WPC:7 ,#gK1KYF.tKpbu\bB(C5FZƲr| $U &6LV|L{Ү) 1}3u .ʾ)*Um2 )ݕ @9^op2/ DQ5$wS$dhd /wfdN$W n}%@0" `dM^nAFZc I D|;V˶0Sd,u5冟8%7 dC2r9ǥĵ` s}FB}GD_Ѣfy(%:ڻVz %2wMQz^jD_#2UN %I 0(O U;@w U: U@ ^ 1 w= A 4W k z m| U 0l 0DT~U+NUNdN U>8:rjC5 0U"c" 0y" 0\# 0!$ 0$ 0% 0L& 0& 0' 0A( 0) 0) 0* 07+ 0+ 0, 0- 0- 0<. 0. 0/ 0|0 0&1 01 0h2 03 03 0<4X4n444444445545 0AJ5  5;56+6A6W6W6m66666666 B66677$7HP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL,,,,0(A Z6Times New Roman Regular($(9 Z(Times New Roman <6X9`("Courier 10cpi(9 Z(Times New Roman aU1    LW.:i+003|x U K $    1    _/Inthisregard,respondentalsomisunderstandsappellantscitationtoPeoplev.  Richards(1976)17Cal.3d614.Asthecourtnotedin_Takencareof_,thisCourtin  Richardsrecognizedthatadefendant,inthecourseofraisingareasonabledoubtasto  guilt,shouldnotalsohavetobeconcernedwithpersuadingasentencingcourtasto  whetherthesefactsshouldenhanceasentenceondifferentcharges.Therestitutionorder  inRichardswasrejectedforanumberofreasons.ThisCourtscommentaboutfindings   contrarytoaverdictofacquittalpointedoutonlysomeoftheproblems,whichalso   includedthefactthatthespecificissuepresentedtothesentencingcourtwasnever   litigatedbythepartiesinthecontextofthesentencingconsideration.(Id.,at624.)Thisis   aproblemthatalsoplaguesthetrialcourtsfindingofaggravatingfactorsunderPenal    Codesection1170andmakesanassessmentofprejudiceinpermittingitimpossible.  (SeeABM4044)((3$ !      0  (#$  0     1 ' SUZAN0SUZAN .   (9 Z6Times New Roman Regular(9 Z 6Times New Roman Regular   H      \  `&Times New Roman . $    2    _/Respondentalsomakesmuchofthedistinctionsbetweenthedetailsof  Californiasschemeandthoseinvolvedin_Apprendi_and_Blakely_.Thesedistinctions,  createdprimarilybecauseCaliforniajudgesaregivenfewersentencingchoices,donot  differentiatetheschemesinwayssignificanttotheconstitutionalquestionposed.Under  allthreeschemes,thesentencingcourtisrequiredtomakefactualfindingsbeyondthose  madebythejuryinordertoimposeahighersentencethanthatauthorizedbythejurys   verdictalone.    ` $    3    _/Inmakingthisargument,appellantrecognizesthattheBarnescourtassumed  thatthemaximumsentenceconstitutionallyavailableiscalculatedbytotalingthe  midtermwiththeenhancementsfoundoradmitted.(Barnes,supra,____Cal.App_.4th___  [2004_D.A.R._Ԁat12019].)AppellantsubmitsthattheBarnescourterredinsocalculating  therelevantmaximum. 9 $    4    _/Accordingly,respondentssuggestionthatsucha retrospective,casebycase  reviewcouldsavethestatuteisalsomisplaced.(SeeCaliforniaTeachersAssn.,supra,  20Cal.4that345.)Thereisnomeansofknowingwhenaparticularpriormightbe  foundtobetrueandanaggravatingfactor.Incasessuchasthis,wherethecourtused  aggravatingfactorsthatweretheresultofunconstitutionalfactfindingtoimposethe  upperterm,thefactthattherewasapotentialalternativeconstitutionalbasisforthe   courtsactiondoesnotcuretheconstitutionalviolationthatinfactoccurred.  $    5    _/ZiTheCourtwasnottherepresentedwiththeissueofwhatburdenofproofneed  beapplied,andinterestingly,expressed noviewastowhethersomeheightened  standardofproofmightapplytosentencingdeterminationsthatbearsignificantlyonthe  severityofthesentence.(_Almendarez_ԄTorresv.UnitedStates,supra,523U.S.,at248.)  Moreover,asAlmendarezTorresadmittedhisprior,therewasnoargumentraised  concerningarighttoajurydeterminationoftheissue;onlythequestionofwhetherthe   allegationneededtobeincludedintheindictmentwasatissue.(See_Apprendi_,supra,   530U.S.at488.)*+ (_2623  ..   *G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   <:Default Para                                 (Vm$0   Ipage page chapter volume footnote endnote                  ,             d     !  _e*X` pX*8-XXdd8@INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA   `     p THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA, p )    `     p )    ` PlaintiffandRespondent,  0 p )_Crim_.No.S125677 p(#p(#  `     p )   Ѐv. `  0  0p(#(#) @  @ (CourtofAppealNo.B166312) p(#p(#  `  0  0p(#(#)(_Sup.Ct.No_.PA040926) p(#p(#  `     p )   SHAWN_TOWNE_ 0   p ) (#(#  `     p )    ` DefendantandAppellant.   p )  _____________________________________________)  @i i  APPELLANTSREPLYBRIEFONTHEMERITS   @* `    JONATHANB.STEINER   `    ExecutiveDirector   `    SUZANE.HIER !  `    StaffAttorney "  `    (StateBarNo.90470) #  `    CALIFORNIAAPPELLATEPROJECT % !  `    520S.GrandAvenue,4thFloor &!"  `    LosAngeles,California90071 '"#  `    Telephone:(213)2430300 (#$  `    AttorneysforAppellant  *%& _ 8D7dXXd8 eOa@hOaCOaHOaLOaMOa NOa @INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA   `     p THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA, p )   `     p )    ` PlaintiffandRespondent,  0 p )Crim.No.S125677 p(#p(#  `     p )   Ѐv. `  0  0p(#(#) @  @ (CourtofAppealNo.B166312) p(#p(#  `  0  0p(#(#)(Sup.Ct.No.PA040926) p(#p(#  `     p )   SHAWNTOWNE 0   p ) (#(#  `     p )    ` DefendantandAppellant.   p )   ____________________________________________0 p )p(#p(# @i i   APPELLANTSREPLYBRIEFONTHEMERITS ###Zic#Ԉ       ARGUMENT    z  I.     8 ` THETRIALCOURTSUSEOFCOUNTSOFWHICH  THEDEFENDANTWASACQUITTEDTOIMPOSE  THEUPPERTERMSHOULDBEREVERSED  UNDERCALIFORNIALAW    ` -` -  ` AppellantassertsthatthisCourtshouldholditimproperunderCalifornia " lawforasentencingcourttoimposeanuppertermbaseduponcountsofwhichthe $  defendanthadbeenacquitted.(ABM1021)Thisrule,whichwaspositedinPeoplev. &"" Takencareof(1981)119Cal.App.3d492,498,mostcarefullyprotectsthejurysroleas ($$ thefactfinderandbufferbetweenthestateandthedefendant.(SeeBlakelyv.Washington *&& (2004)540U.S.___[159L.Ed.2d403,415416;124S.Ct.2531].) ,((  e       ` RespondenturgesthisCourttorejectthisruleprimarilybecausethe  sentencingcourtsdeterminationofaggravatingfactorsisbasedonalesserburdenof  proofthanthejurysfindingonguilt.Therefore,afindingofaggravationbasedupon  acquittedcountsisnotnecessarilyinconsistentwiththejurysverdictanddoesnotviolate   federalDoubleJeopardyproscriptions.RespondentreliesonUnitedStatesv.Watts   (1997)519U.S.148[136L.Ed.2d554,117S.Ct.633].(RBM1013)Thisargument   missesthepoint.    ` Thequestionastothisargumentisnotwhetherthefederalconstitution  precludesrelianceonacquittedcountsinsentencingthedefendant.Itiswhetherthis  Courtshoulddisapprovesuchpractice,asamatterofpolicy,topromotethestateand  federaljurytrialrightandthestatedueprocessright.Inthiscontext,thequestionisnot  whetherthejurynecessarilyrejectedthespecificfactreliedupontoimposesentence,but  ratherwhetherthejurymayhavedoneso.Thevicetobeavoidedisacourtsimposition  ofasentencebasedonfactualfindingsthatwerepossiblycontrarytothosefoundbythe  juryandtheunfairnessthatsuchapracticeengenders. #  1         Oa     ` Respondentthengoesontoarguethat,evenifthisCourtholdsthatthetrial  courtmaynotusefactsofcountsofwhichthedefendantwasacquittedtoincreasea  sentenceonanothercount,therewasnoerrorhere.(RBM1314)Hearguesthatthecourt  foundthatthevictimsfear resultedfromtheunlawfulconductoftakingordrivingthe   victimsvehicle.(RBM14)Hereachesthisconclusionbecausethecourtfocusedonthe   victimsfearwhenheleftthecar,whichheassertswas conductunderlyingtheoffense   ofconviction.(RBM14)    ` Notso.Thetakingofthecarthatconstitutedthesection10851violation  occurredafterthevictimhadleftthecar;carjackingwasrejectedbythejury.(CT178  187l;RT12111217)   ` Finally,respondentarguesthatanyerrorwasharmlessbecausethetrial  courtmentionedappellantsrecordinchoosingtheupperterm,andthatfactoralone  couldhavejustifiedthatchoice.However,thetrialcourtsextensivediscussionofthe  victimsfeardemonstratesthatitconsideredthatfearacrucialfactorinselectingthe  upperterm.Moreover,whilethecourtdidnotexpresslyfindfactorsinmitigation,itdid   notethemitigatingaspectofappellantspersonalitythathewas aninnocentofsorts. " (RT2417)Thus,thereisareasonableprobabilitythatabsenttheconsiderationofthe $  factsunderlyingtheacquittedcounts,thecourtwouldhaveimposedthemiddleorlower &"" term.