiledjustasthesematerialsare goingtopress,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt    hasgivenafairlyexpansiveconstructiontosection1054.9.(InreSteele(Mar.8,2004;S114551) H   32Cal.4th__.)Althoughthestatutebegins, Uponprosecutionofapostconvictionpetitionforwrit `  ofhabeascorpusoramotiontovacateajudgment,Steeleholdsthattheactualpendencyofahabeas (  petitionisnotaprerequisiteforfilingadiscoverymotion.Instead, prosecutionofahabeas   petitionincludesprefilinginvestigationandpreparation. Defendantsarenowentitledtodiscovery h  toassistinstatingaprimafaciecaseforrelief.ButtheonlywaythismodificationoftheGonzalez 0  rulemakessenseistopermitdefendantstoseekdiscoverybeforetheyfilethepetition....(Steele, H  supra,slipopn.,p.6.)Althougheitherthetrialcourtorthereviewingcourthasjurisdictionto  considerasection1054.9,ordinarilythesuperiorcourtistheproperforumforthemotion.P .  14          Turningtothesubstantivescopeof discoverymaterials,theSupremeCourtrejectedthe h notionthatsection1054.9issimplya filereconstructionmechanism,limitedtoreplacingmaterials 0 whichwerepreviouslydisclosedtotrialcounsel.Instead,theCourtemphasizedthatthestatute  coveredbothmaterialsactuallydisclosedandanything towhichthedefendantwouldhavebeen p entitledattimeoftrial.(1054.9,emphasisadded.) 8 8  [W]einterpretsection1054.9torequirethetrialcourt,onapropershowingofagood  faithefforttoobtainthematerialsfromtrialcounsel,toorderdiscoveryofspecific  materialscurrentlyinthepossessionoftheprosecutionorlawenforcement X authoritiesinvolvedintheinvestigationorprosecutionofthecasethatthedefendant  p canshoweither(1)theprosecutiondidprovideattimeoftrialbuthavesincebecome 8 losttothedefendant;(2)theprosecutionshouldhaveprovidedattimeoftrial   becausetheycamewithinthescopeofadiscoveryorderthetrialcourtactuallyissued x! atthattime,astatutorydutytoprovidediscovery,ortheconstitutionaldutyto @" discloseexculpatoryevidence;(3)theprosecutionshouldhaveprovidedattimeof  X# trialbecausethedefensespecificallyrequestedthematthattime;or(4)the  $ prosecutionhadnoobligationtoprovideattimeoftrialabsentaspecificdefense !% request,buttowhichthedefendantwouldhavebeenentitledattimeoftrialhadthe `"& defendantspecificallyrequestedthem.(Steele,supra,slipopn.,atp.14.)(#x'     InSteeleitself,theCourtheldthatthestatuteauthorizeddiscoveryofinformationinthe $ ) possessionoftheDepartmentofCorrectionsconcerningSteelespreviousbehaviorinprisonbecause % * thatinformationwouldhavebeendiscoverableattrialifthedefensehadspecificallyrequestedit H&!+ (duetoitsrelevancetothedefensesmitigationtheory). '`",   ProsecutorscontinuingpostjudgmentBradydutytodiscloseexculpatoryevidence.Since (#. section1054.9appliesonlytospecialcircumstancecases,Gonzalezcontinuestopresentapotential h)$/ Catch22toobtainingdiscoveryandmakinganadequateshowingforhabeasreliefinallothercases.  Withouttherequestedevidence,appellatecounselmaybeunabletopresentthe"primafacie x showing"necessarytoobtainanOSC.Nonetheless,althoughthereisnoauthorityforanypre @ petitionproceduredenominateda"discoverymotion,"counselshouldbecreativeindevising X alternativemeansforobtainingdocumentsfromtheprosecutionatleastwherecounselhasspecific   reasontobelievethatsuchmaterialsexist.Peoplev.Garcia(1993)17Cal.App.4th1169,may  providethenecessarylever.Garciaholdsthattheprosecutorialdutytodiscloseanyexculpatory `  evidence(includingimpeachmentevidence)doesnotendwiththepronouncementofsentence. ( x GarciafoundaBradyviolationbasedontheprosecutionsfailuretodisclosepostjudgment  @ informationsignificantlyimpeachingthecredibilityofakeyexpertwitness.      TheCaliforniaSupremeCourthaspassinglyendorsedthesameprincipleinbothitsGonzalez H   andSteeleopinions. [P]rosecutorshaveacontinuingdutytodiscloseinformationfavorabletothe `  defense,andweexpectandassumethattheywillperformthisdutypromptlyandfully....(Steele, (  supra,S114551,slipopn.,p.9;seealsoGonzalez,supra,51Cal.3datpp.12601261.)      Whereappellatecounselhasreasontobelievethattheprosecutororthepolicemaypossess 0  informationcomingwithinthedisclosurerulesoutlinedinGarcia,Gonzalez,andSteele,counselcan H  directa"PostTrialDisclosureRequest"totherelevantprosecutorscitingthosecases(especially  Garcia).Dependingonthecircumstances,thedisclosurerequestcantaketheformofaletterorof  amoreformalpleading.< .  15      ׀ItwouldbeadvisabletoservetherequestonboththeAttorneyGeneral P andtheDistrictAttorneywhoprosecutedthetrial.Additionally,thoughtherequestisforvoluntary h prosecutorialdisclosureanddoesnotrequireanyimmediatejudicialaction,itmaybewisetolodge 0 acopywiththeappellatecourtincasedisputesariseduringlaterproceedingsovertheadequacyof  theprosecution'sresponse. p   C. ` InvestigationandOtherAncillaryServices  P   Theappellatedistrictsvaryintheirproceduresforauthorizingancillaryexpenses  (investigators,experts,etc.)forahabeasinvestigationduringthependencyofadirectappeal.But, X inalldistricts,appointedappellatecounselgenerallymustobtainsomekindofpreclearancefrom  p eithertherelevantappellateproject(FDAP,CAPLA,CCAP,SDAP,orADI)orfromtheappellate 8 courtitself.Forexample,intheFirstDistrict,FDAPisauthorizedtopreclearupto$900intotal   ancillaryexpenses;anyexpensesinexcessofthatamountrequirepreclearancebytheCourtof x! Appeal. @"  IV.  THEPETITIONSTATINGAPRIMAFACIECASE   $   A. ` TheFactualShowing  `"&   Technically,ahabeaspetitionisa"pleading."Itmustbeverified(Pen.Code,1474(3))(by #@( petitionerorcounsel),andtheverificationcannotbeoninformationorbelief(Peoplev.McCarthy $ ) (1986)176Cal.App.3d593).Butotherwisethereisnoexplicitstatutoryrequirementthatitbe % * supportedbydeclarationsorotherevidence.EventheSupremeCourt'scasesstopshortofrequiring H&!+ thatthepetitionitselfincludecompetentproofofeveryallegation.Instead,theCourthasstated '`", simplythatapetitionshould"includecopiesofreasonablyavailabledocumentaryevidence '(#- supportingtheclaim,includingpertinentportionsoftrialtranscriptsandaffidavitsordeclarations." (#. (Peoplev.Duvall(1995)9Cal.4th464,474(emphasisadded)accordInreClark(1993)5Cal.4th  750,781n.16.)ElsewheretheCourthasdescribedthefunctionofsupportingaffidavitsassimply x "topersuadethecourtofthebonafidesoftheallegations."(InreFields(1990)51Cal.3d1063, @ 1070n.2.) X   Inpractice,however,theappellatecourtsdogenerallyrequirethatthepetition'sfactual  allegationsbesupportedbycompetentproof(usuallydeclarationsorcourtrecordsorotherjudicially `  noticeabledocuments).Whereverpossible,theshowingshouldtakeaformwhichavoidshearsay ( x objectionsi.e.,thedeclarationsshouldcontainmatterstowhichthedeclarantscouldtestifyonthe  @ stand.= .  16      ׀Themostcommonimpedimentisanuncooperativetrialattorney.Inthatsituation,appellate    counselshouldsubmithisowndeclarationdetailinghiseffortstocommunicatewithorobtaina    declarationfromtrialcounsel.(SeePeoplev.Duvall(1995)9Cal.4th464,485,wheretheSupreme H   Courtdescribedtheallegationswhicharespondent'sreturnshouldsetforthwhererespondent's `  counselhasbeenunabletocommunicatewithtrialcounselortoobtainothercrucialinformation.)>  .  17      ׀ (  ЀWheretrialcounselhasdiscussedhisclaimedtacticalreasons(orlackofreasons)withappellate   counselbuthasrefusedtosignadeclaration,appellatecounsel'sdeclarationshouldsummarizethose h  discussions. 0    B. ` InformalBriefingandthePivotalRoleofanOSC     TworecentSupremeCourtopinionshaveaddressedtheproceduralrulesgoverningpost P petitionproceedingsinappellatecourts.(Peoplev.Duvall,supra,9Cal.4th464;Peoplev.Romero h (1994)8Cal.4th728.)BothRomeroandDuvallweredefenselossesinthesensethat,ineachcase, 0 theSupremeCourtconcludedthattheappellatecourthadprematurelygrantedthepetitionwithout  affordingtheAttorneyGeneralanadequateopportunitytodisputethepetition'sallegations. p However,bothopinionsmayproveusefultopetitionerssincetheyunderscorethecrucialfunction 8 ofanordertoshowcause(OSC). P   Onmosthabeaspetitions,theappellatecourtssolicit"informalbriefing"only(Cal.Rulesof  Court,rule60).Usually,asofthetimeoforalargumentonthedirectappeal,theappellatecourtstill X hasnotissuedanOSC.Thisisaproceduralpostureinwhichthehabeaspetitionercanlosebuthe  p can'twin.Anappellatecourtcandenyapetitiononthebasisoftheinformalbriefing(oreven 8 withoutsolicitingopposition),butitcannotgrantthepetition.UnderRomero,anappellatecourt   cannotgrantreliefunlessithasfirstissuedanOSC,affordingtherespondentanopportunitytofile x! aformalreturn.(Romero,supra,8Cal.4thatpp.740744.)Romeroreversedandremandedan @" appellatedecisionwhichhadgrantedawritpetitiononthebasisoftheinformalbriefing.  X#   AcruciallessonofRomeroforappellatecounselisthis:Theimmediateobjectofthehabeas !% petitionandtheinformalreplyshouldbetheissuanceofanOSC.Counselshouldbecarefulto `"& frametheargumentsintermsoftheprimafaciecasestandardforissuanceofanOSCandshould (#x' arguethatitwouldbeprematurefortheappellatecourttodecidepotentiallymeritoriousclaimsat #@( this"preliminary"stageofthehabeasproceeding.Romeromakesclearthatwhereapetitiondoes  stateaprimafaciecaseforrelief,"theissuanceofthewrit(orordertoshowcause)ismandatory, x notoptional."(Romero,supra,8Cal.4thatp.740.)Additionally,bothRomeroandDuvallreiterate @ that,forpurposesofevaluatingwhetherthepetitionstatesaprimafaciecase,theappellatecourt X shouldtakethepetition'sfactualallegationsastrueandconsiderwhetherthoseclaims,ifproven,   wouldsupporthabeasrelief.(Id.atp.737;Duvall,supra,9Cal.4thatpp.474475.)    C. ` SupremeCourtHabeasReviewAfteraSummaryDenial  ( x   AhabeasdenialwithoutissuanceofanOSCisa"summarydenial."Theappellatecourtmay    discussthemeritsofthepetitionintheopiniondecidingthedirectappeal,oritmaydenyitina    separateminuteorder(usuallywithnostatementofthecourt'sreasons).Apetitionercanseek H   SupremeCourtreviewfollowingsuchadenialeitherbyrefilingthehabeaspetitionwithinthe `  SupremeCourt'soriginaljurisdictionorbyfilingaconventionalpetitionforreviewastothehabeas (  denial.@ .  18      ׀Althougheitherprocedureispermissible,insomepastcasestheSupremeCourtexpressed   apreferenceforthepetitionforreviewalternativeatleastincaseswheretheappellatecourtdenied h  thewritpetitioninawrittenopinionfollowingfullbriefing.(InreMichaelE.(1975)15Cal.3d183, 0  193n.15;InreReed(1983)33Cal.3d914,918n.2.) H    RegardlessofwhichprocedureisemployedtobringthehabeaspetitionbeforetheSupreme  Court,counselshouldremainfocusedonthenecessityofanOSCandframethearguments P accordingly.BearinmindthattheSupremeCourthasthepowertoissueanOSCreturnableina h lowercourt,eithertheappellatecourtorasuperiorcourt.Incontrasttoagrantofreviewonadirect 0 appeal,thisformofreliefdoesnotcommittheSupremeCourttoplacingthecaseonitsowndocket  andhearinganddecidingthepetitionitself.However,anOSCreturnableinalowercourtgivesthe p petitioneranotherdayincourt(andalsocommunicatestothelowercourtthatthehighercourtviews 8 thepetition'sallegationsasveryserious). P    V.  POSTOSCPROCEEDINGS     A. ` Forum  @   AreviewingcourtcanmakeitsOSCreturnableeitherbeforeitselforbeforealowercourt.   WheretheOSCismadereturnableintheappellatecourt,thepostOSCproceedings(includingany  evidentiaryhearingbeforearefereeappointedbytheappellatecourt)comewithinappellatecounsel's `  appointment.WheretheappellatecourtmakestheOSCreturnableinsuperiorcourt,iteffectively ( x transfersorremandstheentirewritproceedingtothatcourt.Inthatsituation,thesuperiorcourtwill  @ beresponsibleforappointingcounsel.      B. ` PostOSCPleadingsReturnandTraverse  H     RegardlessofwheretheOSCismadereturnable,thenextstepisfortherespondenttofile (  aformalpleading,a"return,"inanswertothepetition'sallegations.Thepetitionerthenfilesareply   pleading,a"traverse"(alsoknownasa denial)respondingtothereturn.Thefunctionofthereturn h  andthetraverseistodefineandnarrowthecontestedissues.Aftercomparingthereturnandthe 0  traverse,thecourtdetermineswhetherthereareanydisputedissuesofmaterialfactrequiringan H  evidentiaryhearing.     ` 1. SufficiencyoftheReturn  P   AcriticalquestioninpostOSCproceedingsiswhetheracountershowing,intheformof 0 opposingdeclarationsorotherevidence,isnecessarytobringtheopposingparty'sfactualshowing  intodispute.Underpreviouscaselaw,areturnconsistingonlyof"generaldenials"notsupported p byspecificfactualallegationsandsupportingproofwasdeemedinsufficienttobringapetition's 8 factualallegationsintodispute.Underthosecases,thehabeascourtwasentitledtoviewthe P petition'sfactualshowingasuncontrovertedandtodecidethepetitionwithoutthenecessityofan  evidentiaryhearing.A .  19      ׀However,inPeoplev.Duvall,supra,9Cal.4th464,theSupremeCourt  significantlyrelaxedtherespondent'spleadingresponsibilitiesandmadeitsubstantiallyeasierfor X therespondenttoobtainanevidentiaryhearingonthepetition's"disputed"factualallegations,  p withouttenderinganycounterdeclarationsorotherfactualshowing.TheSupremeCourt 8 emphasizedthat"[a]tthisearlystage,...thePeople'sburdenisoneofpleadingnotproof.[Fn.]"(Id.   atp.483.)AlthoughDuvallretainedthegeneralrequirementthatthereturnpleadspecificfacts x! wherepossible,itexcusedthatrequirementundercircumstanceswherecrucialfactsareunavailable @" torespondent'scounsel,suchaswheretrialcounselrefusestospeakwithhimor(asinDuvallitself)  X# trialcounselisdead.TheDuvallopinionarticulatedthefollowingstandards:  $ 8   ` Whenoneparty(respondentforthereturn,petitionerforthetraverse)can `"& allege:(i)heorshehasactedwithduediligence;(ii)crucialinformationisnot (#x' readilyavailable;and(iii)thatthereisgoodreasontodisputecertainallegedfactsor #@( questionthecredibilityofcertaindeclarants,courtsevaluatingthereturnandtraverse $ ) shouldendeavortodeterminewhethertherearefactslegitimatelyindisputethatmay % * requireholdinganevidentiaryhearing.[]Toassistthecourtinmakingthe H&!+ determination,thereturnshouldsetforthwithspecificity:(i)whyinformationisnot '`", readilyavailable;(ii)thestepsthatweretakentotrytoobtainit;and(iii)whyaparty '(#- believesingoodfaiththatcertainallegedfactsareuntrue.(Id.atp.485.)(#.    0*%0 ROY R R     ` 2. SufficiencyoftheTraverse     AfteranOSCissues,thetraverse, .  20      ׀notthepetition,becomesthepetitioner'sprincipal @ pleading.Thepetitionitself,havingserveditspurposebyobtainingtheOSC,essentiallydropsout X ofthecase.Consequently,itisessentialthatthetraverseincorporatethepetitionanditssupporting   exhibitsbyreference;thetraverseshouldalsoincorporatebyreferenceanyotherdocuments  previouslyfiledinsupportofthepetition(including,inparticular,theinformalreplyandany `  supportingexhibits).Alternatively,petitioner'scounselmayenterintoastipulationwith ( x respondent'scounselthattheoriginalpetitionbedeemedatraverse.Usually,however,counselwill  @ prefertofileanewpleadinginordertorespondmorespecificallytothereturn.      AstheforegoingexcerptfromDuvallindicates,apetitioner'straverseissubjecttosimilar H   pleadingrulesasthereturn.(Duvall,supra,9Cal.4thatp.485.)Wherethereturndoesincludea `  countershowing(e.g.,adeclarationfromtrialcounselassertinglegitimatetacticalreasonsfora (  challengedomission),theonusisonthepetitionertorebutthoseallegationsinhistraverse,and   unsubstantiated"generaldenials"willnotsuffice.(Peoplev.Karis(1988)46Cal.3d612,653656.) h  Often,ofcourse,thedeclarationsalreadyfiledinsupportofthepetitionwilldirectlycontradictthe 0  return'scountershowing,andthetraverseneedonlyrefertothosepreviouslyfileddeclarationsto H  showthatanevidentiaryhearingisrequired.Inothercases,itmaybenecessaryforcounselto  submitadditionaldeclarationsorotherevidenceinordertorebutthereturn'sallegations.Finally,  wheretheinformationnecessarytorebutthereturn'sshowingisunavailabletocounsel,thetraverse P shouldfollowtheguidelinesinDuvallanddescribecounsel'seffortstoobtaintheinformation,the h reasonsforitsunavailability,andcounsel'sreasonsforbelievingthereturn'sallegationsareuntrue. 0 (Duvall,supra,atp.485.)    C. ` TheEvidentiaryHearing  8   Whereanevidentiaryhearingisordered,thecourtwillgenerallyissueanorderframingthe  specificfactualissueswhicharedisputed.Ifthereturnandthetraversehavefulfilledtheirfunction  offramingandnarrowingthefactualissueswhicharegenuinelydisputed,theevidentiaryhearing X maywellcoverfewerissuesthantheOSC.(Forinstance,acourtmightorderanevidentiaryhearing  p limitedtotrialcounsel'sreasonsforaparticularomission,butcouldconcludethattheotheraspects 8 oftheineffectiveassistanceclaimposedpurelylegalquestionsnotrequiringanevidentiary   proceeding.) x!   Asnotedearlier,onceanOSChasissued,ahabeascourtdoeshaveauthoritytoorder  X# discovery(eveninnonspecialcircumstancecasesnotcoveredbythenewpostconvictiondiscovery  $ statute,Pen.Code1054.9(discussedinPartIIIB)). Thenatureandscopeofdiscoveryin[post !% OSC]habeasproceedingshasgenerallybeenresolvedonacasebycasebasis.[Citation.](Inre `"& Scott(2003)29Cal.4th783,813.)InScott,theSupremeCourtsuggestedthatahabeascourt(or (#x' referee)hasdiscretionovertheprecisetermsandscopeofdiscovery,butmayappropriatelylookto #@( theProp.115reciprocaldiscoverystatutes(Pen.Code1054etseq.)Althoughitagreedthatthose $ ) statutescoveronly theunderlyingcriminalproceedinganddo notapplytohabeasproceedings, % * theCourtheldthattheyrepresent alogicalplaceforthe[habeas]refereetolooktofashionafair H&!+ discoveryrule.(Scott,supra,atpp.813814.)Consequently,throughouttheinvestigationand '`", preparationofahabeaspetition,counselshouldassumethat,intheeventthemattereverreachesan '(#-  evidentiaryhearing,hisorherinvestigativematerials(witnessstatements,etc.)arelikelytobe (#. subjecttoreciprocaldiscoveryontermssimilartothosefacingdefensetrialattorneysundertheProp.  