WPC!i a 0hfQkN6z\s5/UZ~DީsIRӤI:O"`i9-$p8߾0en v=_GKO^PaJ(omVH>5d>jϮGS1%pfs  3ZvDZBⓓ;L,*qshk.NO󬜢b=7x~D<Tzfg9 eJ[ENB:]?l},Bgx[p%y(0 5lGq#] i syfK#ypYP&oO.e\ ]XHLj٣$쨋el[vqBEeq)csB*`-WOј} Ӯd%}4=V0ۄ U01Ē/k"N>לFNP90 γUNz& %& 0V&#$' )*w}+^ +4++N++ m++ 0, 0D- 0U- 0#. 0/ 0/ 0x0 0+1 01 02 0 3 03 0z4 0E5 05 06 0:7 07 0j8 08 09 0<: 0; 0; 0R< 0< 0= 0> 0> 0<*?U>f?? 02D 0E 0F 0H B-)JU6VJhJKN /P -P QT1V 09V9V 0W 0dY 0rZ 0R[ 002\ 0-b] 0*^ 0'_ 0$` 0!b 0%c 0Cd 0^e 1evf 7ff 0qg 0q h 0(h D+h AQh 0r5iriUNl 0gl Bm 06m 0m 0>n 1un 72eoo 0q 0}r 0_s 0At 0#u 0v 0v 0w 02sx 0x 0Yy 0_y 0 Yz 0c{ 0| B*~ D/+D 0o 9u  D/̈́ 0 06ʅ 0 0: 0^B 0< 0N܇U** )T 0*}t % ;@{m( 0cJ %B #g # ; 0#T>< 0hz 0= 7 V k  # –fזaٖbu }e$ HC v> f R] zV jМ  :aZ z j5 *hɟ z1 j $  ΢<آ z j Lڥ VpƦ j "  < \ª L $+ ¬ެ 2bfa v0 8ű DZ<߱ z j J "Ҵ zڵ <T+ z5 F̸H zZ Ժ \ 4q= zi\ vſ ;U \U &C ( 4B ^E \ 6E{' J lK lc f  : >V7 z  2B t  j+[ ( z (> $9 V!w $Nr RcO  zZ j d> z  , z! p z ) z j= j  `3 rT ^}W | NP f| f V!w/ >  \G t b P Zj T) Z& ` @ X_ dl T $ " z jw zb z R BB fQ `& :n (q   (  (   \M  L  z  Z   Pl  J  h, z j/ RB9 z XG \C jJ d TC ^U O j~ : j ^r z  j Xh! z"8:# xr$$ p% `8&& `>' P'' `(( `) P**z* j5++R, Hb- Z-. z. jd// a0 J}00 Vx11 :22 P33 *44 ^516 z1787 z8]9 \Q: L:6: z/< j< j=}= Z >z> t3?V? x@ huAUAP2C LD zDHE v!FF H7GG ^3H fHH zIGJ PJK zKdL ZM;aMaMaMaMM xN7GO8~P xQ x.R hRRRRS pS,T lT \DUU $wVV $rWrWrWrWW BrXrXrXX DYY @ZZZZ <[\ <\] D]8^ \^^^^^^^8_ T_,` x`wa tObbc 8xd vdddddddddddd&e Te%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%f%fGggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggWh Bh(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX(.$USUS.,CENTRAL OFFICE0C:\DOCUME~1\JAMESB~1\APPLIC~1\Corel\PERFEC~1\9\CUSTOM~1\APPELL~1\AOB.wptC:\Documents and Settings\James Bostwick\Application Data\Corel\PerfectExpert\9\Custom WP Templates\Appellate Forms\AOB.wptټ\6 OV.6m5Pages3|xU "P$USUS.,XX `   2    _ԀAllstatutoryreferencesaretothePenalCodeunlessotherwise  stated.(i(2"P$ !USUS.,  XX `   0  (#$  0  *+ (_2623  ..*D+D (_25   ," <DL,23  ..," <DL,   *5+5 (_24  ) <DL)23  ..) <DL)  *2+2 (_23 ` &<<DL&23  ..&<<DL& ` */+/ (_22  #DL#23  ..#DL#  *,+, (_21   DL 23  .. DL  *)+) (_20 h DDL23  ..DDL h *&+& (_19  L23  ..L  *#+# (_18   L23  .. L  *>> (_17  2( 4 <DL223  Ԁ2( 4 <DL2  *DD (_16   ," <DL,23  Ԁ," <DL,   *55 (_15  ) <DL)23  Ԁ) <DL)  *22 (_14 ` &<<DL&23  Ԁ&<<DL& ` *// (_13  #DL#23  Ԁ#DL#  *,, (_12   DL 23  Ԁ DL  *)) (_11 h DDL23  ԀDDL h *&& (_10  L23  ԀL  (## &_9   L23  Ԁ L  (>> &_8  2( 4 <DL223  2( 4 <DL2  (DD &_7   ," <DL,23  ," <DL,   (55 &_6  ) <DL)23  ) <DL)  (22 &_5 ` &<<DL&23  &<<DL& ` (// &_4  #DL#23  #DL#  (,, &_3   DL 23   DL  ()) &_2 h DDL23  DDL h (&& &_1  L23  L  &## $_   L23   L  <:Default Para\  `&Times New Roman  "P$USUS.,XX `   12    _ԀThisapproachwastakenonaninterimbasispendinglegislative  actionbythehighcourtsin = Arizona(Statev.Brown(2004)209Ariz.200);   ? Colorado(Lopezv.People(Colo.2005)113P.3d713,728);_ A _Maine(Statev.  Schofield(2005)2005ME82);_ E _Minnesota(Statev.Shattuck(2005)704  N.W.2d131,143148); K NorthCarolina(Statev.Allen(2005)359N.C.425,  433);_ R _Oregon(Statev.Dilts(2004)337Ore.645,654);and_ T _Washington   (Statev.Hughes(2005)154Wn.2d118,149152,overruledonother   groundsinWashingtonv. ' Recuenco,supra,126S.Ct.atp.2553,fn.4).<:footnote tex   2( 4 <DL2XXXK4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS  2( 4 <DL2  <VV:footnote refS-\  `&Times New RomanSS-\  `&Times New RomanS64Body Text     5+ 4 <DL5XXXK4<6X9`(Courier NewK#aa  S-\  `&Times New RomanS#``  5+ 4 <DL5  <:Body Text In  , 5+ 4 <DL5K4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS  2( 4 <DL2  )Hairline d<6X9`(Courier New ^ "P$USUS.,XX `   13    _ԀThisapproachwastakenbystatecourtslistedin  Cunninghamv.  California,supra,127_S.Ct_.atp.877,fn.17. , ' *HP_Administrator*0HP_Administrator .     "P$USUS.,XX `   15    _Laterenactmentseliminatedthismandatoryreview,butstill  permittedacourt,onitsownmotionorupontherecommendationofthe  DirectorofCorrectionstorecallasentencewithin120daysandresentence  thedefendant.(Seecurrent_  _Ԁ1170,subd.(d).)~OTHER OUT OF STATE~U.S. CONSTITUTION  "P$USUS.,XX `   1    _Ԁ  SB40passedtheStateSenateFebruary13,2007,andthesameday  wasreadintheAssembly,whereitiscurrentlypendinginthePublicSafety  Committee.(See  Ԁ @  @  @  @ -http://_info.sen.gov_/pub/0708/bill/sen/_sb_0001_Ԅ  0050/_sb_40_bill_20070223_Ԅ_status.html_Ԁ.#-# @ )  "P$USUS.,XX `   7    _Asdiscussedpost,thisinterpretationwouldapplyonlyto  defendantswhosecrimesoccurredbeforethelikelypassageofpending  SenateBill40,underwhichallfuturedefendantswouldbesentencedunder  asystemofpurejudicialdiscretioninthemannerprescribedin  Booker. <?S:EmailStyle16?|%2A`Arial?S-\  `&Times New RomanS6 4heading 4    /%` ` <DL/S-\  `&Times New RomanS   S-\  `&Times New RomanS  2( 4 <DL2    0.footer    !XXXS-\  `&Times New RomanSS-\  `&Times New RomanS   !  :SS8page numberS-\  `&Times New RomanSS-\  `&Times New RomanS4VV2EmphasisS-\  `&Times New RomanSS-\  `&Times New RomanS<c+f :Outline001_1   /%` ` <DL/23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <`+f :Outline001_2   ," <DL,23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <]+f :Outline001_3 j 4 ) <DL)23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Z+f :Outline001_4   &hhDL&23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <W+f :Outline001_5   #DL#23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <T+f :Outline001_6 j <  DL 23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j <Q+f :Outline001_7   ppL23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <N+f :Outline001_8   L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2  <K+f :Outline001_9 j D    L23  ..  2( 4 <DL2 j CDEFGHIJ 35;AGMSY_1A.a.i.1.a.i.1.a.LKi. Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5(I2_$ !USUS.,  (I2_$ !USUS.,  ($'dxdNOPQRC<< c(J3$ !USUS.,   h "P$USUS.,XX `   11    _ԀPardostrialattorneydidnot challengethetrialcourts  determinationofthepriorconviction,butasdetailedinthefollowing  section,thetrialcourtwasatthattimeboundtofollowthiscourtsdecision  in P Peoplev.Black,supra,35Cal.4th1238.Accordingly,anobjection  wouldhavebeenfutile,andsonowaiveroccurred.(A Z6Times New Roman Regular0AA.Normal  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5   d<AA:Definition T  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)\i)  "P$USUS.,XX `   3    _ԀWhilethecourtreferredto thepriorfelonyconviction,this  appearstobeashorthandreferencetothecourtsfindingmomentsearlier  thatPardohadnumerouspriorconvictions,comprisedofthreefeloniesand  severalmisdemeanors.(2RT391.)(hh&H1  5+ ` hp x 5      5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H2  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H3  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H4  5+ ` hp x 5 XXX 5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H5  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H6  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  2DD0Address  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted  /%  ,Kk %#/K4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/  <:zBottom of 7o(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?|%2A`Arial?  S-\  `&Times New RomanS7R(X75+ ` hp x 5  &  d dn)1dxd ! "P$USUS.,XX `   16    _TheUnitedStatesConstitutionbindstheSupremeCourttodecide  solely casesandcontroversies.( } Art.III,2,cl.1.)Thus,thehighcourt  maynotmakedecisionsthatareprospectiveonlyorrenderadvisory  opinions.(See_  _Griffithv.Kentucky(1987)479U.S.314,322323[107  _S.Ct_.708,93_L.Ed_.2d649].)TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtisnotsimilarly  restrained,asthecitedcasesillustrate.