(ABM2021)Accordingly,thesentencemustbereversed.(Peoplev.  Watson(1956)46Cal.2d818,836.)   @h @ @    [[  Q]II.     8 ` THECOURTDIDVIOLATEAPPELLANTSRIGHT  AGAINSTDOUBLEJEOPARDYBYUSING  ACQUITTEDCOUNTS  "TOIMPOSETHEUPPER  TERM " ` -` - *#   ` Appellanturgesthat,becauseApprendiandBlakelyrequirethat   aggravatingfactorsusedtoimposetheuppertermbeprovedtoajurybeyonda    reasonabledoubt,theuseofacquittedcountsasaggravatingfactorsviolatesthefederal   DoubleJeopardyClause.(ABM4951)Respondentarguesagainstthisclaimbecause:   theDoubleJeopardyClausedoesnotapplytosentencingdeterminations;thetrialcourt  heredidnotrelyontheacquittedcounts;UnitedStatesv.Watts,supra,519U.S.148held  thatacquittedcountscouldbeusedassentencingfactors;andBlakelydidnotresolvethe  doublejeopardyquestion.(RABM15)   ` Respondentsargumentsareprimarilypremisedonthenotionthat  aggravatingfactorsaremere sentencingfactorstowhichnojurytrialrightattaches.  Assumingthatappellantiscorrectthat,afterBlakely,aggravatingfactorsareelemental  andmustbeprovedtoajurybeyondareasonabledoubt,respondentsrelianceonMonge ! v.California(1998)524U.S.721,724[141L.Ed.2d615,118S.Ct.2246]andWattsis # misplaced.And,whileBlakelydidnotexplicitlydisapproveofWatts(RABM15),itdid %!! undoitsunderpinningsbyclarifyingthatsomefactswereelementalandmustgotoajury. '## Respondentalsorepeatstheargumentthatthetrialcourtwasnotrelyingontheacquitted )%% counts.Asdiscussedabove,therecordbeliesthisclaim.(Supra,pg.3.) +''  OaQ]  Q Q     III.   +8 ` APPELLANTWASIMPROPERLYSENTENCED  UNDERANUNCONSTITUTIONALSTATUTE  +  @V  @V  @V  @V  @V ` -` - 2, `  A.0 TheIssueisCognizableonThisAppeal  B-   (# (#  ` RZielyingonthegeneralrulethatthefailuretoassertarightmayforfeitit,#D7-#D7#-#   respondentarguesthatappellanthasforfeitedhisBlakelyclaimbyfailingtoassertitinthe   trialcourt.(RABM1922)Respondentismistaken. p     ` Wherechangesinthelawareunforeseeable,itisunreasonabletoexpect   thattrialcounselwouldhaveanticipatedthechange,andthefailuretoobjectdoesnot  forfeittheissueonappeal.(See#D7s.#D7Peoplev.#D70##ZiD7.#Turner(1990)50Cal.3d668,703;ZiPeoplev.  Barnes(2004)___Cal.App.4th___[2004D.A.R.12010].)Moreover, reviewingcourts  havetraditionallyexcusedpartiesforfailingtoraiseanissueattrialwhereanobjection  wouldhavebeenfutileorwhollyunsupportedbysubstantivelawtheninexistence.  [Citations].(Peoplev.Welch(1993)5Cal.4th228,237238;seealsoPeoplev.Chavez  (1980)26Cal.3d334,350,fn.5;OConnorv.Ohio(1966)385U.S.92,9293[wherethe  CourtheldthatadefendantdidnotwaiveGriffinerrorbyfailingtoobjecttoa ! prosecutorscommentsatatrialhadbeforeGriffinwasdecided].) # #D7l1##ZiD71#D7ZiD7 ` Here,atthetimeoftrial,Californialawwasclearthatthetrialcourtmade %!! thedeterminationofwhethertherewerefactorsinaggravationjustifyingtheimpositionof '## theuppertermanddidsobaseduponapreponderanceoftheevidencestandard.(SeePen. )%% COa C C  Code,#5##7#Ԁ1170;Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420.)NocourthadyetheldthatApprendi  underminedCaliforniasschemewithrespecttothetrialcourtsfindingofsentencing  factors.(SeeBarnes,supra,___Cal.App.4that___[2004D.A.R.at12018];Peoplev.  George(2004)122Cal.App.4th419,424;seealsoe.g.,#D7=5#D7Peoplev.#D749#D7Groves(2003)107   Cal.App.4th1227,1231.)#\7##D79#D7ԀPriortoApprendi,ajurytrialrightastocircumstancesin   aggravationtosupporttheimpositionoftheuppertermhadbeenexpresslyrejected.(See   Peoplev.Betterton(1979)93Cal.App.3d406,410413;Barnes,supra,___Cal.App.4th   at___[2004D.A.R.at12018].)And,thisCourthasalwaysassumedthatthetrialcourt  couldmakesuchfactualfindings.(Seee.g.,Peoplev.Wiley(1995)9Cal.4th580,587;  Peoplev.Hernandez(1988)46Cal.3d194,205.)#D7K:#D7ԀMoreover,Blakelysclarificationofthe  Apprendiruleworkeda seachange.(SeeUnitedStatesv.Ameline(9thCir.2004)376  F.3d967,973.)Thus,counselcouldnothavebeenexpectedtoforeseethatthecourtwas  committingfederalconstitutionalerrorwhenitimposedtheuppertermaccordingtothe  rulesthathadbeeninplaceinCaliforniafornearly30years.  #D7<##ZiD7 :#Zi ` Moreover,theforfeiturerulesdonotapplytocertainfundamental   constitutionalrights.(See#D7I?##ZiD7h?#ZiPeoplev.Vera(1997)15Cal.4th269,276277;Peoplev. " Belmares(2003)106Cal.App.4th19,27;Peoplev.Menchaca(1983)146Cal.App.3d $  1019,1025.)#D7M@#D7#l@#ԀTherightstoajurytrial#D7~A##ZiD7A#ZiԀandproofbeyondareasonabledoubtarerecognized &"" asessential.(SeeSullivanv.Louisiana(1993)#`B#Ԁ508U.S.275,277278[124L.Ed.2d182, ($$ 113S.Ct.2078];# C#ԀInreWinship(1970)397U.S.358,364[25L.Ed.2d368,90S.Ct.1068]; *&& HOa  H H  seealsoUnitedStatesv.Gaudin(1995)515U.S.506,509511[132L.Ed.2d444,115  S.Ct.2310].)#C##D7AB#D7   ` Furthermore,nearlyeverypublishedCourtofAppealdecisiontoaddress  thequestionhasconcludedthattheissueisnotforfeited.(SeePeoplev.Butler(2004)___   Cal.App.4th___[2004D.A.R.12083,12089];Barnes,supra,___Cal.App.4th___[2004   D.A.R.at12018];Peoplev.Lemus(2004)122Cal.App.4th614,620;George,supra,122   Cal.App.4that424;Peoplev.Ochoa(2004)121Cal.App.4th1551,1565;butseePeople   v.Sample(2004)122Cal.App.4th206,216221.)TheSamplecourtfoundforfeiture  baseduponananalogytothe plainerrorruleapplicableinfederalcourt.(Ibid.)Sample  shouldbedisapprovedfortheabovereasonsandbecausethefederalanalogyisnotapt.  (SeeBarnes,supra,___Cal.App.4th___[2004D.A.R.at12018,fn.7].)#D7WE#D7#E#   ` Accordingly,theassertederroriscognizableonthisappeal.  #D7I##ZiD7I#Zi 0 `  B.0 ` (#` (#PenalCodesection1170,subdivision(b)IsUnconstitutionalin  AllowingJudicialFactfindingtoSupporttheUpperTerm  (# (#  .KJ ` RespondentassertsthatCaliforniassentencingschemedoesnotoffend ! Blakelybecausetheuppertermiswithintherangeofsentencesauthorizedbythejurys # verdict.(RABM2235)Respondentismistaken.#D7J##ZiD7J#Zi % ! #D7kM##ZiD7M# ` Respondentassertsthat,inCalifornialaw,ajuryverdictaloneauthorizes '"# impositionofanyoneofthethreetermsprovidedfortheparticularoffense.(RABM22) )$% Acarefulreviewoftheentireschemedemonstratesthattheverdictalonedoesnot +&' LOa  L L  authorizeanythingmorethanthemidterm.   ` EvenasrespondentcharacterizestheCaliforniascheme,themiddletermis   thedefaultwithoutacourtfindingofadditionalcircumstances; itisintheabsenceof  suchcircumstancesthatacourtshallthenimposethemiddleterm.(RABM33)Given   thatthecourtmaynotfindasaggravationanyofthefactsestablishedbytheverdict(see   Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(c)(d)),itbecomesclearthatthis defaultsentenceshall   beimposedbaseduponthejurysfindings;thesentenceauthorizedbytheverdictisthe   middleterm.   ` RespondentsrelianceonthisCourtsdecisionsinHernandez,supra,46  Cal.3d194andPeoplev.Scott(1994)9Cal.4th331ismisplaced.Bothdecisionswere  reachedbeforeeitherBlakelyorApprendiwasdecided.Bothwerebaseduponan  interpretationofthesentencingstatuteaswrittenwithoutconsiderationofwhetherthe  proceduresoutlinedinitwereconstitutional.Thus,thestatementthattheuppertermwas  authorizedorthatthejudgehadthepowertochoosetheuppertermwasbasedonlyonthe  statutealone.Thestatutedoes authorizethecourttoimposetheupperterm,butonly   afterthecourthasfoundfactsbeyondthosefoundbythejuryinreachingitsverdict. "  ` Therewasnothing unauthorizedunderNewJerseylawwiththecourts $  imposingtheadditionaltermbasedonracialbiasinApprendiandnothing unauthorized &"" underWashingtonlawwiththesentenceimposedinBlakely.Yet,theprocedureusedto ($$ authorizethesentenceoffendedthefederalconstitution.Similarly,Californiasupper *&&  MOa [  M M   termis authorizedonlyafteranunconstitutionalprocedurehasbeenfollowed. #  2      ׀By  usingHernandeztoestablishthatthefactorsinaggravationaremeresentencingfactorsor  Scotttoestablishthattheuppertermiswithinthe authorizedrangewithinthemeaning  ofBlakelyandApprendi,respondentelevates formover effect.