115statutes. x    WhereareviewingcourtmadeitsOSCreturnableinsuperiorcourt,thesuperiorcourtwill X beresponsiblefordecidingallissuesposedintheOSC,bothfactualandlegal.However,wherean   appellatecourtretainsjurisdictionoverthepetitionandappointsasuperiorcourtjudgetositas  refereeontheappellatecourt'sbehalf,thejudge'srolewillbemorelimited.Thereferenceorder `  shoulddirecttherefereetomakefactualfindingsonly.(InreCordero(1988)46Cal.3d161,171 ( x n.1.)  @   Ahabeasevidentiaryhearingis,inessence,abenchtrialonthespecificissuesframedinthe    referenceorder.Thepetitionerbearstheburdenofprovinghisfactualallegationsbya H   preponderanceoftheevidence.(InreCox(2003)30Cal.4th974,997998;Peoplev.Ledesma `  (1987)43Cal.3d171,218.)B .  21      ׀Thepartiesmayutilizetheusualtrialtoolsfortheproductionof (  evidence,includingsubpoenas,andthecourtisauthorized"todoandperformallotheractsand   thingsnecessarytoafullandfairhearinganddeterminationofthecase."(Pen.Code,1484)In h  contrasttothepleadingstageofthewritproceeding,therulesofevidenceapplywithfullforce, 0  includingthehearsayrule.(Fields,supra,51Cal.3datp.1070.)Adeclarationorotherdocument H  previouslyappendedtothepetitionwillnotbeconsideredattheevidentiaryhearingunlessit  satisfiestherulesofevidence(orthepartiesstipulatetoitsadmission).    InitsrecentScottopinion,theSupremeCourtheldthat,becauseahabeashearingisa h  specialproceedingratherthana criminalcase,theprosecutionmaycallthedefendantpetitioner 0 tothestand.Incontrasttoacriminaltrial, thepetitionerdoesnothavetheprivilegenottobe  calledasawitness.However,ifcalledasawitness,thepetitionerdoeshavetherighttoassertthe p privilegeagainstselfincriminationastoindividualquestions,asdoesanywitnessinanyproceeding. 8 [Citations.](InreScott(2003)29Cal.4th783,815.)  .  22      ׀Moreover, asinotherhearings,thetrier P offactmaynotdrawadverseinferencesfromanywitnessinvocationoftherightagainstself  incrimination.(Scott,supra,atp.816.)   VI.  SUBSEQUENTAPPELLATEREVIEW  8    A. ` AppellateReviewFollowingaSuperiorCourtHabeasDenial  x!   Asuperiorcourt'sdenialofahabeascorpuspetitionisanonappealabledisposition,  X# regardlessofwhethertherewasanOSConthepetition.Themechanismforappellatereviewofa  $ superiorcourt'shabeasdenialisanewhabeaspetition,filedwithintheoriginaljurisdictionofthe !%  CourtofAppeal.(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.767n.7.)Consequently,evenwherethesuperior `"& courtheardthepetitionpursuanttoanOSCfromtheappellatecourt,itisnecessarytofileanew  petitionintheappellatecourttoobtainreviewofthatdecision. x    Incontrast,whereasuperiorcourtjudgeconductedtheevidentiaryhearinginthecapacity !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO X ofareferee,thereferee'sconclusionsaresimplyaninterimstageintheongoinghabeasproceeding   stillpendingintheappellatecourt.Aftertherefereesubmitsareportsummarizinghisorher  findings,thereviewingcourtwilltypicallyreceivesupplementalbriefsfromthepartiessupporting `  orobjectingtothefindings. ( x    B.0 ` StandardsforAppellateReviewFollowinganEvidentiaryHearing   ` (#` (#     Thestandardsforappellatereviewofajudge'sconclusionsinahabeashearingarethesame H   regardlessofthemannerinwhichthecasereachestheappellatecourt.Thatis,itdoesnotmatter `  whetherthecasecomesbeforethereviewingcourtfollowingitsreferee'ssubmissionoffindingsor (  onaneworiginalhabeaspetitionfollowingthesuperiorcourt'sdenialofapetitionpendinginthat   court.(InreWright(1978)78Cal.App.3d788,801802;seealsoInreFountain(1977)74 h  Cal.App.3d715,717718.) 0    Thestandardofreviewofahabeascourt'sorreferee'sfindings,includingfactualfindings,  issignificantlylessdeferentialthanthestandardapplicabletoatrieroffact'sfindingsinanordinary  appeal.Althoughajudge'sorreferee'sfactualdeterminationsinahabeascorpusevidentiaryhearing P areentitledto"greatweight"ifsupportedby"amplecredibleevidence,"theyarenotbindingonthe h appellatecourt.(Martin,supra,44Cal.3datp.32;Ledesma,supra,43Cal.3datp.219.)Asthe 0 SupremeCourthassummarizedonseveraloccasions:  8   ` Areferee'sfindingsoffactare,ofcourse,notbindingonthiscourt,andwe 8 mayreachadifferentconclusiononanindependentexaminationoftheevidence P producedatthehearingheconductsevenwheretheevidenceisconflicting.  [Citation](InreBranch(1969)70Cal.2d200,203n.1[emphasisadded];accord  e.g.,Peoplev.Mozingo(1983)34Cal.3d926,934;Hall,supra,30Cal.3datp.416; X InreCox(2003)30Cal.4th974,998.) p     Forarecentexample,seeHitchings,supra,6Cal.4thatpp.109110,119122,wherethe   SupremeCourtrejectedareferee'sconclusionthatajurorhadnotprejudgedthecase. x!   Finally,asinotherappellatecontexts,asuperiorcourt'sorreferee'sconclusionsonlegal  X# questions,includingmixedquestionsoflawandfact,aresubjecttoindependentreview.(Hitchings,  $ supra,atp.109;Ledesma,supra,43Cal.3datp.219;seee.g.,InreRoss(1995)10Cal.4th184,205 !% [prejudicecomponentofineffectiveassistanceofcounseltestismixedquestionoffactandlaw, `"& subjecttoindependentreview].) (#x'  VII. 0  NEWCALIFORNIASTATUTESANDRULESONHABEASPROCEDUREAND $ ) OTHERPOSTCONVICTIONREMEDIES % *(#(# 0  A.0` (#(#CourtRules '`",` (#` (#   Superiorcourt.󀀀RecentrevisionsintheCaliforniaRulesofCourthavesubstantiallyfleshed (#. outtheproceduresgoverningsuperiorcourthabeasprocedures.(Rules4.550,4.551,4.552(as h)$/ amendedeff.Jan.1,2004).)Whileappellatecourtscommonlysolicitinformaloppositionsand 0*%0 repliestohabeaspetitions(rule60),untilrecentlytherewasnostatuteorruleexplicitlyauthorizing *H&1 asuperiorcourttosolicitinformalbriefing.Thesuperiorcourtsonlyapparentoptionsweretodeny +'2 ahabeaspetitionsummarilyortoissueanOSC(requiringaformalreturnandtraverse(or denial ,'3 insuperiorcourtparlance(rule4.550(b)(4))).TherevisedrulesdoauthorizepreOSCinformal  responsivebriefing(rule4.551(b))V .  23      ׀andalsosettimelinesforthesuperiorcourttoactonahabeas x petition.Within60daysofthefilingofthehabeaspetition,thesuperiorcourtmusteither:(a)issue @ anOSC,(b)denythepetitionsummarily,or(c)solicitaninformalresponse.(Rule4.551(a)(3)(A) X &(a)(4))U .  24      ׀Ifthecourtchoosesthelatteroption,itmusteitherissueanOSCordenythepetition   within45daysoffilingoftheinformalresponse.(Rule4.551(a)(5))    Thesuperiorrulesalsoexplicitlyrestatesomeofthesubstantivehabeasstandardsand ( x proceduralrightsdevelopedinleadingCaliforniaSupremeCourtopinions,includingthestandard  @ fordeterminingwhetherapetitionstatesaprimafaciecase: [T]hecourttakesthepetitioners    factualallegationsastrueandmakesapreliminaryassessmentregardingwhetherthepetitioner    wouldbeentitledtoreliefifhisorherfactualallegationswereproved.Ifso,thecourtmustissue H   anordertoshowcause.(Rule4.551(c)(1))TherulealsorestatesthatissuanceofanOSCrequires `  thesuperiorcourttoappointcounselforallsubsequentproceedings(ifthepetitionerisindigent). (  (Rule4.551(c)(2))     Thesuperiorcourtrulesstandardforanevidentiaryhearingseemstodepartsomewhatfrom 0  thelanguageofSupremeCourtdecisions: Anevidentiaryhearingisrequiredif,afterconsidering H  theverifiedpetition,thereturn,anydenial,anyaffidavitsordeclarationsunderpenaltyofperjury,  andmattersofwhichjudicialnoticemaybetaken,thecourtfindsthereisareasonablelikelihood  thatthepetitionermaybRoot EntrysQ- 7y@‘RPerfectOffice_MAIN& PerfectOffice_OBJECTS,ؤؤ !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~     PQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~WPC  !ޤ)RɃϋWX3(( &wx/{Mhm5h%`o4 &7XyXs' De?ƹcR8:̚XZn[6bϞhƝ=%2G< ~8 , !'e%OlraG9ƶyCCjÍs-e]NnuъO\#&. m./Ss Z-Re(G3N1cxJBVv=÷' ?`yΤt:\DnQCv[Cd~_K~A+AC&E 0<IT $J`xTU|W:Y 0[\ 0S\#](_N`^ `w`4`&` m(`?`Ue@bBb=XbeAim Bo{oGq 0Us 0ns 0Qt 0u 0u 0v 0Aw 0w 0x 06y 0y 0z 0{ 0,| 0| 0t} 0~ 0~ 01 0 0 0q 0 0 0] 0 0 0 0Å 0 0>? 0} 0u 0W 09 0 0 0ߌ 0 02k 0 0: 0Yӏ 0_, 0  0 0 B* D/G D+v 0 D/ 0֗ 06 0ژ 0: 0^ 0<z 1eU6U>QU* 1u 72. 0c`Ü 0w| 0 0 0(r 0N 0 0 0 0Dy 1 72FyxX heb͹չ w^ <U>AAAAAAAAAAAAAz<6X9`(Courier<6X9`(CourierXx6X@`7X@)\  `"TmsRmn 12ptACXXt\  PZuXP) `CG TimesACc PE37PX'  habeas, seminar materials 2cov bo 0 .   p0EnvDJetEnvelope Style for DeskJet Plus    \RV,\   X `  X x6Label3DJetLabels, 3 up for HP DeskJet Plus    \R+\nd+p HxX,x,nx:EnvelopeDJetEnvelope #10, for DeskJet Plus    \RV,\   X `  X dJ$,QuoteL/R Indented, Single Spaced    8.. 8` ..    64In Cameraincamera4 *IbidIbidIbid.8,Suprasupra,supra,, &IdIdId.V *Sec2Double section symbolH*Sec1Section symbolL%*Lab3Label Position 3   h  (# L%*Lab2Label Position 2   h   :(EnvEnvelope    \RV,\   X  ` L%*Lab1Label Position 1   h   X2Elipsis3Elipsis three dots...T2Elipsis4Elipsis - 4 dots....64In Limineinlimine6 4voir direvoirdire4Und-SpaceUnderline but not with spaces on, then off        ,*Dash--x#.Label3Labels, 3-Down FDAP, for HP LaserJet  0          \Rx\    \Rx AL MAIL \Tj6PleadFinalFinal Pleading        X     =  ~ )       X @D..    ڀ(F2Z$ G_!QX+\XXX   0ElipsisElipsis (using hard spaces) with period....xO2ParaNumsParagraph Numbers 1., 2., 3., etc... 21.3  Ԁ  0..R41 SpacingSingle Spacing\54Date/TimeDate and Time Stamp"US[ :!] ! !  nt2EnvelopeEnvelope #10, for HP LaserJet    \RV,\tO 4Right ParRight-Aligned Paragraph Numbers.. 2I.3  Ԁ  0..PB0HeadingChapter Heading@..  2I.3  Ԁ   Ԉ b=6SubheadingSubheadings in briefs 2A.3  ..    xn2SectionASection A, B etc. with TOC Level 2  8.. 8` ..2A.3  0 ..  zn2SectionISection I, II etc. with TOC Level 1  8.. 8` ..2I.3  0 ..  R42 SpacingDouble Spacing~2Label3iiLabels, 3-down, FDAP for HP Series II      \R >\         X x2PleadingPleading Style (Margins, Tabs etc)           X &X` (&+ =  )   X &X` (&@..     ڀ8DoubleSpaceDouble space text between style on/off)\  `"TmsRmn 12ptAC($    (  Z6Times New Roman Regular) `CG Times m G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  1  /'0#/X9X/'E.g.,_McCleskey_v._Zant_(1991)499U.S.467.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  2  /'0#/X9X/'Ahabeaspetitionfiledwithinanappellatecourt'soriginaljurisdictiontoobtainreviewofa  superiorcourt'sdenialofapetitionraisingthesameclaimsisnotconsidereda"successivepetition" x withinthemeaningofClark,norisaSupremeCourthabeaspetitionfollowinganappellatecourt's @ denial.(Clark,supra,atp.767n.7.)  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  3  0XX0#/X9XX0XԀSeeCal.SupremeCourtPoliciesRegardingCasesArisingFromJudgmentsofDeath,std.11.1  (asrevisedthroughNov.20,2002). C G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  6  /'0#/X9X/'SeeInre_Waltreus_(1965)62Cal.2d218.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  7  0XX0#/X9XX0XSeeInreDixon(1953)41Cal.2d756. N G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  8  /'0#/X9X/'Harrisemphasizesthatmerelycharacterizingaconstitutionalclaimas"fundamental"isnot  enoughtobringitwithinthisnarrowcategory.Byitscitationandshortparentheticaldescriptionof x Arizonav._Fulminante_(1991)499U.S.279,309,theHarrisopinionimpliesthatthe"fundamental @ constitutionalerror"exceptionisequivalentto_Fulminante_'sconceptof"structuraldefect."(Harris, X supra,atp.834.)  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  10  /'0#/X9X/'ԀNumerouscasesoutsidethehabeascontext,includingtheSupremeCourt'sScottopinion,  elaborateonthedistinctionsbetweenan"unauthorizedsentence,"whichcanbecorrectedatany x time,andordinarysentencingerror,whichcanbewaived.(Peoplev.Scott(1994)9Cal.4th331; @ seealso,e.g.,X9XX/X9Peoplev.Smith(2001)24Cal.4th849#/X9XXX9o#.) x G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  11  0XX0#/X9XX0XHowever,thislimitationdoesnotbarhabeasconsiderationofanineffectiveassistanceclaim,  basedoncounsel'sfailuretoraiseaFourthAmendmentargument.(E.g.,Peoplev.Howard(1987) x 190_Cal.App_.3d41;see_Kimmelman_v.Morrison(1986)477U.S.365.)  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  12  0XX0#/X9XX0XNotethatastatutory"falseevidence"claimrequiresneitherproofthatthefalsityamountedto  perjurynoranyshowingthattheprosecutorkneworshouldhaveknownofthefalsity.(Pen.Code, x 1473(c);Hall,supra,atp.424.)  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  13  /'0#/X9X/'ԀAhabeasclaimof"newlydiscoveredevidence"facesamoredauntingstandardthanasimilar  claiminanewtrialmotion.Onhabeas,thenewevidencemust"undermine[]theentireprosecution x case"(Hall,supra,atp.417;Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.766)thatis,itmust"cast[]fundamental @ doubtontheaccuracyandreliabilityoftheproceedings"(Peoplev.Gonzalez(1990)51Cal.3d1179, X 1246).    ! G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  15  0XX0#/X9XX0XGarciaitselfdidnotinvolveaformalwrittenrequestfromthedefensesuchastheoneattached,  buttheopiniondoesprovidestrongauthorityfortheprosecutors'ethicalobligationtodisclose x exculpatoryevidence,withorwithoutaspecificrequest.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  16  /'0#/X9X/'Thus,forinstance,forajurormisconductclaim,thepetitionshouldincludeadeclarationfrom  oneofthejurors,ratherthanjustaninvestigator'sdeclarationdescribinghisinterviewwiththejuror.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  17  0XX0#/X9XX0XHowever,the_Duvall_Courtnotedthattherelaxedpleadingruleforarespondent"doesnot  relievethepetitioner,inhisorherpetitionforawritofhabeascorpus,fromallegingfactsthat,if x true,wouldentitlethepetitionertorelief."(_Duvall_,supra,atp.486n.8.)Nonetheless,inlightof @ theCourt'spreviouscommentthatthepetitionshouldincludesupportingaffidavitsif reasonably X available"(id.atp.474),the_Duvall_footnoteappearstoapplytothespecificityofthepetition's   factualallegationsratherthantheformwhichthesupportingprooftakes.<:Default Para J G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  18  /'0#/X9X/'Whereanappellatecourtissuesan_OSC_Ԁbutlaterdeniesthepetitioninanopinion,thetimefor  petitioningforSupremeCourtreviewisthesameasforaregularopinioninadirectappeali.e.,40 x daysaftertheopinioneveniftheopiniondealsonlywiththehabeasproceeding.However,the @ deadlineforapetitionforreviewfollowingasummarydenialofahabeaspetitiondependsonthe X timingofthesummarydenialvisavisthedispositionofthedirectappeal.Ifthehabeasdenialif   filedonthesamedateastheopinionintherelateddirectappeal,itwillbecome"final"onthesame  schedule,sothepetitionforreviewshouldbefiledwithin40daysofthedenial.(SeeCal.Rulesof `  Court,rule24(b)(4).)(Note,however,thatifthepetitionwasdeniedinaseparateorder,filedthe ( x samedateastheappellateopinion,andcounselwishestopetitionforreviewinbothproceedings,  @ itwillbenecessarytofileseparatepetitionsforreviewfortheappealandforthehabeas.(Rule    28(d).)Ifthesummaryhabeasdenialwasonadifferentdatethantheopinioninthedirectappeal,    thenthepetitionforreviewmustbefiledwithin10daysofthedenialorder.  H     TherearenostrictdeadlinesassuchforfilinganoriginalSupremeCourthabeaspetition (  followingtheappellatecourt'sdenialofhabeasrelief.However,likeanyhabeaspetition,thepetition   mustbefiledwithout"substantialdelay."(SeePartIB,supra.)Tobeonthesafeside,counsel h  wouldbewelladvisedtofileanysuchhabeaspetitionwithinthepetitionforreviewdeadlines 0  describedabove.AsdiscussedinPartVIIIB,ifaCaliforniareviewingcourtexplicitlyfinds H   substantialdelayinrefilingapetitionafteradenialbyalowercourt,thatrulingmayalsoaffect  whetherthestatehabeasproceedingisconsidered pendingduringthatintervalforpurposesof  tollingthefederalstatuteoflimitations. V G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  19  0XX0#/X9XX0XSeee.g.,Inre_Lewallen_(1979)23Cal.3d274,278&n.2.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  21  0XX0#/X9XX0XHowever,whatitispetitionermustprovebyapreponderancewilldependuponthesubstantive  standardapplicabletotheunderlyinglegalclaim.  G_!QX9XXX   _Q'XQX90#Q'Ԁ  28  0XX0#/X9XX0XForacomprehensivetreatmentoffederalhabeaslaw,see_Liebman_Ԁ&Hertz,FederalHabeas  CorpusPractice&Procedure(4thed.2001).  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  30    _ԀForthisauthors_analysisof_Ԁthenewcourtruleallowingasupposedlystreamlined exhaustion  petitionforreview(Cal.RulesofCourt,rule33.3),seetheJanuary2004seminarmaterialsposted x on_FDAP_swebsite,4 b O  5  www.fdap.org6O E  7 8.(w!2%$ G_!QX+\XXX   Q+\XXQX+\Ԁ  0  #|x (+_$QX0XXX  HP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL 60!j0 Wd0:i+00U  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  14    _Ԁ-XXQ9-XXX-Eitherpartymayseekappellatereviewofthesuperiorcourtsdiscoveryrulingviaapetition  forwritofmandate#QX9XX-X##Q9XXQX9#.(9 Z(Times New Roman    3 E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  31    _ԀTherearethreeotherpotentialtriggeringevents:thedateonwhichastatecreated impediment  tofiling,inviolationofthefederalconstitution,isremoved; thedateonwhichconstitutionalright x assertedwasinitiallyrecognizedbythe[U.S.]SupremeCourt...,ifthatrightismade retroactively @ applicabletocasesoncollateralreview;or thedateonwhichthefactualpredicatefortheclaim X orclaims...couldhavebeendiscoveredthroughtheexerciseofduediligence.(28U.S.C.   2244(d)(1)(B)(D))  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  32    _ԀQX9XXQ9Twoimportantcaveats:(1)Incalculatingthedeadlineforfilingacert.petition(andthusthe  dateonwhichacasebecomes finalintheabsenceofacert.petition),the90daysrunsfromthe x  dateoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsreviewdenialorder,notfromthedateof_remittitur_.(2)A  cert.petitionorthetimeinwhichacert.petitioncouldhavebeenfiledisonlyrelevanttocalculation x ofthedateonwhichthecasebecomefinalondirectreview.Thependencyofacert.petitionorthe @ timeinwhichonecouldhavebeenfiledfromthedenialofastatehabeaspetitiondoesnot toll X thestatuteoflimitations. 