<:zTop of For7t(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?|%2A`Arial?  S-\  `&Times New RomanS7R(X75+ ` hp x 5  ~CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION~CIVIL CODEn)2dxd0KS.SampleK4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK4<6X9`(Courier NewKS-\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  (O$%2A`Arial~GOVERNMENT CODE($ j "P$USUS.,XX `   5    _ԀInBerry,thecourtnotedthat.whiletwopriorswerenot   numerousforthepurposeofthefactorenumeratedinthen   rule421(b),a  courtcouldchoosetoconsiderevenasinglepriorconvictionasan  aggravatingfactorunderthecatchallprovisionsofthenrules  408(a)and    409.Asnotedante,thesentencingcourtinPardoscaseexpresslyfound  thepriorswerenumerous(2RT391),andthecourtsreferenceto thefact   youhavethepriorfelonyconvictionafewmomentslater(2RT391)   appearstobeashorthandreferencetothefindingofnumerousness.The   recordisnotclearthecourtintendedtosingleoutoneofPardosprior   offensesasanaggravatingfactor,asopposedtoconcludingtheywereasa   wholenumerous.Thus,therecorddoesnotestablishthecourtdetermined   anysinglepriorconvictionwasanaggravatingfactorunderthecatchall   provisionofcurrentrule4.  408(a).~BUSINESS CODE~WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS  "P$USUS.,XX `   6    __R______  ule_Ԁ4.420(b)providesfactorsinaggravationaretobeprovedbya  preponderanceoftheevidence. c "P$USUS.,XX `   10    _ԀR * _ule_Ԁ4.420(b)providesanaggravatingfactormaybeprovedbya  preponderanceofevidenceincludingtheprobationreport.(;3$2#  0  .3  0   @ "P$USUS.,XX `   9    _ԀV(#V#V1RT185,243,2CT235.)#V#~EVIDENCE CODE~VEHICLE CODE~PROBATE CODE~BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS(,!$0  0` (#(#   4 "P$USUS.,XX `   8    _Ԁ_  _Chapmanv.California(1967)386U.S.18,24[87S.Ct.824,17  L.Ed.2d705].(@$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# ` ($0 ~HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE~RULES~CASES~PENAL CODE~INSTRUCTIONS~OTHERTABLE A ~ !USUS.,  XXSixthAmendment#X;X-#- -   Sixth AmendmentU.S. CONSTITUTION 9 !USUS.,  _cXXCunninghamv.California(2007)549U.S.___    [127_S.Ct_.856,166_L.Ed_.2d856]#X:<Xc@#Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.___ [127 CASESCunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.___ [127  !USUS.,  XXFourteenthAmendment#X;X-#Fourteenth AmendmentU.S. CONSTITUTION S !USUS.,  _cXX_Apprendi_Ԁv.NewJersey(2000)530U.S.466    [120_S.Ct_.2348,147_L.Ed_Ԁ2d435]#X:<Xc@#Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.CtCASESApprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.CtSixth Amendment W !USUS.,  _cXX_Blakely_Ԁv.Washington(2004)542U.S.296    [124_S.Ct_.2531,159_L.Ed_.2d403]#X:<Xc@#Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct.CASESBlakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct.Fourteenth Amendment ^ !USUS.,  _cXX_Almendarez_ԄTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S.224    [118_S.Ct_.1219,140_L.Ed_.2d350]#X:<Xc@#Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 2CASESAlmendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 2 !USUS.,  _XXsection1260#X'X=#1260PENAL CODE1260 2 !USUS.,  _cXXUnitedStatesv.Booker(2005)543U.S.220    [125_S.Ct_.738,160_L.Ed_.2d621]#X:<Xc@#United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [125 S.CCASESUnited States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [125 S.C !USUS.,  XXFederalSentencingGuidelines#X;X-#Federal Sentencing GuidelinesOTHER !USUS.,  XXsection1170,subdivision(b)#X;X-#section 1170, subdivision (b)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  _XXSenateBillNo.40(20072008Reg.Sess.)2#X'X=# Sen. Bill No. 40 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.)  2OTHER !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ506#X:<Xc#506PENAL CODE506 !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ_484b_#X:<Xc#Federal Sentencing Guidelines !USUS.,  _cXXArticleI,section9,clause3#X:<Xc=# art. I,  9, cl. 3U.S. CONSTITUTIONUTION !USUS.,  _cXXArticleI,section9#X:<Xc=#art. I,  9CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION484bPENAL CODE !USUS.,  _XXSenateBill40#X'X=#SB 40OTHER z !USUS.,  XXsection654#X;X-#section 654PENAL CODETABLE A | !USUS.,  _cXX4 {O  5  i  -cchttp://info.sen.gov/pub/0708/bill/sen/sb_00010050/sb_40_bill_20070223_status.html_i  6b{Ov  7 !.,  asofFebruary26,2007.#c-c##X:<Xc@# http://info.sen.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0001-00OTHER !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ487,subdivision(a)#X:<Xc#487, subd. (a)PENAL CODEsection 654 2 !USUS.,  _cXXJonesv.UnitedStates(1999)526U.S.227    [119_S.Ct_Ԁ1215,1143_L.Ed_.2d311]#X:<Xc@#Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 [119 S.CtCASESJones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 [119 S.Ct  !USUS.,  XXFifthAmendment#X;X-#Fifth Amendment U.S. CONSTITUTIONFifth Amendment  !USUS.,  _XXUnitedStatesv.Santiago    (2ndCir.2001)268F.3d151#X'X@#United States v. Santiago (2nd Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 1CASESsection 1170, subdivision (b) ! !USUS.,  _cXXUnitedStatesv._Kempis_Ԅ_Bonola_    (8thCir.2002)287F.3d699#X:<Xc@#United States v. Kempis-Bonola (8th Cir. 2002) 287 FCASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Towne,S125677#X;X0#People v. Towne, S125677.)CASES > !USUS.,  _XXChamberlainv._Pliler_    (_C.D.Cal_.2004)307_F.Supp_.2d1128#X'X@#Chamberlain v. Pliler (C.D.Cal. 2004) 307 F.Supp.2d CASESart. I,  9 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.McGee(2006)38Cal.4th682#X;X0#People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682CASES { !USUS.,  XXsection1170#X;X-#section 1170PENAL CODE 3 !USUS.,  _cXXShepardv.UnitedStates(2005)544U.S.13    [125_S.Ct_.1254,161_L.Ed_.2d205]#X:<Xc@#Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13 [125 S.CCASES _ !USUS.,  _cXX_Rangel_,etal.v.UnitedStates(2006)__U.S.__    [126_S.Ct_.2873,165_L.Ed_.2d910]#X:<Xc@#Rangel, et al. v. United States (2006) __ U.S. __ CASESsection 1170 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Kelii(1999)21Cal.4th452#X;X0#People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452CASES !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203a#X;Xv#1203aPENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203.3#X;Xv#1203.3PENAL CODE1203.3 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Totari(2003)28Cal.4th876#X;X0#People v. Totari (2003) 28 Cal.4th 876CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Willis(2002)28Cal.4th22#X;X0#People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22CASESPeople v. Towne, S125677.) !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Ferguson(2003)109Cal.App.4th367#X;X0# !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203.1,subdivision(a)#X;Xv#1203.1, subdivision (a)PENAL CODEPeople v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Fernandez(1990)226Cal.App.3d669#X;X0#People v. Fernandez (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 669CASES !USUS.,  _XXPeoplev.Berry(1981)117_Cal.App_.3d184#X'X=# People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184CASES !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203,subdivision(a)#X;Xv#1203, subd. (a)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203.2,subdivision(a)#X;Xv#1203.2, subd. (a)PENAL CODE L !USUS.,  _XX_Mullaney_Ԁv.Wilbur(1975)421U.S.684    [95_S.Ct_.1881,44_L.Ed_.2d508]#X'X@#Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 [95 S.Ct. 188CASES !USUS.,  _XXrule408(a)#X'X=#408(a)RULES  !USUS.,  XXrule4.421(b)(4)#X;X-#rule 4.421(b)(4)RULES408(a) !USUS.,  _XXrule409#X'X=#409RULESMullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 [95 S.Ct. 188 Q !USUS.,  _XX_McMillan_Ԁv.Pennsylvania(1986)477U.S.79    [106_S.Ct_.2411,91_L.Ed_.2d67]#X'X@# art. I,  9, cl. 3 McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79 [106 S.CCASES z !USUS.,  XXrule421(b)#X;X-# rule 421(b)RULES !USUS.,  _XXsection#X'X=#XX'Ԁ1025#X'X#1025PENAL CODE !