(SeeRingv.Arizona   (2002)536U.S.584,604[153L.Ed.2d556,122S.Ct.2428].)    ` InRing,Arizonamadealmostthesameargument.UndertheArizona   statute,firstdegreemurderwaspunishablebydeathorlifeimprisonment.Thechoice   betweenthetwowasmadeafteraseparatehearingbeforethecourtaloneatwhichit  wouldmakefactualdeterminationsanddecidewhethertherewereaggravatingor  mitigatingfactors.Thecourtcouldthenimposethedeathpenaltyonlyifitfoundatleast  oneaggravatingandnomitigatingfactors.(Id.,at592593.)Arizonaarguedthatunder  thisschemeadeathsentencewas authorizedbythejuryverdict,andthesentencing  courtsfindingsdidnotthereforeresultinasentencehigherthanwasauthorizedbythe  verdict.(Id.,at603604.)TheCourtrejectedthisargument,findingthatitelevatedform  overeffectandthat [t]heArizonafirstdegreemurderstatuteauthorizesamaximum   penaltyofdeathonlyinaformalsense,[citation],...(Id.,at604.)Californiastatutes " authorizetheuppertermonlyinthesameformalsense. $   NOa [  N N    0 `  C.0 ` (#` (#ForPurposesoftheApprendi/BlakelyAnalysis,theRelevant  MaximumistheMaximumSentencetheJuryVerdictPermits  fortheIndividualCountItself  (# (#  `    #` ` Respondentassertsthat,evenifunderBlakelythemidtermistheprescribed  statutorymaximumforthesubstantiveoffense,theimpositionoftheupperterminthis   casewasauthorizedbecausethemaximumsentenceavailableinthiscasewaseightyears.   Respondentgetsthistotalbyaddingtwoyearsforthetwopriorprisontermenhancements   admittedbyappellantandstrickenbythetrialcourttothemiddletermforthesubstantive   offense.(RABM3639)Respondentismistakeninhisconclusionthattheenhancements  maybeincludedinthecalculationoftherelevantmaximumterm.   ` InApprendi,theStateassertedthat,evenwithoutthesentencingcourts  findingofracialmotive,byimposingconsecutivesentences,itcouldhaveachievedthe  samesentenceaswasimposedbaseduponthatinvalidfinding.(ZiZiApprendiv.NewJersey  (2000)530U.S.466,474[147L.Ed.2d435;120S.Ct.2348]#ZiZie#.)TheCourtrejectedthis  argumentstating, Theconstitutionalquestion,however,iswhetherthe12yearsentence  imposedoncount18waspermissible,giventhatitwasabovethe10yearmaximumfor   theoffensechargedinthatcount.(Ibid.)Similarly,theconstitutionalquestionhereis " whattermwaspermissibleforthesentenceonthesubstantivecount.(Ibid.) #  3       $   ` Assuming,however,thatcountspecificenhancements,suchasgunuse &"" (Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7Fi#Ԁ12022.5)orinflictionofgreatbodilyinjury(Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7i#Ԁ12022.7)could  beincludedinthetotalmaximumtermforagivencount,thesamewouldnotbetruefor  enhancementsforpriorsthatattachtoanentiresentence.(SeePeoplev.Tassell(1984)36  Cal.3d77,90[disapprovedonothergroundsat7Cal.4th380,386387;Peoplev.   Smith(1992)10Cal.App.4th178,182183;seealsoPen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7k#Ԁ1170.1,subd.(a).)    [E]nhancementsforpriorconvictionsdonotattachtoparticularcountsbutinsteadare   addedjustonceasthefinalstepincomputingthetotalsentence.(Tassell,supra,36   Cal.3dat90.)Thus,suchenhancementsareindependentoftheindividualcountsandare  ofthesamecharacterastheseparateoffensesinvolvedinApprendi.Therefore,inthis  case,theadditionaltwoyearsavailableforappellantspriorprisontermscouldnotbe  properlyincludedinthecalculationofthemaximumtermauthorizedforviolationof  PenalCodesection10851.      EOa GjOOaTFUOaVOa \Oa!Oa=Oa>Oa ?Oa BOaDOaFOa  IV.   o8 ` ASSUMINGTHATPENALCODESECTION1170  SUBDIVISION(B)CANBESAVEDBY  REFORMATION,ITMUSTBEREFORMEDINA  MANNERTHATWILLPRESERVEUNIFORMITY   OFSENTENCES;THEREFORMATION   SUGGESTEDBYRESPONDENTDOESNOT   PRESERVETHISLEGISLATIVEGOAL #o  @  @  @  @  @  @  @  @  @ 2p ` -` -  ` Respondenthaspositedtwomethods,oneimplicitandoneexplicit,by   whichsection1170couldbereformedtomakeitconstitutional.Theexplicitsuggestion   isofferedattheendofrespondentsbriefandisproposedforprospectiveapplication.  (RABM5053)Theimplicitisinherentinrespondentsassertionthatthestatutecanbe  constitutionallyappliedtoanycaseinwhichthedefendanthasapriorconviction.  (RABM3944)Neithermethodcanbeusedtosalvagethisunconstitutionalstatute.   ` TheargumentsfailbecausePenalCodesection1170isunconstitutionalon  itsfaceandmustbestrickenunlessitcanbereformedorseveredinamannerthatwill  satisfyascloselyaspossibletheprimarylegislativegoalsbehindthestatute.(SeeKoppv.  FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th607,660661.)Asthosegoalsaretopromote   uniformityinsentencingofoffenderscommittingthesameoffense(Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7v#Ԁ1170 " subd.(a)(1);Peoplev.Simon(1983)144Cal.App.3d761,765;Parnas&Salerno,The $  InfluenceBehind,SubstanceandImpactoftheNewDeterminateSentencingLawin &"" California(1978)11U.C.DavisL.Rev.29,3132,3940),thestatutecannotbereformed ($$ toretainuppertermsinonlyafractionofcasesbaseduponretentionofonlyoneof *&& numerousaggravatingfactorsortoremovealtogetherthepreferenceformiddleterms. ,((  ` Rather,ifthestatuteisreformed,itshouldbereformedinamannerthat  wouldretainthepresumptivemidtermandequallyeffectuateallaggravatingfactors.As  suchreformationwouldrequirejudiciallegislation,however,thisCourtmaydecide  insteadtosevertheprovisionspermittingimpositionoftheuppertermfromtherestofthe   statute.Otherwise,thestatuteshouldbestrickenentirely.(SeeKopp,supra,11Cal.4that   670671.)Inanycase,appellantwasimproperlysentencedundertheunconstitutional   statute,andhissentencecannotstand.    `  `  A.0 PenalCodesection1170IsFaciallyUnconstitutional oi|  (# (#  ` Astatuteisfaciallyunconstitutionalif nosetofcircumstancesexists  underwhichthe[statute]couldbevalid.(UnitedStatesv.Salerno(1987)481U.S.739,  745.) [A]facialchallengetoastatutoryprovisionthatbroadlyimpingesupon  fundamentalconstitutionalrightsmaynotbedefeatedsimplybyshowingthattheremay  besomecircumstancesinwhichthestatuteconstitutionallycouldbeapplied,....  (AmericanAcademyofPediatricsv.Lungren(1997)16Cal.4th307,343;California   TeachersAssn.v.California(1999)20Cal.4th327,347.)Whilealawthatinitsgeneral " andordinaryapplicationisclearlyconstitutionalmaynotbeheldunconstitutionalonits $  facesimplybecausetheremaybesomehypotheticalapplicationthatisunconstitutional, &"" whereastatutebroadlyimpingesuponfundamentalconstitutionalrights,itdoesnot ($$ becomeconstitutionalsimplybecausethereisapersoncoveredbyittowhomitmaybe *&& constitutionallyapplied.(Id.,at343348.) ,((  ` [A]lthoughwemaynotinvalidateastatutesimplybecauseinsomefuture  hypotheticalsituationconstitutionalproblemsmayarise[citation],neithermayweignore  theactualstandardscontainedintheproceduralschemeandupholdthelawsimply  becauseinsomehypotheticalsituationitmightleadtoapermissibleresult.(California   TeachersAssn.,supra,20Cal.4that347;seealsoCountyofLosAngelesv.Jessup(1938)   11Cal.2d273,278,disapprovedonothergroundsat16Cal.2d276,284[ astatutewhich   isnotseverableandwhichbyitsexpresstermspermitsanapplicationtheeffectofwhich   isunconstitutional,isinvalideventhoughitsprovisionsalsopermitandcontemplate  anotheranddifferentapplicationwithalegalandpropereffect.];AmericanAcademyof  Pediatricsv.Lungren,supra,16Cal.4thatp.,345[ Legislationismeasuredfor  consistencywiththeConstitutionbyitsimpactonthosewhoseconductitaffects.];City  ofCarmelbytheSeav.Young(1970)2Cal.3d259,272.)   ` PenalCodesection1170providesthatthetrialcourtmustimposethe  middletermabsentanadditionalfindingoffact.(Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7#Ԁ1170subd.(a)(3);People  v.Wright(1982)30Cal.3d705,709;ZiPeoplev.#Zib#ԀLobaugh(1987)188Cal.App.3d780,   785D7Zi.)#ZiD7#ԀToimposetheupperterm,acourtmustfindaggravatingfactorsbya " preponderance,andthosefactorsmustnotbeelementsofthecrimeorenhancements $  chargedandfoundbythejury.