7 E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  24    _ԀAshortlivedversionofthisrule(eff.20012003)actuallyprovidedthat,ifthesuperiorcourt  failedtotakeanyoftheseactionswithinthespecifiedtime,an_OSC_Ԁwasdeemedtohaveissuedby x operationoflaw.(Formerrule4.551(a)(3).)Themostrecentroundofrevisions,however,provides @ afarlesssubstantiveremedyifthesuperiorcourtfailstoact.Thepetitionermayfile anoticeand X requestforrulingstatingthathehasnotreceivedatimelyruling.Uponreceiptofthatnotice,the   presidingjudge mustassignthepetitiontoajudgeandcalendarthematterforadecisionwithout  appearanceswithin30daysofthefilingofthenoticeandrequestforruling.(Currentrule `  4.551(a)(3)(B)(ii).)  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  23    _ԀLikeanappellatecourt(rule60(1)),asuperiorcourtisalsoauthorizedtoobtainrelevant  records pertainingtothepetitionerscasefromtheresponsible custodianofthoserecords.(Rule x 4.551((b)(1)(b)) d q E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  25    _ԀUnliketheotherpointscoveredhere,this statementofreasonsrequirementisnotnew.It  isacarryoverfromthepre2001superiorcourthabeasrule,formerrule260.  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  26    _ԀAsapracticalmatter,iftheexhibitsareclearlyindextabbedandinternallypaginated(allowing  foreasyreference),itisdoubtfulthattheappellateclerkswillinsistupontheadditionalstepof x consecutivepaginationoftheentirevolume.*+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   0AA.Normal  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition T  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(hh&H1  5+ ` hp x 5      5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H2  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H3  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H4  5+ ` hp x 5 XXX 5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H5  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H6  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  2DD0Address  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted  /%  ,Kk %#/K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/  <:zBottom of 7(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7(X75+ ` hp x 5  &  d d)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7(X75+ ` hp x 5  )2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  cdefghij 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0    E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  27    _ԀThoughthechoiceofJanuary1,1992,asthecutoffdateisunderstandable,thatdaterepresents  lessofademarcationinthestateofCalifornialawthantheenactmentofEvidenceCodesection x 1107mightimply.Bythetimeoftheenactmentofthatstatute,caselawhadalreadyrecognizedthe @ admissibilityof_BWS_Ԁtestimonybyanalogytootherrecognizedformsof syndromeevidence,so X thestatutewaslargelydeclaratoryofexistinglaw.(Cf.Peoplev._Aris_(1989)215_Cal.App_.3d1178   [disapprovedinpart,Peoplev.Humphrey(1996)13Cal.3d1073].)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  29    _ԀTheBaldwinopiniondidleaveopenthepossibilitythatreferencestostateauthoritiesmust  sufficeifthestatestandardisidenticaltothefederalone.Ifcounselfindshimorherselfinfederal x courtdefendingapoorlyexhaustedclaim,thatargumentmayprovidearayofhope.Butwhenone @ isstillintheprocessofexhaustingstateremedies,thereisnoreasontotakethatrisk.Counsel X shouldsimplytakecaretocitefederalauthorities,aswellasanystateones.(Also,evenassuming    thatrelianceonstateauthoritiesapplyinganidenticalstandardwillsuffice,itisnotclearthat  Californiaandfederalstandardsarenecessarilyidenticalinsomecrucialareas.Forexample,Pope x andotherpre_Strickland_Californiacases(aswellasafewpost_Strickland_ones)framethe @ ineffectiveassistancetestintermsthatdonotneatlycorrespondto_Strickland_.(suchas withdrawal X ofapotentiallymeritoriousdefense).(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#http://www.fdap.org(O$(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(# xCGaeimquy}Bullet ListBullets List o E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  35    _ԀThecalculationbecomesstillmorecomplicatedwherethereisanoverlapbetweenthedifferent   rounds!e.g.,wherethedefendantbeginsa secondroundastoanewhabeasclaims,whilehe x isstillinthemidstofhisfirst roundofreviewastohisinitialclaims.(Cf._Delhomme_Ԁv.Ramirez @ (9thCir.2003)340F.3d817.)  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  36    _ԀTheAdvisoryCommitteeCommenttotherevisedrulestatesthatthe immediatefinality  provision reflectssettledSupremeCourtpractice(citingunpublishedSupremeCourtminutes x concerninglackofjurisdictiontoconsiderarehearingpetitionfromasummaryhabeasdenial).But @ theCommentssuggestionthattherevisiondoesnotchangeanythingisflatlywrong,sincetheonly X publishedopiniononthetopic,_Bunney_,hadheldthatsuchadenialisnotfinalimmediately. N E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  38    _ԀAstheNinthCircuitrecognizedinBennett,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtsstandardsfor  capitalhabeaspetitionsprovidepresumptivetimelinessguidelines,butthereisnocounterpartfor x measuringthetimelinessofanoncapitalpetition.Consequently,evenassumingthattheCalifornia @ SupremeCourthasbeendemonstratingconsistencyinitspostRobbinsapplicationofthose X standardsincapitalcases(anotherunresolvedquestion),thatwouldnotanswerthequestionwhether   theCaliforniacourtshaveshownsimilarconsistencyininvokingthetimelinessrulesonnoncapital  petitions.(See-XXQ9-XXX-Bennettv.Mueller,supra,322F.3datpp.#QX9XX-X##Q9XXQX9#583584.) ^ E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  37    _ԀOfcourse,evenifthestateruleisconsidered adequateandindependent,thatfindingonly  leadstoanothermorecasespecificinquiryintowhethertherearegroundsforovercomingthe x  proceduraldefault( causeandprejudice, miscarriageofjustice,etc.).Thosetopicsarebeyond @ thescopeofthesematerialsonCaliforniahabeasstandards.- -  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  22    _ԀAsapracticalmatter,therighttoasserttheprivilege astoindividualquestionsshouldbar  theprosecutorfromexaminingthedefendantonthefactsoftheunderlyingcriminalcase.Butthe x prosecutorsrighttoquestionthedefendantonnominallynonincriminatingmattersstillcanpose @ seriousproblems.Amongotherthings,inahearingonanineffectiveassistanceclaim,Scottwould X probablyallowaprosecutortoexamineadefendantoncertainaspectsofhisdiscussionswithtrial   counsel(evenifthedefensewasnototherwiseplanningtoputonthedefendantsowntestimony  duringthehearing).SearchTerm T E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  34    _Ԁ-XXQ9-XXX-Adenialongroundsofunreasonabledelayinfilingtheinitialpetitionwouldrepresenta   proceduraldefault(Clark,Robbins)butwouldnotaffectthestatuteoflimitationscalculation, x becauseCaliforniastimelinessrulesarenota conditiontofiling.Soastatepetitionisstill @ considered properlyfiledandpending,evenifitislaterdeniedasuntimely.(Cf.Smithv. X Duncan(9thCir.2002)297F.3d809.)#QX9XX-X##Q9XXQX9#  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  4    _ԀConstitutionalerrorresultingintrial sofundamentallyunfairthatabsenttheerrorno  reasonablejudgeorjurywouldhaveconvictedthepetitioner;actualinnocence;anderrorresulting x insucha grosslymisleadingprofileofthepetitioner...thatabsenttheerrororomissionno @ reasonablejudgeorjurywouldhaveimposedasentenceofdeath.(-XXQ9-XXX-Clark,supra,5#QX9XX-XY#/X9XXQX9Cal.4th#QX9XX/X9#-XXXQX9Ԁatpp. X 797798.#QX9XX-X##Q9XXQX9x#)  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  5    _Evenifthestatecourtdoescomplainaboutthetimingofthepetition,thosestatementswill  representa proceduraldefaultonlyifthecourtexplicitlyinvokesthedelayasagroundfordenial x ofthepetition.(Cf.Harrisv.Reed(1989)489U.S.255(federalcourtwillfindstate procedural @ defaultonlyifstatecourt clearlyandexpresslyreliedonproceduralbarasgroundfordenial).) E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  9    _ԀTworecentU.S.SupremeCourtdecisionshaveprovidedopportunitiesforinvocationofthe  lastofthesegrounds.First,ofcourse,lastyeartheSupremeCourtstruckdown,asaviolationofthe x expostfactoclause,theCaliforniastatutewhichhad revivedtheprosecutionofsexoffenseson @ whichthestatuteoflimitationshadrunpriortotherevivalstatutesenactment/9XXQ9/X9XX/9(Pen.Code#QX9XX/X9h##Q9XXQX9#Ԁ803(g)). X (9XXQ9X9XX9_Stogner_Ԁv.California(2003)539U.S.____,123_S.Ct_.2446.)FormanyCaliforniadefendants   whosecaseshadotherwisebecomefinal,astatehabeaspetitionprovidedthemechanismthrough  whichtheyobtainedreliefunder_Stogner_.Thoughnotyetaswellknownasthe_Stogner_decision, `  theU.S.SupremeCourtsdecisionthismonthinCrawfordv.Washington(March8,2004;No.02 ( x 9410)541U.S.___,2004WL413301,mayprovideasimilarbasistoreopenthecasesofanumber  @ ofCaliforniadefendantswhoseappealsarelongover.TheCrawford#QX9XXX9##Q9XXQX9=#Ԁopinionoverhaulsthe    confrontationclauseanalysisofadmissionofoutofcourt testimonialstatementsbyabsent    witnesses.Anumberofnewhearsayexceptionsenactedoverthepastdecadeorsomaywellbe H   deemedunconstitutionalunderCrawfordsanalysis,includingthespecialstatutesallowing `  admissionof reliableor trustworthyextrajudicialstatementsconcerning childabuse, elder (  abuseordomesticviolence.(Cf._Evid_.Code/9XXQ9/X9XX/9#QX9XX/X92 ##Q9XXQX9Q #/9XXQ9/X9XX/9#QX9XX/X9 ##Q9XXQX9 #Ԁ1360,1370,1380.)Attorneysshouldconsider   whethertheCrawfordanalysiscouldchangetheresultofanypriorappealsinvolvingtheadmission h  ofevidenceunderoneofthosestatutes.Ifso,the changeinthelawexceptiontoDixonand 0  _Waltreus_shouldprovideanavenueforreopeningthosecasesviaahabeaspetition.<  9p`(&Times New Roman p E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  20    _ԀThesuperiorcourthabeasrules(seePartVIIA,infra)describethispleadingasa denial,  ratherthana traverse.(Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.550(b)(4).)  E%$QX9XXX  Q9XXQX9Ԁ  33    _ԀTheU.S.SupremeCourthasgrantedcertiorariinaNinthCircuitcaseconcerningwhetherthe  federalcourtmustadviseapro.per.petitionoftheoptionofdeletingunexhaustedclaimsfroma x mixedpetitionandthenaskingthefederalcourttostayproceedingswhilehereturnstostatecourt @ toexhausttheremainingclaims.(Fordv._Hubbard_(9thCir.2003)330F.3d1086,cert.granted,Jan. X 9,2004,sub.nom.,_Pliler_Ԁv.Ford,No.03221.) G_!QX9XXX   _  -XXXQX9ROY8[7XXdd8;[@ -X-XSTATEHABEASCORPUSUPDATEANDPRACTICETIPS   #-XX-#-gX-X@  #-XX-g#-{X-XJ.BradleyO'Connell   @  StaffAttorney,FirstDistrictAppellateProject  l #-XX-{#-gX-X  March2004#-XX-g#  . ~ @(*****    QX9XX-XINTRODUCTION  ^     Thesematerialsprovideashortsketchofthevariousstagesofstatehabeascorpus  >  proceedings.Amongotherpoints,theytouchonCaliforniaSupremeCourtcaseswhichhavealtered   orclarifiedsomeoftheproceduralrulesgoverninghabeasproceedings,includingstateprocedural ~  defaults(Clark,etc.,PartIB,infra)andtherulesgoverningOSC'sandpostOSCpleadings(Romero F  andDuvall,PartsIVBandVB,infra).However,thisisnotintendedtobeacomprehensiveprimer ^  onstatehabeaspractice.Numeroustopics(e.g.,formatofthepetition,logisticsofanevidentiary &  hearing)arenotcoveredorarenotedonlypassingly.     ThesematerialswereoriginallypreparedforaseminarsponsoredbytheFirstDistrict .~ AppellateProjectin1996.TheyhavebeenupdatedinMarch2004,withparticularemphasison F recentchangesinCaliforniashabeasstatutesandcourtrules(PartVII,infra)andontheinterplay  betweenCaliforniasuniquehabeasproceduresandcrucialfederalhabeasdoctrines,including  exhaustion,calculationoftheAEDPAstatuteoflimitations,andthefederalstatusofCalifornia N proceduraldefaultrules(PartVIII,infra). f  I.  JURISDICTIONANDPROCEDURALBARS     A. ` WheretoFile  6    ` 1. DuringPendencyofDirectAppeal     Thesuperiorcourts,theCourtsofAppeal,andtheSupremeCourtallhaveoriginal V  jurisdictionoverhabeascorpusproceedings.Wherethedefendantalreadyhasadirectappeal n! pending,ahabeaspetitionshouldgenerallybefiledintheCourtofAppeal.IntheFirstDistrictand 6" someotherdistricts,theusualpracticeisfortheappellatecourttoacceptjurisdictionoverthe  # petitionandtoconsideritconcurrentlywiththedirectappeal(thoughthecourtwillnotnecessarily v!$ "consolidate"thepetitionwiththeappeal).Thepracticesvaryinotherdistricts.Sometimesan >"% appellatecourtwilldeclinetoexerciseitsoriginaljurisdiction,despitethependencyofanappeal, #V& andwilldirectcounseltorefilethepetitioninsuperiorcourt.(Seee.g.,InreBaker(1988)206 #' Cal.App.3d493.) $(   UsuallyappellatecounselwillprefertofilethehabeaspetitionintheCourtofAppealinthe &&v!* firstinstance,especiallyifthehabeasclaimsoverlaporcomplementargumentsraisedinthedirect &>"+ appeal.Occasionally,however,appellatecounselmaybelievethatthetrialcourtwillbemore '#, receptivetoaparticularhabeasclaimorcounselmayhaveothertacticalreasonsforpreferringa ~(#- superiorcourtforum.TworecentSupremeCourtdecisionshaveaddressedwhetherthependency F)$. ofanappealbarsthesuperiorcourtfromexercisingjurisdictionoverapetition. *^%/   Peoplev.Mayfield(1993)5Cal.4th220:Wherethehabeasclaimisalsoraisedorcould +&1 beraisedondirectappeal,onthebasisoftheappellaterecord,thesuperiorcourtlacksauthorityto f,'2 entertainthewritpetition.Inthatsituation,superiorcourtwritreliefwouldinterferewiththe  appellatecourt'sjurisdictionoverthependingappeal.AsMayfieldreflects,theassertedinclusion x of"newevidence"willnotnecessarilyremoveawritpetitionfromthisrule,wherethesamebasic @ issueisbeingraisedonappeal.Dictuminapreviouscasesuggeststhatthetestiswhetherthehabeas X claimis"inextricablyconnected"withanissueondirectappeal.(InreKetchel(1968)68Cal.2d   397,399n.2.)(TheMayfieldcourtfounditunnecessaryto"revisit"theKetcheldictumsinceit  foundthattheputative"newevidence"wasirrelevanttothelegalmeritsoftheissue.(Mayfield, `  supra,atp.226.)) ( x   InreCarpenter(1995)9Cal.4th634,645646:However,wherethehabeasclaimrestson    mattersoutsidetheappellaterecordandcouldnotberaisedondirectappeal,superiorcourt    considerationofahabeaspetitiondoesnotinterferewiththeappellatecourt'sjurisdiction.(E.g.,in H   Carpenter,ajurormisconductclaim"thatdidnotappearofrecord"(italicsomitted).) `    Carpentersimplyholdsthatahabeaspetitionmaybefiledinsuperiorcourtwheretheclaim   restsonmattersoutsidetherecordandisnotrelatedtothedirectappealissues;itdoesnotrequire h  asuperiorcourtfiling.Again,inseveraldistricts,theusualpracticeistofilethehabeaspetitionin 0  theappellatecourt,evenintheCarpentersituationwherethehabeasclaimdoesnotparalleloneof H  theappellatearguments.     ` 2. WhenNoDirectAppealisPending  P   Anappellatecourtmaydeclinetoexerciseitsoriginalhabeasjurisdictioninthefirstinstance, 0 especiallyifthereisnodirectappealcurrentlypendingbeforeit.(E.g.,InreRamirez(2001)89  Cal.App.4th1312.)Unlessacurrentlypendingappealprovidesa"hook"forappellatecourt p jurisdiction,thesuperiorcourtisconsideredtheplacetoinitiateahabeasproceeding.(Ofcourse, 8 wheretherewasnodirectappealorwheretheconvictionhasalreadybeenaffirmedonappeal,the P habeaspetitionmayalsohavetoovercomesomeoftheproceduralobstaclesdiscussedinPartIB,  infra.)Ontheotherhand,ifthehabeasclaimsrelatecloselytoapreviouslydecidedappeal(e.g.,  aclaimofineffectiveassistanceofappellatecounselorabidforreconsiderationofapreviously X rejecteddirectappealclaiminlightofinterveningSupremeCourtauthority),theappellatecourt  p wouldbethelogicalplacetofilethehabeaspetition.(Forexample,appellatecourtshaveentertained 8 postaffirmancehabeaspetitionsbasedonPeoplev.Lasko(2000)23Cal.4th101,whichheldthat   specificintenttokillisnotanelementofvoluntarymanslaughter(contrarytopriorcasesand x! standardCALJICinstructions).) @"   However,thereisalsotheoptionoffilingahabeaspetitioninthefirstinstanceintheoriginal  $ jurisdictionoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.AlthoughtheSupremeCourtisnothesitantabout !% invokingotherproceduralbars(e.g.,unreasonabledelay)initshabeasorders,anecdotalreports `"& suggestthattheSupremeCourtislesslikelythantheappellatecourtstodismissanoriginalpetition (#x' forfailuretofileitinthelowercourts.Thus,asapracticalmatter,wherenoappealiscurrently #@( pending,thereisachoicebetweenfilingfirstinsuperiorcourtandthengoing uptheladderwith $ ) petitionsintheappellatecourtandtheSupremeCourtorskippingthelowercourtsaltogetherand % * filingfirstintheSupremeCourt.Thelattercoursemaybeappropriatewhenthestatehabeaspetition H&!+ isviewedsimplyasan exhaustionvehicleandthemainobjectiveistoclearthewayforafederal '`", hearingontheclaims.Obviously,however,iftherearereasonstobelievethatasuperiorcourt '(#- judgemightbeespeciallyreceptivetoaparticularclaim(e.g.,thetrialjudgehasaverydimviewof (#. theattorneywhosthesubjectoftheIACclaimorhaspreviouslyfoundmisconductonthepartof h)$/ thesameprosecutororpoliceofficers),itmakessensetofollowthetraditionalrouteoffilinginthat 0*%0 courtfirst. *H&1  ,'3   B. ` DelayandOtherProceduralBars     Theworstfateforastatehabeaspetitionisaproceduraldefault"i.e.,adenialonsome @ groundotherthanthemerits"atleastifthefederalcourtsdeemthestaterule adequateand X independent.(SeePartVIIICfordiscussionofcurrentfederalstatusofCaliforniasprocedural   defaultrules.)Notonlydoesthepetitionerlosetheopportunityforstatecourtconsiderationofthe  meritsofhishabeasclaims,thestateproceduraldefaultwillcontinuetohaunthiminanysubsequent `  federalhabeasproceedingbasedonthesameclaims. ( x   Inapairofdecisionsissuedonthesamedayin1993,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt    summarizedtheprincipalstateproceduralbarstohabeasclaims,aswellastheexceptionstothose    rules.