WPCQ vGqTIҭ1 ( UZV'OO<^,}E%NT|(:s$CoFG PKdr";XC]N~ҡ=fr#<UN %S 0 (Y UW@ ^ w 4    m U># a 0 l; 0 DRN=U@?M 0U 07 0* 0 0 0U 0 0 0J 0 0 0o! 0" 0" 0d# 0# 0$ 0#% 0% 0f& 0.' 0' 0|( 0) 0) 0D* 0*T+1<1UNm2#2~8 j\; Z; <E< B*<<< 0C= 0AF=  ===@B/B xE|E lFF;G6HLHLHbHbH txHH xID J <OK jK zKCoL HMM BN ^NO TO P jPQQQQQQQQQQQQQ 0<'QcQcQyQQ QHP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL,,,,0(A Z6Times New Roman Regular($(9 Z(Times New Roman i6 `{4:i+003|x   U\  `&Times New Roman  $    7    _/Respondentexpressesconcernthatmakingitharderfortheimpositionofthe  uppertermthanfortheimpositionofthelowertermwouldputthepartiesonunequal  footingandwouldcreatedisparitybymakinglowertermseasiertoachieve.(_RBSC_Ԁ18)  Thefactthattheprosecutionwouldbeartheburdenofprovingelementalaggravation  beyondareasonabledoubtisnodifferentfromtheaddedburdenplacedonthe  prosecutionineverycriminalcase.Moreover,thefactthatitwillbehardertoimposethe   uppertermwillresultinnoincreaseinthenumberofcasesinwhichthelowertermis    imposed.Theoptionisnottheuppertermorthelowerterm.Whiletheremaybemore  middletermsasaresultofitbeingmoredifficulttoprovefactorsinaggravation,that  factwillhavenoimpactonthenumberoflowerterms,whichwillstillresultasthey  alwayshavefromfindingsoffactorsinmitigation.((3$ !      0  (#$  0   H $    1    _/Respondentmakesapitchforeliminationofthemiddletermasthesolutionto  theproblembecauseitwouldpermitcontinuedconsiderationofallrelevantfactorsand  permittherulesofcourttoplayanillustrativeroleandprovideguidanceforthe  sentencingcourtintheexerciseofitsdiscretion.(_RSBC_Ԁ1819)Thisisanargumentto  > presenttotheLegislatureasitmakesitsdeterminationofwhattodonext.Itdoesnot  resolvetheissueofwhatremedytheLegislaturewouldultimatelypreferandenablethis  Courttodeterminewhethersuchasolutionbestsatisfieslegislativeconcerns. (9 Z(Times New Roman  C $    2    _/FJFThiswasprovidedtoAssemblymanKennethL.MaddybyLegislativeCounsel  inApril1977.Initsopeningparagraph,itexplainedthattheSanDiegoDistrict  AttorneysOfficebelievedthatthedeterminatesentencingactneededmodificationand  thatthisdocumentwasatentativedraftofsuggestedmodifications.Acopyofitwassent  toappellantfromtheLegislativeArchives.OnNovember16,2004,appellantfileda  requestforthisCourttotakejudicialnoticeofthearchivedmaterialsthatprovidethe   legislativehistoryfor_DSL_.ThelettertoAssemblymanMaddywasattachedtothe   requestasExhibitB.AppellanthasnottodatereceivedanorderfromthisCourtruling   ontherequestandurgesthisCourttoissueanordergrantingit.   *+ (_2623  ..*D+D (_25   ," <DL,23  ..," <DL,      *5+5 (_24  ) <DL)23  ..) <DL)  *2+2 (_23 ` &<<DL&23  ..&<<DL& ` */+/ (_22  #DL#23  ..#DL#  *,+, (_21   DL 23  .. DL  *)+) (_20 h DDL23  ..DDL h *&+& (_19  L23  ..L  *#+# (_18   L23  .. L  *>> (_17  2( 4 <DL223  Ԁ2( 4 <DL2  *DD (_16   ," <DL,23  Ԁ," <DL,   *55 (_15  ) <DL)23  Ԁ) <DL)  *22 (_14 ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ&<<DL& ` *// (_13  #DL#23  Ԁ#DL#  *,, (_12   DL 23  Ԁ DL  *)) (_11 h DDL23  ԀDDL h *&& (_10  L23  ԀL  (## &_9   L23  Ԁ L  (>> &_8  2( 4 <DL223  2( 4 <DL2  (DD &_7   ," <DL,23  ," <DL,   (55 &_6  ) <DL)23  ) <DL)  (22 &_5 ` &<<DL&23  &<<DL& ` (// &_4  #DL#23  #DL#  (,, &_3   DL 23   DL  ()) &_2 h DDL23  DDL h (&& &_1  L23  L  &## $_   L23   L    $    4    _/RespondentalsoreliesonthefactthatinUnitedStatesv.Booker(2005)543  U.S.220[160_L.Ed_.2d621;125_S.Ct_.738],theHighCourtelectedthistypeof  reformationtothefederalstatutesasthebestmeanstoeffectuateCongresssintentin  enactingthefederalsentencingscheme.(_RSBC_Ԁ2128)Respondentadditionallyrelieson  thechoiceofthecourtsinNewJerseyandOhiotoreformtheirsentencingschemes  similarly.(_RSBC_Ԁ2833)Thesecourtswereallinterpretingstatuteswithinthe   applicablereformationrulesintheir_jurisdictions_Ԁandbaseduponthelegislativeintentof   theirrespectiveLegislatures.(App.Supp.Rep.Brief(re:Booker)[_ASRBB_]56)   Whateverthemeritsofthedecisionsinthosejurisdictions,inCalifornia,itisclearthat   theLegislaturerejectedthemodificationsuggestedbyrespondentbecauseitwas    inconsistentwithitsprimarygoalsinenactingthestatute.Thus,themodelsfromthese  otherjurisdictionsshouldnotbefollowed. ' $    5    _/Asnotedabove,respondentsproposalforeliminatingthepresumptive  midtermwouldrequiresubstantialadditionalmodificationtothestatutesandthecourt  rules.(9 Z6Times New Roman Regular  $    8    _/Afurtherreasonnottoreformthestatutetoremovethepresumptivemidtermis  themassiveupheavalitwouldcausebynecessitatingnewsentencinghearingsforall  defendantspreviouslysentencedtothemiddletermwhenthatwasthepresumptive  sentence.Ifthecourtswillinfactbefreetoimposeanytermwithoutfindingsin  aggravationormitigation,orifthosefactorsareonlyrequiredtoinsurereasonableness  andnottoovercomeapresumptioninfavorofthemiddleterm,anydefendantsentenced   tothepresumptivemiddletermshouldbeentitledtoaremandtopermitthesentencing   courttoexercisepreviouslyunrecognizeddiscretiontoimposethelowertermwithout   findingsoffactorsinmitigation.(Seex.xPeoplev.SuperiorCourt(Romero)#J.##FJ#ԀxF.x(1996)13   Cal.4th49#J.s##FJӒ#7,530,fn.13[providingforwritrelieffordefendantswhohadbeensentenced    bycourtsthatdidnotrecognizethescopeoftheirdiscretion];Griffithv.Kentucky,supra,  479U.S.314,328.)  ' SUZAN0SUZAN .   Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 33 [101 S.Ct. 99People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251CASES !  _ Peoplev.Smith(1983)34Cal.3d251# .#&0 d d   (2C$ !  (Vm$0   ?  $    3    _/ThisdiscretionwasfurtherconstrainedbytheLegislaturesdesignationof  specificfixedtermsratherthanasentencingrange,aswellasitsrequirementsthatcertain  factorsbeconsidered(seee.g.Pen.Code,J#FJV#1170.7et.seq.),thattheJudicialCouncil  provideadditionalrulesforthesentencingcourtstofollow,andthatthesentencingcourt  identifyreasonsontherecord.(_ASBMB_Ԁ6) x $    6    _/TheLegislaturesreluctancetocomplicatetheproceedingsis,ofcourse,  irrelevantiftheLegislatureseekstomaintaintherequirementofafindingof  aggravationtojustifytheuppertermandtheConstitutionmandatesthatsuchfactsbe  foundbyajury.(See_Blakely_Ԁv.Washington(2004)542U.S.296,313314[159_L.Ed_.  2d403,419420;124_S.Ct_.2531].)    % $    9    _/Respondentalsoassertsthatappellantdidnotobjecttohissentence.(_RSBC_  45)Thisismisleading.Appellantdidnotagreetothesentence,butratherarguedthathis  wobblercrimeshouldbesentencedasamisdemeanor,aswellasthathisstrikepriorbe  strickenalongwiththeprisontermpriorsandthatthelowtermbeimposed.(4RT2410  2413)F Miller v. Florida (1987) 482 U.S. 423, 433 [107 S.CASES !  _ ԀMillerv.Florida(1987)482U.S.423    [107S.Ct.2446,96_L.Ed_.2d351]# +#HPeople v. Williams (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1157CASES !  _ Peoplev.Williams(1987)196_Cal.App_.3d1157# .