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ7028,subdivision(a)#X:<Xc#7028, subd. (a)BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS !USUS.,  _XXsection#X'X=#XX'Ԁ1158#X'X#1158PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXInreYurko(1974)10Cal.3d857#X;X0#In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Barre(1992)11Cal.App.4th961#X;X0# E !USUS.,  _cXXInre_Winship_(1970)397U.S.358    [90_S.Ct_.1068,25_L.Ed_.2d368#X:<Xc@#In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [90 S.Ct. 106CASESIn re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [90 S.Ct. 106People v. Barre (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961CASES !USUS.,  XXWashingtonv.Recuenco(2006)548U.S.__    [126S.Ct.2546,2550,165L.Ed.2d466]#X;X0#Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. __ [126 S.Ct.CASES | !USUS.,  XXrule4.420(b)#X;X-#rule 4.420(b)RULES !USUS.,  XXNederv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S.1    [119S.Ct.1827,144L.Ed.2d35]#X;X0#Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [119 S.CCASES !USUS.,  _cXXUnitedStatesv.Smith    (6thCir.2007)2007U.S.App.LEXIS1707#X:<Xc@# !USUS.,  XXWashingtonsSentencingReformAct#X;X-#"Washingtons Sentencing Reform ActOTHER OUT OF STATE!United States v. Smith (6th Cir. 2007) 2007 U.S. ApCASES  !USUS.,  _cXXUnitedStatesv._Papay_    (7thCir.2004)119Fed._Appx_.800#X:<Xc@#%United States v. Papay (7th Cir. 2004) 119 Fed. AppxCASESWashington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. __ [126 S.Ct.Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8 [119 S.C !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Padilla(1995)11Cal.4th891#X;X0#rule 4.420(b))People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Castellanos(1990)219Cal.App.3d1163#X;X0#,People v. Castellanos (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1163CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Osband(1996)13Cal.4th622#X;X0#.People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622CASES s !USUS.,  _XXUnitedStatesexrel.AttorneyGen.v.Delaware&HudsonCo.    (1909)213U.S.366    [29_S.Ct_.527,53_L.Ed_.836]#X'X@#0United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & HudCASESPeople v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622 !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev.Combs(1986)184_Cal.App_.3d508#X:<Xc=#3 People v. Combs (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 508CASES !USUS.,  _XXPeoplev.Jones(1995)37_Cal.App_.4th1312#X'X@#5People v. Jones (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1312CASESPeople v. Jones (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1312 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.BirksL  M  Ԁ(1998)19Cal.4th108#X;X0# !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1203.2,subdivision(b)#X;Xv#91203.2, subd. (b)PENAL CODE8People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108CASES !USUS.,  _XXArizona  (Statev.Brown(2004)209Ariz.200)#X'X=#<Arizona (State v. Brown (2004) 209 Ariz. 200)OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXColorado  Lopezv.People(Colo.2005)113P.3d713#X'X=#>Colorado (Lopez v. People (Colo. 2005) 113 P.3d 713OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXMaine  Statev._Schofield_(2005)2005ME82#X'X=#@Maine (State v. Schofield (2005) 2005 ME 82OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXMinnesota  Statev._Shattuck_(2005)704N.W.2d131#X'X=# !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Hill(1998)17Cal.4th800#X;X0#CPeople v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800CASESBMinnesota (State v. Shattuck (2005) 704 N.W.2d 131OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXNorthCarolina  Statev.Allen(2005)359N.C.425#X'X=# !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Reed(1996)13Cal.4th217#X;X0#GPeople v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.GuerraL  M  Ԁ(2006)37Cal.4th1067#X;X0#IPeople v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067CASESFNorth Carolina (State v. Allen (2005) 359 N.C. 425OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXOregon  Statev._Dilts_(2004)337Ore.645#X'X=# !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Hill(1967)67Cal.2d105#X;X0#MPeople v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105CASES !USUS.,  _XXPeoplev.Black()35Cal.4th1238#X'X@#OPeople v. Black, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1238. CASESPeople v. Black, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1238. LOregon (State v. Dilts (2004) 337 Ore. 645OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _XXWashington  Statev.Hughes(2005)154_Wn_.2d118#X'X=#SWashington (State v. Hughes (2005) 154 Wn.2d 118OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  _cXX_Kopp_Ԁv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th607#X:<Xc@#UKopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 6CASESKopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 6 m !USUS.,  _cXX_Dombrowski_Ԁv._Pfister_Ԁ(1965)380U.S.479    [85_S.Ct_.1116,14_L.Ed_.2d22]#X:<Xc@#XDombrowski v. Pfister (1965) 380 U.S. 479, 491-492 [CASES !USUS.,  XXMetromedia,Inc.v.CityofSanDiego(1982)32Cal.3d180#X;X0#ZMetromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.CASES !USUS.,  XXInreMinnis(1972)7Cal.3d639#X;X0#\In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639CASESIn re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Sutton(1980)113Cal.App.3d162#X;X0#_People v. Sutton (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 162CASES !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev._Saffell_Ԁ(1979)25Cal.3d223#X:<Xc=#a People v. Saffell (1979) 25 Cal.3d 223CASES !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ1170,subdivision(a)#X:<Xc#c1170, subd. (a)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170.3#X;Xv#e1170.3PENAL CODE1170, subd. (a) !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170.4#X;Xv#h1170.4PENAL CODE1170.4 !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170.5#X;Xv#k1170.5PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Navarro(1972)7Cal.3d248#X;X0#mPeople v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Tanner(1935)3Cal.2d279#X;X0# !USUS.,  XXAutoEquitySales,Inc.v.SuperiorCourt(1962)57Cal2d450#X;X0#pAuto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 CASESoPeople v. Tanner (1935) 3 Cal.2d 279CASES !USUS.,  XXArticleIII,section4#X;X-#sart. III,  4CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONPeople v. Tanner (1935) 3 Cal.2d 279 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.HillL  M  Ԁ(2005)131Cal.App.4th1089#X;X0#vPeople v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089 CASES !USUS.,  XXKansasv.Gould(2001)271Kan.394#X;X0# !USUS.,  _cXX_Arp_Ԁv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395#X:<Xc@#yArp v. Workers Comp. Appeal Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 39CASESArp v. Workers Comp. Appeal Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 39 !USUS.,  _XXArticleIII,section2,clause1#X'X=#|Art. III,  2, cl. 1U.S. CONSTITUTION / !USUS.,  _cXX_Halbert_sLumber,Inc.v.LuckyStores,Inc.    (1992)6_Cal.App_.4th1233#X:<Xc@#~Halberts Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) CASESxKansas v. Gould (2001) 271 Kan. 394CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Martin(1986)42Cal.3d437#X;X0#People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437CASES !USUS.,  XXInreApplicationofLee(1918)177Cal.690#X;X0#In re Application of Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690CASES !USUS.,  _cXXNewJerseyv._Natale_Ԁ(2005)184N.J.458#X:<Xc=# New Jersey v. Natale (2005) 184 N.J. 458CASES New Jersey v. Natale (2005) 184 N.J. 458 !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev.Tilbury(1991)54Cal.3d56#X:<Xc=#(People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56CASES !USUS.,  _cXXMinnesotav._Shattuck_Ԁ(2005)704_N.W.2d_Ԁ131#X:<Xc=# Minnesota v. Shattuck (2005) 704 N.W.2d 131OTHER OUT OF STATE !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Martinez(1999)76Cal.App.4th489#X;X0#People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489CASES !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(c)#X;Xv#1170, subd. (c)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXTapiav.SuperiorCourt(1991)53Cal.3d282#X;X0#Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Snook(1997)16Cal.4th1210#X;X0#People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210CASES h !USUS.,  _cXX_Lynce_Ԁv._Mathis_(1997)519U.S.433    [117_S.Ct_.891,137_L.Ed_.2d63]#X:<Xc@#Lynce v. Mathis (1997) 519 U.S. 433, 436 [117 S.Ct. CASESLynce v. Mathis (1997) 519 U.S. 433, 436 [117 S.Ct.  N !USUS.,  _cXXCollinsv._Youngblood_(1990)497U.S.37    [110_S.Ct_.2715,111_L.Ed_.2d30]#X:<Xc@#Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 50 [110 S.CASES . !USUS.,  _cXXRogersv.Tennessee(2001)532U.S.45    [121_S.Ct_.1693,149_L.Ed_.2d697]#X:<Xc=#(Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) 532 U.S. 45 [121 S.Ct. CASES !USUS.,  _cXX_Bouie_Ԁv.CityofColumbia,()378U.S.347#X:<Xc@#Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. 347 CASESBouie v. City of Columbia, supra, 378 U.S. 347  !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Blakeley(2000)23Cal.4th82#X;X0#People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82CASESPeople v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Huggins(2006)38Cal.4th175#X;X0#People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175CASES !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev._Morante_(1999)20Cal.4th403#X:<Xc@#People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403CASESPeople v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403 !USUS.,  _cXXMossv.SuperiorCourt(1998)17Cal.4th396#X:<Xc@#Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396CASES !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev.Davis(1994)7Cal.4th797#X:<Xc@#  !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ667,subdivision(e)(2)(A)(_i_)#X:<Xc#667 subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)PENAL CODEPeople v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797CASES !USUS.,  XXChapmanv.California(1967)386U.S.18    [87S.Ct.824,17L.Ed.2d705]#X;X0#Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.CCASESChapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.C !USUS.,  _XXrule4.423#X'X=#4.423RULESPeople v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797 !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev.King(1993)5Cal.4th59#X:<Xc@#People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59CASES !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ1170.1subdivision(a)#X:<Xc#1170.1 subd. (aPENAL CODE !USUS.,  _cXXArticleI,section10,clause1#X:<Xc=#art. I,  10, cl. 1U.S. CONSTITUTION !USUS.,  _cXXsection#X:<Xc=#cXX:<Ԁ12022.5#X:<Xc#12022.5PENAL CODE !USUS.,  _cXXPeoplev.Escobar(1992)3Cal.4th740#X:<Xc@#People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740CASES ' !USUS.,  _XXWeaverv.Graham(1981)450U.S.24    [101_S.Ct_.960,67_L.Ed_.2d17]#X'X@#Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 33 [101 S.Ct. 9CASES . !USUS.,  _cXXGriffithv.Kentucky(1987)479U.S.314    [107_S.Ct_.708,93_L.Ed_.2d649].#X:<Xc@#Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 322-323 [1CASES !USUS.,  _cXXInre_Baert_Ԁ(1988)205_Cal.App_.3d514#X:<Xc=#In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514CASESIn re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514 , !USUS.,  _XXLindseyv.Washington(1937)301U.S.397    [57_S.Ct_.797,81_L.Ed_.1182]#X'X@#Lindsey v. Washington (1937) 301 U.S. 397, 400 [57 SCASESLindsey v. Washington (1937) 301 U.S. 397, 400 [57 SWeaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 33 [101 S.Ct. 9 !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Smith(1983)34Cal.3d251#X;X0#People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251CASES !USUS.,  _XXCalderv.Bull(1798)3U.S.(3Dall)386#X'X@#Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 390.) CASES L !USUS.,  _cXXԀ_Carmell_Ԁv.Texas(2000)529U.S.513    [120_S.Ct_.162,146_L.Ed_.2d577]#X:<Xc=# Carmell v. Texas (2000) 529 U.S. 513 [120 S.Ct. 16CASES Carmell v. Texas (2000) 529 U.S. 513 [120 S.Ct. 16 K !USUS.,  _XX_Teague_Ԁv.Lane(1989)489U.S.288    [109_S.Ct_.1060,103_L.Ed_.2d334]#X'X@# F !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(a)(1)  section#X;Xv#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(b)#X;X#1170, subds. (a)(1), (b)PENAL CODETeague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 [109 S.Ct. 1060, CASES !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.Dupas    (9thCir.2005)419F.3d916#X;X0#United States v. Dupas (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 91CASES !USUS.,  XXGriffithv.Kentucky,supra#X;X0#Griffith v. Kentucky, supraCASES !USUS.,  _XXPeoplev.Dillon(1983)34Cal.3d441#X'X=#(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441CASESUnited States v. Dupas (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 91 !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.Duncan    (11thCir.2005)400F.3d1297#X;X0#United States v. Duncan (11th Cir. 2005) 400 F.3d 12CASES u !USUS.,  XX#X;X-#pre-Apprendi decision in UnitedCASES !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.Newman    (9thCir.2000)203F.3d700#X;X0#United States v. Newman (9th Cir. 2000) 203 F.3d 700CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Seel(2004)34Cal.4th535#X;X0#People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535CASESpage page chapter volume footnote endnote  !USUS.,  _Millerv.Florida()482U.S.    [107_S.Ct_.2446,96_L.Ed_.2d351][Miller v. Florida, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 432-433 CASES - !USUS.,  _XXԀMillerv.Florida(1987)482U.S.423    [107_S.Ct_.2446,96_L.Ed_.2d351]#X'X=# . !USUS.,  _cXXMarksv.UnitedStates(1977)430U.S.188    [97_S.Ct_.990,51_L.Ed_.2d260]#X:<Xc=# Marks v. United States (1977) 430 U.S. 188, 191 [9CASES Miller v. Florida (1987) 482 U.S. 423, 433 [107 S.CASES Miller v. Florida (1987) 482 U.S. 423, 433 [107 S. !USUS.,  XXJohnL.v.SuperiorCourt(2004)33Cal.4th158#X;X0#John L. v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 158CASES !USUS.,  XXPeoplev.Williams(1987)196Cal.App.3d1157#X;X0#People v. Williams (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1157CASESPeople v. Williams (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1157 !USUS.,  _XXsection#X'X=#XX'Ԁ667#X'X#667 PENAL CODE !USUS.,  _XXsection#X'X=#XX'Ԁ1385#X'X#1385PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(a)(1)#X;Xv#1170, subd. (a) (1)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(a)(2)#X;Xv# 1170, subd. (a)(2) PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170.3,subdivision(b)#X;Xv#1170.3, subd. (b) PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(d)#X;Xv# 1170, subd. (d)PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(d)#X;Xv#1170, subd. (d).PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1238,subdivision(a)(10)#X;Xv# 1238, subd. (a)(10) PENAL CODE !USUS.,  XXBlairv.Pitchess(1971)5Cal.3d258#X;X0# Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258CASES !USUS.,  XXInreTartar(1959)52Cal.2d250#X;X0#In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250CASES !