(InreClark(1993)5Cal.4th750;InreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813.) H      ` 1. Clark&RobbinsDelayedorSuccessivePetitions  (    InClark,supra,5Cal.4th750,theSupremeCourtdeclareditshostilityto"piecemeal h  presentation"ofhabeasclaimsandadoptedan"abuseofthewrit"doctrine,borrowedinpartfrom 0  U.S.SupremeCourtcaseslimitingsuccessivefederalwritpetitions.1 .  1      ׀Clarkbasicallyestablishesa H  "onebiteattheapple"policy.Apetitionerisexpectedtoincludeallhabeasclaimsinhisfirsthabeas  petition.Apetitionermustdemonstrate"duediligenceinpursuingpotentialclaims."(Id.atp.775.)  Asecondor"successive"petitionwillbeconsideredan"abuseofthewrit"ifthepetitionerorhis P counselkneworshouldhaveknownofthefactualbasesforthenewclaimsatthetimeoftheoriginal h petition.2X .  2      ׀"However,wherethefactualbasisfortheclaimwasunknowntothepetitionerandhehad 0 noreasontobelievethattheclaimmightbemade,orwherethepetitionerwasunabletopresenthis  claim,thecourtwillcontinuetoconsiderthemeritsoftheclaimifassertedaspromptlyas p reasonablypossible."(Ibid.) 8   ThoughClark's"successivepetition"rulehashadaprofoundeffectindeathpenaltycases,  ithashadrelativelylittleimpactonappellatepracticeintheCourtsofAppeal.Innoncapitalcases,  appointedcounsel'srolegenerallyendswiththe"firstround"ofhabeasproceedings,anditisrare X forcounseltoattempttofileasecondhabeaspetition,raisingnewclaimsorofferingnewevidence  p insupportofthepreviouslyrejectedclaims.Inanyevent,Clark'slessonforappellatecounselis 8 clear.Counselshouldmarshallallthehabeasclaimsinasinglepetition.     TheotherproceduralbardiscussedinClarkhasgreaterpotentialrelevancefornoncapital @" habeaspetitions."`[A]habeascorpuspetitionshouldbefiledaspromptlyasthecircumstancesof  X# thecaseallow....[O]newhoseeksextraordinaryrelief...mustpointtoparticularcircumstances  $ sufficienttojustifysubstantialdelay....'"(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.786[emphasisadded], !% quotingInreStankewitz(1985)40Cal.3d391,397n.1.) `"&   UndertheSupremeCourtsstandardsforcapitalcases,ahabeaspetitionispresumptively #@(  timelyiffiledwithin180daysofthefinalduedateforthereplybriefinthedirectappealorwithin $ ) 24monthsoftheappointmentofseparatehabeascounsel.3 .  3      ׀However,counselshouldnotassumethat   apetitionfiledwithinthatperiodwillautomaticallybeconsideredtimelyinanoncapitalcase. x Outsidethecapitalcontext,therearenobrightlinerulesfordeterminingthetimelinessofahabeas @ petition. X   Wheneverpossible,counselshouldattempttofilethehabeaspetitionconcurrentlywithor  withinashorttimeaftertheopeningbriefonappeal.Atanyrate,thepetitionshouldbefiledbefore `  thedirectappealisheardanddecided.Counsel"shouldnotawaittheoutcomeoftheappeal"to ( x determinewhethertofileahabeaspetition.(Clark,supra,atp.784n.20.)  @   ExceptionstoClark"FundamentalMiscarriageofJustice."Areviewingcourtwillstill    consideran"untimely"or"successive"petitiononthemerits,despitetheabsenceofjustificationfor H   thedelayedpresentationoftheclaim,wherethepetition'sallegations,ifproven,wouldestablisha `  "fundamentalmiscarriageofjustice"concerningeithertheconvictionorsentencingproceedings. (  (Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.797.)Forpurposesofthisrule,however,"fundamentalmiscarriage   ofjustice"isnarrowlydefinedasconsistingoffourcategories: h  8   ` (1)[T]haterrorofconstitutionalmagnitudeledtoatrialthatwasso H  fundamentallyunfairthatabsenttheerrornoreasonablejudgeorjurywouldhave  convictedthepetitioner;[fn.](2)thatthepetitionerisactuallyinnocentofthecrime  orcrimesofwhichthepetitionerwasconvicted;[fn.](3)thatthedeathpenaltywas P imposedbyasentencingauthoritywhichhadsuchagrosslymisleadingprofileofthe h petitionerbeforeitthatabsentthetrialerrororomissionnoreasonablejudgeorjury 0 wouldhaveimposedasentenceofdeath;[fn.](4)thatthepetitionerwasconvicted  orsentencedunderaninvalidstatute.(Id.atpp.797798.)p     Clark'scompanioncase,Harris,suggeststhatthejurisdictionalclaimsdiscussedthereare P alsoexceptionstothebarsondelayedorsuccessivepetitions.Inparticular,claimsof"lackof  fundamentaljurisdiction"(i.e.,subjectmatterjurisdiction)orjudicialacts"inexcessofjurisdiction"  mayberaisedatanytime,andthepetitionerisnotrequiredtojustifyanydelayinassertingthe X claim.(Harris,supra,5Cal.4thatpp.836842.)  p   Alsonotethata"substantialdelay"objectionisitselfsubjecttowaiverandestoppel   limitations.ThePeoplemayeffectivelywaivethisproceduralbarbyfailingtoassertthetimeliness x! objectioninatimelyfashion.(E.g.,InreMoser(1993)6Cal.4th342,350n.7;seealsoInre @" Sassounian(1995)9Cal.4th535,551n.15.)  X#   RobbinsRefinementoftheClarkrules.TheSupremeCourtrevisitedClarkinapairof1998 !% opinionsandattemptedtoexplainhowitmeasured substantialdelayandotheraspectsofthe `"& timelinessinquiry.(InreRobbins(1998)18Cal.4th770;InreGallego(1998)18Cal.4th825.) (#x' Bothopinionsareunusuallydenseandfactspecific,and(perhapscontrarytotheCourtsintention) #@( itisdifficulttoextractany brightlineprinciplesfromthem.However,severalaspectsofthe $ ) Robbinsopinionareparticularlynoteworthy:Theprimaryconsiderationinmeasuringwhethera % * petitionwasfiledwithout substantialdelayiswhenthedefendantorhiscounselkneworshould H&!+ haveknownof triggeringfactsputtingthedefenseonnoticeofapotentialhabeasclaimwarranting '`", furtherinvestigation.InRobbins,theCourtaddressedthe substantialdelayquestiononaclaim '(#- byclaimbasis.Infact,itsubdividedtheclaimsmuchmoreminutelythanthepetitionitselfhad. (#. Itbrokesomeclaimsintomultiple subclaims,basedonstatementsfromdifferentwitnessesand h)$/ separatelyanalyzedcounselsdiligenceininvestigatingandpresentingeach subclaim.(See  Robbins,supra,atpp.784815[breaking ClaimIofthepetitioninto4 subclaims].) x Throughouttheopinion,theCourtemphasizedthat thepetitionerhastheburdenofestablishing(i) @ theabsenceofsubstantialdelay,(ii)goodcauseforthedelay,or(iii)thattheclaimfallswithinan X exceptiontothebarofuntimeliness.(Id.atp.780,emphasisinoriginal.)     TheRobbinsCourtalsoaddressedtheroleofinvestigationofotherclaims(includingclaims `  whichdonotultimatelymaterialize)inassessingthetimelinessoftheclaimswhichareultimately ( x presentedinahabeaspetition.Ordinarily,aclaimwillbedeemeduntimelyifthepetitionerorhis  @ counselhadalreadyobtainedsufficientfactstostateaprimafaciecaseonthatclaimorcouldhave    obtainedsuchinformationthroughadiligentinvestigationatanearliertime.However,theCourt    alsoappearedtorecognizesometensionbetweentheobjectivesofpresentationofafullydeveloped H   claimattheearlieropportunityandavoidanceof piecemeallitigation. Aclaimorapartthereof `  thatissubstantiallydelayedneverthelesswillbeconsideredonthemeritsifthepetitionercan (  demonstrategoodcauseforthedelay.Goodcauseforsubstantialdelaymaybeestablishedif,for   example,thepetitionercandemonstratethatbecauseheorshewasconductingan%  %Qongoing h  investigationintoatleastonepotentiallymeritoriousclaim,thepetitionerdelayedpresentationof 0  oneormoreotherknownclaimsinordertoavoidthepiecemealpresentationofclaims..... H  (Robbins,supra,atp.780,emphasisinoriginal.)    Finally,inRobbins,theSupremeCourtannouncedachangeinthewayinwhichitapplied P the miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstothetimelinessbar.Itstatedthathenceforthitwouldlook h onlytoCalifornialaw,ratherthanfederallaw,inassessingwhetheraclaimcamewithinanyofthe 0 firstthreeexceptionsidentifiedinClark. .  4      ׀(Robbins,supra,atpp.811812&fn.32.)Asthe  Robbinsopinionacknowledged,thepurposeofthecuriousresortto statelawonlydeciding p whetherapetitionersfederalclaimsrisetoamiscarriageofjusticewastodisentanglethetimeliness 8 proceduralbarfromfederallaw,sothatthestaterulewouldbeconsidered adequateand P independentoffederallawforfederalhabeaspurposes.(SeePartVIIIC,infra,fordiscussionof  theimpactofRobbinsonfederalcourtsreviewofpreandpostRobbinshabeasdenials.)    AppellateapplicationsofClarkandRobbins.󀀀AlthoughsomeaspectsofClarksand  p Robbinstimelinessrulesapplytoallhabeaspetitions,capitalandnoncapital,bothwerecapital 8 casesandconcernedthemorewellestablisheddutiesofcapitalcounseltoconductahabeas   investigation.Additionally,asnotedearlier,bothcasesdealtwiththeSupremeCourts x!  presumptiveguidelinesformeasuringthetimelinessofacapitalhabeaspetition.Thereareno @" comparablebenchmarksfornoncapitalpetitions.Consequently,itisverydifficulttotranslatethose  X# theClarkandRobbinsholdingsintothenoncapitalcontext.Andthepublishedcaselawdoesnot  $ spelloutthespecificapplicationofthosestandardstothetimingofahabeaspetitionrelatedtoa !% conventionalnoncapitalappeal. `"&   AtleastintheFirstDistrict,itisrareforawritdenialtociteClarkandRobbinsorotherwise #@( refertoatimelinessbar.Ahabeaspetitionfiledduringthecourseofthebriefingorwithinashort $ ) timeafterthecompletionofbriefingwillgenerallybeconsideredtimely.Apetitionfiledmonths % *  afterbriefingoraroundthetimeoforalargumentmayencounterproblems,butitisdifficultto H&!+ predictwhetherthecourtwillsayanythingaboutthepetitionstiming. .  5      ׀Insomecases,ofcourse,   thecircumstancessurroundingthehabeasclaimwillalsoprovidethejustificationforitsdelayed x presentatione.g.,awitness'suddenrecantationorthefortuitousdiscoveryofnewexculpatory @ evidence. X   Evenwherethehabeaspetitionisfiledduringthebriefingofthecurrentappeal,itislikely  tofacelacheslikeobjectionsofunjustifieddelaywheretheclaimederroractuallyrelatestosome `  priorproceedinginthesamecaseratherthantheonewhichisthesubjectofthecurrentappeal. ( x (E.g.,inaprobationrevocationcase,ahabeaschallengetothevalidityoftheoriginalguiltyplea  @ underlyingtheconviction;inanextensionofanNGIcommitment(Pen.Code,1026.5),aclaim    ofdefectiveadvisementssurroundingtheoriginalNGIplea.Ineachsituation,itwillbenecessary    tojustifywhythepleachallengewasnotraisedatthetimeofthepreviousdisposition(theorder H   grantingprobationortheoriginalNGIcommitment).) `     ` 2.0 Dixon,Waltreus&HarrisClaimsWhichWereorCouldHaveBeen   RaisedonAppeal h  (# (#   TheSupremeCourthasoftensaidthat"`[habeascorpuswillnotserveasasecondappeal.' H  [Citations]"(InreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813,825.)First,areviewingcourtordinarilywillnot  consider,onhabeascorpus,aclaimwhichwasraisedandrejectedondirectappeal(the"Waltreus  rule"4 .  6      ).(Harris,supra,atpp.824829.)Neitherwillitconsiderahabeasclaimwhichcouldhave P beenbutwasnotraisedondirectappeal(the"Dixonrule"5@ .  7      ).(Id.atpp.825n.3,829.) h   RobbinsaddsanimportantqualificationtotheDixonandWaltreusrules.Becausehabeas  corpusisthepreferredvehicleforconsiderationofIACclaims, Wedonotapplythosebars[Dixon p &Waltreus[toclaimsofineffectiveassitanceoftrialcounsel,evenifthehabeascorpusclaimis 8 basedsolelyupontheappellaterecord.[Citation.](InreRobbins(1998)18Cal.4th770,814fn. P 34.)    LikeClark,theHarrisopinionalsoidentifiestheexceptionstotheseproceduralbars:(a)a X constitutionalerrorwhich"isbothclearandfundamentalandstrikesattheheartofthetrialprocess"  p (id.atp.834[emphasisadded]);6 .  8      ׀(b)"atruelackoffundamentaljurisdiction"(i.e.,subjectmatter 8  jurisdiction)(Harris,supra,5Cal.4thatpp.836838);(c)acts"inexcessof_jurisdiction;"and(d)   claimsaffectedbyachangeinthelaw(e.g.,aninterveningU.S.orCaliforniaSupremeCourt  decisionestablishinganewrule). .  9       x    The"inexcessofjurisdiction"exceptiondeservesspecialnote.Impositionofan X unauthorizedsentenceisanactinexcessofjurisdiction.(Id.atp.839.)JustastheAttorneyGeneral   (ortheappellatecourtitself)mayraisean"unauthorizedsentence"issueinthecontextofadefense  appeal,despitetheprosecution'sfailuretonoticeanappeal,adefendant's"unauthorizedsentence" `  claimiscognizableonhabeascorpusevenwhereitcouldhavebeenraisedonappeal.7 .  10      ׀However, ( x the"excessofjurisdiction"exceptiontotheWaltreusandDixonrulesappliesonlytopurelylegal  @ claimswhichdonotrequireany"redeterminationofthefactsunderlyingtheclaim."(Id.atpp.840    841.)     II.  ISSUESCOGNIZABLEONSTATEHABEASCORPUSCOMMONCLAIMS  `    Appellatecounselmostcommonlyutilizehabeaspetitionswhereaclaimrestsinpartonfacts   "outsidetherecord"ofthedirectappealorwheredirectappellatereviewisunavailableforsome h  otherreason(suchasadefaultedappeal).Justaswithfederalhabeaspractice,FourthAmendment 0  claimsarenotcognizableonstatehabeascorpus.(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.767,citingInre H  Sterling(1965)63Cal.2d486.)8 .  11      ׀Withthatexception,virtuallyanyotherclaimmayberaisedvia  ahabeaspetition(subject,ofcourse,totheprocedurallimitationsdiscussedinPartIB,supra.)  Unlikefederalhabeascorpusreview,statehabeasreviewisnotlimitedtofederalconstitutional P violations,butalsoincludesstatelawclaims.(Notably,someofthestatelawbasesforhabeasrelief h donotinvolveanyerrorormisconductonthepartofanyoftheparticipantsinthetrial.suchas 0 newlydiscoveredevidenceorthenewstatutoryprovisionon BatteredWomensSyndrome(Pen.  Code1473.5;seePartVIIB).)Counselshouldconsiderthepossibilityofawritpetition,notonly x whereaclaimrestsentirelyonmattersoutsidetherecord,butalsoinsituationswhereanadditional @ factualshowingcanprovidefurthersupportforanargumentbeingraisedondirectappeal(e.g.,to X establishprejudicefromBoykinTahlerrororotherdefectsinpleaadvisements).Thefollowinglist   notessomeofthemostcommonusesofhabeascorpuspetitionsinconjunctionwithcriminal  appeals;thelistisbynomeansexhaustive: `    Ineffectiveassistanceoftrialcounsel(e.g.,InreSixto(1989)48Cal.3d1247.)  @   Counsel'sconflictofinterest(e.g.,InreHochberg(1970)2Cal.3d870).      Ineffectiveassistanceofappellatecounsel(e.g.,InreSmith(1970)3Cal.3d192[failure `  toraisecrucialpotentiallymeritoriousissuesonappeal]). (    Reinstatementofalateorotherwisedefaultedappeal(e.g.,InreSerrano(1995)10Cal.4th h  447;InreJordan(1992)4Cal.4th116;InreVallery(1992)3Cal.App.4th1125). 0    Prosecutorialsuppressionofexculpatoryevidence("Bradyerror")orpresentationof  testimonywhichtheprosecutorknowsorshouldknowisfalseormisleading("Agurserror")(e.g.,  InreSassounian(1995)9Cal.4th535;InreJackson(1992)3Cal.4th578). P   Prosecutorialpresentationoffalseevidence(Pen.Code,1473;e.g.,InreHall(1981)30 0 Cal.3d408,424;seealsoSassounian,supra,9Cal.4thatp.546).9 .  12          Prosecutorialintimidationofdefensewitness(e.g.,InreMartin(1987)44Cal.3d1). 8   Vindictiveordiscriminatoryprosecution(e.g.,InreBower(1985)38Cal.3d865).    Newlydiscoveredevidence(e.g.,Hall,supra,30Cal.3datp.417).: .  13       X   Jurormisconduct(e.g.,InreHitchings(1993)6Cal.4th97). 8   Statuteoflimitations(e.g.,InreDemillo(1975)14Cal.3d598). x!   BoykinTahlerrororotherdefectsintheadvisementsandwaiversattendingapleaor  X# admission(e.g.,InreMoser(1993)6Cal.4th342).  $   Claimsthatthepriorconvictionsfailtosatisfytheenhancementstatute(e.g.,InreHarris `"& (1989)49Cal.3d131[erroneousimpositionoftwoenhancements(underPen.Code,667(a))where (#x' thepriorcaseswerenotbroughtandtriedseparately]). #@( Ї  Custodycreditsissues(e.g.,InreJoyner(1989)48Cal.3d487).    Appellatereviewofadenialofbail(eitherpretrialbailorbailpendingappeal)(e.g.,Inre @ Pipinos(1982)33Cal.3d189). X   !Sentencingjudgesmistakenbeliefthatheorshelackeddiscretionregardingimpositionof  a strikeorotherenhancement(in silentrecordcaseswherethatmistakeisnotevidentfromthe `  sentencingtranscript)(Peoplev.Fuhrman(1997)16Cal.4th930,945946); ( x   SeePartVIIBfordiscussionofnewstatuteauthorizinghabeasrelieffor Battered    WomensSyndromeinpre1992murdercases.(Pen.Code1473.5)      III.  INVESTIGATIVETOOLS  b    A. ` ObtainingInformationfromTrialCounsel      Trialcounselisethicallyobligedtocooperatewithsuccessorcounselincludingappellate 2  counselinvestigatingapossiblehabeasissueofineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.(StateBarof J  California,StandingCommitteeonProfessionalResponsibility&Conduct,FormalOpinionNo.  1992127)Uponrequest,"theattorneymustturnoverallpapersandpropertyintheclient'sfileto  theclientorsuccessorcounsel.[Fn.]"(Id.,p.2)Trialcounselhasno"workproductprivilege"vis R avishisformerclient;consequently,successorcounselisentitledto"theentirecontentsofthefile, j notjustthepleadings,depositionsandexhibits."(Ibid.)  2   TheSupremeCourtsrecentSteeleopinion(discussedfurtherbelow)alsolendssomesupport r tothatview. Atrialattorneyisobligatedtoturnoverthelitigationfiletotheclientornewcounsel : oncethatattorneysrepresentationhasterminated.[Citation.]  (InreSteele(Mar.8,2004;S114551) R 32Cal.4th__,slipopn,pp.89.)     Finally,trialcounselshouldalsocooperatewithappellatecounselinprovidinganyrequested Z informationwhichhasnotbeenreducedtowriting.(StateBar,StandingCom.,etc.,supra,Formal "r Opn.1992127atpp.23.)AlthoughtheStateBarOpiniondidnotspecificallymentionthispoint, : thisprincipleappearsespeciallyapplicabletoacommonproblemencounteredbyappellatecounsel:   Underthereasoningoftheopinion,trialcounselshouldbeobligedtorespondtoappellatecounsels z! inquiriesconcerningcounsel'sreasons(ifany)forparticularactsoromissionsbeforeorduringtrial B" (e.g.,failuretoobjecttoparticularevidence).Also,ofcourse,appellatecounselisentitledto  Z# informationontheextentoftrialcounsel'soutofcourtpreparationandinvestigation.  "$   B. ` ObtainingInformationfromtheProsecution  b"&   Generalrule:nopostjudgment,preOSCdiscoverymechanism:Sometypesofhabeas #B( claimsfrequentlydependonextractingadditionalmaterialsfromprosecutorsandpolicee.g.,a $ ) Bradyclaimconcerningsuppressionofexculpatoryevidencesuchasinducementsofferedtoan % * informant.InPeoplev.Gonzalez1990)51Cal.3d1179,12551261,theSupremeCourtsquarely J&!+ heldthatthetrialcourthasnojurisdictiontoentertainapostjudgment"discovery"motionduring 'b", thependencyofanappeal.Moreover,Gonzalezalsoappearstoforecloseaprepetitiondiscovery '*#- motionintheCourtofAppealasameansofobtainingevidencetobeincludedinthepetition.Under (#. Gonzalez,areviewingcourthasnoauthoritytoorderdiscoveryunlessthepetitionisalreadyonfile j)$/ andthecourthasalreadyfoundaprimafaciecasethestandardforissuanceofanordertoshow 2*%0 cause(OSC). *J&1  +'2   NewstatutoryprocedureforpostjudgmentdiscoveryincapitalandLWOPcases.󀀀In2002,  theLegislaturepartiallyabrogatedGonzalezbyenactinganewstatuteforpostjudgmentdiscovery x byappellatecounselofanymaterialsthatwereorcouldhavebeenprovidedindiscoveryduringtrial. @ (Pen.Code1054.9.)However,thediscoverystatuteislimitedtocasesinwhichadefendant X receivedeitherthedeathpenaltyoranLWOPsentence(i.e.,specialcircumstancecases).󀀀Upona   showingthat goodfaitheffortstoobtaindiscoverymaterialsfromtrialcounselhavebeenmadeand  wereunsuccessful,adefendantmayfileamotionseekingdiscoveryofany materialsinthe `  prosecutionandlawenforcementauthoritiestowhichthesamedefendantwouldhavebeenentitled ( x attimeoftrial.  @   Inadecisionfiledjustasthesematerialsare goingtopress,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt    hasgivenafairlyexpansiveconstructiontosection1054.9.(InreSteele(Mar.8,2004;S114551) H   32Cal.4th__.)Althoughthestatutebegins, Uponprosecutionofapostconvictionpetitionforwrit `  ofhabeascorpusoramotiontovacateajudgment,Steeleholdsthattheactualpendencyofahabeas (  petitionisnotaprerequisiteforfilingadiscoverymotion.Instead, prosecutionofahabeas   petitionincludesprefilinginvestigationandpreparation. Defendantsarenowentitledtodiscovery h  toassistinstatingaprimafaciecaseforrelief.ButtheonlywaythismodificationoftheGonzalez 0  rulemakessenseistopermitdefendantstoseekdiscoverybeforetheyfilethepetition....(Steele, H  supra,slipopn.,p.6.)Althougheitherthetrialcourtorthereviewingcourthasjurisdictionto  considerasection1054.9,ordinarilythesuperiorcourtistheproperforumforthemotion.P .  14          Turningtothesubstantivescopeof discoverymaterials,theSupremeCourtrejectedthe h notionthatsection1054.9issimplya filereconstructionmechanism,limitedtoreplacingmaterials 0 whichwerepreviouslydisclosedtotrialcounsel.Instead,theCourtemphasizedthatthestatute  coveredbothmaterialsactuallydisclosedandanything towhichthedefendantwouldhavebeen p entitledattimeoftrial.(1054.9,emphasisadded.) 8 8  [W]einterpretsection1054.9torequirethetrialcourt,onapropershowingofagood  faithefforttoobtainthematerialsfromtrialcounsel,toorderdiscoveryofspecific  materialscurrentlyinthepossessionoftheprosecutionorlawenforcement X authoritiesinvolvedintheinvestigationorprosecutionofthecasethatthedefendant  p canshoweither(1)theprosecutiondidprovideattimeoftrialbuthavesincebecome 8 losttothedefendant;(2)theprosecutionshouldhaveprovidedattimeoftrial   becausetheycamewithinthescopeofadiscoveryorderthetrialcourtactuallyissued x! atthattime,astatutorydutytoprovidediscovery,ortheconstitutionaldutyto @" discloseexculpatoryevidence;(3)theprosecutionshouldhaveprovidedattimeof  X# trialbecausethedefensespecificallyrequestedthematthattime;or(4)the  $ prosecutionhadnoobligationtoprovideattimeoftrialabsentaspecificdefense !% request,buttowhichthedefendantwouldhavebeenentitledattimeoftrialhadthe `"& defendantspecificallyrequestedthem.(Steele,supra,slipopn.,atp.14.)(#x'     InSteeleitself,theCourtheldthatthestatuteauthorizeddiscoveryofinformationinthe $ ) possessionoftheDepartmentofCorrectionsconcerningSteelespreviousbehaviorinprisonbecause % * thatinformationwouldhavebeendiscoverableattrialifthedefensehadspecificallyrequestedit H&!+ (duetoitsrelevancetothedefensesmitigationtheory). '`",   ProsecutorscontinuingpostjudgmentBradydutytodiscloseexculpatoryevidence.Since (#. section1054.9appliesonlytospecialcircumstancecases,Gonzalezcontinuestopresentapotential h)$/ Catch22toobtainingdiscoveryandmakinganadequateshowingforhabeasreliefinallothercases.  Withouttherequestedevidence,appellatecounselmaybeunabletopresentthe"primafacie x showing"necessarytoobtainanOSC.Nonetheless,althoughthereisnoauthorityforanypre @ petitionproceduredenominateda"discoverymotion,"counselshouldbecreativeindevising X alternativemeansforobtainingdocumentsfromtheprosecutionatleastwherecounselhasspecific   reasontobelievethatsuchmaterialsexist.Peoplev.Garcia(1993)17Cal.App.4th1169,may  providethenecessarylever.Garciaholdsthattheprosecutorialdutytodiscloseanyexculpatory `  evidence(includingimpeachmentevidence)doesnotendwiththepronouncementofsentence. ( x GarciafoundaBradyviolationbasedontheprosecutionsfailuretodisclosepostjudgment  @ informationsignificantlyimpeachingthecredibilityofakeyexpertwitness.      TheCaliforniaSupremeCourthaspassinglyendorsedthesameprincipleinbothitsGonzalez H   andSteeleopinions. [P]rosecutorshaveacontinuingdutytodiscloseinformationfavorabletothe `  defense,andweexpectandassumethattheywillperformthisdutypromptlyandfully....(Steele, (  supra,S114551,slipopn.,p.9;seealsoGonzalez,supra,51Cal.3datpp.12601261.)      Whereappellatecounselhasreasontobelievethattheprosecutororthepolicemaypossess 0  informationcomingwithinthedisclosurerulesoutlinedinGarcia,Gonzalez,andSteele,counselcan H  directa"PostTrialDisclosureRequest"totherelevantprosecutorscitingthosecases(especially  Garcia).Dependingonthecircumstances,thedisclosurerequestcantaketheformofaletterorof  amoreformalpleading.< .  15      ׀ItwouldbeadvisabletoservetherequestonboththeAttorneyGeneral P andtheDistrictAttorneywhoprosecutedthetrial.Additionally,thoughtherequestisforvoluntary h prosecutorialdisclosureanddoesnotrequireanyimmediatejudicialaction,itmaybewisetolodge 0 acopywiththeappellatecourtincasedisputesariseduringlaterproceedingsovertheadequacyof  theprosecution'sresponse. p   C. ` InvestigationandOtherAncillaryServices  P   Theappellatedistrictsvaryintheirproceduresforauthorizingancillaryexpenses  (investigators,experts,etc.)forahabeasinvestigationduringthependencyofadirectappeal.But, X inalldistricts,appointedappellatecounselgenerallymustobtainsomekindofpreclearancefrom  p eithertherelevantappellateproject(FDAP,CAPLA,CCAP,SDAP,orADI)orfromtheappellate 8 courtitself.Forexample,intheFirstDistrict,FDAPisauthorizedtopreclearupto$900intotal   ancillaryexpenses;anyexpensesinexcessofthatamountrequirepreclearancebytheCourtof x! Appeal. @"  IV.  THEPETITIONSTATINGAPRIMAFACIECASE   $   A. ` TheFactualShowing  `"&   Technically,ahabeaspetitionisa"pleading."Itmustbeverified(Pen.Code,1474(3))(by #@( petitionerorcounsel),andtheverificationcannotbeoninformationorbelief(Peoplev.McCarthy $ ) (1986)176Cal.App.3d593).Butotherwisethereisnoexplicitstatutoryrequirementthatitbe % * supportedbydeclarationsorotherevidence.EventheSupremeCourt'scasesstopshortofrequiring H&!+ thatthepetitionitselfincludecompetentproofofeveryallegation.Instead,theCourthasstated '`", simplythatapetitionshould"includecopiesofreasonablyavailabledocumentaryevidence '(#- supportingtheclaim,includingpertinentportionsoftrialtranscriptsandaffidavitsordeclarations." (#. (Peoplev.Duvall(1995)9Cal.4th464,474(emphasisadded)accordInreClark(1993)5Cal.4th  750,781n.16.)ElsewheretheCourthasdescribedthefunctionofsupportingaffidavitsassimply x "topersuadethecourtofthebonafidesoftheallegations."(InreFields(1990)51Cal.3d1063, @ 1070n.2.) X   Inpractice,however,theappellatecourtsdogenerallyrequirethatthepetition'sfactual  allegationsbesupportedbycompetentproof(usuallydeclarationsorcourtrecordsorotherjudicially `  noticeabledocuments).Whereverpossible,theshowingshouldtakeaformwhichavoidshearsay ( x objectionsi.e.,thedeclarationsshouldcontainmatterstowhichthedeclarantscouldtestifyonthe  @ stand.= .  16      ׀Themostcommonimpedimentisanuncooperativetrialattorney.Inthatsituation,appellate    counselshouldsubmithisowndeclarationdetailinghiseffortstocommunicatewithorobtaina    declarationfromtrialcounsel.(SeePeoplev.Duvall(1995)9Cal.4th464,485,wheretheSupreme H   Courtdescribedtheallegationswhicharespondent'sreturnshouldsetforthwhererespondent's `  counselhasbeenunabletocommunicatewithtrialcounselortoobtainothercrucialinformation.)>  .  17      ׀ (  ЀWheretrialcounselhasdiscussedhisclaimedtacticalreasons(orlackofreasons)withappellate   counselbuthasrefusedtosignadeclaration,appellatecounsel'sdeclarationshouldsummarizethose h  discussions. 0    B. ` InformalBriefingandthePivotalRoleofanOSC     TworecentSupremeCourtopinionshaveaddressedtheproceduralrulesgoverningpost P petitionproceedingsinappellatecourts.(Peoplev.Duvall,supra,9Cal.4th464;Peoplev.Romero h (1994)8Cal.4th728.)BothRomeroandDuvallweredefenselossesinthesensethat,ineachcase, 0 theSupremeCourtconcludedthattheappellatecourthadprematurelygrantedthepetitionwithout  affordingtheAttorneyGeneralanadequateopportunitytodisputethepetition'sallegations. p However,bothopinionsmayproveusefultopetitionerssincetheyunderscorethecrucialfunction 8 ofanordertoshowcause(OSC). P   Onmosthabeaspetitions,theappellatecourtssolicit"informalbriefing"only(Cal.Rulesof  Court,rule60).Usually,asofthetimeoforalargumentonthedirectappeal,theappellatecourtstill X hasnotissuedanOSC.Thisisaproceduralpostureinwhichthehabeaspetitionercanlosebuthe  p can'twin.Anappellatecourtcandenyapetitiononthebasisoftheinformalbriefing(oreven 8 withoutsolicitingopposition),butitcannotgrantthepetition.UnderRomero,anappellatecourt   cannotgrantreliefunlessithasfirstissuedanOSC,affordingtherespondentanopportunitytofile x! aformalreturn.(Romero,supra,8Cal.4thatpp.740744.)Romeroreversedandremandedan @" appellatedecisionwhichhadgrantedawritpetitiononthebasisoftheinformalbriefing.  X#   AcruciallessonofRomeroforappellatecounselisthis:Theimmediateobjectofthehabeas !% petitionandtheinformalreplyshouldbetheissuanceofanOSC.Counselshouldbecarefulto `"& frametheargumentsintermsoftheprimafaciecasestandardforissuanceofanOSCandshould (#x' arguethatitwouldbeprematurefortheappellatecourttodecidepotentiallymeritoriousclaimsat #@( this"preliminary"stageofthehabeasproceeding.Romeromakesclearthatwhereapetitiondoes  stateaprimafaciecaseforrelief,"theissuanceofthewrit(orordertoshowcause)ismandatory, x notoptional."(Romero,supra,8Cal.4thatp.740.)Additionally,bothRomeroandDuvallreiterate @ that,forpurposesofevaluatingwhetherthepetitionstatesaprimafaciecase,theappellatecourt X shouldtakethepetition'sfactualallegationsastrueandconsiderwhetherthoseclaims,ifproven,   wouldsupporthabeasrelief.(Id.atp.737;Duvall,supra,9Cal.4thatpp.474475.)    C. ` SupremeCourtHabeasReviewAfteraSummaryDenial  ( x   AhabeasdenialwithoutissuanceofanOSCisa"summarydenial."Theappellatecourtmay    discussthemeritsofthepetitionintheopiniondecidingthedirectappeal,oritmaydenyitina    separateminuteorder(usuallywithnostatementofthecourt'sreasons).Apetitionercanseek H   SupremeCourtreviewfollowingsuchadenialeitherbyrefilingthehabeaspetitionwithinthe `  SupremeCourt'soriginaljurisdictionorbyfilingaconventionalpetitionforreviewastothehabeas (  denial.@ .  18      ׀Althougheitherprocedureispermissible,insomepastcasestheSupremeCourtexpressed   apreferenceforthepetitionforreviewalternativeatleastincaseswheretheappellatecourtdenied h  thewritpetitioninawrittenopinionfollowingfullbriefing.(InreMichaelE.(1975)15Cal.3d183, 0  193n.15;InreReed(1983)33Cal.3d914,918n.2.) H    RegardlessofwhichprocedureisemployedtobringthehabeaspetitionbeforetheSupreme  Court,counselshouldremainfocusedonthenecessityofanOSCandframethearguments P accordingly.BearinmindthattheSupremeCourthasthepowertoissueanOSCreturnableina h lowercourt,eithertheappellatecourtorasuperiorcourt.Incontrasttoagrantofreviewonadirect 0 appeal,thisformofreliefdoesnotcommittheSupremeCourttoplacingthecaseonitsowndocket  andhearinganddecidingthepetitionitself.However,anOSCreturnableinalowercourtgivesthe p petitioneranotherdayincourt(andalsocommunicatestothelowercourtthatthehighercourtviews 8 thepetition'sallegationsasveryserious). P    V.  POSTOSCPROCEEDINGS     A. ` Forum  @   AreviewingcourtcanmakeitsOSCreturnableeitherbeforeitselforbeforealowercourt.   WheretheOSCismadereturnableintheappellatecourt,thepostOSCproceedings(includingany  evidentiaryhearingbeforearefereeappointedbytheappellatecourt)comewithinappellatecounsel's `  appointment.WheretheappellatecourtmakestheOSCreturnableinsuperiorcourt,iteffectively ( x transfersorremandstheentirewritproceedingtothatcourt.Inthatsituation,thesuperiorcourtwill  @ beresponsibleforappointingcounsel.      B. ` PostOSCPleadingsReturnandTraverse  H     RegardlessofwheretheOSCismadereturnable,thenextstepisfortherespondenttofile (  aformalpleading,a"return,"inanswertothepetition'sallegations.Thepetitionerthenfilesareply   pleading,a"traverse"(alsoknownasa denial)respondingtothereturn.Thefunctionofthereturn h  andthetraverseistodefineandnarrowthecontestedissues.Aftercomparingthereturnandthe 0  traverse,thecourtdetermineswhetherthereareanydisputedissuesofmaterialfactrequiringan H  evidentiaryhearing.     ` 1. SufficiencyoftheReturn  P   AcriticalquestioninpostOSCproceedingsiswhetheracountershowing,intheformof 0 opposingdeclarationsorotherevidence,isnecessarytobringtheopposingparty'sfactualshowing  intodispute.Underpreviouscaselaw,areturnconsistingonlyof"generaldenials"notsupported p byspecificfactualallegationsandsupportingproofwasdeemedinsufficienttobringapetition's 8 factualallegationsintodispute.Underthosecases,thehabeascourtwasentitledtoviewthe P petition'sfactualshowingasuncontrovertedandtodecidethepetitionwithoutthenecessityofan  evidentiaryhearing.A .  19      ׀However,inPeoplev.Duvall,supra,9Cal.4th464,theSupremeCourt  significantlyrelaxedtherespondent'spleadingresponsibilitiesandmadeitsubstantiallyeasierfor X therespondenttoobtainanevidentiaryhearingonthepetition's"disputed"factualallegations,  p withouttenderinganycounterdeclarationsorotherfactualshowing.TheSupremeCourt 8 emphasizedthat"[a]tthisearlystage,...thePeople'sburdenisoneofpleadingnotproof.[Fn.]"(Id.   atp.483.)AlthoughDuvallretainedthegeneralrequirementthatthereturnpleadspecificfacts x! wherepossible,itexcusedthatrequirementundercircumstanceswherecrucialfactsareunavailable @" torespondent'scounsel,suchaswheretrialcounselrefusestospeakwithhimor(asinDuvallitself)  X# trialcounselisdead.TheDuvallopinionarticulatedthefollowingstandards:  $ 8   ` Whenoneparty(respondentforthereturn,petitionerforthetraverse)can `"& allege:(i)heorshehasactedwithduediligence;(ii)crucialinformationisnot (#x' readilyavailable;and(iii)thatthereisgoodreasontodisputecertainallegedfactsor #@( questionthecredibilityofcertaindeclarants,courtsevaluatingthereturnandtraverse $ ) shouldendeavortodeterminewhethertherearefactslegitimatelyindisputethatmay % * requireholdinganevidentiaryhearing.[]Toassistthecourtinmakingthe H&!+ determination,thereturnshouldsetforthwithspecificity:(i)whyinformationisnot '`", readilyavailable;(ii)thestepsthatweretakentotrytoobtainit;and(iii)whyaparty '(#- believesingoodfaiththatcertainallegedfactsareuntrue.(Id.atp.485.)(#.    0*%0 ROY R R     ` 2. SufficiencyoftheTraverse     AfteranOSCissues,thetraverse, .  20      ׀notthepetition,becomesthepetitioner'sprincipal @ pleading.Thepetitionitself,havingserveditspurposebyobtainingtheOSC,essentiallydropsout X ofthecase.Consequently,itisessentialthatthetraverseincorporatethepetitionanditssupporting   exhibitsbyreference;thetraverseshouldalsoincorporatebyreferenceanyotherdocuments  previouslyfiledinsupportofthepetition(including,inparticular,theinformalreplyandany `  supportingexhibits).Alternatively,petitioner'scounselmayenterintoastipulationwith ( x respondent'scounselthattheoriginalpetitionbedeemedatraverse.Usually,however,counselwill  @ prefertofileanewpleadinginordertorespondmorespecificallytothereturn.      AstheforegoingexcerptfromDuvallindicates,apetitioner'straverseissubjecttosimilar H   pleadingrulesasthereturn.(Duvall,supra,9Cal.4thatp.485.)Wherethereturndoesincludea `  countershowing(e.g.,adeclarationfromtrialcounselassertinglegitimatetacticalreasonsfora (  challengedomission),theonusisonthepetitionertorebutthoseallegationsinhistraverse,and   unsubstantiated"generaldenials"willnotsuffice.(Peoplev.Karis(1988)46Cal.3d612,653656.) h  Often,ofcourse,thedeclarationsalreadyfiledinsupportofthepetitionwilldirectlycontradictthe 0  return'scountershowing,andthetraverseneedonlyrefertothosepreviouslyfileddeclarationsto H  showthatanevidentiaryhearingisrequired.Inothercases,itmaybenecessaryforcounselto  submitadditionaldeclarationsorotherevidenceinordertorebutthereturn'sallegations.Finally,  wheretheinformationnecessarytorebutthereturn'sshowingisunavailabletocounsel,thetraverse P shouldfollowtheguidelinesinDuvallanddescribecounsel'seffortstoobtaintheinformation,the h reasonsforitsunavailability,andcounsel'sreasonsforbelievingthereturn'sallegationsareuntrue. 0 (Duvall,supra,atp.485.)    C. ` TheEvidentiaryHearing  8   Whereanevidentiaryhearingisordered,thecourtwillgenerallyissueanorderframingthe  specificfactualissueswhicharedisputed.Ifthereturnandthetraversehavefulfilledtheirfunction  offramingandnarrowingthefactualissueswhicharegenuinelydisputed,theevidentiaryhearing X maywellcoverfewerissuesthantheOSC.