#page page chapter volume footnote endnote          PCalder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 390.) CASES !  _ Calderv.Bull(1798)3U.S.(3Dall)386# .#R Carmell v. Texas (2000) 529 U.S. 513 [120 S.Ct. 16CASES : !  _ Ԁ_Carmell_Ԁv.Texas(2000)529U.S.513    [120_S.Ct_.162,146_L.Ed_.2d577]# +#section 1170, subdivision (b)United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [125 S.CVTeague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 [109 S.Ct. 1060, CASES 9 !  _ _Teague_Ԁv.Lane(1989)489U.S.288    [109_S.Ct_.1060,103_L.Ed_.2d334]# .#XGriffith v. Kentucky, supraCASES !  _ Griffithv.Kentucky,supra# .# d[(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441CASES !  _ Peoplev.Dillon(1983)34Cal.3d441# +#]In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250CASES !  _ InreTartar(1959)52Cal.2d250# .#Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 33 [101 S.Ct. 9   <:Default Para        H !  _x.x@INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA  THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA, p )     `     h      p )    PlaintiffandRespondent,0 h 0h(#h(#  0p(#(#)_Crim_.No.S125677 p(#p(#    `     h      p )   Ѐv. `  0  0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#)(CourtofAppealNo.B166312) p(#p(#    ` 0 h 0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#)(_Sup.Ct.No_.PA040926) p(#p(#    `     h      p )   SHAWN_TOWNE_ 0   h 0(#(#0(#(#0p(#(#) p(#p(#    `     h      p )     DefendantandAppellant. h   0  0p(#(#) p(#p(# ____________________________________________)   @G G   APPELLANTSSUPPLEMENTALREPLY@@BRIEF   @$ONTHEMERITS    ӀRE:CUNNINGHAMV.CALIFORNIA #x.J#.x  A;:) xdE0 0xA  @@*       `     h   JONATHANB.STEINER /    `     h   ExecutiveDirector /    `     h   SUZANE.HIER  /    `     h   StaffAttorney !/    `     h   (StateBarNo.90470) "/    `     h   CALIFORNIAAPPELLATEPROJECT $/ !    `     h   520S.GrandAvenue,4thFloor %/!"    `     h   LosAngeles,California90071 &/"#    `     h   Telephone:(213)2430300 '/#$    `     h   AttorneysforAppellant  )/%& _ w8Jdd8OaCOaMOa #x.#.x_Oa<Oa OaJOaOaK[ @INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA  THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA, p )     `     h      p )    PlaintiffandRespondent,0 h 0h(#h(#  0p(#(#)Crim.No.S125677 p(#p(#    `     h      p )   Ѐv. `  0  0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#)(CourtofAppealNo.B166312) p(#p(#    ` 0 h 0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#)(Sup.Ct.No.PA040926) p(#p(#    `     h      p )   SHAWNTOWNE 0   h 0(#(#0(#(#0p(#(#) p(#p(#    `     h      p )     DefendantandAppellant. h   0  0p(#(#) p(#p(# ____________________________________________)   @G G  @@  APPELLANTSSUPPLEMENTALREPLY@@BRIEF   @$ONTHEMERITS    ӀRE:CUNNINGHAMV.CALIFORNIA  0#x. ##Fx+#xF .x  A;:) xdE0 0xA  #x.s##FxQ#    RespondentagreesthatCunninghamxF.xԀv.California(2007)549U.S.___[#x.#.x127S.Ct. I/ 856#x.#.x;166L.Ed.2d856]#J.##FJ#ԀheldthatCaliforniassentencingschemeviolatesthefederal I/ constitutionbypermittingjudicialfactfindingtoincreasethemaximumsentence I/ available.(Resp.sSupp.Brief(re:Cunningham)[RSBC]2,48)Respondentfurther I/ acknowledgesthatthestatutoryschememustbereformedtomakeitcomplywiththe I / federalconstitutionalrequirements.(RSBC2)Thereafter,respondentproposes I"/ reformation(RSBC840),andalsourgesthateitherappellantssentencedidnotviolate I$/ ! Cunningham,orthatifitdid,anyerrorwasharmlessinthiscase.(RSBC4162) I&/"# Throughoutappellantspreviouslyfiledbriefing,appellanthasaddressedallofthese I(/$% arguments.Appellantwillnothereinrepeatallofthepriorargumentsmade,whichhe I*/&' stillasserts,butwilladdresssomepointsrequiringadditionalcommenttoassistthis I,/() Courtinresolvingtheissuespresented. I./*+ <Oa <w <     @  ARGUMENT      I.      8 @ THISCOURTSHOULDNOTREFORMCALIFORNIAS  SENTENCINGSTATUTESTOELIMINATETHE   0@ PRESUMPTIONOFTHEMIDDLETERM  ӈ     RespondentassertsthatthisCourthastheauthoritytoreformthesentencing "  statutes,andnotesthatanysuchreformationmustbeconsistentwiththeLegislatures "  intentinenactingthelaw.(RSBC813)RespondentsuggeststhatthisCourtshould "  reformthestatutoryprovisionstostrike thelanguageofsection1170,subdivision(b), " thattheSupremeCourtfoundunconstitutional.(RSBC13)Inrespondentsview,the " offendingstatutorylanguageis whenajudgementofimprisonmentistobeimposedand " thestatutespecifiesthreepossibleterms,thecourtshallorderimpositionofthemiddle " term,unlesstherearecircumstancesinaggravationormitigationofthecrime.(RSBC " 13) "   WhilerespondentiscorrectthatthisCourthasthepowertoreformstatutesina " mannerconsistentwiththeintentoftheLegislatureinenactingit,heiswronginhis "  assertionsthatremovingthepresumptivemidtermwouldbeconsistentwiththatintent. "" (SeeKoppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th607,660661;Peoplev.Martin "$  (1986)42Cal.3d437,442443;App.sReplyBriefontheMerits[ARBM]1732; "&"" App.sSupp.LetterBrief11/16/04[ASLB].)Alsoincorrectishisassertionthat "($$ Cunninghamdeclaredthepresumptivemidtermunconstitutionalandthatremovingit "*&& Oa    wouldmerelybestriking thelanguagethatthe SupremeCourtfound  unconstitutional.(RSBC13)Itisthejudicialfindingofelementalfactsnecessaryto  permitsentenceabovethemidtermthatoffendsthefederalconstitution(seeCunninghamxF.x  v.California,supra,549U.S.___[#x.a&#.x127S.Ct.856#x.&#,873.x;166L.Ed.2d856]#J.B&##FJ9'#),notthe   presumptivemidtermitself.Thus,thisCourtsreformationofthestatuteshouldlimit   itselftoeliminationoftheunconstitutionalaspectsoftheschemeinamannerthatbest   promotestheconcernsoftheLegislaturethatenactedit.       A.0 ` TheLegislature,WhosePrimaryGoalsinFormulatingthe  DeterminateSentencingLaw[DSL]WeretoPromoteUniformityof  SentencingandLimitJudicialDiscretioninImposingSentence,  RejectedtheOptionofRemovingthePresumptiveMidterm.  Therefore,thisCourtShouldNotReformtheStatutetoEliminatethe  Presumption  ) ` (#` (#   Respondentrecognizesthateliminationofdisparityinsentencingwasagoalof  theLegislatureinenactingDSL,butassertsthattheLegislatureintendedtoconfer   broaddiscretiononthesentencingcourtunderDSLandthatremovingthe  presumptionofthemiddletermwouldbeconsistentwiththisintent.(RSBC1520) ! RespondentsanalysisignorestheLegislaturesclearintenttoseverelylimitthe # sentencingcourtsdiscretionunderDSL.(SeePeoplev.Martin,supra,42Cal.3d437, %!! 442443;ARBM3131)Moreover,respondentsproposedsolutionwouldundermine '## theLegislaturesmaingoalinDSLofeliminatingdisparityinsentencing. )%%   Theprimarylegislativegoalbehindsection1170'senactmentwastopromote +'' uniformityinsentencingofoffenderscommittingthesameoffense.(Pen.Code,JF#FJ2/#Ԁ1170  subd.