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.Vaughn    (2dCir.2005)430F.3d518#X;X0#United States v. Vaughn (2d Cir. 2005) 430 F.3d 518CASES !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.Lata    (1stCir.2005)415F.3d107#X;X-# United States v. Lata (1st Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 1CASES !USUS.,  XXUnitedStatesv.PerezRuis    (1stCir.2005)421F.3d11#X;X0# !USUS.,  XXsection#X;X-#XX;Ԁ1170,subdivision(f)#X;Xv#1170, subd.(f)PENAL CODEUnited States v. Perez-Ruis (1st Cir. 2005) 421 F.CASES !USUS.,  _cXXSen.Bill40(20072008Reg.Sess#X:<Xc=#.(Sen. Bill 40 (2007-2008 Reg. SessOTHER "P$USUS.,XX `   4    _AllfurtherrulereferencesaretotheCaliforniaRulesofCourt. = "P$USUS.,XX `   14    _Allfurtherreferencestosection1170inArgumentI,B,aretothe  original_DSL_ԀeffectiveJuly1,1977. ~ !USUS.,  XXArt.I,10#X;X-#Art. I,  10U.S. CONSTITUTION !USUS.,  _8!XXdd8XXVSUPREMECOURTNO.    INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA  *Xddd Xdd Xdd X  ,dd , dd +   THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOF  d CALIFORNIA,  d PlaintiffandRespondent,  d vs.  d  GARYMITCHELLPARDO, d  DefendantandPetitioner. ,Xd  ,CourtofAppeal  d No.E039420  d SuperiorCourt d  No.FMB006545(d  X (@*  APPEALFROMTHESUPERIORCOURTOF D  SANBERNARDINOCOUNTY D  `   D   HonorableMarshaG.Slough,JudgePresiding D  `  򀀀 D   PETITIONERPARDOSBRIEFONTHEMERITS  D    `  򀀀 B #V#@"  ISSUESPRESENTED    B    ` (1)0 Didthetrialcourtviolatedefendants  SixthAmendmentrightto > ajurytrial,asinterpretedin  Cunninghamv.California(2007) >! 549U.S.___[127S.Ct.856,166L.Ed.2d856],byimposingan >!# uppertermsentencebasedonaggravatingfactorsnotfoundtrue >#% bythejury?>% '   ` (2)0 Ifso,whatistheproperremedy? >'")     INTRODUCTION  U    F  `   CunninghamheldCaliforniasDeterminateSentencingLawviolatesthe  Sixthand  FourteenthAmendments,asconstruedin  Apprendiv.NewJersey  (2000)530U.S.466[120S.Ct.2348,147L.Ed2d435]and  Blakelyv.   Washington(2004)542U.S.296[124S.Ct.2531,159L.Ed.2d403]because   theexistenceofaggravatingfactorsessentialtoexceedthestatutorymaximum   (themiddleterm)wasdeterminedbythecourtbyapreponderanceofthe   evidence.    ` PetitionerGaryPardowasconvictedbyajuryofmisappropriating  contractfunds.Thecourtimposedathreeyearuppertermbasedonfour  aggravatingfactors,noneofwhichwaseitheradmittedorfoundtruebyajury  beyondareasonabledoubt.Twofactors!planningandsophisticationand  lackofremorse!plainlyrequiredjuryfindings.TheothertwothatPardo  hadnumerouspriorsandwasonprobationwhentheoffenseoccurred  involvedthecommissionofapriorcrimebutdidnotfallwithinthe prior   convictionexceptionof  AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S. " 224[118S.Ct.1219,140L.Ed.2d350].Numerousnessofpriorsrequiresa $  factladenjudgmentdependentoncircumstances,whilethe onprobation &!" factorrequiresafactualdeterminationnotascertainablefromtherecordofany (#$ priorconviction. *%&  ` Assuminganyfactorfellwithinthe factofapriorconviction  exception,itwasstillimproperbecauseitwasfoundbyapreponderance,  whereasfederaldueprocessrequiresabeyondareasonabledoubtfinding.   ` Theappropriateremedyistoorderthesentencesetatthemiddleterm,   becausenoneofthefactorsthecourtusedcansupportanupperterm.This   couldbeaccomplishedbyasimplereviewingcourtorderandwouldrequire   nofurtherproceedings.(Pen.Code,  1260.)IfPardomustberesentenced,   twoapproachesareopen:ahearinginfrontofajuryontheaggravating  factors,orresentencingunderthelawasitexistedatthetimePardocommitted  theacts,butwithoutusinganyconstitutionallyinvalidfactors.   ` Aremedyadoptedbysomeotherjurisdictions!thesocalledBooker  approach!isnotappropriateinCalifornia.In  UnitedStatesv.  Booker(2005)  543U.S.220[125S.Ct.738,160L.Ed.2d621],thecourtseveredthe  provisionofthe  FederalSentencingGuidelinesprovidingforamandatorybase  termabsentaggravatingormitigatingfactors,renderingtheGuidelines   advisoryandmakingtheselectionoftermsamatterofpurejudicialdiscretion. "  ` AstatutecannotbejudiciallyreformedabsentevidencetheLegislature $  wouldhavepreferredreformationhaditknownthestatutewasconstitutionally &"" invalid.Thestatutesandlegislativehistoryonthispointareinadequateto ($$ determinewhat,ifany,reformationtheLegislaturewouldhavewanted.To *&& theextentanylightisshedontheprobableintent,itdemonstratestheopposite,  i.e.,theLegislatureenactedtheDeterminateSentencingLawtoreducejudicial  discretioninsentencing,nottoincreaseit,topromoteuniformityofsentences.  ThereformationapproachsuggestedinTownesReplyBriefonthemerits!   severanceoftheuppertermoptionfromtheremainderofPenalCode  section   1170,subdivision(b)!wouldbemoreconsistentwiththisobjectivethanone   basedonthe  Bookermodel.(  Peoplev.Towne,S125677.)    ` EveniftheDSLisopentoaBookertypeofjudicialreformationorthe  Legislatureamendsthelawitself(see  ԀSen.BillNo.40(20072008Reg.Sess.)  2: #  1      ),thechangecannotconstitutionallybeappliedtoPardo,whocommitted  hisactsbeforethedateofthereformationoramendment,becauseoftheban  againstexpostfactolaws(U.S.Const.,  Ԁart.I,9,cl.3;Cal.Const.,  art.I,9)  andtheequivalentdueprocessbaragainstretroactivejudicialdecisions.  Applicationofareformedoramendedstatutewouldbeunconstitutional  becauseitwouldretroactively(a)increasethepunishmentfortheoffense,(b)   eliminateelementsneededtosupportanupperterm,and(c)lessentheburden " ofjustifyinganuppertermfromwhatwasanunconstitutionallylow $  preponderancestandardtonothing.   @[[   STATEMENTOFTHECASE  2     ` AjuryfoundPardoguiltyofmisappropriationoffundsundercontract  (Pen.Code, #  2      ׀  506),diversionofconstructionfunds(  484b);grandtheftof  personalproperty(  487,subd.(a)),andmisdemeanorcontractingwithouta   license(Bus.&Prof.Code,  7028,subd.(a)).(1CT5557,2CT189193,   201.)Thecourtimposedtheuppertermofthreeyearsonthesection  506   charge.Theotherfelonieswerestayedunder  section654,andthe   misdemeanorsentencewassetat85days,timeserved.(2RT391392,2CT   204.)InanunpublishedopinionfiledNovember17,2006,DivisionTwoof  theFourthAppellateDistrictaffirmedthejudgment.Thiscourtgranted  appellantspetitionforreviewonFebruary7,2007.   @!  STATEMENTOFFACTS  $    ` PardowasemployedasgeneralmanagerofLKBContracting,a  licensedgeneralcontractingbusinessownedandoperatedbyLorenBuck,until  lateJune2003.(1RT92,185.)OnAugust13,2003,MarkTiffany   approachedPardotoaskaboutplanforagrading/excavatingjobathishouse.   (1RT102103.)PardosaidthatiswhathedidforalivingandgaveTiffany   abusinesscardwhichsaid LKBContracting,Inc.and GaryPardo,General   Manager.(RT102,CT232.)    ` ThenextdayPardoaskedforanimmediatemeeting.(1RT103.)  Pardosaidhehadfriendswhocouldpreparetheneededplans.(1RT104.)  TiffanygavePardoacheckfor$3,500.(1RT104,2CT239.)Pardosaidhe  wouldletTiffanyknowthefullcostafterhehadtalkedtotheengineer.(1RT  104.)   ` SeveraldayslaterPardotoldTiffanytheengineersaidtheworkwould  costover$8,600.(1RT105.)Thiswasinlinewithotherengineersestimates,   soTiffanyagreedbutrequestedareceiptforhispayments.(1RT05.)Pardo " presentedahandprintedcontract/receipt,whichstatedthecontractwas $  betweenTiffanyandJimMcBrian,thatPardowould overlookthisproject &!" andrunerins[sic],thatapaymentfor$3,500hadbeenreceived,andthata (#$ secondpaymentfor$3,800wasdue.(1RT106,2CT235.)Tiffanygave *%& PardoasecondcheckmadepayabletoPardoandassignedPardothetitletohis  1989Camaroforthebalanceofabout$1,500.