(SeePen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7&#Ԁ1170;Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.408 &"" (a);4.420(c)(d);Peoplev.Bowen(1992)11Cal.App.4th102,105;ZiPeoplev.#D7##ZiD7#Castorena ($$ (1996)51Cal.App.4th558,562;ZiPeoplev.#Ziŋ#Garcia(1995)32Cal.App.4th1756,1775 *&& 1776.)Thus,PenalCodesection1170isdesignedtooperateinamannerthatviolatesthe ,(( !Oa ! !  defendantsfederalconstitutionalrightsasstatedinBlakely,supra,540U.S.___Zi[159  L.Ed.2dat413414###D7n#D7,124S.Ct.at2537]###Zi<#.)(AOBM2138)   ` Thefactthatinsomeinstancesthejurymayhaveactuallyfoundthe  aggravatingcircumstancestrue,thedefendantmayhaveadmittedanaggravatingfactor,   orasrespondentposits,anaggravatingfactormaybeexemptfromthejuryfinding   requirement,doesnotrenderthestatutefaciallyvalid.(SeeCaliforniaTeachersAssn.,   supra,20Cal.4that345;ZiPeoplev.#D7##ZiD7Ő#Stevenson(1962)58Cal.2d794,798.) Retrospective   casebycasereviewcannotpreservefundamentalfairnesswhenaclassofproceedingsis  governedbyaconstitutionallydefectiveevidentiarystandard.[Citation](California  TeachersAssn.,supra,20Cal.4that345.) Thus,forexample,astatuteauthorizinga  criminalconvictionunderaclearandconvincingstandardofproofwouldbeinvalidon  itsface,eventhoughtherewouldbesomecases,decidedunderthatstandard,inwhichthe  proofwouldsatisfytheproperstandardofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.[Citation]  (Ibid.)   ` Accordingly,unlessPenalCodesection1170canbereformedtoeliminate   thejudgespowertofindaggravatingfactorsandrequireajuryfindingastothemorthe " judicialpowertoelevateasentencecanbeseveredfromtherestofthestatute,theentire $  statuteshouldbedeclaredinvalid.(SeeBlairv.Pitchess(1971)5Cal.3d258,282; &"" CalfarmInsuranceCompanyv.Deukmejian(1989)48Cal.3d805,821;American ($$ AcademyofPediatricsv.Lungren,supra,16Cal.4that343;Kopp,supra,11Cal.4that *&& 670671;SantaBarbaraSchoolDistrictv.SuperiorCourt(1975)13Cal.3d315,330;  Peoplev.Navarro(1972)7Cal.3d248,260.)     0 ` B.0 ` (#` (#PenalCodesection1170CannotbeReformedtoPermit   ImpositionoftheUpperTermOnlyWhentheDefendantHasa   PriorConviction  he  (# (#  ` Althoughcourtsdonotlackpowertoremedyaconstitutionaldefectby   literallyrewritingstatutorylanguage,itisacomparativelydrasticalternative,tobe   invokedsparingly,andonlywhentheresultachievedbysuchacourseismoreconsistent  withlegislativeintentthantheresultthatwouldattendoutrightinvalidation.(Arpv.  WorkersComp.AppealsBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395,407408.)Suchreformationis  permissibletopreserveastatutesconstitutionalitywhenitispossibleto reformthe  statuteinamannerthatcloselyeffectuatespolicyjudgmentsclearlyarticulatedbythe  enactingbody,and theenactingbodywouldhavepreferredthereformedconstruction  toinvalidationofthestatute.(Kopp,supra,11Cal.4that660661;seealsoInreJorge  G.(2004)117Cal.App.4th931,940941[relyingonKopptoreformstatutebylimiting   constructionofitsterms].) "  ` Respondentarguesthat,becauseappellanthasapriorrecord,hissentence $  didnotviolateBlakely.Hereasonsthatapriormaybeanaggravatingfactor,whichmay &"" justifytheimpositionoftheuppertermandisexemptfromtheBlakelyrule.(RABM39) ($$ Implicitinthisargumentisthenotionthatsection1170canbeconstitutionallyreformed *&& OOa O O  bylimitingtheuppertermtothosedefendantswithpriorconvictions.Suchreformation,  however,wouldseverelyunderminethebasiclegislativepurposeinenactingsection  1170.   ` PenalCodesection1170setsoutitspurposeandtheLegislatures   determinationofhowbesttoachievethatpurpose:   8 ` ZiTheLegislaturefindsanddeclaresthatthepurposeof   imprisonmentforcrimeispunishment.#D7B##ZiD7a#ZiThispurposeisbest   servedbytermsproportionatetotheseriousnessofthe   offensewithprovisionforuniformityinthesentencesof   offenderscommittingthesameoffenseundersimilar  circumstances.TheLegislaturefurtherfindsanddeclares  thattheeliminationofdisparityandtheprovisionof  uniformityofsentencescanbestbeachievedbydeterminate  sentencesfixedbystatuteinproportiontotheseriousnessof  theoffenseasdeterminedbytheLegislaturetobeimposed  bythecourtwithspecifieddiscretion.(Pen.Code,#D77##ZiD7V#D7Zi#ZiD7#ZiԀ1170,  subd.(a)(1);emphasisadded;seealsoPen.Code,#D7ե##ZiD7#D7Zi#ZiD7#1170.3,  1170.4.)` -` -  Tothisend,thestatuteprovidesthatthecourtwouldimposethemiddletermunless,  employingtheruleslaidoutbytheJudicialCouncil,itfindsfactorsinaggravationor  mitigationanddeterminesthatoneoutweighstheother.Suchfactorsaretobeunlimited,   exceptthatthedualuseoftheelementsoftheoffenseorenhancementsisprecluded.(Cal. " RulesofCourt,rule4.408(a),4.420(c)(d);Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7A#Ԁ1170,subd.(b).) $   ` Torestricttheimpositionoftheuppertermtothosecasesinwhichthe &"" defendanthasapriorconvictionthatthecourtfoundtobeanaggravatingfactorandthe ($$ useofwhichwouldnotviolatethedualuseproscriptionwouldskewthesentencesina *&& =Oa = =  mannerunintendedbytheLegislatureanddoviolencetothegoalofuniformityof  sentencing.Undersuchconstruction,twodefendantscouldcommitrobberies.Ifonehas  apriorconvictionthatdidnotresultinaprisontermandtheotherhasnopriorconviction,  theonewiththepriorcouldgettheupperterm,whiletheothercouldnot.Thiswouldbe   trueeveniftheonewithoutthepriorplannedhiscrime,selectedhisvictimonthebasisof   raceandvulnerabilityandstoledrugsfromapharmacyemployee(Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7#1170.7,   1170.75;Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.421),whiletheotherdefendantwhohadtheprior   committedarobberythatwasnomorethanashopliftgonebad.   ` Suchsentencingthatwouldlimitthemoreaggravatedcasetoamidterm  sentence,whilepermittingtheimpositionoftheupperterminthemoremitigatedcase,  wouldleadtoabsurdresultsandnotpromoteanyofthestatedLegislativegoals.  Accordingly,suchreformation,whichwoulddoviolencetothelegislativeintent,should  notbeadopted.(SeeMetromediav.SanDiego(1982)32Cal.3d180,190;Kopp,supra,  11Cal.4that643,669670;seealsoBarlowv.Davis(1999)72Cal.App.4th1258,1267;  Gerkinv.FairPoliticalPracticesCommission(1993)6Cal.4th707,714;California   TeachersAssn.,supra,20Cal.4that345;cf.,Peoplev.Barksdale(1972)8Cal.3d320, " 333334;InreJ.W.(2002)29Cal.4th200,213.) $   ` Additionally,respondentssuggestionthatthemerefactofaprior &"" convictionissufficienttomakeanyuppertermconstitutionalisproblematicinother ($$ ways.Respondenterroneouslyassumesthatthefactofapriorautomaticallymakesa *&& UOa U U  defendanteligiblefortheupperterm.(RABM4144)Noteverypriorisconsidered  aggravating;veryoldpriorsforrelativelyminoroffensesforwhichnoprisontermwas  servedhavefrequentlybeenrejectedassentenceenhancers.(Seee.g.,Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7>#D7Zi#ZiD7#  667.5[requiringaprisontermtohavebeenservedbeforetheenhancementappliesand   precludingenhancementwhenawashoutperiodhasbeensatisfied],667[requiringfelony   convictionsofaseriousorviolentnature],1210.1[providingthatseriouspriorfeloniesdo   notmakeadruguserineligibleforProp.36probationifawashoutperiodhasbeen   satisfied];ZiPeoplev.Humphrey(1997)58Cal.App.4th809,813#D7##ZiD7#Ԁ[describingwhenrecords  maybesoremoteastowashoutinthecontextofRomero].)Thus,amerefindingofa  priorconviction,beitfelonyormisdemeanor,doesnotequatetoafindingofafactorin  aggravation. #  4         ` Furthermore,anypriorthatisusedasanenhancementorelementofa  crimecannotbeusedtojustifyanupperterm.(SeeCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(d);  Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7#Ԁ1170,subd.(b).)Thus,notevenallotherwiseaggravatingpriorswould  maketheuppertermavailable.    ` Finally,thereisseriousdoubtthatthefindingofapriorasanaggravating " TF T T  factortoincreasethemaximumsentencecanbeconstitutionallyremovedfromthejury.  