(a)(1);Peoplev.Simon(1983)144Cal.App.3d761,765;Parnas&Salerno,The  InfluenceBehind,SubstanceandImpactoftheNewDeterminateSentencingLawin  California(1978)11U.C.DavisL.Rev.29,3132,3940;App.Supp.Brief(re:Booker)   filed2/10/05[ASBMB]56)  FF J FTheLegislaturefurtherfindsanddeclaresthatthe   eliminationofdisparityandtheprovisionofuniformityofsentencescanbestbeachieved   bydeterminatesentencesfixedbystatuteinproportiontotheseriousnessoftheoffenseas   determinedbytheLegislaturetobeimposedbythecourtwithspecifieddiscretion.(Pen.  Code,#J J0##FJ1#JF#FJ%3# FF J FԀ1170,subd.(a)(1);emphasisadded;seealsoPen.Code,#J Jk3# JJ# F Jӊ3# J F# F JG4# J F1170.3,1170.4;  Peoplev.Martin,supra,42Cal.3d437,442443[with#J J4##FJӍ4#JF#FJ^5# FF J FԀ1170,#J JӤ5##FJ5#theLegislaturesoughtto  createasystemofuniformsentencingthatwouldgivethesentencingcourtlimited  discretiontoimposeasentencethatfitthecrime]JF JJ.)#J J7##FJ6#    Respondentrecognizesthislegislativeintenttoprovideforuniformsentences,but  urgesthat,becausetheLegislatureprovidedforthecourttomakethefactualfindingsto  supportaggravation,removalofthepresumptionforthemiddletermwouldbestreflect   thedesiresoftheLegislature.(RSBC1520)This,however,ignoresthefactthatthe " Legislature,whichwasalsoveryconcernedaboutlimitingjudicialsentencingdiscretion, $  rejectedthisoption. #  1      ׀ [T]hemovementtopromoteuniformityinsentencing...wasinno &""  Oa      smallpartamovementtodiminishjudicialdiscretion.( FF J FPeoplev.Martin,supra,42Cal.  3d437,#J J;##FJ$;#Ԁ443,emphasisadded;ASBB6.)  FF  AsinitiallydraftedinSenateBill42,PenalCodesection1170didnotinclude  currentsubdivision(b)withitsrequirementthatthemiddletermbeimposedunlessthe   courtfoundadditionalfactorsjustifyingdeparturefromit.(SeeSen.BillNo.42(1975   1976,Reg.Sess.)#FF<#FFԀ273.)Rather,itmerelystatedthatthetrialcourtshallsentencethe   defendanttooneofthethreetermsabsentagrantofnewtrialorprobation.(Ibid.)Inthe   August7,1975versionofthebill,subdivision(b)wasadded,providingforthe  mandatoryimpositionofthemiddletermabsentadditionalfindingsandlayingout  variousproceduralrulesfordoingso.(SeeAssem.AmendtoSen.BillNo.42(1975  1976,Reg.Sess.)Aug.7,1975,pp.111113.)Whilethoseprocedureswerelater  amendedbyAssemblyBill476topermitfindingofthefactorsatasinglesentencing  hearingandwithoutamotionbytheparties,therequirementthatthecourt shallimpose  themiddletermunlessitmadeadditionalfindingsandstatedthereasonsforthe  departureontherecordwasnevereliminated.(SeeAssem.Bill476(19771978,Reg.   Sess.)#FF=#FFԀ15.) "   Additionally,in1977,whenAB476wasbeingdraftedtoamendthenewly $  enacteddeterminatesentencinglawaspassedinSB42,theSanDiegoDistrict &"" JOa J J  AttorneysOfficeurgedtheLegislaturetogivethesentencingcourtmorediscretionand  reducetheemphasisona narrowuniformity.(SeeExh.BinApp.Req.forJud.Not.  filed11/16/04[ARJN],SuggestedModificationofSB42TentativeDraft,p.4.) #  2      ׀It  furtherarguedtothisendthat, [t]hemiddletermshouldbeviewedasthenorm,butnot   mademandatory;...(Id.atp.4.)Theproposalwentontosuggestthat:(1)the   requirementofaspecialhearingonaggravationormitigationshouldbeeliminated;(2)   thechoiceoftermshouldbelefttothesounddiscretionofthecourt;(3)theJudicial   Councilssentencingguidelinesshouldbemerely takenintoconsiderationinsteadof  mandatorilyapplied;and(4)thecourtshouldbeabletouseawiderangeofinformation,  includingtheprobationreport.(Id.atpp.47.)Thesameofficealsowrotetothe  ChairmanoftheAssemblyCommitteeforCriminalJustice,theHonorableKennethL.  Maddy,towithdrawitssupportofthebillbecauseitsproposedamendments,which  includedthosementionedabove,hadnotbeenadopted.(SeeARJNExh.A.)    Subsequently,theLegislaturedidfollowsomeofthesesuggestionsastheyrelated  toPenalCodesection1170,suchascombiningthehearingonaggravatingormitigating   COa C C  factorswiththesentencinghearingandpermittingconsiderationoftheprobation  officersreports.(SeePen.Code,#FF B#1170asenactedin1977;seealsoExh.C,D,E.)But,  despitetheearlierrequestthattheLegislaturemakethemiddleterm thenorm,the  Legislatureretainedthemandatory shall.Itfurthercontinuedtomandatethatthetrial   courtfollowtheJudicialCouncilrules.Thisretentionofthemandatorymiddleterm   demonstratesaclearlegislativeintenttorequirethesentencingcourttoimposethe   middletermunlessadditionalfactswerefound.(Cf.,Kusiorv.Silver(1960)54Cal.2d   603,618[ FF #F FM# FFfailuretomakechangesinagivenstatuteinaparticularrespectwhenthe  subjectisbeforetheLegislature,andchangesaremadeinotherrespects,isindicativeof  anintentiontoleavethelawunchangedinthatrespect.#F FM#FF];#FFO# FFMadridv.JusticeCourt#F F\O# FFԀ(1975)  52Cal.App.3d819,825#F FO#Ԅ826.)TheLegislatureplainlyrejectedthesuggestionof  expandingthetrialcourtsdiscretiontoenableittoimposeanyofthethreetermsatwill.  NeitherdiditpermitthetrialcourttoignoretherulesoftheJudicialCouncilinmaking  itsfindingsonaggravatingormitigatingfactors.Therejectionofthesuggestionin1977  demonstratesclearlythatsuchasolutionwascontrarytotheintentoftheLegislature.As   aresult,thisCourtshouldnotnowdowhattheLegislaturehasalreadyoptedagainst. " (SeeKoppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th607,FFJF661.) $    Moreover,eliminatingtherestraintofthepresumptivemidtermandrequirementof &"" proofofadditionalfactstojustifytheaggravatedtermwouldactuallyleadtomore ($$ disparityinsentences.Undersuchasystem,solongasthesentencingcourtsdecision *&& wasnotarbitrary,asentencetoanyofthethreetermswouldbepermissibleirrespective  ofwhethertherewereaggravatingfacts.(Cf.#FJS##FFR#InreCortez(1971)6Cal.3d78,8586JFJJ  [reasoneddecisionthatisnotarbitraryorcapriciouswillnotbefoundanabuseof  discretion].)Asrespondentnotes,inPeoplev.Black(2005)35Cal.4th1255,1260   [overruledinCunningham],thisCourtrecognizedthatthe broaddiscretionafforded   sentencingjudgesundersection1170is constrained,tosomedegreebythemandated   middleterm.(RSBC20)A #  3      ׀Ofnecessity,ifthisconstraintisremoved,thediscretionwill   broaden.Asrespondentalsonotes,thisCourtconcludedinBlackthatthepresumptive  middletermandrequirementofaggravationwasameansofassuringthatthesentence  wasreasonable.(RSBC20)Thisveryspecificcontrolonwhatisreasonableservedto  promoteuniformityinassessingwhichtermtoimpose.Withthebroadeningofthe  discretion,thisdegreeofuniformitywillnecessarilybelost.2 #  4      #JJU##FJӢU#Ԁ  Oa         B.0 ` JudicialFactfinding,NotthePresumptiveMidterm,Is  Unconstitutional;Thus,theFactfinding,NotthePresumptive  Midterm,ShouldbeStricken Y[ abz[` (#` (#   RespondentsuggeststhatCunninghamheldthatthepresumptivemidtermwas  unconstitutional.(RSBC13,35)Thisisnotso.TheCourtstated, Because   circumstancesinaggravationarefoundbythejudge,notthejury,andneedonlybe   establishedbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,notbeyondareasonabledoubt,[citation   omitted],theDSLviolatesApprendisbrightlinerule....(Cunninghamv.California,   supra,xF.x549U.S.___[#x.^#.x127S.Ct.856#x.H_#.x,873#J.