(Forinstance,acourtmightorderanevidentiaryhearing  p limitedtotrialcounsel'sreasonsforaparticularomission,butcouldconcludethattheotheraspects 8 oftheineffectiveassistanceclaimposedpurelylegalquestionsnotrequiringanevidentiary   proceeding.) x!   Asnotedearlier,onceanOSChasissued,ahabeascourtdoeshaveauthoritytoorder  X# discovery(eveninnonspecialcircumstancecasesnotcoveredbythenewpostconvictiondiscovery  $ statute,Pen.Code1054.9(discussedinPartIIIB)). Thenatureandscopeofdiscoveryin[post !% OSC]habeasproceedingshasgenerallybeenresolvedonacasebycasebasis.[Citation.](Inre `"& Scott(2003)29Cal.4th783,813.)InScott,theSupremeCourtsuggestedthatahabeascourt(or (#x' referee)hasdiscretionovertheprecisetermsandscopeofdiscovery,butmayappropriatelylookto #@( theProp.115reciprocaldiscoverystatutes(Pen.Code1054etseq.)Althoughitagreedthatthose $ ) statutescoveronly theunderlyingcriminalproceedinganddo notapplytohabeasproceedings, % * theCourtheldthattheyrepresent alogicalplaceforthe[habeas]refereetolooktofashionafair H&!+ discoveryrule.(Scott,supra,atpp.813814.)Consequently,throughouttheinvestigationand '`", preparationofahabeaspetition,counselshouldassumethat,intheeventthemattereverreachesan '(#-  evidentiaryhearing,hisorherinvestigativematerials(witnessstatements,etc.)arelikelytobe (#. subjecttoreciprocaldiscoveryontermssimilartothosefacingdefensetrialattorneysundertheProp.  115statutes. x    WhereareviewingcourtmadeitsOSCreturnableinsuperiorcourt,thesuperiorcourtwill X beresponsiblefordecidingallissuesposedintheOSC,bothfactualandlegal.However,wherean   appellatecourtretainsjurisdictionoverthepetitionandappointsasuperiorcourtjudgetositas  refereeontheappellatecourt'sbehalf,thejudge'srolewillbemorelimited.Thereferenceorder `  shoulddirecttherefereetomakefactualfindingsonly.(InreCordero(1988)46Cal.3d161,171 ( x n.1.)  @   Ahabeasevidentiaryhearingis,inessence,abenchtrialonthespecificissuesframedinthe    referenceorder.Thepetitionerbearstheburdenofprovinghisfactualallegationsbya H   preponderanceoftheevidence.(InreCox(2003)30Cal.4th974,997998;Peoplev.Ledesma `  (1987)43Cal.3d171,218.)B .  21      ׀Thepartiesmayutilizetheusualtrialtoolsfortheproductionof (  evidence,includingsubpoenas,andthecourtisauthorized"todoandperformallotheractsand   thingsnecessarytoafullandfairhearinganddeterminationofthecase."(Pen.Code,1484)In h  contrasttothepleadingstageofthewritproceeding,therulesofevidenceapplywithfullforce, 0  includingthehearsayrule.(Fields,supra,51Cal.3datp.1070.)Adeclarationorotherdocument H  previouslyappendedtothepetitionwillnotbeconsideredattheevidentiaryhearingunlessit  satisfiestherulesofevidence(orthepartiesstipulatetoitsadmission).    InitsrecentScottopinion,theSupremeCourtheldthat,becauseahabeashearingisa h  specialproceedingratherthana criminalcase,theprosecutionmaycallthedefendantpetitioner 0 tothestand.Incontrasttoacriminaltrial, thepetitionerdoesnothavetheprivilegenottobe  calledasawitness.However,ifcalledasawitness,thepetitionerdoeshavetherighttoassertthe p privilegeagainstselfincriminationastoindividualquestions,asdoesanywitnessinanyproceeding. 8 [Citations.](InreScott(2003)29Cal.4th783,815.)  .  22      ׀Moreover, asinotherhearings,thetrier P offactmaynotdrawadverseinferencesfromanywitnessinvocationoftherightagainstself  incrimination.(Scott,supra,atp.816.)   VI.  SUBSEQUENTAPPELLATEREVIEW  8    A. ` AppellateReviewFollowingaSuperiorCourtHabeasDenial  x!   Asuperiorcourt'sdenialofahabeascorpuspetitionisanonappealabledisposition,  X# regardlessofwhethertherewasanOSConthepetition.Themechanismforappellatereviewofa  $ superiorcourt'shabeasdenialisanewhabeaspetition,filedwithintheoriginaljurisdictionofthe !%  CourtofAppeal.(Clark,supra,5Cal.4thatp.767n.7.)Consequently,evenwherethesuperior `"& courtheardthepetitionpursuanttoanOSCfromtheappellatecourt,itisnecessarytofileanew  petitionintheappellatecourttoobtainreviewofthatdecision. x    Incontrast,whereasuperiorcourtjudgeconductedtheevidentiaryhearinginthecapacity X ofareferee,thereferee'sconclusionsaresimplyaninterimstageintheongoinghabeasproceeding   stillpendingintheappellatecourt.Aftertherefereesubmitsareportsummarizinghisorher  findings,thereviewingcourtwilltypicallyreceivesupplementalbriefsfromthepartiessupporting `  orobjectingtothefindings. ( x    B.0 ` StandardsforAppellateReviewFollowinganEvidentiaryHearing   ` (#` (#     Thestandardsforappellatereviewofajudge'sconclusionsinahabeashearingarethesame H   regardlessofthemannerinwhichthecasereachestheappellatecourt.Thatis,itdoesnotmatter `  whetherthecasecomesbeforethereviewingcourtfollowingitsreferee'ssubmissionoffindingsor (  onaneworiginalhabeaspetitionfollowingthesuperiorcourt'sdenialofapetitionpendinginthat   court.(InreWright(1978)78Cal.App.3d788,801802;seealsoInreFountain(1977)74 h  Cal.App.3d715,717718.) 0    Thestandardofreviewofahabeascourt'sorreferee'sfindings,includingfactualfindings,  issignificantlylessdeferentialthanthestandardapplicabletoatrieroffact'sfindingsinanordinary  appeal.Althoughajudge'sorreferee'sfactualdeterminationsinahabeascorpusevidentiaryhearing P areentitledto"greatweight"ifsupportedby"amplecredibleevidence,"theyarenotbindingonthe h appellatecourt.(Martin,supra,44Cal.3datp.32;Ledesma,supra,43Cal.3datp.219.)Asthe 0 SupremeCourthassummarizedonseveraloccasions:  8   ` Areferee'sfindingsoffactare,ofcourse,notbindingonthiscourt,andwe 8 mayreachadifferentconclusiononanindependentexaminationoftheevidence P producedatthehearingheconductsevenwheretheevidenceisconflicting.  [Citation](InreBranch(1969)70Cal.2d200,203n.1[emphasisadded];accord  e.g.,Peoplev.Mozingo(1983)34Cal.3d926,934;Hall,supra,30Cal.3datp.416; X InreCox(2003)30Cal.4th974,998.) p     Forarecentexample,seeHitchings,supra,6Cal.4thatpp.109110,119122,wherethe   SupremeCourtrejectedareferee'sconclusionthatajurorhadnotprejudgedthecase. x!   Finally,asinotherappellatecontexts,asuperiorcourt'sorreferee'sconclusionsonlegal  X# questions,includingmixedquestionsoflawandfact,aresubjecttoindependentreview.(Hitchings,  $ supra,atp.109;Ledesma,supra,43Cal.3datp.219;seee.g.,InreRoss(1995)10Cal.4th184,205 !% [prejudicecomponentofineffectiveassistanceofcounseltestismixedquestionoffactandlaw, `"& subjecttoindependentreview].) (#x'  VII. 0  NEWCALIFORNIASTATUTESANDRULESONHABEASPROCEDUREAND $ ) OTHERPOSTCONVICTIONREMEDIES % *(#(# 0  A.0` (#(#CourtRules '`",` (#` (#   Superiorcourt.󀀀RecentrevisionsintheCaliforniaRulesofCourthavesubstantiallyfleshed (#. outtheproceduresgoverningsuperiorcourthabeasprocedures.(Rules4.550,4.551,4.552(as h)$/ amendedeff.Jan.1,2004).)Whileappellatecourtscommonlysolicitinformaloppositionsand 0*%0 repliestohabeaspetitions(rule60),untilrecentlytherewasnostatuteorruleexplicitlyauthorizing *H&1 asuperiorcourttosolicitinformalbriefing.Thesuperiorcourtsonlyapparentoptionsweretodeny +'2 ahabeaspetitionsummarilyortoissueanOSC(requiringaformalreturnandtraverse(or denial ,'3 insuperiorcourtparlance(rule4.550(b)(4))).TherevisedrulesdoauthorizepreOSCinformal  responsivebriefing(rule4.551(b))V .  23      ׀andalsosettimelinesforthesuperiorcourttoactonahabeas x petition.Within60daysofthefilingofthehabeaspetition,thesuperiorcourtmusteither:(a)issue @ anOSC,(b)denythepetitionsummarily,or(c)solicitaninformalresponse.(Rule4.551(a)(3)(A) X &(a)(4))U .  24      ׀Ifthecourtchoosesthelatteroption,itmusteitherissueanOSCordenythepetition   within45daysoffilingoftheinformalresponse.(Rule4.551(a)(5))    Thesuperiorrulesalsoexplicitlyrestatesomeofthesubstantivehabeasstandardsand ( x proceduralrightsdevelopedinleadingCaliforniaSupremeCourtopinions,includingthestandard  @ fordeterminingwhetherapetitionstatesaprimafaciecase: [T]hecourttakesthepetitioners    factualallegationsastrueandmakesapreliminaryassessmentregardingwhetherthepetitioner    wouldbeentitledtoreliefifhisorherfactualallegationswereproved.Ifso,thecourtmustissue H   anordertoshowcause.(Rule4.551(c)(1))TherulealsorestatesthatissuanceofanOSCrequires `  thesuperiorcourttoappointcounselforallsubsequentproceedings(ifthepetitionerisindigent). (  (Rule4.551(c)(2))     Thesuperiorcourtrulesstandardforanevidentiaryhearingseemstodepartsomewhatfrom 0  thelanguageofSupremeCourtdecisions: Anevidentiaryhearingisrequiredif,afterconsidering H  theverifiedpetition,thereturn,anydenial,anyaffidavitsordeclarationsunderpenaltyofperjury,  andmattersofwhichjudicialnoticemaybetaken,thecourtfindsthereisareasonablelikelihood  thatthepetitionermaybeentitledtoreliefandthepetitionersentitlementtoreliefdependsuponthe P resolutionofanissueoffact.(Rule4.551(f))Incontrast,theSupremeCourtsleadingcasesdo h notemploythe reasonablelikelihoodofreliefterminology,butinsteadspeakof materialfacts 0 indisputeasthecrucialfactorinorderinganevidentiaryhearing.(E.g.,Peoplev.Duvall(1995)  9Cal.4th464,478.) p   Finally,regardlessofwhetherasuperiorcourtissuesanOSCordeniesapetitionsummarily, P  Anyorderdenyingapetitionforwritofhabeascorpusmustcontainabriefstatementofthereasons  forthedenial.Anorderonlydeclaringthepetitiontobedeniedisinsufficient.(Rule4.551(g))X  .  25      ׀  ЀThus,unlikeanappellatecourtortheSupremeCourt,asuperiorcourtmaynotdisposeofahabeas X petitionwithaoneline postcarddenial.Thisreasonsrequirementmaybeamixedblessingfor  p habeaspetitioners.Ononehand,itdoesrequireasuperiorcourtjudgetoaccordahabeaspetitioner 8 thedignityofsomediscussionofhisclaims.Butitcouldalsocomebacktohauntapetitionerwho    latertriestopursuethoseclaimsinfederalcourt.Asuperiorcourtsstatementofareasonedbasis x! foritsdenialofaclaimwillpresumablyinvokegreaterfederaldeferencetothatrulingunderthe  AEDPAstandardofreview(28U.S.C.2254(d))thananuninformativepostcarddenial. x    Appellaterules.Therehavealsobeensomeminorchangesintherulesgoverningappellate X habeaspetitions,buttheseonlyconcernmattersofform.Anyhabeaspetitionfiledbyanattorney   inanappellatecourtorintheSupremeCourt mustbeaccompaniedbyalodgedcopyofanyrelated  petition(excludingexhibits)previouslyfiledinanylowerstatecourt,orinanyfederalcourt.... `  (Rule56.5(c)(3))Also,underastrictreadingoftherulesgoverningoriginalwritpetitions, any ( x supportingdocumentsaccompanyingthepetition)(rule56.5(c)(4))(i.e.,declarations,transcripts  @ andotherexhibits)mustbe indextabbedbynumberorletterandbe consecutive[ly]paginat[ed]    throughout(rule56(d)).Y .  26          0  B.0` (#(#BatteredWomensSyndrome ` ` (#` (#   In2001,theLegislatureenactedaspecialstatute,PenalCodesection1473.5,authorizing   habeasreliefincertainmurdercaseswherethereisa reasonableprobabilitythatevidenceof h   batteredwomenssyndrome(BWS)couldhavealteredtheverdict,haditbeenintroduced.The 0  statuteappliesonlytodefendantsconvictedofmurder,eitherbytrialorplea,priortoJanuary1, H  1992,theeffectivedateofEvidenceCodesection1107,thestatutewhichexplicitlyrecognizedthe  admissibilityofBWS. .  27      ׀AhabeaspetitionerisentitledtoreliefiftheBWSevidenceis ofsuch  substancethat,haditbeenintroduced,thereisareasonableprobability,sufficienttoundermine P confidenceinthejudgmentofconviction,thattheresultoftheproceedingswouldhavebeen h different.(1473.5(a))Thatformulation,ofcourse,correspondtotheprejudiceprongofthe 0 Stricklandtestforineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.Thedifferenceisthatsection1473.5provides  anindependentstatelawgroundforhabeasrelief,whichdoesnotrequireanyfindingthattrial p counselsfailuretointroduceBWSevidencefellbelowprofessionalstandardsasofthetimeoftrial 8 (whichmaywellhaveoccurredprioreventotherecognitionofBWS). P   Todate,therehavebeennoappellateconstructionsofsection1473.5.Butseveralwomen  havereportedlyobtainedsomeformofreliefunderthestatute(thoughtheauthorisnotfamiliarwith X thenumberofcasesorwithanyofthedetails).  p 0  C.0` (#(#FalseEvidenceorFraudulentGovernmentalConductasGroundsforVacating   aConvictionx!` (#` (#   In2001,inthewakeofsomewellpublicizedscandalsinvolvingpolicefabricationof  X# evidence(mostnotably,theRampartscasesinLosAngeles),theLegislatureenactedaspecialstatute  $ authorizingcollateralreliefevenforconvicteddefendantsnolongerincustody.(Pen.Code !% 1473.6.)Newlydiscoveredevidenceoffalsetestimonybya governmentofficialprovides `"& groundsforvacatingaconvictionifthattestimony wassubstantiallyprobativeontheissueofguilt (#x' orpunishment.Similarly,governmental fabricationofevidenceentitlesadefendanttoreliefis  thatevidencewas substantiallymaterialandprobative.Finally, fraudbyagovernmentalofficial x (shortoffalsetestimonyorfabricatedevidence)alsoprovidesgroundsforreliefbutthestandardis @ moredifficult(parallelingthehabeasstandardfornewlydiscoveredevidence)!i..e,evidencewhich X  completelyunderminestheprosecutionscase,isconclusive,andpointsunerringlytohisorher   innocence.(1473.6(a))Ofcourse,prosecutorialpresentationoffalsetestimonyorfabricated  evidencearealreadywellrecognizedgroundsforhabeasreliefunderbothfederalconstitutionaland `  statestatutorylaw.Buthabeasreliefisavailableonlytoadefendantwhowasinactualcustody ( x (prison,jail,etc.)orconstructivecustody(probation,parole,etc.)atthetimeofhispetition.Section  @ 1473.6authorizessuchreliefforanunjustlyconvicteddefendantwhohasalreadycompletedhis    custody.     VIII. 0  INTERPLAYBETWEENCALIFORNIAHABEASRULESANDFEDERAL `  HABEASDOCTRINES ( (#(#   TheByzantinelawoffederalhabeascorpus!whichhasgrownevenmorecomplexwiththe h  enactmentoftheAntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA)!isbeyondthe 0  scopeofthesematerials.C .  28      ׀However,itisvitalforanyonelitigatingaCaliforniahabeaspetitionto H  beawareofthebasicexhaustionrequirementsforanylaterpursuitoffederalhabeasreliefandtopay  particularnotetothecurrentstatusofcertainCaliforniahabeasproceduresanddoctrinesunder  federallaw. P 0  A.0` (#(#ExhaustionBasics 0` (#` (#   Inastatehabeaspetition,asinadirectappeal,itisessentialthatadefendantspleadingand p briefsmakecrystalclearthefederalconstitutionalbasesoftheclaims(Duncanv.Henry(1995)513 8 U.S.364)andthathepresentthoseclaimstothestateshighestcourt(OSullivanv.Boerckel(1999) P 526U.S.838).Justthisweek,theU.S.SupremeCourtdeliveredanothersharpreminderofthe  necessityofcloseattentiontoexplicit federalizationofeachclaimthroughoutthestate  proceedings.ApostconvictionpetitiontotheOregonSupremeCourtalleging ineffecteentitledtoreliefandthepetitionersentitlementtoreliefdependsuponthe P resolutionofanissueoffact.(Rule4.551(f))Incontrast,theSupremeCourtsleadingcasesdo h notemploythe reasonablelikelihoodofreliefterminology,butinsteadspeakof materialfacts 0 indisputeasthecrucialfactorinorderinganevidentiaryhearing.(E.g.,Peoplev.Duvall(1995)  9Cal.4th464,478.) p   Finally,regardlessofwhetherasuperiorcourtissuesanOSCordeniesapetitionsummarily, P  Anyorderdenyingapetitionforwritofhabeascorpusmustcontainabriefstatementofthereasons  forthedenial.Anorderonlydeclaringthepetitiontobedeniedisinsufficient.(Rule4.551(g))X  .  25      ׀  ЀThus,unlikeanappellatecourtortheSupremeCourt,asuperiorcourtmaynotdisposeofahabeas X petitionwithaoneline postcarddenial.Thisreasonsrequirementmaybeamixedblessingfor  p habeaspetitioners.Ononehand,itdoesrequireasuperiorcourtjudgetoaccordahabeaspetitioner 8 thedignityofsomediscussionofhisclaims.Butitcouldalsocomebacktohauntapetitionerwho    latertriestopursuethoseclaimsinfederalcourt.Asuperiorcourtsstatementofareasonedbasis x! foritsdenialofaclaimwillpresumablyinvokegreaterfederaldeferencetothatrulingunderthe  AEDPAstandardofreview(28U.S.C.2254(d))thananuninformativepostcarddenial. x    Appellaterules.Therehavealsobeensomeminorchangesintherulesgoverningappellate X habeaspetitions,buttheseonlyconcernmattersofform.Anyhabeaspetitionfiledbyanattorney   inanappellatecourtorintheSupremeCourt mustbeaccompaniedbyalodgedcopyofanyrelated  petition(excludingexhibits)previouslyfiledinanylowerstatecourt,orinanyfederalcourt.... `  (Rule56.5(c)(3))Also,underastrictreadingoftherulesgoverningoriginalwritpetitions, any ( x supportingdocumentsaccompanyingthepetition)(rule56.5(c)(4))(i.e.,declarations,transcripts  @ andotherexhibits)mustbe indextabbedbynumberorletterandbe consecutive[ly]paginat[ed]    throughout(rule56(d)).Y .  26          0  B.0` (#(#BatteredWomensSyndrome ` ` (#` (#   In2001,theLegislatureenactedaspecialstatute,PenalCodesection1473.5,authorizing   habeasreliefincertainmurdercaseswherethereisa reasonableprobabilitythatevidenceof h   batteredwomenssyndrome(BWS)couldhavealteredtheverdict,haditbeenintroduced.The 0  statuteappliesonlytodefendantsconvictedofmurder,eitherbytrialorplea,priortoJanuary1, H  1992,theeffectivedateofEvidenceCodesection1107,thestatutewhichexplicitlyrecognizedthe  admissibilityofBWS. .  27      ׀AhabeaspetitionerisentitledtoreliefiftheBWSevidenceis ofsuch  substancethat,haditbeenintroduced,thereisareasonableprobability,sufficienttoundermine P confidenceinthejudgmentofconviction,thattheresultoftheproceedingswouldhavebeen h different.(1473.5(a))Thatformulation,ofcourse,correspondtotheprejudiceprongofthe 0 Stricklandtestforineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.Thedifferenceisthatsection1473.5provides  anindependentstatelawgroundforhabeasrelief,whichdoesnotrequireanyfindingthattrial p counselsfailuretointroduceBWSevidencefellbelowprofessionalstandardsasofthetimeoftrial 8 (whichmaywellhaveoccurredprioreventotherecognitionofBWS). P   Todate,therehavebeennoappellateconstructionsofsection1473.5.Butseveralwomen  havereportedlyobtainedsomeformofreliefunderthestatute(thoughtheauthorisnotfamiliarwith X thenumberofcasesorwithanyofthedetails).  