(1RT106.)   ` Amonthlater,PardorequestedmoremoneybecauseMcBrianhadquit  andheneededmoremoneytopayanewengineer.(1RT109,112.)After   Pardomadeaphonecallorderingatopographandagradingplan,Tiffany   gavehim$1,400cashtopaytheengineers.(1RT110.)Pardosphonecall   wastoCoachellaValleyEngineers(CVE),alegitimateengineeringdesignand   landsurveyingcompany.(1RT74,75.)PardosignedacontractwithCVE  inwhichCVEagreedtodoaboundaryandtopographicsurveyandpreparea  gradingplanfor$7,500,andPardopaid$1,000bycheck.(1RT77,2CT  237.)TheengineerscametoTiffanysproperty,andPardosignedthecontract  anddeliveredapersonalcheck.(1RT118.)Theengineerssaidagrading  planwouldbecompletedwithinabouttwoweeks.(1RT119.)   ` Aroundthesametime,PardobroughtTiffanyatypewrittenor  computerprintedcontracttoreplacethehandwrittenone.(2CT233.)The   newcontractwasentitled McBrideDesign,withJimMcBrideasengineer " andstatedthatPardowouldsupervisetheproject,thatMcBridehadreceived $  $8,500fromPardo,andthatPardowouldreceivea$3,500drawforexpenses. &"" (2CT233.)PardoandTiffanyagreedTiffanyhadmadepaymentsof$8,500 ($$ and$3,500,andabalanceof$3,000wasdue.(1RT113,2CT233.) *&&  ` Twoweekslater,whenTiffanycalledCVE,hewastoldworkhad  stoppedbecausePardoscheckhadbounced.(1RT119.)Tiffanycalled  Pardoandaskedhowthegradingplanwasgoing.Pardosaideverythingwas  okay,butheneeded$1,000;hischeckswerebouncingallovertown,andhis   telephonewasbeingturnedoffbecauseothercontractorswerenotpayinghim.   (1RT120.)Tiffanyrefusedtopayuntilhehadagradingplanwithavalid   seal.(1RT120.)Twodayslater,TiffanyagaincalledPardo,whosaidthe   workwouldbedonebyOctober10.(1RT121122.)Theworkwasnot  completed.(1RT122.)Eventually,Tiffanyhadtosignanewcontractwith  CVEtocompletethework.(1RT79,124.)   ` PardohaddepositedTiffanyschecksinapersonalbankaccount,after  whichhemadelargecashwithdrawalsbycheckorATM.(2RT204210.)As  ofSeptember2,theaccounthadanongoingnegativebalance.(1RT211  212.)PardowithdrewconsiderablemoneyattheMorongoIndianCasino.(1  RT209,215.)    ` TherewasnoJamesMcBrideandJames/JimMcBrianincomputer " records,DMVrecords,orlocaltelephonedirectories.(1RT213,216217.) $   ` PardotestifiedinhisowndefensethathereferredTiffanytothe &"" engineerMcBride,whowasinTexas,andactedasagobetweenforthetwo, ($$ butthathe(Pardo)wasnotapartytothecontract.(1RT232234.)McBride *&& cametovisitthejobsiteandcalculatedthecostat$14,000to$15,000.(1RT  236.)PardocashedTiffanyschecksandgavethemoneytoMcBride.(1RT  236.)Pardowastoreceive$500perweekfromMcBridetooverseethe  project.(1RT238.)PardoacknowledgedsigningthecontractwithCVE,but   hedidnotreaditbecausehecannotread.(1RT243.)Tiffanywassupposed   togivePardofundstocoverthe$1000checkPardogavetoCVE,butTiffany   failedtodoso,andthecheckbounced.(1RT243244.)Eventually,Tiffany   demandedarefundandthreatenedPardo,andPardoquit.(1RT244245.)   @jj&  ARGUMENT  =Ԉ     I.0 ` THESENTENCINGCOURTVIOLATEDPARDOSSIXTH  AND  FOURTEENTHAMENDMENTRIGHTSWHENIT  IMPOSEDTHEUPPERTERMBASEDONFACTORS  NEITHERADMITTEDNORFOUNDTRUEBYAJURY.  ` `    ==  `  A.0 PardosSentencing  I?    ` Thetrialcourtimposedthethreeyearuppertermformisappropriating    contractfunds,identifyingfouraggravatingfactors:   8 ` Thecourtfindsthatthefactorsinaggravationclearlyoutweigh   thefactorsinmitigation.Factorsinaggravationincluding[sic]   thefactthatyouhavethepriorfelonyconviction.^ #  3      ׀Themanner  inwhichthiscrimewascarriedoutdemonstratestothisCourt  planning,criminalsophisticationand/orprofessionalismon  yourpart.[]Also,asitrelatestofactorsinaggravation,as  indicated,youwereonsummaryprobationatthetimethatyou  committedthisoffense.Andindeed,youhaveshownno  remorse,atleastthatIcantell,tothispoint.[]Thereareno  circumstancesinmitigationthatthisCourtcouldreviewin  lookingatthosemitigatingcircumstance[sic]whichare  outlinedinRuleofCourt  4.423.[2RT391.]` x` x _@ ` ThefactorsofnumerouspriorconvictionsandPardosbeingon  probationwerebasedentirelyontheprobationreport.(InitialProbation   Report(Prob.Rpt.)28.)Thefactorofplanningandsophisticationappearsto " havebeenbasedontheevidenceattrial.(2RT391.)Thefactoroflackof $  remorseappearstohavebeenbasedonacombinationoftheevidenceattrial  andPardospurporteddenialofculpabilitytotheprobationofficer.(2RT  390391,InitialProbationReport46.)  &   `  B. Applicablecaselaw     GgG ` In' yGԀ  AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates,supra,523U.S.atp.238,the   defendantwasconvictedofenteringtheUnitedStatesafterhavingbeen   deportedandwasgivenanincreasedsentencebecausethedeportationwas   afterconvictionofaggravatedfelonies.Atsentencing,thedefendantadmitted   theaggravatedfeloniesbutarguedtheincreasedsentencecouldnotbeapplied  becausetheywerenotallegedintheindictment.(Id.atp.226.)Rejectingthe  defendantsclaim,themajorityframedtheissueaswhetherthepriorwasan   elementoftheoffenseormerelya sentencingfactorandfounditwasthe  latter.(Id.atpp.228,235.)Thusthepriorconvictionneednotbechargedand  wastobedeterminedbyajudgeratherthanajury.(Id.atpp.243247.)   ` JusticeScalia,inadissentjoinedbythreejustices,concludedasa   matterofstatutoryanalysisthatthepriorconvictionwasactuallyanelement " oftheoffenseandhadtobeprovedtoajury.(  AlmendarezTorres,supra,523 $  U.S.atpp.248250(dis.opn.ofScalia,J.).)Evenifapriorwereasentence &!" enhancementratherthananelementoftheoffense,thedissentadded,itwas (#$  genuinelydoubtfulsuchanenhancementcouldbeproperlydeterminedby *%& ajudgeratherthanajuryconsistentwiththe  SixthAmendmentrighttojury  trial.(Id.atp.251.)   ` Thefollowingyear,in  Jonesv.UnitedStates(1999)526U.S.227[119  S.Ct1215,1143L.Ed.2d311],thecourtconsideredwhetherthedefendantwas   entitledtoajurytrialonagreatbodilyinjuryallegation,whichunderfederal   statuteincreasedthemaximumpunishmentforcarjackingbytenyears.The   courtfoundthedefendantwasentitledtoajurytrialontheallegation,holding   that undertheDueProcessClauseofthe  FifthAmendmentandthenoticeand  jurytrialguaranteesoftheSixthAmendment,anyfact(otherthanprior  conviction)thatincreasesthemaximumpenaltyforacrimemustbecharged  inanindictment,submittedtoajury,andprovenbeyondareasonabledoubt.  (Id.atp.243,fn.6.)   ` Thenextyear,in  Apprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,the  courtheld, [o]therthanthefactofapriorconviction,anyfactthatincreases  thepenaltyforacrimebeyondtheprescribedstatutorymaximummustbe   submittedtoajury,andprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt.Atissuewas " whetherApprendisoffenseofpossessingafirearmforanunlawfulpurpose $  wasa hatecrime;theNewJerseystatuteprovidedarangeof5to10years  &"" forthebaseoffense,butarangeof10to20yearsifthejudgefounditwasa  hatecrime.(Id.atpp.468469.)   ` Thecourtnotedtheconstitutionalrightstoajurytrialandafindingof  guiltbeyondareasonabledoubtare ofsurpassingimportance.(  Apprendiv.   NewJersey,supra,530U.S.atpp.476477.)   8 ` [T]hehistoricalfoundationforourrecognitionofthese   principlesextendsdowncenturiesintothecommonlaw. To   guardagainstaspiritofoppressionandtyrannyonthepartof   rulersand asthegreatbulwarkof[our]civilandpolitical   liberties,[]trialbyjuryhasbeenunderstoodtorequirethat the  truthofeveryaccusation...shouldafterwardsbeconfirmedby  theunanimoussuffrageoftwelveof[thedefendants]equals  andneighbors....[]Equallywellfoundedisthecompanion  righttohavethejuryverdictbasedonproofbeyonda  reasonabledoubt.` x` x BW(Id.atpp.477478,citationsomitted,emphasisinoriginal.)Thecourt  explainedtheconstitutionallimitsofdelegatingfactfindingtothesentencing  court:  8 ` Ifadefendantfacespunishmentbeyondthatprovidedbystatute  whenanoffenseiscommittedundercertaincircumstancesbut   notothers,itisobviousthatboththelossoflibertyandthe ! stigmaattachingtotheoffenseareheightened;itnecessarily " followsthatthedefendantshouldnot!atthemomenttheState # isputtoproofofthosecircumstances!bedeprivedof $  protectionsthathave,untilthatpoint,unquestionablyattached.