ZiRespondentrelieson#D7#D7D7AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S.224[140  L.Ed.2d350,118S.Ct.1219],which#D7D7'#D7Ԁheldthatthefactofapriorconvictionwasnomore  thana sentencingfactorthatneednotbetreatedasanelementoftheoffenseandneed   notbechargedintheindictmentorprovedtoajury.(Id.,at235,239,247.) #  5      ׀Thisholding,   however,althoughnotoverruledbyeitherBlakelyorApprendi,wasquestionedby   ApprendiandhaditsunderpinningsremovedbyBlakelyandApprendiaswellas   numerousconcurringanddissentingopinionsincasesleadinguptothem.#D7##ZiD7м#D7ZiD7   ` #D7##ZiD7#D7ZiD7I#D7#D7nApprendi,theCourtcharacterizedthedecisioninAlmendarezTorresas   atbestanexceptionaldeparturefromthehistoricalpracticethatwehavedescribed  (Apprendi,supra,530U.S.at486),andnoted:  8 ` EventhoughitisarguablethatAlmendarezTorreswas  incorrectlydecided,andthatalogicalapplicationofour  reasoningtodayshouldapplyiftherecidivistissuewere  contested,Apprendididnotcontestthedecisionsvalidity  andweneednotrevisititforpurposesofourdecisiontoday  totreatthecaseasanarrowexceptiontothegeneralrulewe  recalledattheoutset.(Id.,at490[footnoteomitted,   emphasisadded].)#D7##ZiD7#ZiM!` -` - VOa V V  JusticeThomassconcurringopinion#D7#D7inApprendi#D7#D7#2#alsoexplainedatlengthwhythe  decisionin#D7i#D7D7AlmendarezTorres#D7D71#D7Ԁwaswrong.(Apprendi,supra,530U.S.at501523;see  also#D7#D7D7AlmendarezTorres,supra,523U.S.#D7D7%#D7at256257,261[Scalia,J.dissenting].)#D7#D7##   ` Blakely,whichalsodidnotinvolvearecidiviststatute,merelyfollowed   Apprendi,maintainingtheexceptionforpriorswithoutfurtheranalysis.(#D7#D7Blakely,supra,   540U.S.at___[159L.Ed.2dat412413#D7]#D7#C#;124S.Ct.at25362537].)#D7#D7ԀYet,theBlakely   decisionreflectedthepositionthatitsauthor,JusticeScalia,hadarticulatedseveraltimes   inconcurringanddissentingopinionswhichwoulddisapproveoftheAlmendarezTorres  holding.(Seee.g.,AlmendarezTorres,supra,523U.S.at248271[dissenting];Apprendi,  supra,530U.S.at498499[concurring];Jonesv.UnitedStates(1999)526U.S.227,253  [143L.Ed.2d311,119S.Ct.1215][concurring;majoritylimitedAlmendarezTorresto  recidivistissuesanddistinguisheditasapleadingcase(id.,at248249)].) Since  Winship,wehavemadeclearbeyondperadventurethatWinshipsdueprocessand  associatedjuryprotectionsextend,tosomedegree,todeterminationsthat[go]nottothe  defendantsguiltorinnocence,butsimplytothelengthofhissentence.[Citation]   (Apprendi,supra,530U.S.at484[citingScaliasdissentinAlmendarezTorres].) "  ` Moreover,AlmendarezTorreswasbasedonadistinctionbetween $   sentencingfactorsand elementsofthecrime,thatApprendiandBlakelyhavenow &"" soundlyrejected.(Apprendi,supra,530U.S.at478,484,494;Blakely,supra,540U.S.at ($$ ___[159L.Ed.at415416#D7#D7#6#;124S.Ct.at25382540].)Thesimplerulenowisthatany *&& EOa E E  significantincreaseinastatutorymaximumsentence(otherthanthatduetoaprior  conviction)triggersaconstitutional elementsrequirement.(#D7#D7#R#Apprendi,supra,530U.S.  at490;Blakely,supra,540U.S.at___#Zi#Zi[159L.Ed.2dat413414;124S.Ct.at2537].)#D7##ZiD7#D7ZiD7   ` Inthecontextofmakingtheuppertermavailabletothesentencingcourt   insteadofthepresumptivemiddleterm,thefactofapriorconvictionisnotoperatingasa    sentencingfactor,butisinsteadoperatingasanelementalfactorthatiscreatingthe   discretionofthetrialcourttoimposethehighersentence.(See,Ring,supra,536U.S.#^##D7}#D7Ԁat   602.)AsJusticeThomasstated, establishingwhatpunishmentisavailablebylawand  settingaspecificpunishmentwithintheboundsthatthelawhasprescribedaretwo  differentthings.(Apprendi,supra,530U.S.at519,Thomas,J.concurring.)Justice  Thomasfurtherexplainedthatsentencingfactorswhichmayconstitutionallybefoundbya  judgewerenotthosethatcould swellthepenalty.(Id.,at519.)#D7##ZiD7#Zi   ` AlmendarezTorresfoundsupportforitsholdingbyreferenceto#D7U#D7D7Waltonv.  Arizona(1990)497U.S.639,647649[111L.Ed.2d511,110S.Ct.3047]#D7D7 #D7(Almendarez  Torres,supra,523U.S.at247)#D7##ZiD7t#D7ZiD7,whichhassincebeenoverruledinlightofApprendi.   (Ring,supra,536U.S.at588589.)#D7#D7#}#Thus,itishighlylikelythatwhensquarelyfacedwith " thequestion,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwillholdthatAlmendarezTorresdoesnot $  surviveApprendi,BlakelyandRing.(SeeId.,at588589,602604,609.) &"" #D7^#D7## ` Accordingly,thisCourtshouldavoidaninterpretationofPenalCode ($$ section1170thatcouldmakeitviolatethefederalconstitutionalrightstoajurytrialand *&& proofbeyondareasonabledoubt.(SeeBarrowsv.MunicipalCourt(1970)1Cal.3d821,  827[rejectinganinterpretationofastatutethatwouldrenderitinviolationoftheEqual  ProtectionClause];seealsoMetromedia,supra,#D7##ZiD7a#32Cal.3dat186;D7ZiԀGrahamv.Department  ofPublicWelfare(1971)403U.S.365,382383[29L.Ed.2d534;91S.Ct.1848][general   ruleofstatutoryconstructionnottointerpretastatuteinamannerthatwouldrenderit   unconstitutional.)#ZiD7#    0 `  C.0 ` (#` (#IfthisCourtReformstheStatute,ItMustRequireaJury   DeterminationofAllAggravatingFactors,IncludingPrior  Convictions ddd / (# (#  ` Respondentalsosuggeststhatthestatutecouldbereformedtoprovidethat  theuppertermmaybeimposedonlyonthebasisoffactorsotherwisefoundbythejuryor  admittedbythedefendant.(RABM4144)Thissolutionalsohasproblemsbecauseit  requiresreformationofthestatutetoprovideforsuchfindingsoradmissions.   ` ReformationofPenalCodesection1170thatwouldmakeitcomportwith  thedefendantsrighttoajurydeterminationofeveryfactessentialtotheimpositionofthe  uppertermwouldrequirewholesalerewritingofproceduresthatshouldbelefttothe ! Legislature.Thereisnostatutoryprovisionforajurytrialonaggravatingfactors.There # isnostatutoryframeworkforhowandwhensuchfactorswouldbepleadedortried.The %!! currentstatuteprovidesforthemtobefoundbythejudgeonthebasisofallmannerof '## evidencethatwouldnotbeadmissibleinanormaljurytrial.(SeeUnitedStatesv. )%% Jackson(1968)390U.S.570,580[20L.Ed.2d138;88S.Ct.1209][wheretheCourt +'' >Oa > >  declinedtorestructureproceduresforimplementingafederaldeathpenaltyforkidnaping  thatwouldbeconstitutional].)   ` ThisCourtcouldreadintothestatutearequirementthatallaggravating  factors,includingpriors,bepresentedtoandfoundbythejury.WhethertheLegislature   wouldopttoimposethisproceduralframeworkonacriminaltrialinsteadofrestructuring   itssentencingschemeisnotclear.Whatisclearisthatthedeterminationofwhetherto   changethesentencingschemeortheproceduresatacriminaltrialis properlya   legislativefunctionandlikelyshouldnotbetakenonbythisCourt.(SeeArp,supra,19  Cal.3dat409411;AmericanAcademyofPediatricsv.Lungren,supra,16Cal.4that  344.) Theonlywayinwhichthestatutenowatissuecouldbelimitedtoaproperscope  withrespecttothe[defendantsrightstoajurytrialandproofbeyondareasonabledoubt]  wouldbebyreadingintoitnumerousqualificationsandexceptions[andrightsand  procedures],therebyperformingawholesalerewritingofthestatutewhichthecourts  cannotreasonablybeexpectedtoundertake.(CityofCarmelbytheSeav.Young,supra,  2Cal.3dat272;seealsoMetromedia,supra,32Cal.3dat187[ifthecourtweretoinsert   allofthequalifyingprovisionsneededtorenderthestatuteconstitutional,itwouldbe " servinga legislativeratherthana judicialfunction];seealsoJackson,supra,390U.S. $  at580.) &""  ` Ontheotherhand,theLegislaturehasprovidedajurytrialrightasto ($$ enhancements,includingthoseinvolvingpriors.(Pen.Code,D7Zi#ZiD7#666.5,1025,1170.1, *&& ?Oa ? ?  subd.(e).)Thisdemonstrationoflegislativeintenttohavethosefactorsitrecognizedas  givingrisetoanincreasedsentencebesubmittedtothejurysuggeststhatreformationof  section1170toincludeajurytrialrightforelementalaggravatingfactorswouldconform  withtheLegislaturesintentandpurpose.    ` Additionally,reformationofthestatutetoaddarequirementofajury   findingofbeyondareasonabledoubtastoallaggravatingfactorswouldalsopreservethe   legislativepurposeofgivingthesentencingcourttheoptionofimposinganupperterm   whenthecrimemeritsit.Thus,itmaybeanappropriatemeansofimplementingthe  Legislaturesintentinaconstitutionalmanner.