p 0  C.0` (#(#FalseEvidenceorFraudulentGovernmentalConductasGroundsforVacating   aConvictionx!` (#` (#   In2001,inthewakeofsomewellpublicizedscandalsinvolvingpolicefabricationof  X# evidence(mostnotably,theRampartscasesinLosAngeles),theLegislatureenactedaspecialstatute  $ authorizingcollateralreliefevenforconvicteddefendantsnolongerincustody.(Pen.Code !% 1473.6.)Newlydiscoveredevidenceoffalsetestimonybya governmentofficialprovides `"& groundsforvacatingaconvictionifthattestimony wassubstantiallyprobativeontheissueofguilt (#x' orpunishment.Similarly,governmental fabricationofevidenceentitlesadefendanttoreliefis  thatevidencewas substantiallymaterialandprobative.Finally, fraudbyagovernmentalofficial x (shortoffalsetestimonyorfabricatedevidence)alsoprovidesgroundsforreliefbutthestandardis @ moredifficult(parallelingthehabeasstandardfornewlydiscoveredevidence)!i..e,evidencewhich X  completelyunderminestheprosecutionscase,isconclusive,andpointsunerringlytohisorher   innocence.(1473.6(a))Ofcourse,prosecutorialpresentationoffalsetestimonyorfabricated  evidencearealreadywellrecognizedgroundsforhabeasreliefunderbothfederalconstitutionaland `  statestatutorylaw.Buthabeasreliefisavailableonlytoadefendantwhowasinactualcustody ( x (prison,jail,etc.)orconstructivecustody(probation,parole,etc.)atthetimeofhispetition.Section  @ 1473.6authorizessuchreliefforanunjustlyconvicteddefendantwhohasalreadycompletedhis    custody.     VIII. 0  INTERPLAYBETWEENCALIFORNIAHABEASRULESANDFEDERAL `  HABEASDOCTRINES ( (#(#   TheByzantinelawoffederalhabeascorpus!whichhasgrownevenmorecomplexwiththe h  enactmentoftheAntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA)!isbeyondthe 0  scopeofthesematerials.C .  28      ׀However,itisvitalforanyonelitigatingaCaliforniahabeaspetitionto H  beawareofthebasicexhaustionrequirementsforanylaterpursuitoffederalhabeasreliefandtopay  particularnotetothecurrentstatusofcertainCaliforniahabeasproceduresanddoctrinesunder  federallaw. P 0  A.0` (#(#ExhaustionBasics 0` (#` (#   Inastatehabeaspetition,asinadirectappeal,itisessentialthatadefendantspleadingand p briefsmakecrystalclearthefederalconstitutionalbasesoftheclaims(Duncanv.Henry(1995)513 8 U.S.364)andthathepresentthoseclaimstothestateshighestcourt(OSullivanv.Boerckel(1999) P 526U.S.838).Justthisweek,theU.S.SupremeCourtdeliveredanothersharpreminderofthe  necessityofcloseattentiontoexplicit federalizationofeachclaimthroughoutthestate  proceedings.ApostconvictionpetitiontotheOregonSupremeCourtalleging ineffective X assistanceofappellatecounselwasfoundinsufficienttoexhaustthatclaimbecausetheargument  p didnotmakeclearthatthepetitionerwasassertingafederalconstitutionalclaim,ratherthanaclaim 8 undertheOregonConstitutionsrighttocounselprovision.(Baldwinv.Reese(March2,2004;No.   02964)541U.S.___,2004WL372501.) x!   Baldwinhasclearimplicationsforanystateappellateorhabeascounselwhomightbe  X# inclinedtoframetheirclaimsinfamiliarCaliforniashorthand! Popewrit, Marsdenmotion,  $  Wheelermotion, Pen.Code1368hearing).Ofcourse,counselshouldalwaysexplicitlyrefer !% totherelevantfederalconstitutionalright(e.g., ineffectiveassistanceofcounselundertheSixth `"& Amendment, thefederaldueprocessclause,etc.)andleadingfederalauthoritiesonthatright (#x' (e.g.,Stricklandv.WashingtonforanyIACclaim,Patev.Robinsonforanycompetencytostand #@( trialclaim,etc.).  .  29      ׀ $ ) Ї  Inordertopresentaclaiminasubsequentfederalhabeaspetition,thedefendantmustfirst  havepresentedittotheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Toexhaustafederalclaimondirectappeal,the x defendantmustraiseitbothinhisbriefsintheCourtofAppealandinatimelypetitionforreview @ totheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Dx .  30      ׀However,asnotedearlier,ahabeasclaimmaybepresentedto X theCaliforniaSupremeCourteitherasapetitionforreviewfromtheappellatecourt'sdenialoras   anewhabeaspetitionwithintheSupremeCourt'soriginaljurisdiction.(SeePartIVC,supra)    Whichevermethodischosen,theSupremeCourtpetitionmustbothstatethefederal ( x constitutionalclaimandthefactssupportingthatclaim."Athoroughdescriptionoftheoperative  @ factsbeforethehigheststatecourtisanecessaryprerequisitetosatisfactionofthe[exhaustion]    standard...."(Kellyv.Small(9N  th2 N ԀCir.2003)315F.3d1063,1069.)Frequently,the original    petitionprocedurewillprovideaneasier(andpossiblyevenamorereliable)exhaustionmethod H   thanapetitionforreviewfromtheappellatehabeasdenial.Thatisespeciallysoiftheappellate `  courtsummarilydeniedthehabeaspetitionwithoutanydiscussionofthemerits.Inthatcase, (  counselcansimplyaddtoallegationsregardingthefilinganddenialoftheappellatehabeaspetition   andthenrepackagethatpetitionforfilingintheSupremeCourt. h      Indeed,whileproperexhaustionofadirectappealclaimordinarilyrequiresitspresentation H  toboththeCourtofAppealandtheCaliforniaSupremeCourt(Castillev.Peoples(1989)489U.S.  346),exhaustionofstatehabeasclaimsdoesnotrequirepresentationofthoseclaimsinanylower  statecourt.Apetitionermayskipboththesuperiorandappellatecourtsandsimplyfilehishabeas P petitionintheSupremeCourtinthefirstinstance. h 0  B.0` (#(#CalculationoftheAEDPAStatuteofLimitationsforaCaliforniaPetitioner` (#` (#   AEDPAsoneyearstatuteoflimitationsordinarilyrunsfromthedateaconvictionbecame 8 finalondirectreview.(28U.S.C.2244(d)(1)(A))S .  31      ׀Assumingthattherewasapetitionforreview P inthedirectappeal,aCaliforniacasebecomesfinalondirectrevieweither(a)onthedatetheU.S.  SupremeCourtdeniesacertioraripetition,or(b)onthelastdateonwhichthedefendantcouldhave  filedacert.petition!i.e.,90daysafterthedateoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsorderdenying X review.(Bowenv.Roe(9thCir.1999)188F.3d1157.)T .  32        p Ї  TheAEDPAstatuteoflimitationsistolled(i.e.,excludedfromthelimitationscalculation)  duringtheduringtheperiodinwhicha properlyfiledstatepostconvictionpetition(suchasastate x habeaspetition)is pending.(28U.S.C.2244(d)(2))Mostofthelitigationanduncertainty @ surroundingcalculationoftheAEDPAlimitationsperiodhaveconcernedthistollingprovisionfor X statepostconvictionpetitions,and,inparticular,itsapplicationtoCaliforniasunusualprocedures   for originalhabeaspetitionsinreviewingcourts.But,mostofthebasicquestionshavenowbeen  answered,and,inthemajorityofCaliforniacases(evenonesinvolvingpostaffirmancestatehabeas `  petitions),counselshouldbeabletocalculatethestatuteoflimitationsdeadlinebyreferencetoafew ( x keyrules.Evenifstateappellatecounselisnotplanningtoattempttoprepareafederalhabeas  @ petitionontheclientsbehalf,itisessentialthatappellatecounselprovidetheclientwithaccurate    adviceoncalculationofthedeadlineforanypro.per.petition.      Thetollingprovisionappliesonlytoastatepostconvictionpetition.Thereisnotolling `  duringthependencyofafederalhabeaspetitionwhichislaterdismissed.(Duncanv.Walker(2001) (  533U.S.167.)Consequently,inthecommonsituation,inwhichafederalcourtdismissesa    mixedpetitionforincompleteexhaustion,thereisnotollingduringtheperiodbetweentheinitial h  federalfilingandthedismissal.x .  33       0    Astatepostconvictionpetition tollsthestatuteoflimitations,itdoesnotrestarttheone  yearperiod.Theoneyearperiodstartsrunningwhentheconvictionbecomesfinalondirectappeal,  asoutlinedabove(usuallythedateofacert.denialorthelastdateonwhichacert.petitioncould P havebeenfiled).Ifadefendantfilesalaterstatehabeaspetition,thatfilingstopstheclockaslong h asstatehabeaspetitionremains pending.Whenthereisafinaldenialofreliefinthatstatehabeas 0 proceeding,theAEDPAclockresumesrunningwhereitleftoff.    ACaliforniahabeaspetitionisordinarilyconsidered pendingthroughouttheentire round 8 inwhichaCaliforniapetitionerispursuingparticularclaimsthroughsuccessivepetitionsinsuperior P court,theCourtofAppealandtheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Careyv.Saffold(2002)536U.S.214.  ЀAstheU.S.SupremeCourtrecognizedinSaffold,unlikemoststatespostconvictionregimens,  Californiahasnoprocedurefor appealingasuperiorcourtsdenialofahabeaspetition.Instead, X apetitionerseeksappellatereviewofthatdenialbyrefilingthoseclaimsinanew originalpetition  p intheCourtofAppeal,and,hemayseekreviewofanappellatecourtshabeasdenialeitherviaa 8 petitionforrevieworthroughyetanother originalhabeaspetitionintheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.   ЀBecausethese originalpetitionsintheappellatecourtandintheSupremeCourtrepresentthe x! mechanismforstateappellatereviewofahabeasdenial,thestatehabeasproceedingisconsidered @"  pendingandcontinuesto tollthestatuteoflimitationsfortheentireperiodfromthefilinga  X# habeaspetitioninsuperiorcourtthroughthefilingandfinaldispositionofahabeaspetitionbythe  $  CaliforniaSupremeCourt,includingthe gapsbetweensuperiorcourtdenialandfilingofthe !% appellatehabeaspetitionandbetweenappellatecourtsdenialandfilingofSupremeCourthabeas  petition.󀀀Buttherearetwocaveats: x   (Cy3"3"  0  3o2C3  0` (#(#  UnderCalifornialaw,apetitionerseekingreviewofalowercourtshabeasdenial X shouldfileanoriginalpetitioninthenexthighestcourtwithinga reasonabletime.   IfaCaliforniaappellatecourtortheCaliforniaSupremeCourtdeniesahabeas  petitiononthegroundofunreasonabledelaybetweenthelowercourtdenialandthe `  newfiling,thehabeaspetitionwillnotbeconsidered pendingduringthatgap.In ( x Saffolditself,theCaliforniaSupremeCourthaddeniedthehabeaspetitionbasedon  @  lackofdiligence.TheU.S.SupremeCourtcouldnottellwhetherthisreferredto    the4monthdelaybetweentheappellatecourtsdenialandtheSupremeCourt    filing(whichwouldmeanthatthehabeasproceedingcouldnotbeconsidered H    pendingduringthatinterval)ortothemuchlongerdelay(5years)betweenthe `  judgmentandthefilingofSaffoldsinitialpetitioninsuperiorcourt.The lackof (  diligencereferencewouldaffectthelimitationscalculationonlyifitreferredtothe   relativelyshortdelayinrefilingthepetitionintheSupremeCourt. .  34      ׀TheSupreme h  CourtremandedthecasetotheNinthCircuitforconsiderationofthatquestion.On 0  remand,theNinthCircuitdecidedthatthe lackofdiligencedenialreferredtothe H  delaybetweenjudgmentandthesuperiorcourtfiling,ratherthantothetimingofthe  CaliforniaSupremeCourtfiling.Consequently,thehabeaspetitionwasstill  consideredtohavebeenpendingthroughouttheentireperiodfromthefilingofthe P superiorcourtpetitionthroughtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtshabeasdenial. h (Saffoldv.Carey(9thCir.2003)312F.3d1031.)3oo݌0` (#` (# Ќ  ";"  ;x0  2C3  0` (#(#  TheSaffoldruleappliestoa onefullroundofhabeaspetitionsonaclaimorsetof p claims,butdoesnotapplythetimebetweendifferent roundsofstatehabeas 8 petitionsconcerningdifferentclaims.󀀀(Careyv.Saffold,supra,536U.S.atp.222.). P ЀInotherwords,ifaCaliforniacourtdeniesahabeaspetitionraisingonesetofclaims  andseveralmonthslaterthedefendantfilesanewstatehabeaspetitionraising  differentclaims,thelatterpetitionisconsideredtobethecommencementofanew X  roundofhabeasreviewratherthanacontinuationoftheearlierpetition.  p Consequently,thehabeaspetitionisnotconsidered pendingandtheAEDPA 8 limitationsperiodisnottolledduringthegapbetweenthedenialofthelaststate   petitionraisingtheonesetofclaimsandtheinitialfilingofastatepetitionraising x! differentclaims.E.g.,Welchv.Carey(9thCir.2003)350F.3d1079(enbanc);King @" v.Roe(9thCir.2003)340F.3d821.).x .  35      ;xy݌ X#` (#` (# Ќ    BecarefulincalculatingthefinalitydateofahabeasdenialorderbytheCaliforniaSupreme !% Court.󀀀WhendoesaCaliforniaSupremeCourtorderdenyingahabeaspetition(withoutissuance `"& ofanOSC)become finalastothatCourt!immediatelyoronlyafter30days?TheNinthCircuit (#x' attemptedtoobtaintheanswerfromtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtitselfbycertifyingthequestion  toit,buttheSupremeCourtdeclinedtoacceptthecertification.TheNinthCircuitproceededto x decidethequestionitself.ConstruingthethenapplicableCaliforniaRulesofCourt,theNinth @ Circuitconcludedthat(unlikeanappellatecourtshabeasdenialwithoutissuanceofanOSC)a X CaliforniaSupremeCourtordersummarilydenyingahabeaspetitionbecame final30daysafter   thedateoftheorder.Consequently,thestatehabeasproceedingwasstillconsideredpending  throughoutthat30dayperiod.(Bunneyv.Mitchell(9thCir.2001)261F.3d973.)However, `  BunneysholdingappliesonlytoCaliforniaSupremeCourthabeasdenialsthroughDecember31, ( x 2002.EffectiveJanuary1,2003,theJudicialCouncilrevisedtherulestoprovideexplicitlythatthe  @ SupremeCourtsdenialofahabeaspetitionwithoutissuanceofanOSCbecomesfinalimmediately.    (Cal.RulesofCourt,rule29.4(b)(2)(C).) .  36      ׀Consequently,forallhabeasdenialsafterthatdate,there    isnoadditional30dayfinalitywindow,andtheAEDPAclockresumesrunningimmediatelyupon H   issuanceoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsdenialorder. `    The prisonmailboxruleappliestopro.per.habeasfilingsinbothstateandfederalcourt.   Consequently,astatehabeaspetitionisconsidered pendingasofthedatethataninmatesubmits h  itformailingthroughtheappropriateprisonchannelsforinmatelegalmail,andafederalpetition 0  isalsodeemed filedasofthedatetheinmatesubmitsitintotheprisonmail.(Anthonyv.Cambra H  (9thCir.2000)236F.3d568,574575;Stillmanv.LaMarque(9thCir.2003)319F.3d1199,1201)  ЀOfcourse,this mailboxruleappliesonlytoaninmatespro.per.filings,thereisnocounterpart  forpetitionsfiledwiththeassistanceofcouive X assistanceofappellatecounselwasfoundinsufficienttoexhaustthatclaimbecausetheargument  p didnotmakeclearthatthepetitionerwasassertingafederalconstitutionalclaim,ratherthanaclaim 8 undertheOregonConstitutionsrighttocounselprovision.(Baldwinv.Reese(March2,2004;No.   02964)541U.S.___,2004WL372501.) x!   Baldwinhasclearimplicationsforanystateappellateorhabeascounselwhomightbe  X# inclinedtoframetheirclaimsinfamiliarCaliforniashorthand! Popewrit, Marsdenmotion,  $  Wheelermotion, Pen.Code1368hearing).Ofcourse,counselshouldalwaysexplicitlyrefer !% totherelevantfederalconstitutionalright(e.g., ineffectiveassistanceofcounselundertheSixth `"& Amendment, thefederaldueprocessclause,etc.)andleadingfederalauthoritiesonthatright (#x' (e.g.,Stricklandv.WashingtonforanyIACclaim,Patev.Robinsonforanycompetencytostand #@( trialclaim,etc.).  .  29      ׀ $ ) Ї  Inordertopresentaclaiminasubsequentfederalhabeaspetition,thedefendantmustfirst  havepresentedittotheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Toexhaustafederalclaimondirectappeal,the x defendantmustraiseitbothinhisbriefsintheCourtofAppealandinatimelypetitionforreview @ totheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Dx .  30      ׀However,asnotedearlier,ahabeasclaimmaybepresentedto X theCaliforniaSupremeCourteitherasapetitionforreviewfromtheappellatecourt'sdenialoras   anewhabeaspetitionwithintheSupremeCourt'soriginaljurisdiction.(SeePartIVC,supra)    Whichevermethodischosen,theSupremeCourtpetitionmustbothstatethefederal ( x constitutionalclaimandthefactssupportingthatclaim."Athoroughdescriptionoftheoperative  @ factsbeforethehigheststatecourtisanecessaryprerequisitetosatisfactionofthe[exhaustion]    standard...."(Kellyv.Small(9N  th2 N ԀCir.2003)315F.3d1063,1069.)Frequently,the original    petitionprocedurewillprovideaneasier(andpossiblyevenamorereliable)exhaustionmethod H   thanapetitionforreviewfromtheappellatehabeasdenial.Thatisespeciallysoiftheappellate `  courtsummarilydeniedthehabeaspetitionwithoutanydiscussionofthemerits.Inthatcase, (  counselcansimplyaddtoallegationsregardingthefilinganddenialoftheappellatehabeaspetition   andthenrepackagethatpetitionforfilingintheSupremeCourt. h      Indeed,whileproperexhaustionofadirectappealclaimordinarilyrequiresitspresentation H  toboththeCourtofAppealandtheCaliforniaSupremeCourt(Castillev.Peoples(1989)489U.S.  346),exhaustionofstatehabeasclaimsdoesnotrequirepresentationofthoseclaimsinanylower  statecourt.Apetitionermayskipboththesuperiorandappellatecourtsandsimplyfilehishabeas P petitionintheSupremeCourtinthefirstinstance. h 0  B.0` (#(#CalculationoftheAEDPAStatuteofLimitationsforaCaliforniaPetitioner` (#` (#   AEDPAsoneyearstatuteoflimitationsordinarilyrunsfromthedateaconvictionbecame 8 finalondirectreview.(28U.S.C.2244(d)(1)(A))S .  31      ׀Assumingthattherewasapetitionforreview P inthedirectappeal,aCaliforniacasebecomesfinalondirectrevieweither(a)onthedatetheU.S.  SupremeCourtdeniesacertioraripetition,or(b)onthelastdateonwhichthedefendantcouldhave  filedacert.petition!i.e.,90daysafterthedateoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsorderdenying X review.(Bowenv.Roe(9thCir.1999)188F.3d1157.)T .  32        p Ї  TheAEDPAstatuteoflimitationsistolled(i.e.,excludedfromthelimitationscalculation)  duringtheduringtheperiodinwhicha properlyfiledstatepostconvictionpetition(suchasastate x habeaspetition)is pending.(28U.S.C.2244(d)(2))Mostofthelitigationanduncertainty @ surroundingcalculationoftheAEDPAlimitationsperiodhaveconcernedthistollingprovisionfor X statepostconvictionpetitions,and,inparticular,itsapplicationtoCaliforniasunusualprocedures   for originalhabeaspetitionsinreviewingcourts.But,mostofthebasicquestionshavenowbeen  answered,and,inthemajorityofCaliforniacases(evenonesinvolvingpostaffirmancestatehabeas `  petitions),counselshouldbeabletocalculatethestatuteoflimitationsdeadlinebyreferencetoafew ( x keyrules.Evenifstateappellatecounselisnotplanningtoattempttoprepareafederalhabeas  @ petitionontheclientsbehalf,itisessentialthatappellatecounselprovidetheclientwithaccurate    adviceoncalculationofthedeadlineforanypro.per.petition.      