%!!` x` x [(Id.atp.484.) '##  ` Then,in  Blakelyv.Washington,supra,542U.S.296,theSupreme )%% Courtappliedtherulearticulatedin  Apprenditoinvalidate # Washingtons +'' SentencingReformAct.Theactpermittedthesentencingcourttoimposea  sentencegreaterthanthe standardrangebasedonsentencingfactorsfound  bythejudge.Blakelyssentencewasincreasedbythreeyearsbasedonthe  courtsfindingthecrimewascommittedwith deliberatecruelty.(Id.atp.   300.)Reversingthejudgment,theSupremeCourtreaffirmedthe brightline   ruleithadexpressedin  Apprendiandclarifiedthatthe prescribedstatutory   maximumis themaximumsentenceajudgemayimposesolelyonthebasis   offactsreflectedinthejuryverdictoradmittedbythedefendant.(  Blakely,  atp.304,emphasisoriginal.)   ` Thefollowingyear,thecourtstruckdownthe  FederalSentencing  GuidelinesinL  M  UnitedStatesv.  BookerL  M  ,supra,543U.S.220.InBooker,the  defendantwasconvictedofpossessionwithintenttodistributecrackcocaine.  Theoffensecarriedabasesentencingrangeof210to262months.However,  theGuidelinesauthorizedagreatersentencewherethecourtfoundcertain  aggravatingfactors.ThetrialcourtfoundbyapreponderancethatBooker   possessedalargerquantityofcocainethanfoundbythejuryandhad " obstructedjustice.Basedontheseaggravatingfactorsitimposed360months, $  98monthsgreaterthantheupperendofthebaserange.(Id.543U.S.atp. &"" 227.)TheSupremeCourtheldBookerssentenceviolatedthe  Sixth ($$ Amendment.Thecourtfoundtherewas nodistinctionofconstitutional *&& significancebetweenthe  FederalSentencingGuidelinesandtheWashington  proceduresatissuein[  Blakely].(Id.atp.233.)Inaseparateopinion,the  courtreformedtheGuidelinesbydeletingtherequirementtherebean  aggravatingfactortojustifyanupwarddeparture,renderingtheGuidelines   advisoryandmakingthesentencingcourtsdecisionwhethertodeviatefrom   thebaserangeentirelydiscretionary.(Id.atpp.244268.)    ` Finally,in  Cunninghamv.California,supraL  M  L  M  ,549U.S.___[127S.Ct.   856,166L.Ed.2d856],thecourtpartiallyinvalidatedCaliforniasDSL.The  trialcourthadimposedtheuppertermof16yearsbasedonseveral  aggravatingfactors.TheSupremeCourtheldthat,becauseunder  section1170  theexistenceofanaggravatingfactorismandatorytoimposetheupperterm,  suchafactormustbefoundbyajurybeyondareasonabledoubt.Thejudicial  determinationofaggravatingfactorsessentialtoimposeasentencegreater  thanthemiddletermwas theveryinquiry  Apprendisbrightlinerulewas  designedtoexclude.(Cunningham,127S.Ct.atp.874.)    `  C.0 PardosUpperTermSentenceViolatedCunningham " BecauseItWasBasedonFactsNotAdmittedorFoundTrue # byaJury,andNoFactFellWithinthe PriorConviction $  Exception. Pam% !  m ` Thefouraggravatingfactorsreliedonbythesentencingcourtwere '"# planningandsophistication,lackofremorse,numerouspriorconvictionsand )$% Pardosbeingonprobationatthetimeoftheoffense.(2RT391.)Nofactor +&' wasadmittedbyPardoorfoundtruebythejury.Thelattertwofactorsfell  outsidethepriorconvictionexceptionof  AlmendarezTorresbecauseeach  requiredmorethanthe factofapriorconviction(  Apprendiv.NewJersey,  supra,530U.S.atp.490),andeachposesfactualquestionsnotanswerable   basedontherecordofapriorconviction.    ` AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates,supra,523U.S.224itselfis   questionableauthority.Itwasa54decision,andoneofthemajorityjustices,   JusticeThomas,hassincerepudiatedhisposition.(  Apprendiv.NewJersey,  supra,530U.S.atpp.518521(conc.opn.ofThomas,J.).)InApprendi,the  courtstated itisarguablethatAlmendarezTorreswasincorrectlydecided.  (Apprendi,atp.489.)ItnotedAlmendarezTorreswasbasedon unique  facts,i.e.,thedefendanthadadmittedsufferingthepriorconvictions.  (  Apprendi,atpp.488,490.)ThemajoritycharacterizedAlmendarezTorres  asa narrowexceptiontotherule.   ` TheSupremeCourtfurtheremphasizedthenarrownessofAlmendarez   Torresin  Shepardv.UnitedStates(2005)544U.S.13[125S.Ct.1254,161 " L.Ed.2d205].Shepardaddressedwhatportionsoftherecordinpriorguilty $  pleaburglaryconvictionscouldbeconsideredbythesentencingcourtto &"" determinewhethertheycouldbeusedforenhancement.Underthestatute,a ($$ priorburglaryqualifiedasanenhancementifitoccurredina buildingor *&& enclosedspace.(Id.atp.15.)Theprosecutionarguedthesentencingcourt  couldrelyonpolicereportsandcomplaintapplicationstoprovetheburglaries  occurredinabuildingorenclosedspace.Thecourtrejectedtheprosecutions  positionandheldthatthesentencingcourtsdeterminationofthesubstanceof   theguiltypleapriorwasnecessarilylimitedto thechargingdocument,the   termsofapleaagreementortranscriptofcolloquybetweenjudgeand   defendantinwhichthefactualbasisforthepleawasconfirmedbythe   defendant,ortosomecomparablejudicialrecordofthisinformation.(Id.at  p.26.)Asentencingcourtsuseoffactsoutsidethosenecessarilyadmittedor  foundtruebyajuryraisedthesameconcernsunderlying  Jonesand  Apprendi.  8 ` Whilethedisputedfactherecanbedescribedasafactabouta  priorconviction,itistoofarremovedfromtheconclusive  significanceofapriorjudicialrecord,andtoomuchlikethe  findingssubjecttoJonesandApprendi,tosaythat  Almendarez  Torresclearlyauthorizesajudgetoresolvethedispute.` x` x h|(Shepard,atp.25.)   ` RecentlytheSupremeCourthasdeniedcertiorariincasespresenting   challengestoAlmendarezTorresin  Rangel,etal.v.UnitedStates(2006)__ " U.S.__[126S.Ct.2873,165L.Ed.2d910].JusticeStevensstatedthat,while $  hecontinuedtobelieve  AlmendarezTorreswas wronglydecided,hedidnot &"" believetheriskofprejudicetoadefendantwasgreatenoughtowarrant ($$ reversingthedecisioninlightofstaredecisis.(126S.Ct.atp.2874.) *&& Dissentingfromthedenialofcertiorari,JusticeThomasreiteratedhisviewthat    AlmendarezTorreswasincorrectlydecidedandstated, ithaslongbeenclear  thatamajorityofthiscourtnowrejectsthatexception.(Id.atpp.2874  2875.)    ` Mostrecently,in  Cunninghamthecourtemphasizedthattheprior   convictionexceptionshouldnotbeappliedbroadly.RespondingtoJustice   Kennedysdissentingviewthattherighttojurytrialunder  Apprendishouldbe   limitedtosentencingfactsconcerningthecurrentoffense,leavingfacts  relatingtothedefendantforjudicialdetermination,themajoritystated:   JusticeKennedyurgesadistinctionbetweenfactsconcerningtheoffense,  whereApprendiwouldapply,andfactsconcerningtheoffender,whereit  wouldnot.[]Apprendiitself,however,leavesnoroomforthebifurcated  approachJusticeKennedyproposes.[](Anyfactthatincreasesthepenaltyfor  acrimebeyondtheprescribedstatutorymaximummustbesubmittedtoajury,  andprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt.(emphasisadded.)(Cunninghamv.   California,supra,127S.Ct.atp.874,fn.14,citationsomitted.) "  ` Severalfederaldecisionshavepermittedthetrialcourttomakefindings $  aboutpriorconvictions.(  UnitedStatesv.Santiago(2ndCir.2001)268F.3d &"" 151,153154[whetherallegedpriorswerecommittedonsameoccasion]; ($$   UnitedStatesv.KempisBonola(8thCir.2002)287F.3d699,702703 *&& [whetherpriorwas aggravatedfelony];  Chamberlainv.Pliler(C.D.Cal.  2004)307F.Supp.2d1128,11411142[whetherpriorinvolvedpersonaluse  ofdeadlyweapon].)Thiscourt,too,hasconsideredthequestion.In  People  v.McGee(2006)38Cal.4th682,thedefendantwaschargedwithfelonystrikes   basedontwopriorrobberiesinNevada.Nevadarobberydidnotrequirethe   specificintentelementrequiredforaCaliforniarobbery.Thecourtheld     AlmendarezTorrespermittedthetrialcourttodeterminewhethera   defendantspriorconvictionqualifiedasa seriousfelonyunderCalifornias  ThreeStrikesLaw.