(SeeKopp,supra,11Cal.4that660661.)    0 ` D.0 ` (#` (#TheStatuteCanbeSeveredtoEliminatetheImpositionofthe  UpperTerm j (# (#  Y ` ThisCourtmayalsobeabletosavepartofPenalCodesection1170by  severingtheunconstitutionalschemeforelevatingthesentencefromtherestofthe  statute. Generally,unconstitutionalprovisionsdonotvitiatethewholeactunlessthey  entersoentirelyintothescopeanddesignofthelawthatitwouldbeimpossibleto ! maintainitwithoutsuchobnoxiousprovisions.[Citation].(Navarro,supra,7Cal.3dat # 260;seealsoLeamingv.MunicipalCourt(1974)12Cal.3d813.) %!!  ` Threecriteriamustbemetforanunconstitutionalportionofastatutetobe '## severablefromtherestofthestatute:(1)theinvalidprovisionmustbemechanicallyand )%% grammaticallyseverable;(2)itmustbefunctionallyseverable;and(3)theremainderof +'' BOa B B  thestatutelikelywouldhavebeenadoptedhadtheinvalidityoftheseveredportionbeen  foreseen.(CalfarmInsuranceCompanyv.Deukmejian(1989)48Cal.3d805,822;  Gerkin,supra,6Cal.4that714;Peoplev.SalazarMerino(2001)89Cal.App.4th590,  600.) Thetestofseverabilityiswhethertheinvalidpartsofastatutecanbesevered   fromtheotherwisevalidpartswithoutdestroyingthestatutoryschemeorutilityofthe   remainingprovisions.(Manningv.MunicipalCourt(1982)132Cal.App.3d825,828   831.)    ` Theuppertermprovisionscanbemechanicallyseveredbyremovingthem  fromthestatute.Forexample,thefirstprovisionofsubdivision(b)wouldreadin  pertinentpart, thecourtshallorderimpositionofthemiddleterm,unlessthereare  circumstancesinmitigationofthecrime.And,theoptionofimposingtheupperterm  foundlaterinthestatutecouldbedeleted.Functionally,asentencingcourtcouldeasily  imposeamiddleterminmostcasesorthelowertermwhereitiswarranted.The  eliminationoftheuppertermwouldnothindertheseotherfunctions.(ComparePeoplev.  LibraryOne(1991)229Cal.App.3d973,989.)    ` Indecidingthethirdcriterion,volitionalseverability,thecourtmustlookto " whetherthosewhofavoredthestatutewouldbehappytoachieveatleasttheportionof $  theirpurposethattheremainingstatutereflects.(Gerkin,supra,6Cal.4that714716; &"" SalazarMerino,supra,89Cal.App.4that600.) Ifaparttobeseveredreflectsa ($$  substantialportionofthe[Legislature]spurpose,thatpartcanandshouldbesevered *&& DOa D D  andgivenoperativeeffect.[Citation].(Ibid.,citingGerkin.)(#(#K(#   ` InenactingPenalCodesection1170,theLegislaturesoughttocreatea  systemofuniformsentencingthatwouldgivethesentencingcourtlimiteddiscretionto  imposeasentencethatfitthecrime.(SeePeoplev.Martin(1986)42Cal.3d437,442   443.)Itthusgavethecourtsentencingauthority,butmandatedthatthesentencetobe   imposedbethemiddletermabsentadditionalfactualfindings.Itthenimpermissibly   soughttogivethecourtthepowertomakethosefactualfindingstoincreasethesentence.   (SeeBlakely,supra,540U.S.___Zi[159L.Ed.2dat413414;124S.Ct.at2537]#.##Zi#.)   ` Iftheconstitutionallyinvalidauthoritytoimposeanuppertermbasedupon  judicialfactfindingwereseveredfromthestatute,thestatutewouldstillperformmuchof  theintendedfunction.TheLegislaturewouldundoubtedlyhavewantedthecourtto  retainthepowertosentenceconvictedpersons,thepresumptivesentencetobethe  midtermtheLegislaturehadchosen,andtohavethecourtretainthepowertomitigate  thattermifcircumstancesdemanded.Thefactthatthecourtcouldnotalsohavethe  powertoincreasethesentenceforaggravatedcrimes,whileitwasnotwhatthe   Legislaturehadenvisioned,wouldnotlessentheLegislaturesdesiretohavethestatute " otherwiseperformitsfunction.(SeeSalazarMerino,supra,89Cal.App.4that600.) $  Accordingly,thisCourtcouldsevertheunconstitutionalprovisionforimposingtheupper &"" termfromPenalCodesection1170. ($$  ` ThiswasthechoiceapparentlymadebytheKansasSupremeCourtwhen *&& \Oa \ \  facedwithasimilarproblem.InKansas,ashere,thechallengedstatuterequiredthe  impositionofapresumptivesentenceunlessthetrialcourtfoundfactorsinaggravationor  mitigationthatjustifiedanupwardordownwarddeparture.(SeeK.S.A.1999Supp.21  4716;Statev.Murphy(2001)270Kan.804.)TheKansasSupremeCourtfoundthis   judicialfactfindingunconstitutionalunderApprendi.(Statev.Gould(2001)271Kan.   394.)IntheinterimbetweentheKansasLegislaturesenactmentofanewschemethat   providedforjuryfindingsofaggravatingfactors(K.S.A.2002Supp.214716(b)&4718   (b))andthetimeoftheGoulddecision,onetrialcourtattemptedtoremedythe  constitutionalflawinthestatutorysentencingschemebyaskingthejurytomakethe  factualfindingsneededforanupwarddepartureinsentencing.TheKansasSupreme  Courtrejectedthissolutionandannouncedaruleprecludinganupwardsentencing  departureinanycase.(SeeStatev.Kessler(2003)276Kan.202,215217.)Thecourt  stated: [W]edenytheStatesinvitationtoworkaroundaflawedsentencingscheme.A  districtcourtsauthoritytoimposesentenceiscontrolledbystatute.Thus,wherethe  statutoryprocedureforimposingupwarddurationaldeparturesentenceshasbeenfound   unconstitutional,thedistrictcourthasnoauthoritytoimposesuchasentence.(Id.,at " 217;seealsoStatev.Cody(2001)272Kan.564,565566[guiltypleaadmissionof $  factorsusedtoincreasesentencewasnotsufficienttopermitupwarddeparturebecause &"" thelegislaturesgrantofauthoritytodepartfromapresumptivesentencehadbeen ($$ declaredunconstitutional].)Itthen,asithadpreviouslyinGouldandCody,remandedfor *&& Gj G G  resentencing,presumablytoasentenceinthepresumptiverangeorlower.(Kessler,  supra,276Kan.at217.)   ` ThisCourthastakensimilarstepsinothersituationsinwhichthe  impositionofahighersentencewasunconstitutional.Thus,inLeaming,supra,12Cal.3d   813,thisCourtheldthattheprovisioninformerPenalCodesection314foratermwitha   lifetopforasecondconvictionofindecentexposure,whichhadbeenpreviouslydeclared   unconstitutional,couldbeseveredfromtherestofthestatutethatdeclaredasecond   convictiontobeafelony.ThisCourtfurtherconcludedthatreadingthefelonyprovision  withthestatuteprovidingthatafelonysentencenototherwisespecifiedhadamaximum  offiveyearsresultedintheremainderofthestatutebeing completeinitselfwithoutthe  unconstitutionallifemaximumterm.(Id.,at816817.)InRockwellv.SuperiorCourt  (1976)18Cal.3d420,thisCourtfoundtheproceduresforimpositionofadeathsentence  forfirstdegreemurdertobeunconstitutionalanddeclinedtorewritethestatutetocorrect  theproceduraldefects.(Id.,at444445.)ThisCourtconcludedinsteadthattheprovisions  requiringadeathsentencewereseverablefromtheprovisionofalifesentencewhere   deathwasnotimposedandleftalifetermastheapplicablepunishment.(Ibid.)Similarly " here,theupperterm,whichrequiresunconstitutionaljudicialfactfindingtoimpose, $  couldbeeliminatedasasentencingoption,leavingthetrialcourtauthoritytoimposethe &"" presumptivemiddletermorthelowertermifmitigatingfactorssupportit. ($$  *&& FOa  F F   0 `  E.0 ` (#` (#ThisCourtShouldNotReadthePresumptiveMidtermOutof  theStatute ulJ  (# (# ) ` RespondentsuggeststhatthisCourtcouldcorrecttheconstitutionaldefect  insection1170byconstruingittopermittheimpositionoftheuppertermwithoutthe   findingofadditionalaggravatingcircumstances.(RABM5053)ThisCourtshouldnot   adoptsuchconstructionbecauseitwouldbeinconsistentwithLegislativeintent.(See   Peoplev.Gardeley(1996)14Cal.4th605,621[musteffectuatelegislativeintentin   construingastatute].)    ` TheLegislatureprovidedthatthecourtshallimposethemiddletermunless  additionalfactsarefound.Thisdemonstratesthelegislativeconclusionthataconviction  alonewarrantspunishmentnogreaterthanthemiddleterm.And,whiletheLegislature  didintendthatagreatertermmightbeimposedifadditionalfactorswerepresent,itdid  notintendtogivethetrialcourtunfettereddiscretiontoimposetheuppertermwithout  them.Instatingthatthepurposebehindsection1170wastopromoteuniformityin  sentencing,thisCourt,inMartin,supra,42Cal.3dat443,notedthat themovementto  promoteuniformityinsentencing...wasinnosmallpartamovementtodiminishjudicial ! discretion.