^##FJӗ_#]emphasisadded.)Thus,itwasjudicial  factfindingtomaketheuppertermavailablethattheHighCourtfoundproblematic,not  therequirementthatadditionalfactsbeyondtheidentifiedelementsofthecrimeand  enhancementsbefoundbeforetheuppertermcanbeimposed.    Baseduponthisfaultyassumption,respondenturgesexcisionofthepresumptive  midtermfromsection1170,subdivision(b),additionofthemiddletermtoPenalCode  section1170.3,andinvalidationofrule4.420(a)sprovisionthatthemiddletermbe  selectedunlesstheupperorlowertermisjustifiedbyfactorsinaggravationor   mitigation.(RBSC15,3537)Respondentfurtherurgesthatrule4.420(b)sprovisions " thattheuppertermisjustifiedonlyuponafindingthataggravatingfactorsoutweigh $  mitigatingfactorsandthelowertermisjustifiedonlyuponafindingthatmitigating &"" factorsoutweighaggravatingfactors,alongwiththedefinitionsofaggravatingand ($$ MOa  M M  mitigatingcircumstancesinrule4.405andtherequirementofastatementofreasonsin  rule4.406(b),shouldalsobeinvalidated.(RBSC3537)Yet,noneoftheseprovisions  violatethefederalconstitutionorwereinvalidatedbyCunningham.Rather,onlythe  provisionspermittingthetrialjudge,insteadofthejury,tomaketherequiredfactual   findingsofaggravationbasedonapreponderanceoftheevidence,ratherthanproof   beyondareasonabledoubt,wereheldtobeconstitutionallyimpermissible.(Cunningham   v.California,supra,xF.x549U.S.___[#x.g#.x127S.Ct.856#x.&h#.x,873#J.g##FJuh#].)Onlytheyneedberemoved.     RespondentalsoassertsthattheLegislaturedemonstratedanintentthatjudges  ratherthanjuriesidentifyandimposetheappropriatesentences.(RSBC16)Thisistrue.  AppellantdoesnotdisputethattheLegislatureintendedthatthecourtselectthesentence  withinthelimiteddiscretionoutlinedforit.NothingintheApprendilineofcases  requiresthatthejurydecidewhatsentencetoimpose.Rather,thosecasesmerelyhold  thatthefederalconstitutionrequiresthatallfactsreliedupontosetthemaximum  potentialsentencebefoundbythejury.Thus,tosatisfytheconstitution,Californias  schemeneedonlyeliminatethejudgesauthoritytofindtheaggravatingfactors   necessarytojustifytheupperterm.Itneednoteliminatethepresumptivemiddleterm,or " thecourtsauthoritytoweightheaggravatingfactorsagainstmitigatingfactors,orthe $  trialcourtspowertomaketheultimatedecisionwhethertoimposetheuppertermonce &"" itisavailable. ($$   Toeliminatetheunconstitutionalimpositionoftheuppertermbaseduponjudicial *&& factfinding,thisCourthasseveraloptions.Onewouldbetoeliminatetheuppertermin  allcases.Thisistheremedyappellantendorses.(ARBM2630,ASBMB78)Another  optionwouldbesimplytoremovetheprovisionspermittingthesentencingcourttofind  factstojustifytheaggravatedterm,andeitherpermittheuppertermonlywherethose   factshavealreadybeenestablishedbyconstitutionalmeansortopermitjurytrialsonthe   aggravatingfacts.(ARBM1718,2526)     Therefore,thisCourtcouldseverfromPenalCodesection1170,subdivision(b)   theprovisionsforinterestedpartiestodisputefactsorpresentevidence,aswellasthose  permittingtheconsiderationofadditionalevidencetodeterminewhethertheupperterm  isjustified.Thiswouldleavesubdivision(b)toread: p    FF J F8  8`    #J Jvr# JJ(b)Whenajudgmentofimprisonmentistobeimposedand  thestatutespecifiesthreepossibleterms,thecourtshallorder  impositionofthemiddleterm,unlesstherearecircumstances  inaggravationormitigationofthecrime.Atleastfourdays  priortothetimesetforimpositionofjudgment,eitherparty  orthevictim,orthefamilyofthevictimifthevictimis  deceased,maysubmitastatementinaggravationor  mitigation.Thecourtshallsetforthontherecordthefacts  andreasonsforimposingtheupperorlowerterm.Thecourt   maynotimposeanuppertermbyusingthefactofany ! enhancementuponwhichsentenceisimposedunderany " provisionoflaw.Atermofimprisonmentshallnotbe # specifiedifimpositionofsentenceissuspended.$ ` x` x #J J s##FJӕr#Theprovisionforthepartiestosubmitstatementsinaggravationandthecourts &"" considerationofsuchfactorswouldhavetobeinterpretedtobelimitedtofactsfoundby ($$ thejuryasprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt. *&&   TheRulesofCourtwouldalsohavetobemodifiedtoeliminatetheprovisionsfor  thesentencingcourttofindtheaggravatingfactorsbyamerepreponderanceofthe  evidence.Thus,rule4.420(b)wouldhavetobereformedtodeletethefirstandthird  sentencesandread:   8  8`    Selectionoftheuppertermisjustifiedonlyif,aftera   considerationofalltherelevantfacts,thecircumstancesin   aggravationoutweighthecircumstancesinmitigation.   Selectionofthelowertermisjustifiedonlyif,considering   thesamefacts,thecircumstancesinmitigationoutweighthe   circumstancesinaggravation.z ` x` x Withthisreformationtothesetwosections,theschemecouldoperateconstitutionally.It  doesnotappearthatanyotherstatutesorruleswouldrequiremodification.3 #  5      ׀    ThisCourtwouldthenhavetodecidewhetheritshouldfurtherreformthesystem  toreadintoitprovisionsforjurytrialsonanyaggravatingfactorsthatwouldnotbe  otherwiseconstitutionallyavailable.Asappellanthasnoted,thisoptionisproblematic  becausetheproceduralmechanismsforobtainingjuryfindingsonthesefactsarenotin  place,andthedxF.xeterminationofwhatproceduresshouldbeimplementedtoprovidefor  pleadingtheallegationsofaggravatingfactsandsubmittingthemtothejuryarelargely ! legislativefunctions.(See#x.<#.x#J.#.JCityofCarmelbytheSeav.Young#J.##FJb#(1970)2Cal.3d259,xF.xԀ272; # #J.E##FJd#Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealsBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395,JF.JԀ40941;ARBM2426#J.B#.J; %!! AppellantsSupplementalBriefontheMerits(re:Cunningham)[ASBMC3132].#x.##.x#J.#.J) '## K[ K K  Moreover,asrespondentnoted,itappearsthattheLegislaturepreferredtokeepthe  proceduralaspectsofthedeterminationoftheaggravatingfactorsuncomplicated.Thus,  itoptedtohaveanevenmoreinformalhearingonfactorsinaggravation.(RSBC1617)B #  6        Accordingly,itmaybebesttoleavetotheLegislaturethedecisionastohowadditional   factorsneededtojustifytheuppertermmaybeconstitutionallydetermined.     ThisCourtsotheroptionwouldbeto#J.##FJD#Ԁholdthattheuppertermmaybeimposed   onlywherethereareaggravatingfactorsthatwerefoundbyconstitutionallycompliant   means.Appellanthasarguedthatthiswouldimproperlyskewsentencinginamanner  notanticipatedbytheLegislatureandleadtodisparatesentences.(SeeARBM1819)  Barringuppertermsbasedonfactsrelatingtothecurrentoffense,nomatterhow  aggravatingtheymaybe,whilepermittingtheuppertermbaseduponapriororan  enhancementthatwasnotimposed,willresultinsentencesinsomemoreaggravated  crimesbeinglimitedtothemiddletermwhilesentencesinsomemoremitigatedcasesare  allowedtoincreasetotheupperterm.Sucharesultwouldnotpromoteanyofthestated  Legislativegoals,butwouldbecontrarytolegislativeintent.Thus,thisCourtshould   rejectthisoptionaswell.