Thetollingprovisionappliesonlytoastatepostconvictionpetition.Thereisnotolling `  duringthependencyofafederalhabeaspetitionwhichislaterdismissed.(Duncanv.Walker(2001) (  533U.S.167.)Consequently,inthecommonsituation,inwhichafederalcourtdismissesa    mixedpetitionforincompleteexhaustion,thereisnotollingduringtheperiodbetweentheinitial h  federalfilingandthedismissal.x .  33       0    Astatepostconvictionpetition tollsthestatuteoflimitations,itdoesnotrestarttheone  yearperiod.Theoneyearperiodstartsrunningwhentheconvictionbecomesfinalondirectappeal,  asoutlinedabove(usuallythedateofacert.denialorthelastdateonwhichacert.petitioncould P havebeenfiled).Ifadefendantfilesalaterstatehabeaspetition,thatfilingstopstheclockaslong h asstatehabeaspetitionremains pending.Whenthereisafinaldenialofreliefinthatstatehabeas 0 proceeding,theAEDPAclockresumesrunningwhereitleftoff.    ACaliforniahabeaspetitionisordinarilyconsidered pendingthroughouttheentire round 8 inwhichaCaliforniapetitionerispursuingparticularclaimsthroughsuccessivepetitionsinsuperior P court,theCourtofAppealandtheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.Careyv.Saffold(2002)536U.S.214.  ЀAstheU.S.SupremeCourtrecognizedinSaffold,unlikemoststatespostconvictionregimens,  Californiahasnoprocedurefor appealingasuperiorcourtsdenialofahabeaspetition.Instead, X apetitionerseeksappellatereviewofthatdenialbyrefilingthoseclaimsinanew originalpetition  p intheCourtofAppeal,and,hemayseekreviewofanappellatecourtshabeasdenialeitherviaa 8 petitionforrevieworthroughyetanother originalhabeaspetitionintheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.   ЀBecausethese originalpetitionsintheappellatecourtandintheSupremeCourtrepresentthe x! mechanismforstateappellatereviewofahabeasdenial,thestatehabeasproceedingisconsidered @"  pendingandcontinuesto tollthestatuteoflimitationsfortheentireperiodfromthefilinga  X# habeaspetitioninsuperiorcourtthroughthefilingandfinaldispositionofahabeaspetitionbythe  $  CaliforniaSupremeCourt,includingthe gapsbetweensuperiorcourtdenialandfilingofthe !% appellatehabeaspetitionandbetweenappellatecourtsdenialandfilingofSupremeCourthabeas  petition.󀀀Buttherearetwocaveats: x   (Cy3"3"  0  3o2C3  0` (#(#  UnderCalifornialaw,apetitionerseekingreviewofalowercourtshabeasdenial X shouldfileanoriginalpetitioninthenexthighestcourtwithinga reasonabletime.   IfaCaliforniaappellatecourtortheCaliforniaSupremeCourtdeniesahabeas  petitiononthegroundofunreasonabledelaybetweenthelowercourtdenialandthe `  newfiling,thehabeaspetitionwillnotbeconsidered pendingduringthatgap.In ( x Saffolditself,theCaliforniaSupremeCourthaddeniedthehabeaspetitionbasedon  @  lackofdiligence.TheU.S.SupremeCourtcouldnottellwhetherthisreferredto    the4monthdelaybetweentheappellatecourtsdenialandtheSupremeCourt    filing(whichwouldmeanthatthehabeasproceedingcouldnotbeconsidered H    pendingduringthatinterval)ortothemuchlongerdelay(5years)betweenthe `  judgmentandthefilingofSaffoldsinitialpetitioninsuperiorcourt.The lackof (  diligencereferencewouldaffectthelimitationscalculationonlyifitreferredtothe   relativelyshortdelayinrefilingthepetitionintheSupremeCourt. .  34      ׀TheSupreme h  CourtremandedthecasetotheNinthCircuitforconsiderationofthatquestion.On 0  remand,theNinthCircuitdecidedthatthe lackofdiligencedenialreferredtothe H  delaybetweenjudgmentandthesuperiorcourtfiling,ratherthantothetimingofthe  CaliforniaSupremeCourtfiling.Consequently,thehabeaspetitionwasstill  consideredtohavebeenpendingthroughouttheentireperiodfromthefilingofthe P superiorcourtpetitionthroughtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtshabeasdenial. h (Saffoldv.Carey(9thCir.2003)312F.3d1031.)3oo݌0` (#` (# Ќ  ";"  ;x0  2C3  0` (#(#  TheSaffoldruleappliestoa onefullroundofhabeaspetitionsonaclaimorsetof p claims,butdoesnotapplythetimebetweendifferent roundsofstatehabeas 8 petitionsconcerningdifferentclaims.󀀀(Careyv.Saffold,supra,536U.S.atp.222.). P ЀInotherwords,ifaCaliforniacourtdeniesahabeaspetitionraisingonesetofclaims  andseveralmonthslaterthedefendantfilesanewstatehabeaspetitionraising  differentclaims,thelatterpetitionisconsideredtobethecommencementofanew X  roundofhabeasreviewratherthanacontinuationoftheearlierpetition.  p Consequently,thehabeaspetitionisnotconsidered pendingandtheAEDPA 8 limitationsperiodisnottolledduringthegapbetweenthedenialofthelaststate   petitionraisingtheonesetofclaimsandtheinitialfilingofastatepetitionraising x! differentclaims.E.g.,Welchv.Carey(9thCir.2003)350F.3d1079(enbanc);King @" v.Roe(9thCir.2003)340F.3d821.).x .  35      ;xy݌ X#` (#` (# Ќ    BecarefulincalculatingthefinalitydateofahabeasdenialorderbytheCaliforniaSupreme !% Court.󀀀WhendoesaCaliforniaSupremeCourtorderdenyingahabeaspetition(withoutissuance `"& ofanOSC)become finalastothatCourt!immediatelyoronlyafter30days?TheNinthCircuit (#x' attemptedtoobtaintheanswerfromtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtitselfbycertifyingthequestion  toit,buttheSupremeCourtdeclinedtoacceptthecertification.TheNinthCircuitproceededto x decidethequestionitself.ConstruingthethenapplicableCaliforniaRulesofCourt,theNinth @ Circuitconcludedthat(unlikeanappellatecourtshabeasdenialwithoutissuanceofanOSC)a X CaliforniaSupremeCourtordersummarilydenyingahabeaspetitionbecame final30daysafter   thedateoftheorder.Consequently,thestatehabeasproceedingwasstillconsideredpending  throughoutthat30dayperiod.(Bunneyv.Mitchell(9thCir.2001)261F.3d973.)However, `  BunneysholdingappliesonlytoCaliforniaSupremeCourthabeasdenialsthroughDecember31, ( x 2002.EffectiveJanuary1,2003,theJudicialCouncilrevisedtherulestoprovideexplicitlythatthe  @ SupremeCourtsdenialofahabeaspetitionwithoutissuanceofanOSCbecomesfinalimmediately.    (Cal.RulesofCourt,rule29.4(b)(2)(C).) .  36      ׀Consequently,forallhabeasdenialsafterthatdate,there    isnoadditional30dayfinalitywindow,andtheAEDPAclockresumesrunningimmediatelyupon H   issuanceoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtsdenialorder. `    The prisonmailboxruleappliestopro.per.habeasfilingsinbothstateandfederalcourt.   Consequently,astatehabeaspetitionisconsidered pendingasofthedatethataninmatesubmits h  itformailingthroughtheappropriateprisonchannelsforinmatelegalmail,andafederalpetition 0  isalsodeemed filedasofthedatetheinmatesubmitsitintotheprisonmail.(Anthonyv.Cambra H  (9thCir.2000)236F.3d568,574575;Stillmanv.LaMarque(9thCir.2003)319F.3d1199,1201)  ЀOfcourse,this mailboxruleappliesonlytoaninmatespro.per.filings,thereisnocounterpart  forpetitionsfiledwiththeassistanceofcounsel.(Stillman,supra.) P 0  C.0` (#(#CurrentFederalStatusofCaliforniasHabeas ProceduralDefaultRules. 0` (#` (#   The adequateandindependentinquiry.Generally,astatehabeasdenialwhichdoesnot p includeanystatementofreasonsorcitationofauthoritiessuchasthetypicalminuteorder 8 "summarydenial"willbeconsideredadenialonthemeritsratherthanonproceduralgrounds.But P ifastatehabeasorderoropinionexplicitlycitesastateproceduralbar(e.g.,untimeliness,failureto  raisethegroundonappeal,etc.)asagroundforthedenial,thatstate proceduraldefaultrulingmay  raisedauntingbarrierstofederalhabeasconsiderationofthoseclaims.Butthepreliminaryfederal X questioniswhetherthestateproceduralruleis adequateandindependent!thatis,whetherthestate  p rulewasclearlyestablishedandconsistentlyappliedattherelevanttimeandwhetheritwas 8  independentofthemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaim.x .  37      ׀Inthemid1990's,   numerousNinthCircuitdecisionsheldthat,atleastuntilthe1993decisionsinInreClark(1993) x! 5Cal.4th750,andInreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813,Californiasvarious proceduraldefaultrules @" (boththeDixonruleconcerningclaimswhichcouldhavebeenraisedondirectappealandtheClark  X# rulesonuntimelyorsuccessivepetitions)hadnotbeen adequate,because,asacknowledgedinthe  $ ClarkandHarrisopinions,thoserulesandtheirexceptionswerenotclearlydefinedandconsistently !% applied.(E.g.,Moralesv.Calderon(9thCir.1996)85F.3d1387,13901391;Fieldsv.Calderon `"& (9thCir.1997)125F.3d757,764);Calderonv.U.S.Dist.Court(Hayes)(9thCir.1996)103F.3d72, (#x' ;[ ; ;  75;_Calderon_Ԁv.U.S.Dist.Court(Bean)(9thCir.1996)96F.3d1126,11291131.)ThoseNinth  Circuitrulingsleftopenthequestionwhether,guidedbyClarkandHarris,theCaliforniacourts x wereapplyingthevariousproceduralruleswiththerequisiteclarityandconsistencyafter1993. @   NeitherDixonnorClarkruleswere independentpriortoAugust3,1998.󀀀TheCalifornia   SupremeCourtsfurtherattemptatclarificationofthetimelinessrulesin_In_ԀreRobbins(1998)18  Cal.4th770,essentiallymootedthequestionofthe adequacyofthestateproceduralrulesduring `  the19931998intervalbyrevealingadifferentdeficiency.InRobbins,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt ( x suggestedthat,inapplyingthe miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstoitsvariousproceduraldefault  @ rules,ithadformerlyconsideredthemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaims.Butit    statedthat,inthefuture,itwouldlooktostatelawonlyindecidingwhethertheproceduraldefault    couldbeexcusedon miscarriageofjusticegrounds.(Cf.Robbins,supra,atpp.811812&fn. H   32;seealsop.814fn.34.) `    InlightofRobbinsimplicitacknowledgmentthat,priortothatopinion,theCalifornia   SupremeCourthadconsideredfederallawinapplyingtheexceptionstoitsproceduraldefaultrules, h  theNinthCircuitsubsequentlydecidedthat(untilRobbins)theCaliforniaproceduraldefaultrules 0  hadbeenentangledwiththemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaims.Thatis,pre H  Robbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsnecessarilyreflectedsomeconsiderationofthemeritsofthe  federalclaims,becausetheCaliforniacourtslookedinparttofederallawinevaluatingwhetherthe  claimpresenteda miscarriageofjustice.Consequently,priortoAugust3,1998(thedateof P Robbins),neitherCaliforniasDixonrule(claimsthatshouldhavebeenraisedondirectappeal)nor h theClark/Robbinsrules(untimelyorsuccessivepetitions)were independentoffederallaw.For 0 thatreason,preRobbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsarenotrecognizedas adequateand  independentgroundsanddonotcallintoplaytheruleslimitingfederalhabeasconsiderationof p defaultedclaims( causeandprejudice,etc.).(Parkv.California(9thCir.2000)206F.3d1146; 8 _LaCrosse_Ԁv._Kernan_(9thCir.2001)244F.3d702,704707.)(#(#K(# P   AsofAugust3,1998,Californiasproceduraldefaultrulesare independent.󀀀InRobbins,  theCaliforniaSupremeCourtstatedthathenceforthitwouldlookonlytostatelawinapplyingthe X  miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstotheproceduraldefaultrules.(Robbins,supra,18Cal.4that  p pp.811812,814&_fns_.32,34.)Thatpromiseeffectivelydecoupledtheapplicationofthestate 8 proceduralrulesfromthemeritsofthefederalclaims.Consequently,theNinthCircuithasruledthat   postRobbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsare independentoffederallawforpurposesofthe x!  adequateandindependentinquiry.(Bennettv.Mueller(9thCir.2003)322F.3d573,581583.) @"   UnresolvedquestionwhetherpostRobbinsdenialsontimelinessgroundsare adequate.  $ ThatstillleavesthequestionwhetherpostRobbinsdenialsareconsidered adequate.Thatis, !% duringthepostRobbinsperiod,havetheproceduraldefaultrulesbeensufficientlyclear,andhave `"& theCaliforniacourtsappliedthemconsistently?InBennett,theNinthCircuitfoundthattherewas (#x' sufficientuncertaintyregardingtheconsistencyofapplicationofthetimelinessstandardtorequire #@( aremandforfurtherdevelopmentoftherecordoftheCaliforniacourtspractices.(Bennettv. $ ) Mueller,supra,322F.3datpp.583586.) .  38      ׀Consequently,pendingfurtherwordfromthefederal % * courts,the adequacyoftheClark/Robbinsrulesremainsanopenquestion. #-XXXQX9a# h    Thetollingprovisionappliesonlytoastatepostconvictionpetition.Thereisnotolling H  duringthependencyofafederalhabeaspetitionwhichislaterdismissed.(Duncanv.Walker  (2001)533U.S.167.)Consequently,inthecommonsituation,inwhichafederalcourtdismisses  a mixedpetitionforincompleteexhaustion,thereisnotollingduringtheperiodbetweenthe Pnsel.(Stillman,supra.) P 0  C.0` (#(#CurrentFederalStatusofCaliforniasHabeas ProceduralDefaultRules. 0` (#` (#   The adequateandindependentinquiry.Generally,astatehabeasdenialwhichdoesnot p includeanystatementofreasonsorcitationofauthoritiessuchasthetypicalminuteorder 8 "summarydenial"willbeconsideredadenialonthemeritsratherthanonproceduralgrounds.But P ifastatehabeasorderoropinionexplicitlycitesastateproceduralbar(e.g.,untimeliness,failureto  raisethegroundonappeal,etc.)asagroundforthedenial,thatstate proceduraldefaultrulingmay  raisedauntingbarrierstofederalhabeasconsiderationofthoseclaims.Butthepreliminaryfederal X questioniswhetherthestateproceduralruleis adequateandindependent!thatis,whetherthestate  p rulewasclearlyestablishedandconsistentlyappliedattherelevanttimeandwhetheritwas 8  independentofthemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaim.x .  37      ׀Inthemid1990's,   numerousNinthCircuitdecisionsheldthat,atleastuntilthe1993decisionsinInreClark(1993) x! 5Cal.4th750,andInreHarris(1993)5Cal.4th813,Californiasvarious proceduraldefaultrules @" (boththeDixonruleconcerningclaimswhichcouldhavebeenraisedondirectappealandtheClark  X# rulesonuntimelyorsuccessivepetitions)hadnotbeen adequate,because,asacknowledgedinthe  $ ClarkandHarrisopinions,thoserulesandtheirexceptionswerenotclearlydefinedandconsistently !% applied.(E.g.,Moralesv.Calderon(9thCir.1996)85F.3d1387,13901391;Fieldsv.Calderon `"& (9thCir.1997)125F.3d757,764);Calderonv.U.S.Dist.Court(Hayes)(9thCir.1996)103F.3d72, (#x' ;[ ; ;  75;_Calderon_Ԁv.U.S.Dist.Court(Bean)(9thCir.1996)96F.3d1126,11291131.)ThoseNinth  Circuitrulingsleftopenthequestionwhether,guidedbyClarkandHarris,theCaliforniacourts x wereapplyingthevariousproceduralruleswiththerequisiteclarityandconsistencyafter1993. @   NeitherDixonnorClarkruleswere independentpriortoAugust3,1998.󀀀TheCalifornia   SupremeCourtsfurtherattemptatclarificationofthetimelinessrulesin_In_ԀreRobbins(1998)18  Cal.4th770,essentiallymootedthequestionofthe adequacyofthestateproceduralrulesduring `  the19931998intervalbyrevealingadifferentdeficiency.InRobbins,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt ( x suggestedthat,inapplyingthe miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstoitsvariousproceduraldefault  @ rules,ithadformerlyconsideredthemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaims.Butit    statedthat,inthefuture,itwouldlooktostatelawonlyindecidingwhethertheproceduraldefault    couldbeexcusedon miscarriageofjusticegrounds.(Cf.Robbins,supra,atpp.811812&fn. H   32;seealsop.814fn.34.) `    InlightofRobbinsimplicitacknowledgmentthat,priortothatopinion,theCalifornia   SupremeCourthadconsideredfederallawinapplyingtheexceptionstoitsproceduraldefaultrules, h  theNinthCircuitsubsequentlydecidedthat(untilRobbins)theCaliforniaproceduraldefaultrules 0  hadbeenentangledwiththemeritsoftheunderlyingfederalconstitutionalclaims.Thatis,pre H  Robbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsnecessarilyreflectedsomeconsiderationofthemeritsofthe  federalclaims,becausetheCaliforniacourtslookedinparttofederallawinevaluatingwhetherthe  claimpresenteda miscarriageofjustice.Consequently,priortoAugust3,1998(thedateof P Robbins),neitherCaliforniasDixonrule(claimsthatshouldhavebeenraisedondirectappeal)nor h theClark/Robbinsrules(untimelyorsuccessivepetitions)were independentoffederallaw.For 0 thatreason,preRobbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsarenotrecognizedas adequateand  independentgroundsanddonotcallintoplaytheruleslimitingfederalhabeasconsiderationof p defaultedclaims( causeandprejudice,etc.).(Parkv.California(9thCir.2000)206F.3d1146; 8 _LaCrosse_Ԁv._Kernan_(9thCir.2001)244F.3d702,704707.)(#(#K(# P   AsofAugust3,1998,Californiasproceduraldefaultrulesare independent.󀀀InRobbins,  theCaliforniaSupremeCourtstatedthathenceforthitwouldlookonlytostatelawinapplyingthe X  miscarriageofjusticeexceptionstotheproceduraldefaultrules.(Robbins,supra,18Cal.4that  p pp.811812,814&_fns_.32,34.)Thatpromiseeffectivelydecoupledtheapplicationofthestate 8 proceduralrulesfromthemeritsofthefederalclaims.Consequently,theNinthCircuithasruledthat   postRobbinsproceduraldefaultdenialsare independentoffederallawforpurposesofthe x!  adequateandindependentinquiry.(Bennettv.Mueller(9thCir.2003)322F.3d573,581583.) @"   UnresolvedquestionwhetherpostRobbinsdenialsontimelinessgroundsare adequate.  $ ThatstillleavesthequestionwhetherpostRobbinsdenialsareconsidered adequate.Thatis, !% duringthepostRobbinsperiod,havetheproceduraldefaultrulesbeensufficientlyclear,andhave `"& theCaliforniacourtsappliedthemconsistently?InBennett,theNinthCircuitfoundthattherewas (#x' sufficientuncertaintyregardingtheconsistencyofapplicationofthetimelinessstandardtorequire #@( aremandforfurtherdevelopmentoftherecordoftheCaliforniacourtspractices.(Bennettv. $ ) Mueller,supra,322F.3datpp.583586.) .  38      ׀Consequently,pendingfurtherwordfromthefederal % * courts,the adequacyoftheClark/Robbinsrulesremainsanopenquestion. #-XXXQX2a#