(Emphasisadded.) #  ` Thus,theLegislatureverycarefullycircumscribedthediscretionitgranted %!! tothetrialcourtundersection1170.ThisCourtmustnotjustwriteoutthelimitations '## imposed.TheLegislaturemayultimatelydecidetogivesentencingcourtsbroader )%% discretioninsentencing,butthatisadeterminationthatshouldbelefttotheLegislature. +'' (SeeKopp,supra,11Cal.4that660661;Arp,supra,19Cal.3dat407408.)   ` RespondentsrelianceonPeoplev.Roder(1983)33Cal.3d491is  misplaced.InRoder,theconstitutionaldefectinthestatutewasthecreationofan  unconstitutionalpresumptionastoanelementoftheoffense.(Id.,at504.)Toremedyit,   thisCourtreadoutthepresumption,andchangedittoaconstitutionalinference.(Id.,at   505506.)Itdidnotcuretheproblembytakingtheelementoutofthecrime.Thatis   whatrespondentisaskingthecourttodohere.Theonlyunconstitutionalportionof1170   isthatenablingthetrialcourttomakefactualfindingsbyapreponderancethatwill  increaseasentence.Makingthemidtermthepresumptivesentenceisnot  unconstitutional;neitherisrequiringafindingofadditional elementstoimposethe  upperterm.ApplyingRoderhere,thisCourtshouldridthestatuteoftheunconstitutional  procedureforfindingtheadditionalelements,nottheelementsthemselves.       V.   ,8 ` RESPONDENTSFORMULATIONOFTHE  CHAPMANANALYSISINTHISCASEISWRONG & - 1-` -` -  ` RespondentarguesthattoapplyChapmantoBlakelyerror,thereviewing   courtneedonlydecidewhetherthejurywouldhavefoundatleastoneaggravatingfactor   beyondareasonabledoubt.Ifitsofinds,thenitmustfindtheerrorharmlessbecause,   uponthefindingofonefactor,thedefendantbecameeligiblefortheupperterm.(RABM   4446)Asdiscussedabove,thisargumentfailsbecauseadefendantdoesnotbecome   automaticallyeligiblefortheuppertermuponafindingofonefactorinaggravation.The  necessaryfactualfindingisonlythefirststep.Thesentencingcourtmustalsodecide  whetherthefactorisinfactaggravatinginthecontextofthecaseandthenwhetheritisof  sufficientweighttoimposetheupperterm.Alloftheseconsiderationsgointowhether  thedefendantiseligiblefortheupperterm,notjustwhethertheuppertermshouldbe  chosen.(SeeWright,supra,30Cal.3dat720.)Thus,theChapmananalysiscannotend  withadeterminationthatafactthatcouldpotentiallyhavesupportedthefindingofan  aggravatingfactorwouldhavebeenfoundbythejury. ! (#(#K(#  #    CONCLUSION &3  3 ` AstheprovisionsinPenalCodesection1170forjudicialfactfindingto  imposetheuppertermareunconstitutional,thisCourtmusteitherinvalidatetheentire  statuteorriditofitsunconstitutionalprovisions.(SeeSantaBarbaraSchoolDistrict,   supra,13Cal.3dat330.)Thelattermaybeaccomplishedbyeitherreformationofthe   statutetoaddtherighttoajuryfindingofthefactorsbeyondareasonabledoubtorby   severingtheunconstitutionalprovisionsforimpositionoftheuppertermfromtherestof   thestatute.(SeeIbid;Kopp,supra,11Cal.4that670671.)Itcannotbeaccomplishedby  reformingthestatutetopermitimpositionoftheupperterminonlythelimitedsituationin  whichthedefendanthasapriorconvictionwhichthetrialcourtfindstobebothtrueand  aggravatingasthiswouldleadtodisparityinsentencing,contrarytotheprimarypurpose  oftheLegislature.(Ibid.;Simon,supra,144Cal.App.3dat765.)   ` Undereitherthereformedorseveredstatute,appellantssentencecannot  stand.IfthisCourtreformsthestatutetorequireajuryfindingoftheaggravatingfactors  beyondareasonabledoubt,thetrialcourtsreliancehereonthecountsthatthejury   rejectedviolatedappellantsrighttosuchajuryfinding.Assumingthatappellants " admissionsofthepriorscouldhaveenabledthecourttoimposetheupperterm,the $  sentencemuststillbereversedbecauseitisnotclearbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthe &"" courtwouldhavefoundthepriorstobeaggravatingandchosentheuppertermbased ($$ uponthepriorsalone.(SeeD7ZiNederv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S.1,79#ZiD7<#.)Iftheupper *&& termprovisionsareseveredfromthestatutoryscheme,appellantssentencetotheupper  termisillegalandmustbereversed.Alternatively,thisCourtshouldreversethesentence  undertheCaliforniaConstitutionbecauseofthetrialcourtsrelianceonthefactsofthe  countsofwhichappellantwasacquitted.(SeeTakencareof,supra,119Cal.App.3dat   498.)   Dated:October20,20040  RespectfullySubmitted, (#(# Zi `    CALIFORNIAAPPELLATEPROJECT   `    JONATHANB.STEINER,   `    ExecutiveDirector  0 ` 0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#_________________________________(#(#  `    SUZANE.HIER,   `    StaffAttorney   `    AttorneysforAppellant#D7?##ZiD7$?#   $@++" TABLEOFCONTENTS    D(#Page(s)  Jw  APPELLANTSREPLYBRIEFONTHEMERITS""J(#.EE.1  6eXXpX` X6  ARGUMENT""J(#. 1     I.0 ` THETRIALCOURTSUSEOFCOUNTSOFWHICHTHE   DEFENDANTWASACQUITTEDTOIMPOSETHEUPPERTERM   SHOULDBEREVERSEDUNDERCALIFORNIALAW#""J(#.<` (#` (##1     II.0 ` THECOURTDIDVIOLATEAPPELLANTSRIGHTAGAINST   DOUBLEJEOPARDYBYUSINGACQUITTEDCOUNTS#""J(#.>` (#` (##5     III.0 ` APPELLANTWASIMPROPERLYSENTENCEDUNDERAN  UNCONSTITUTIONALSTATUTE#""J(#.,` (#` (##6     ` A.0 TheIssueisCognizableonThisAppeal#""J(#.VV? (# (##6     ` B.0 PenalCodesection1170,subdivision(b)IsUnconstitutionalin  AllowingJudicialFactfindingtoSupporttheUpperTerm#""J(#.``P (# (##8     ` C.0 ForPurposesoftheApprendi/BlakelyAnalysis,theRelevant  MaximumistheMaximumSentencetheJuryVerdictPermitsfor  theIndividualCountItself#L"L"I(#.4 (# (## @  @p  @p #@L"L"I(#.pp2 (# (##11      IV.0 ` ASSUMINGTHATPENALCODESECTION1170SUBDIVISION(B)  CANBESAVEDBYREFORMATION,ITMUSTBEREFORMEDIN   AMANNERTHATWILLPRESERVEUNIFORMITYOF ! SENTENCES;THEREFORMATIONSUGGESTEDBYRESPONDENT " DOESNOTPRESERVETHISLEGISLATIVEGOAL#L"L"I(#.||;` (#` (##13 #    ` A.0 PenalCodesection1170IsFaciallyUnconstitutional#L"L"I(#.M (# (##14 %!!    ` B.0 PenalCodesection1170CannotbeReformedtoPermit'## (# (#    `  ImpositionoftheUpperTermOnlyWhentheDefendant ($$    `  HasaPriorConvictionL"L"I(#./17 )%%    +''    ` C.0 IfthisCourtReformstheStatute,ItMustRequireaJury  DeterminationofAllAggravatingFactors,IncludingPrior  Convictions#L"L"I(#.$ (# (##24     ` D.0 TheStatuteCanbeSeveredtoEliminatetheImpositionofthe  UpperTerm#L"L"I(#.# (# (##26      ` E.0 ThisCourtShouldNotReadthePresumptiveMidtermOutofthe   Statute#L"L"I(#.JJ! (# (##31     V.0 ` RESPONDENTSFORMULATIONOFTHECHAPMAN ` (#` (#    ` ANALYSISINTHISCASEISWRONGL"L"I(#.233   CONCLUSIONL"L"I(#. 34    wB_    WOaRP^OY@  TABLEOFAUTHORITIES    D(#Page(s)  D7Zi  K+ ` hp x eXXXKD7  FEDERALCASES      2%#X_ Almendarez_ ԄTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)   X 2%#2%#523U.S.224zz@".1 1 21,22,23    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Apprendi_ Ԁv.NewJersey(2000)    X 2%#2%#530U.S.46666<".1 1 11,21,22,23    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Blakely_ Ԁv.Washington(2004)    X 2%#2%#540U.S.[159_ L.Ed_ .2d403;124_ S.Ct_ .2531]>(#.81,22,23,28    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XGrahamv.DepartmentofPublicWelfare(1971)    X 2%#2%#403U.S.365""H".1 1 24    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XJonesv.UnitedStates(1999)   X 2%#2%#526U.S.227""H".1 1 22   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Monge_ Ԁv.California(1998)   X 2%#2%#524U.S.721n"n"I".1 1 5   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Neder_ Ԁv.UnitedStates(1999)   X 2%#2%#527U.S.1""H".Y Y 34   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XO'Connorv.Ohio(1966)   X 2%#2%#385U.S.92n"n"I". 6   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XRingv.Arizona(2002)    X 2%#2%#536U.S.584 D".1 1 10,23 !  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XSullivanv.Louisiana(1993) #  X 2%#2%#508U.S.275n"n"I".1 1 7 $   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XUnitedStatesv._ Ameline_ (9thCir.2004) &!"  