(SeeMetromediav.SanDiego(1982)32Cal.3d180,190; " Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.,supra,11Cal.4thatpp.643,669670;ASBMC32 $  34;ARBM1726.) &""   NoreformationwillgivetheLegislatureexactlywhatitwantedbecausepartof  whatitwantedjudicialfindingoffactsnecessarytoaggravatethesentenceis  unconstitutional.Itislikely,however,thattheLegislaturewouldprefertohaveits  systemoperatetotheextentthatitcaninamannerthatwouldleadtothemostuniform   sentencingandresultinasentenceconsideredappropriatebytheLegislatureinthe   majorityofcases.(SeeGerkinv.FairPoliticalPracticesCommission(1993)6Cal.4th   707,714716;Peoplev.SalazarMerino(2001)89Cal.App.4th590,600[ Ifapartto   beseveredreflectsa substantialportionofthe[Legislature]spurpose,thatpartcan  andshouldbeseveredandgivenoperativeeffect.[CitingGerkin].].)Thisresultcanbe  constitutionallyaccomplishedbyeliminatingtheuppertermuntiltheLegislaturehasthe  opportunitytodecidewhatfinalreformsshouldbemade.Bymakingthemiddleterm  presumptive,theLegislatureindicatedadeterminationthatitwasthesentencethatwould  beexpectedintheusualcase.Itfurtheranticipatedthatthelowertermwouldbe  imposedsomeofthetime.Thus,inthemajorityofcases,theuppertermwouldnotbe  implicated.Moreover,byeliminatingtheuppertermacrosstheboard,thedisparity   causedbyallowingimpositionoftheupperterminonlysomeoftheaggravatedcases " wouldbeavoided.(ARBM2630,ASBMC34) #  7      ׀ThisCourthasmadesimilar $  reformationslimitingsentenceswherestatutoryprovisionsforhighersentenceswere  foundtobeunconstitutional.(SeeRockwellv.SuperiorCourt(1976)18Cal.3d420,  444445[thisCourtfoundtheproceduresforimpositionofadeathsentencetobe  unconstitutional,declinedtorewritethestatutetocorrecttheproceduraldefects,and   insteadseveredtheprovisionsforthedeathsentence,leavingalifesentenceasthe   applicablepunishment];Leamingv.MunicipalCourt(1974)12Cal.3d813,816817   [thisCourtseveredtheprovisionforalifetopfromastatute].)       C.0 ` RetroactiveApplicationofaReformedVersionofsection1170,  subdivision(b)thatEliminatedthePresumptiveMidtermand  RequirementofFindingAggravatingFactorsWouldViolateDue  Process v ` (#` (#   Finally,thisCourtsadoptionofrespondentssuggestedreformationwouldtrigger  seriousconstitutionalquestionsifitwereappliedtoappellantandanydefendantwhose  crimeswerecommittedpriortotheimplementationofthereformation.Asappellant  arguedinthesupplementalreplybriefaddressingBooker,anewrulepermittingthe  uppertermtobeimposedwithoutfindingsofaggravationwouldviolateappellants   federaldueprocessrights.(See4xF4.4xBouiev.CityofColumbia(1964)378U.S.347,352354 " [12L.Ed.2d894,84S.Ct.1697]#J4.##FJ=#Ԁ[federalFFdueprocessprohibitstheretroactiveapplication $  ofajudicialenlargementofacriminalstatuteinamannerthatwouldoperatelikeanex &"" _Oa _ _  postfactolaw];App.sSupp.ReplyBriefontheMerits(re:Booker)[ASRBMB]10.)#FF#  4xF  4.4xExpostfactoprohibitionsareviolatedbychangesinthelawthateliminatea  beneficialpresumption.(See E ԀMillerv.Florida(1987)482U.S.423,433[107S.Ct.2446,  96L.Ed.2d351][departurefromthepresumptivesentenceunderrevisedsentencing   guidelineviolatedexpostfactoprohibitions].)#J4.Ŝ##FJ#ԀHere,thepresumptionthatthedefendant   wouldnotgettheaggravatedtermabsentfindingsoffactorsinaggravationissucha   beneficialpresumption.   4xF4.4x  Thecriticalquestionforexpostfactopurposesiswhether thesystemitself[has]  beenalteredtotheprisonersdetriment.( G Peoplev.Williams(1987)196Cal.App.3d  1157#4x4.П#4.4x#J4.#4.J,1160.)Eliminatingthepresumptivemiddletermintheabsenceofaggravating  factorschanges thestandardbywhichpunishmentwillbeimposedtodefendants  disadvantage.Applyingtheselawstodefendantthusrunsafouloftheexpostfacto  clause.(Ibid.)    Moreover,whileproceduralchangesdonottriggerexpostfactoconcerns,#J4.Z##FJ# itis  theeffect,nottheform,ofthelawthatdetermineswhetheritisexpostfacto.   [Citations].(Id.atp.1161,citing 8 Peoplev.Smith(1983)34Cal.3d251,260,citing " 4xF4.4x 7 Weaverv.Graham#J4.##FJӼ#(1981)450U.S.24FFJF[67L.Ed.2d17,23,101S.Ct.960]#JJX##FJw#.)Thus, $  although4xF4.4xԀseeminglyproceduralinnature,theproposedreformationactuallyaltersa &"" substantiverightandsoretrospectiveapplicationofitwouldviolatetheexpostfactoand ($$ dueprocessclauses.(Id.atp.1161,citing ^ Weaverv.Graham#J4.$#,supra,#FJC#FFJF450U.S.24#JJ##FJ#,29fn. *&& 12.)    Furthermore,loweringoftheburdenofproofrequiredbythelawatthetime  appellantcommittedhiscrimewouldbeanotherexpostfactoviolation.( O Calderv.Bull  (1798)3U.S.(3Dall)386,390.)In Q ԀCarmellv.Texas(2000)529U.S.513[120S.Ct.   162,146L.Ed.2d577],theCourtstated:   T8  8`    Alawreducingthequantumofevidencerequiredtoconvict   anoffenderisasgrosslyunfairas,say,retrospectively   eliminatinganelementoftheoffense,increasingthe   punishmentforanexistingoffense,orloweringtheburdenof   proof....Ineachoftheseinstances,thegovernment  subvertsthepresumptionofinnocencebyreducingthe  numberofelementsitmustprovetoovercomethat  presumption;bythreateningsuchseverepunishmentsoasto  induceapleatoalesseroffenseoralowersentence;orby  makingiteasiertomeetthethresholdforovercomingthe  presumption.Reducingthequantumofevidencenecessary  tomeettheburdenofproofissimplyanotherwayof  achievingthesameend.(Id.atpp.532533.)n` x` x   Atthetimeofappellantscrime,section1170andtherulesofcourtrequiredthat  aggravatingfactorsbefoundbyapreponderanceoftheevidence.Althoughthisstandard  wasunconstitutionallylow,reformingsection1170andtherulesofcourttoremovethe   requirementoffindingaggravatingfactsatallwouldimproperlyeliminateanelement " andreducethequantumofevidencerequiredtoimposethehigherterm.Any $  reformationto S section1170,subdivision(b)thatwouldeliminateelementsrequiredto &"" imposetheupperterm,increasethemaximumsentenceforthebareoffensefromthe ($$ middletotheupperterm,eliminateabeneficial,statutorilyprescribedpresumption(the *&& middleterm)oflongstanding,andreducetheburdenofprovingaggravating  circumstancesfromanunconstitutionallylowpreponderancestandardtonothingwould  violateexpostfactoprohibitionsortheirdueprocessequivalents.    ThefactthattheHighCourtin T Bookeralteredthefederalsystemandallowedthe   alterationtoapplytocasespendingonappealdoesnotmeanotherwise.TheCourttook   thisactionasaroutineacknowledgmentofthenormalprinciplesofretroactivity   establishedin U Teaguev.Lane(1989)489U.S.288[109S.Ct.1060,103L.Ed.2d334]   and W Griffithv.Kentucky(1987)479U.S.314,328[93L.Ed.2d649,107S.Ct.708].  (UnitedStatesv.Booker,supra,543U.S.220,268.)Neitherthemajoritynorthedissent  discussedorgaveanyconsiderationtoexpostfactoordueprocessissues.Casesarenot  authorityforpropositionsnotconsidered. Z (Peoplev.Dillon(1983)34Cal.3d441,473  474; \ InreTartar(1959)52Cal.2d250,258.)Hence,itcannotbearguedthataBooker  typereformationoftheCaliforniasystem,asurgedbyrespondenthere,wouldnot  constituteaviolationofdueprocessandtheexpostfactoclausesifappliedtoappellant  andothersinhissituation.5 #  8            II.    8  APPELLANTSSENTENCETOTHEUPPERTERMVIOLATED  THEFEDERALCONSTITUTIONUNDERCALIFORNIAv.  