X 2%#2%#376F.3d967n"n"I".7 7 7 '"#  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XUnitedStatesv._ Gaudin_ (1995) )$%  X 2%#2%#515U.S.506n"n"I".1 1 8 *%&  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? +&'  2%#XUnitedStatesv.Jackson(1968)   X 2%#2%#390U.S.570 D".1 1 24,25   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XUnitedStatesv.Salerno(1987)   X 2%#2%#481U.S.739""H".1 1 14   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XUnitedStatesv.Watts(1997)    X 2%#2%#519U.S.148!!F".1 1 2,5    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XWaltonv.Arizona(1990)    X 2%#2%#497U.S.639""H".1 1 23    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XInre_ Winship_ (1970)    X 2%#2%#397U.S.358n"n"I".1 1 7    X?+ ` hp x 2%#?  CALIFORNIACASES      2%#XAmericanAcademyofPediatricsv._ Lungren_ (1997)   X 2%#2%#16Cal.4th30766<". 14,15,16,25   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Arp_ Ԁv.Workers'CompensationAppealsBoard(1977)   X 2%#2%#19Cal.3d395zz@".  17,25,32   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Barlow_ Ԁv.Davis(1999)   X 2%#2%#72_ Cal.App_ .4th1258""H". !19   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XBarrowsv.MunicipalCourt(1970)   X 2%#2%#1Cal.3d821""H".  24    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XBlairv._ Pitchess_ (1971) "  X 2%#2%#5Cal.3d258""H".  16 #  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#X_ Calfarm_ ԀInsuranceCompanyv.Deukmejian(1989) % !  X 2%#2%#48Cal.3d805 D".  16,27 &!"  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCaliforniaTeachersAssociationv.California(1999) (#$  X 2%#2%#20Cal.4th3278". 14,15,16,19,20 )$%  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? +&' _  2%#XCityofCarmelbytheSeav.Young(1970)   X 2%#2%#2Cal.3d259 D".  15,25   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCountyofLosAngelesv.Jessup(1938)   X 2%#2%#11Cal.2d273""H".  15   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XGerkinv.FairPoliticalPracticesCommission(1993)    X 2%#2%#6Cal.4th707 D".O O 19,27    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XInreJ.W.(2002)    X 2%#2%#29Cal.4th200""H". 19    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XInreJorgeG.(2004)    X 2%#2%#117Cal.App.4th931""H". !17    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XKoppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)   X 2%#2%#11Cal.4th607&&,". 13,14,16,17,19,26,32,34   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XLeamingv.MunicipalCourt(1974)   X 2%#2%#12Cal.3d813 D".  26,30   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XManningv.MunicipalCourt(1982)   X 2%#2%#132Cal.App.3d825""H". 27   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XMetromediav.SanDiego(1982)   X 2%#2%#32Cal.3d180zz@".  19,24,25   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Barksdale(1972)   X 2%#2%#8Cal.3d320""H".  19    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Barnes(2004) "  X 2%#2%#___Cal.App.4th___[2004D.A.R.12010]zz?".;;56,7,8,11 #  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Belmares(2003) %!!  X 2%#2%#106Cal.App.4th19n"n"I".e e 7 &""  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Betterton(1979) ($$  X 2%#2%#93Cal.App.3d406n"n"I".) ) 7 )%%  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? +''  2%#XPeoplev.Bowen(1992)   X 2%#2%#11Cal.App.4th102""H".e e 15   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Butler(2004)   X 2%#2%#___Cal.App.4th___[2004D.A.R.12083]n"n"I".;;58   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Castorena(1996)    X 2%#2%#51Cal.App.4th558""H".e e 15    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Chavez(1980)    X 2%#2%#26Cal.3d334n"n"I".  6    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Garcia(1995)    X 2%#2%#32Cal.App.4th1756""H". !15    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Gardeley(1996)   X 2%#2%#14Cal.4th605""H". 31   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.George(2004)   X 2%#2%#122Cal.App.4th419!!F". !7,8   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Groves(2003)   X 2%#2%#107Cal.App.4th1227n"n"I".=="7   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Hernandez(1988)   X 2%#2%#46Cal.3d194!!F".  7,9   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Humphrey(1997)   X 2%#2%#58Cal.App.4th809""H".e e 20    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Lemus(2004) "  X 2%#2%#122Cal.App.4th614n"n"I". !8 #  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.LibraryOne(1991) %!!  X 2%#2%#229Cal.App.3d973""H". 27 &""  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Lobaugh(1987) ($$  X 2%#2%#188Cal.App.3d780""H". 15 )%%  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? +'' ^OY+ ^ ^   2%#XPeoplev.Martin(1986)   X 2%#2%#42Cal.3d437 D".  28,31   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Menchaca(1983)   X 2%#2%#146Cal.App.3d1019n"n"I".!7   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Navarro(1972)    X 2%#2%#7Cal.3d248 D".  17,26    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Ochoa(2004)    X 2%#2%#121Cal.App.4th1551n"n"I".=="8    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Richards(1976)    X 2%#2%#17Cal.3d614n"n"I".  2    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Roder(1983)   X 2%#2%#33Cal.3d491""H".  32   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.SalazarMerino(2001)   X 2%#2%#89Cal.App.4th590 D".e e 27,28   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Sample(2004)   X 2%#2%#122Cal.App.4th206n"n"I". !8   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Scott(1994)   X 2%#2%#9Cal.4th331n"n"I".O O 9   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Simon(1983)   X 2%#2%#144Cal.App.3d761 D". 13,34    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Stevenson(1962) "  X 2%#2%#58Cal.2d794""H".  16 #  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Takencareof(1981) %!!  X 2%#2%#119Cal.App.3d492*!*!E". 1,35 &""  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Tassell(1984) ($$  X 2%#2%#36Cal.3d77P"P"I(#.  12 )%%  +'' RP, R, R  Peoplev.Smith(1992)    10Cal.App.4th178,182183P"P"I(#.)@""H".;;;12     2%#2%#Peoplev.Turner(1990)   2%#2%#  50Cal.3d668n"n"I".  6  ?+ ` hp x 2%#?    2%#XPeoplev.Vera(1997)    2%#2%#  15Cal.4th269n"n"I". 7   ?+ ` hp x 2%#?    2%#XPeoplev.Watson(1956)    2%#2%#  46Cal.2d818n"n"I".  4   ?+ ` hp x 2%#?    2%#XPeoplev.Welch(1993)    2%#2%#  5Cal.4th228n"n"I".O O 6      2%#2%#Peoplev.Wiley(1995)   2%#2%#  9Cal.4th580n"n"I".O O 7    ?+ ` hp x 2%#?#D7VQ##ZiD7P#ԀPeoplev.Wright(1982)    30Cal.3d705Zi ! !E(#. 15,33     2%#XRockwellv.SuperiorCourt(1976)   2%#2%#  18Cal.3d420""H".  30  ?+ ` hp x 2%#?   2%#XSantaBarbaraSchoolDistrictv.SuperiorCourt(1975)   2%#2%#  13Cal.3d315 D".  17,34  ?+ ` hp x 2%#?   2%#X  @xx$ OTHERSTATECASES     ! Statev.Cody(2001) "   272Kan.564P"P"I(#.O O  @ 29 #  $  #J##D7+#D7Statev.Gould(2001) % !  2%#2%#  271Kan.394.""H". 29#D7#D7#C#Ԉ &!"  '"# #ZiK#ZiStatev.Kessler(2003) (#$   276Kan.202 ! !E(#.O O  @ 29,30 )$% #D7ޤ##ZiD7#Zi *%& #Zi#ZiStatev.Murphy(2001) +&'   270Kan.804""H".O O 29 ,'( #D7F#D7#e# -() #D7 ##ZiD7b#D7ZiD7 .)* Ї%    STATESTATUTES        PenalCodesections:       314P"P"I(#. @ 30  #D7#D7#ܧ#     666.5P"P"I(#.25        667.5P"P"I(#. @ 20#D7I#D7##Ԉ         1025P"P"I(#.mm25        1170 E(#.mmpassim###Ziu#Ԉ        1170.1L"L"I(#.   @ 25       1170.3L"L"I(#.  18      1170.4L"L"I(#.   @ 18      1170.7L"L"I(#.  19      1170.75L"L"I(#.  @ 19      12022.5L"L"I(#.  @ 12      12022.7L"L"I(#.  @ 12    ?+ ` hp x 2%#?  10851L"L"I(#. @ 12    !  "  CaliforniaRulesofCourtrules:  #  $    4.408!!E(#. @ 15,18 % ! ?+ ` hp x X? &!"   4.420 C(#. @ 7,9,20 '"# ?+ ` hp x X? (#$   4.421L"L"I(#. @ 19