CUNNINGHAM,ANDHISSENTENCEMUSTBEREVERSED        A.0 ` TheErrorIsCognizableonAppeal N  ` (#` (#   Respondentargues,ashedidintheAnswerBriefontheMerits(ABM1922)that   appellantforfeitedhisSixthAmendmentclaimbynotassertingitinthetrialcourt.   (RBSC4547)D #  9      ׀AsthisCourtrecognizedin4xF4.4xPeoplev.Vera(1997)15Cal.4th269,276   277#J4.##FJ8#,however,theconstitutionalrighttoajurytrialcannotbeforfeitedbyfailuretoassert  it.(Seealso4xF4.4xPeoplev.Belmares(2003)106Cal.App.4th19,27#J4.d##FJӃ#Ԁ[decliningtofind  forfeitureofaclaimofaconstitutionaljurytrialrightonanenhancementforaprior  pursuanttoApprendi];butseePeoplev.Hill(2005)131Cal.App.4th1089,1103.)    Moresignificantly,however,thereisnorequirementthatthedefendantmakea  futileobjectiontopreserveanissueforappellatereview.4xF4.4xԀ [R]eviewingcourtshave  traditionallyexcusedpartiesforfailingtoraiseanissueattrialwhereanobjectionwould  havebeenfutileorwhollyunsupportedbysubstantivelawtheninexistence.[Citations].   (Peoplev.Welch(1993)5Cal.4th228,237238;seealsoPeoplev.Chavez(1980)26 " Cal.3d334,350,fn.5;OConnorv.Ohio(1966)385U.S.92,9293[wheretheCourt  heldthatadefendantdidnotwaiveGriffinerrorbyfailingtoobjecttoaprosecutors  commentsatatrialhadbeforeGriffinwasdecided].)#J4.տ##FJ#Ԁ    Respondentassertsthat,althoughappellantwassentencedpriortoBlakelybeing   decided,becauseBlakelywasbaseduponApprendi,andApprendiwasdecidedbefore   appellantwassentenced,anobjectionbasedonthedeprivationofajurytrialwouldnot   havebeenfutile.(RBSC46)AsappellantarguedintheReplyBriefontheMerits,atthe   timeofappellantssentencing,nocourthadheldthatthedefendanthadajurytrialright  astofactorsinaggravation.(ARBM7)PriortoCunningham,decidedinJanuaryofthis  year,nocourthadyetsoheld.Infact,thisCourt,inBlackhadexpresslyheldtothe  contrary.Anobjectionwouldhavebeenfutile;theerrorwasnotforfeited.      B.0 ` TheFactthattheCourtMayHaveReliedUponaConstitutionally  FoundFactorinAdditiontoUnconstitutionallyFoundFactorsDoes  NotRemovetheSentencingProceedingsfromthePurviewof  Cunningham  ` (#` (#   RespondentassertsthattheAlmendarezTorresexceptiontotheApprendirule ! extendstoallrecidivismfactors,andthatthepresenceofanysinglerecidivismfactorora # factorfoundbyconstitutionalmeansrendersthedefendanteligiblefortheupperterm % ! andtakesthesentencingoutsidethepurviewofCunningham.(RSBC4753)As '"# appellantarguedextensivelyinthesupplementalbriefaddressingCunningham,neither )$% oftheseassertionsiscorrect.(ASBMC1417) +&'   Asinglefactormightjustifytheimpositionoftheuppertermifitisofsufficient  weighttodosounderthelaw,butitdoesnotnecessarilydoso.(SeexFPeoplev.Covino  (1980)100Cal.App.3d660,67#Fxq#0672;xF.xPeoplev.Searle(1989)213Cal.App.3d1091,  1100;Peoplev.Kellett(1982)134Cal.App.3d949,963#J.#.J#x.##.x;#J.##FJ+#ԀASBMC22)Thus,ifthetrial   courtusesimpermissiblefactorstoestablishthataggravationoutweighsmitigationand   imposetheupperterm,thecourthasmadeafactualfindingnecessarytomakethe   aggravatedsentenceavailableandviolatedthefederalconstitution.(SeexF.xApprendiv.New   Jersey(2000)530U.S.466,#J.##FJ#Ԁ490,494;ASBMC23)    Here,thecourtusedappellantslengthycriminalhistory,thefactthathewasaliar  andthefactthathedidthingstoterrorizethevictimtodecidethatappellantshouldbe  sentencedtotheupperterm.(4RT24112417)Therewasnojuryfindingastoanyof  thesethings.    Respondentarguesthatthelengthycriminalhistoryneednotbefoundbythejury  becauseitisarecidivistfactor.(RSBC4850)Asappellantarguedinhislast  supplementalbrief,thedeterminationofalengthyhistorygoesbeyondtheparametersof   theAlmendarezTorresexception.(ASBMC413) "   Respondentcitesmanycasesfromotherjurisdictionsthathaveinterpreted $   recidivismtoextendbeyondthemerefactofthepriorconviction.(RSBC4850) &"" xF.xShepardv.UnitedStates(2005)544U.S.13[161L.Ed.2d205;125S.Ct.1254]#J.##FJ#Ԁrecently ($$ clarifiedthattheHighCourtconsiderstheAlmendarezTorresexceptiontotheApprendi *&& ruletobeverynarrow.(ASBMC511)Becausethesecases,manyofwhichpredated  Shepard,donotreadtheexceptionnarrowly,appellantsubmitstheywerewrongly  decided.(ASBMC411)Additionally,asnotedbythecourtinStatev.Fagan(Conn.  2006)905A.2d1101,onitswaytoholdingthatthefactthatthedefendantwason   controlledreleaseatthetimeofthenewoffensefellwithintherecidivistexception,other   courts haverefusedtoextendthepriorconvictionexceptiontoapplytosuchfacts.(Id.   atp.11201121,seealsoStatev.Wissink(N.C.2005)617S.E.2d319[probationary   statuswasoutsidetheexceptionforpriors];Statev.Steele(Ore.2006)134P.3d1054  [similarpriorconvictionsandprobationarystatuswereoutsidetheexceptionforpriors].)    Moreover,evenifappellantsrecidivismwasproperlyconsideredherebased  eitheruponAlmendarezTorresorappellantsadmissionsregardinghispriorconvictions,  thecourtstillviolatedappellantsconstitutionalrightsbyrelyingonthecourtsown  findingsthatappellantwasaliarandthathehadcommittedtheactsallegedinthecounts  ofwhichhewasacquitted.(xF.xApprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,#J.##FJ #Ԁ490,494;  ASBMC23)       C.0 ` TheMaximumTermAvailablefortheSubstantiveOffenseWasthe $  MiddleTerm,NottheMiddleTermPlustheEnhancementsforPrior %!! PrisonTerms  &""` (#` (#   Respondentargues,ashedidintheAnswerBriefontheMerits(RABM3639), ($$ thatbecauseappellantadmittedtwopriorprisontermenhancementsthatcouldhave *&& addedtwoyearstohistotalsentence,hismaximumsentenceforCunninghampurposes  waseightyears.(RBSC5456)Insodoing,respondentacknowledgesthatPenalCode  section667.5,subdivision(b)enhancementsdonotattachtoindividualcounts.(See  Peoplev.Tassell(1984)36Cal.3d77,90,RBSC55,fn.21.)Baseduponthis,heagrees   thattheenhancementscouldnotbeincludedtoassessthemaximumtermastoanygiven   countinamultiplecountcase,butassertsthat,whereonlyonecountischarged,the   enhancementsmaybeusedtoassessthemaximumtermavailableforthatcountindoing   theCunninghamanalysis.(RBSC55,fn.21.)    Asappellantnotedinpreviousbriefing,theCourtinApprendirejectedsimilar  reasoningwithrespecttowhethertheidenticaltermcouldhavebeenachievedthereby  impositionofconsecutivesentences.TheCourtconcluded, Theconstitutionalquestion,  however,iswhetherthe12yearsentenceimposedoncount18waspermissible,given  thatitwasabovethe10yearmaximumfortheoffensechargedinthatcount.  (FFApprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,474[147L.Ed.2d435;120S.Ct.2348]  emphasisadded#FFU#.)Similarly,theconstitutionalquestionhereiswhattermwas   permissibleforthesentenceonthesubstantivecount.(Ibid.) "   Respondentfurtherassertsthattheabilitytoimposetheuppertermbaseduponthe $  section667.5enhancementsthathadbeenstrickenalsomadetheuppertermthe &"" maximumtermavailableinthiscase.(RSBC56)Thatwouldbesoifthesentencing ($$ courtherehaddecidedthatthe667.5priorsaloneweresufficienttojustifytheupper *&& termanddidnotstrikethemforreasonsindependentofusingthemtoimposetheupper  term.Asthisisfarfromclearfromtherecordhere,however,andthecourtreliedon  factorsinadditiontothepriorsforfindingtheuppertermjustified,appellants  constitutionalrightswereviolated.(xF.xId.atpp.#J.##FJ#Ԁ490,494;ASBMC23)      D.0 ` TheErrorWasPrejudicial Ъ ` (#` (#   Inaddressinghowtoanalyzeprejudice,respondentrepeatshisassertionthata   singleconstitutionallycompliantreasonforimposingtheaggravatedtermtakestheissue  outofthepurviewofCunningham.(RSBC5760)Respondentmovesfromthis  assertiontotheconclusionthat,afteranappellatedeterminationcanbemadethatbeyond  areasonabledoubtasingleconstitutionallycompliantfactorexistedorwouldhavebeen  foundbythejurybeyondareasonabledoubt,thereisnolongeranyneedtoapplya  federalconstitutionalstandardofprejudice.Heurgesthatthefederalconstitutionalerror  willhavebeendeemedharmless,andthemostthatwillbeleftisstateerror.(RSBC57  60)Respondentarguesthat,becauseApprendidoesnotprecludethecourtfrom   imposingsentencebaseduponjuryfoundfacts,oncethereviewingcourtdetermines " underaxF.xNederv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S.1,8[119S.Ct.1827,144L.Ed.2d35]#J.R##FJq# $  analysisthatthejurywouldhavefoundanaggravatingfactorbeyondareasonabledoubt &"" ifasked,anyCunninghamerrorisharmless.(RSBC59) ($$   Forthereasonspreviouslystated,thisisnotso.DSLdoesnotmaketheupper *&& termavailableuponthefindingofasinglepotentiallyaggravatingfactor.Rather,it  requiresthatthefactorbesufficientlyvaluedanddeterminedtooutweighanymitigation  andjustifytheimpositionoftheupperterm.(SeexFPeoplev.Covino,supra,100Cal.  App.3d660,67#Fx#0672;xF.xPeoplev.Searle,supra,213Cal.App.3d1091,1100;Peoplev.   Kellett,supra,134Cal.App.3d949,963#J.#.J#x.9#.x;#J. ##FJO#ԀASBMC1825)Thus,contraryto   respondentsassertion,asentencingcourtwouldnotautomaticallyhaveauthorityto   considerafactorthatwasnotfoundconstitutionallyjustbecausetherewasanother   constitutionallycompliantfactortouseaswell.(ASBMC1825)Solongasthe  sentencingcourtisusingthenoncompliantfactortoestablishthataggravation  outweighsmitigationandjustifiestheupperterm,itisusingthefactorasan element  necessarytopermittheimpositionoftheincreasedsentenceandviolatingthe  constitution.(xF.xApprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,#J.o##FJӎ#Ԁ490,494.)Therefore,until  thereviewingcourtcandeterminethatthenoncompliantfactordidnotcontributetothe  determinationthataggravationjustifiedtheupperterm,itwillnotbeabletosaytheerror  washarmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.Here,thatcannotbedone.     Contrarytorespondentsargument,thereisnowaythatthejurywouldhavefound " thatappellantcausedthevictimsfearbytakingthecar.(RSBC6061)First,asthereis $  nomechanisminCaliforniaforajurytrialonaggravatingfactors,thereisnowaythat &"" thisjurywouldhavemadethefindingsoftheminthiscase.(SeeWashingtonv. ($$ RecuencoxF.xԀ(2006)548U.S.___[126S.Ct.2546,2550,165L.Ed.2d466,474]#J.^##FJ}#[notingthat, *&& ifthedefendantwascorrectthattherewasnomechanismforajurytofindthemissing  factorunderWashingtonlaw,hewouldbeabletodemonstratethattheerrorwasnot  harmless].)    Moreover,thejurynecessarilyfoundthatappellanttookthecarafterthevictim   hadleftandwithouthavingunlawfullyengenderedthefearcausinghimtoleavebecause   itacquittedhimofthecarjacking,whichhadtheelementofforceorfear.Appellant   admittedthathetookthecarwithoutpermissionafterthevictimhadleft,andthe   unlawfultakingofthecar,withoutforce,wastheonlycountthatthejuryfoundtrue  beyondareasonabledoubt.(4RT12111217,CT178187)    Itmattersnotthattheevidenceofthevictimsfearwasuncontested.(RSBC61)  Thus,thejurydidnotbelievebeyondareasonabledoubtthatappellantunlawfully  causedthe uncontestedfearthevictimfelt.Thus,itcannotbesaidbeyonda  reasonabledoubtthatthejurywouldhavefoundthataggravatingfactor.    Neithercanitbesaidbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthejurywouldhavefound  appellantwasaliar,anotherfactormentionedbythetrialcourt.(4RT2416)Asnoted   above,thejuryconvictedappellantoftheonlycountthatheadmitted.Thissuggeststhat " thejurydidnotagreebeyondareasonabledoubtthatappellantwasaliar. $    Respondentalsoassertsthatthecourtfoundnomitigatingcircumstances.(RSBC &"" 61)Thisisnotso.Thecourtnotedthatappellantwas aninnocentofsorts.(4RT ($$ 2417)Thiswasafterdefensecounselhadpointedoutthatappellantwasunsophisticated *&& andavictimofsorts.(4RT2411)Additionally,counselnotedthatappellanthadalways  acknowledgedhisguiltoftheonlycountofwhichhewasconvicted(4RT24112412),  wasvulnerableasaprostituteworkinginadangerousjobandtakentounfamiliar  territorybythevictim(4RT2411),andhadadifficultpersonalhistory(aproductof   fostercare,notraisedbyeitherbirthparent,thechildofadrugaddict,andeventually   adoptedandmovedtoUtahwherehissexualorientationcausedhimproblems).(4RT   2412)Thus,itisnotclearbeyondareasonabledoubtthatappellantspriorrecordalone   wouldhavebeensufficienttojustifytheupperterminthiscase.Therefore,thecourts  relianceonthefactsoftheacquittedcountsinviolationofCunninghamwasnot  harmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt,andremandisrequired.(SeeWashingtonv.  RecuencoxF.xԀ(2006)548U.S.___[126S.Ct.2546,25522553,165L.Ed.2d466,475477]#J.##FJӢ#;  seealsoxF.xApprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,#J.s##FJӒ#Ԁ490,494;xF.xChapmanv.California  #J.:##FJY#(1967)386U.S.18,34[87S.Ct.824,17L.Ed.2d705]JF.J;seealsoPeoplev.Covino,  supra,#J.A #.J100Cal.App.3datpp.670672#J. #.JԀ[wherethecourtreversedunderaWatson  standardbasedonthepresenceofonlyonevalidaggravatingfactorandsomepotential   mitigation].)#J.( ##FJ" #Ԁ_   " xF.x    CONCLUSION п       Becausethetrialcourtherereliedonfactsofcrimesofwhichappellanthadbeen  acquittedtoimposetheupperterminviolationofappellantsfederalconstitutionalrights  toajurytrialandproofbeyondareasonabledoubtandoftheDoubleJeopardyClause,   hissentencemustbereversed,andthecaseremandedtopermittheimpositionofa   constitutionalsentence.   #J.o #JJDated:March8,20070  0h(#(#0h(#h(#RESPECTFULLYSUBMITTED (#(#    ` 0 0 (# (# h   CALIFORNIAAPPELLATEPROJECT(#(# Ѐ   `    `     h   JonathanB.Steiner     `     h   ExecutiveDirector  =#FJӎ #JF   `     h   ____________________________________     `     h   SuzanE.Hier     `     h   StaffAttorney     `     h    `     h   AttorneysforAppellant#JJ##FJӌ#   _ @QQ" TABLEOFCONTENTS    D(#Page(s)  @  ?Vm  ?Vm0     APPELLANTSSUPPLEMENTALREPLYBRIEFONTHEMERITS?Vm݌(#(# Ќ  ݀RE:CUNNINGHAMv.CALIFORNIA""J(#.'1   ?Vm  ?Vm0     ARGUMENT#""J(#. (#(##2?Vm ݌   Ќ  ?Vm  ?Vm0       I.0` (#(#THISCOURTSHOULDNOTREFORMCALIFORNIAS   SENTENCINGSTATUTESTOELIMINATETHE   PRESUMPTIONOFTHEMIDDLETERM#""J(#.3` (#` (##2?Vm݌   Ќ     ` A0 TheLegislature,WhosePrimaryGoalsinFormulatingthe   DeterminateSentencingLaw[DSL]WeretoPromote (# (#    `  UniformityofSentencingandLimitJudicialDiscretionin     `  ImposingSentence,RejectedtheOptionofRemovingthe     `  PresumptiveMidterm.Therefore,thisCourtShouldNot     `  ReformtheStatutetoEliminatethePresumption""J(#.DDH3     ` B.0 JudicialFactfinding,NotthePresumptiveMidterm,Is  Unconstitutional;Thus,theFactfinding,NotthePresumptive  Midterm,ShouldbeStricken#""J(#.4 (# (##9     ` C.0 RetroactiveApplicationofaReformedVersionofsection1170,  subdivision(b)thatEliminatedthePresumptiveMidtermand  RequirementofFindingAggravatingFactorsWouldViolateDue  Process#L"L"I(#.PP (# (##15    II.0 ` APPELLANTSSENTENCETOTHEUPPERTERMVIOLATEDTHE ! FEDERALCONSTITUTIONUNDERCALIFORNIAv.CUNNINGHAM, " ANDHISSENTENCEMUSTBEREVERSED#L"L"I(#.5` (#` (##19 # ?Vm     ` ?Vm70 `   A.0 (# (#TheErrorIsCognizableonAppeal#L"L"I(#.: (# (##19?Vm7k݌ %!! Ќ  ?Vm     ` ?Vm70 `   B.0 (# (#TheFactthattheCourtMayHaveReliedUponaConstitutionally '## FoundFactorinAdditiontoUnconstitutionallyFoundFactorsDoes ($$ NotRemovetheSentencingProceedingsfromthePurviewof )%% Cunningham#L"L"I(#.&&# (# (##20?Vm7k݌ *&& Ќ  ?Vm +''      ` ?Vm 0 `   C.0 (# (#TheMaximumTermAvailablefortheSubstantiveOffenseWas?Vm f ݌ (# (# Ќ     `  theMiddleTerm,NottheMiddleTermPlustheEnhancements     `  forPriorPrisonTermsL"L"I(#.dd/22  ?Vm  ?Vm"0        ` D.0 (#(#TheErrorWasPrejudicial#L"L"I(#.2 (# (##24?Vm"-"݌  Ќ  ?Vm  ?Vm #0     CONCLUSION#L"L"I(#.2 2 (#(##28?Vm #%#݌   Ќ      mOYo/gpOa@  TABLEOFAUTHORITIES    D(#Page(s)    FEDERALCASES     ?+ ` hp x X? 2%#XApprendiv.NewJersey(2000)    X 2%#2%#530U.S.466 D%#. passim    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XBlakelyv.Washington(2004)    X 2%#2%#542U.S.296!!D%#. 13,20    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XBouiev.CityofColumbia(1964)    X 2%#2%#378U.S.347I"I"H%#. 15    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCalderv.Bull(1798)   X 2%#2%#3U.S.(3Dall)386I"I"H%#. "17   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCarmellv.Texas(2000)   X 2%#2%#529U.S.513I"I"H%#. 17   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XChapmanv.California(1967)   X 2%#2%#386U.S.18I"I"H%#.  27   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCunninghamv.California(2007)   X 2%#2%#549U.S.___ D%#. passim   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XGriffithv.Kentucky(1987)   X 2%#2%#479U.S.314!!D%#. 18,19   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XMillerv.Florida(1987) !  X 2%#2%#482U.S.423I"I"H%#. 16 "  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XNederv.UnitedStates(1999) $   X 2%#2%#527U.S.1I"I"H%#. 24 %!!  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XOConnorv.Ohio(1966) '##  X 2%#2%#385U.S.92I"I"H%#.  20 ($$  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XShepardv.UnitedStates(2005) *&&  X 2%#2%#544U.S.13I"I"H%#.  22 +'' mOY! m m  X 2%#2%#Teaguev.Lane(1989)   X 2%#2%#489U.S.288I"I"H%#. 18   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XUnitedStatesv.Booker(2005)   X 2%#2%#543U.S.220' ' A%#. 8,15,18    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XWashingtonv.Recuenco(2006)    X 2%#2%#548U.S.___!!D%#. 25,27    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XWeaverv.Graham(1981)    X 2%#2%#450U.S.24!!D%#.  16,17    X?+ ` hp x 2%#??+ ` hp x X?  STATECASES      2%#XArpv.WorkersCompensationAppealsBoard(1977)   X 2%#2%#19Cal.3d395I"I"H%#. 12   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XCityofCarmelbytheSeav.Young(1970)   X 2%#2%#2Cal.3d259I"I"H%#.l l 12   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XGerkinv.FairPoliticalPracticesCommission(1993)   X 2%#2%#6Cal.4th707I"I"H%#. 14   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XInreCortez(1971)   X 2%#2%#6Cal.3d78""I%#. 8   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XInreTartar(1959)    X 2%#2%#52Cal.2d250I"I"H%#. 18 !  X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XKoppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995) #  X 2%#2%#11Cal.4th607 B%#.  2,7,13 $    2%#2%#Kusiorv.Silver(1960) &""    2%#2%#54Cal.2d603""I%#. 7 '##  ($$  2%#2%#Leamingv.MunicipalCourt(1974) )%%  2%#2%#  12Cal.3d813I"I"H%#. 15 *&&  +'' Ї 2%#2%#Madridv.JusticeCourt(1975)   2%#2%#  52Cal.App.3d819""I%#. 7     X  2%#2%#Metromediav.SanDiego(1982)  !  2%#!  32Cal.3d180L"L"I(#. 13  Peoplev.Belmares(2003)    X! 2%# !106Cal.App.4th19I"I"H%#. !19    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Black(2005)    X 2%#2%#35Cal.4th1255o!o!E%#. 8,20    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Chavez(1980)    X 2%#2%#26Cal.3d334I"I"H%#. 20    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Covino(1980)   X 2%#2%#100Cal.App.3d660@%#. !21,25,27    2%#2%#Peoplev.Dillon(1983)   2%#2%#  34Cal.3d441I"I"H%#. 18     X Peoplev.Hill(2005)  !  2%#!  131Cal.App.4th1089L"L"I(#.#19  B+ ` hp x  B 2%#XPeoplev.Kellett(1982)   X 2%#2%#134Cal.App.3d949!!D%#. !21,25   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Martin(1986)   X 2%#2%#42Cal.3d437) ) @%#. 2,3,4,5     2%#2%#Peoplev.SalazarMerino(2001) "  2%#2%#  89Cal.App.4th590I"I"H%#. !14 #  $   2%#2%#Peoplev.Searle(1989) %!!  2%#2%#  213Cal.App.3d1091!!D%#.ff"21,25 &""  '##  X  2%#2%#Peoplev.Simon(1983) ($$ !  2%#!  144Cal.App.3d761""J(#. !4 )%%  +'' o/g# o o  ! 2%# !Peoplev.Smith(1983)   X 2%#2%#34Cal.3d251I"I"H%#. 16   X 2%#2%#Peoplev.SuperiorCourt(Romero)(1996)   X 2%#2%#13Cal.4th497I"I"H%#.  19   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Tassell(1984)    X 2%#2%#36Cal.3d77I"I"H%#.l l 23    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Vera(1997)    X 2%#2%#15Cal.4th269I"I"H%#.  19    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Welch(1993)    X 2%#2%#5Cal.4th228I"I"H%#. 20    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XPeoplev.Williams(1987)   X 2%#2%#196Cal.App.3d1157I"I"H%#.ff"16   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XRockwellv.SuperiorCourt(1976)   X 2%#2%#18Cal.3d420I"I"H%#. 15   X?+ ` hp x 2%#? 2%#XStatev.Fagan(Conn.2006)   X 2%#2%#905A.2d1101I"I"H%#.& & 22     Statev.Steele(Ore.2006)    134P.3d1054I"I"H%#.8 8 22     2%#2%#Statev.Wissink(N.C.2005)   2%#2%#  617S.E.2d319I"I"H%#.P P 22    X?+ ` hp x 2%#? !  "   STATESTATUTES  #    2%#XPenalCode,sections:  %!! ! %#2%#!  667.5I"I"H%#.23 '##   11705(#.4,5,6,7,9,11,17 )%%   1170.3!!G(#.d d 4,9 +''   1170.4""I%#.d d 4 -))   1170.7""I%#.d d 8 /++ pOa$ p p    SECONDARYAUTHORITY     Parnas&Salerno,TheInfluenceBehind,Substanceand  ImpactoftheNewDeterminateSentencingLawinCalifornia(1978)    11U.C.DavisL.Rev.29,3132,3940""J(#.ZZ44  @% LEGISLATION@@*    AssemblyBill476""I(#.  5   SenateBill42""J(#. 5   @  STATERULESOFCOURT    CaliforniaRulesofCourt,Rules:     4.405L"L"I(#.10    4.406(b)L"L"I(#. 10    4.420(a)""J(#. 9    4.420(b)r!r!F(#. 9,12% q