(Id.atp.687,affirming  Peoplev.Kelii(1999)21Cal.4th  452,455459.)Itfurtherheldthetrialcourtcouldconsiderthepreliminary  hearingtestimonyintherecordoftheNevadaconvictionstodetermine  whetherthepriorsqualifiedasstrikes.(Id.atpp.689690,693.)   ` ThesedecisionsinterpretingAlmendarezTorresallshareacommon  feature:ineach,thejudicialdeterminationofapriorconvictionislimitedto  therecordofthatconviction.Here,bycontrast,thepurportedfactsthatPardo   wasonprobationwhenhecommittedthecurrentoffenseandthathisprior " convictionswere numerouswouldrequireafindingoffactthatcouldnot $  havebeenestablishedsolelybytherecordofanyconviction.  &""  `   1.  Theonprobationfactor 3    ` ThefindingPardowasonprobationatthetimeoftheoffensewasnot  limitedtothe factofpriorconviction.(  Apprendiv.NewJersey,supra,   530U.S.atp.488.)Themaximumprobationarytermforagivenclassof   offenseissetbyPenalCodesections  1203a(misdemeanors)and  1203.1,   subdivision(a)(felonies).However,thesentencingcourtmayterminate   probationearly( : 1203.2,subd.(b),  1203.3;  Peoplev.Totari(2003)28   Cal.4th876,879).Conversely,thecourtmay,withincertainlimits,extend  previouslyimposedprobationterms(  1203,subd.(a)).Adefendants  probationmayalsoberevoked,whichterminatesprobation.(  1203.2,subd.  (a),  1203.3.)Accordingly,eventhougharecordofconvictiongenerallystates  theinitiallengthofanimposedtermofprobation,thatrecordcannotestablish  whetherthedefendantwasstillonprobationonthedateofsomefuture  offense.    ` Factualquestionsareinherentinanydeterminationwhetheradefendant " wasonprobationatagiventime.(See,e.g.,  Peoplev.Willis(2002)28Cal.4th $  22,3536[policeactedonincorrectrecordslistingappellantasbeingon &!" parole];  Peoplev.Ferguson(2003)109Cal.App.4th367,370371 (#$ [defendantsprobationhadbeenterminatedpriortosearch].) *%&  ` Pardoscasewellillustratesthispoint.Theprobationreportstatesthat  PardowasplacedonathreeyeartermofprobationonJune17,2001,andthat  hewasplacedonathreeyeartermofprobationinadifferentcaseon  November21,2001.However,theprobationreportfurtherstatesPardos   probationwasrevokedonMay1,2003,approximatelythreemonthspriorto   hisoffenseinthecurrentcase.Thereferencetorevocationislistedunderthe   mostrecentofthetwocases,butitdoesnotestablishwhetherprobationwas   revokedinonlyone,orboth,ofthecases.(Prob.Rpt.23.)Itisentirely  possiblethatwhenPardocommittedthecurrentoffensehewasnoton  probationatall,byvirtueoftheearlierrevocation.   ` Becauseadefendantsprobationstatusisafluidfact,subjecttochange,  itcannotbeestablishedbytherecordofthepriorconviction.Thus,thisfactor  isnotwithinthepriorconvictionexceptionof  AlmendarezTorres.   `   2.  Numerouspriors     ` TheJudicialCouncilschoiceofthesubjectiveterm numerousin   CaliforniaRulesofCourt,* #  4      ׀  rule4.421(b)(4)injectsanelementofsubjectivity " intothisfactor. Numerouswasdoubtlesschosennotbyaccident,but $  preciselybecauseofitsflexibility,inrecognitionthatthecircumstances &!" attendingaparticulardefendantsprioroffenses,suchasthenatureandtiming  (#$ oftheoffenses,impactwhethertheysufficetoconstituteafactorin  aggravation.   ` Forexample,thecommissionofseveralcrimesonasingleoccasionor  periodofaberrantbehaviormightnotbeconstruedasnumerous,whereasan   equalnumberofcrimescommittedondiscreteoccasionswouldmorelikelybe   numerous  .Similarly,threepriorconvictionsremoteintimemightnotbe   numerous,whilethreerecentpriorconvictionscouldbenumerous.Further,   agivennumberofpriorconvictionsmightbedeemednumerousifthecrimes  arerelativelyserious,whereasanequalnumberofmisdemeanorsmightnotbe  deemednumerous.  Californiacourtshaveheldthattwopriorconvictionsare  notnumerous.(  Peoplev.Fernandez(1990)226Cal.App.3d669,681;  ԀPeople  v.Berry(1981)117Cal.App.3d184,191. #  5      )Beyondthatthreshold,however,  nocaseauthorityestablisheswhetheranyparticulargreaternumberofoffenses  isnecessarilynumerous.Theinherentsubjectivityofthisfactorpresentsa  factualquestionbeyondthe factofapriorconviction,whichcannotbe  answeredconclusivelybytherecordinanypriorcase.Instead,anassessment  ofthenumber,nature,andtimingofthepriorsisessential.    ` Pardowasentitledtoajurytrialoneachofthepurportedaggravating   factors,andaccordinglynoneofthosefactorswasproperlyfoundbythe   sentencingcourt.    `  D.0 EvenIfAnyAggravatingFactorWasWithinthePrior  ConvictionException,PermittingaJudicialDetermination,  SuchaFactorIsStillImproperBecauseItWasFoundbya  PreponderanceoftheEvidenceRatherThanBeyonda  ReasonableDoubt.   oln `     h      p M ` EvenifoneormoreofPardospurportedaggravatingfactorsfellwithin  the  AlmendarezTorrespriorconvictionexception,thuspermittingacourt  determination,thereremainstheproblemthatthecourt,applyingpre    CunninghamCalifornialaw,foundthefactor(s)truebyapreponderancerather  thanbyareasonabledoubt. #  6      ׀Asdetailedbelow,amajorityofjusticeshave   suggestedtheapplicablestandardinsuchaproceedingisbeyondareasonable " doubt.Undertheprincipleof constitutionaldoubt,thiscourtshould $  interpretCaliforniassentencingschemeinamannerthatisplainly &!" constitutional,byrequiringproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.   ` In  InreWinship(1970)397U.S.358,364[90S.Ct.1068,25L.Ed.2d  368],thecourtinvalidatedaNewYorkstatuteunderwhichtheburdenof  proofinajuveniledelinquencyproceedingwasreducedtoapreponderanceof   theevidence,holdingthat theDueProcessClauseprotectstheaccused   againstconvictionexceptuponproofbeyondreasonabledoubtofeveryfact   necessarytoconstitutethecrimewithwhichheischarged.    ` In  Mullaneyv.Wilbur(1975)421U.S.684[95S.Ct.1881,44L.Ed.2d  508],thecourtextendedtheruleofWinshiptodeterminationsthatwentnotto  adefendant'sguiltorinnocence,buttothelengthofhissentence.In  Mullaney,thecourtinvalidatedMaineshomicidelaw,underwhichall  intentionalmurderswerepresumedtobecommittedwithmaliceaforethought  (punishablebylifeimprisonment),unlessthedefendantcouldrebutthis  presumptionwithproofthatheactedintheheatofpassion(whichreducedthe  convictiontomanslaughterandthemaximumsentenceto20years).Thecourt   acknowledgedthatunderMainelawtheabsenceofheatofpassionwasnotan " elementofmurder,butwasinsteadafactbearingonpunishment.However, $  thecourtrejectedthepurporteddistinctionbetweenthecrimeelementsand &"" punishment,explaining, IfWinshipwerelimitedtothosefactsthatconstitute ($$ acrimeasdefinedbystatelaw,aStatecouldunderminemanyoftheinterests *&& thatdecisionsoughttoprotectwithouteffectinganysubstantivechangeinits  law.Itwouldonlybenecessarytoredefinetheelementsthatconstitute  differentcrimes,characterizingthemasfactorsthatbearsolelyontheextent  ofpunishment.(  Mullaney,supra,412U.S.atpp.697-698.)    ` In   McMillanv.Pennsylvania(1986)477U.S.79[106S.Ct.2411,91   L.Ed.2d67],thecourtupheldaPennsylvaniasentencingstatutewhich   prescribedamandatoryminimumsentenceoffiveyearsuponajudgesfinding   byapreponderancethatthedefendant visiblypossessedafirearmduringthe  commissionofcertainenumeratedoffenses,allofwhichcarriedmaximum  sentencesofmorethanfiveyears.(Id.atp.81.)Thecourtfoundthestatute  didnotviolatetherighttojurytrial,primarilybecauseitdidnotincreasethe  maximumsentence,butmerelysetaminimumsentence.(Id.atpp.87-88.)   ` In  AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates,supra,523U.S.224,the  majorityexpresslyrefrainedfromdecidingtheapplicablestandardofproofin  acourttrialonaprior,notingthattheburdenissuehadnotbeenraisedandthe   defendantsadmissionofhispriorconvictionsrenderedtheburdenquestion " effectivelymoot.(Id.atpp.247248.)Thefourjusticedissentexpressedthe $  viewtherewasastrongargumentthatthe  SixthAmendmentappliedtothe &"" determinationofsentencingpriors,requiringbothajurytrialandproofbeyond ($$ areasonabledoubt.Subsequently,amajorityofthecourthasbeen *&& consistentlycriticalof  AlmendarezTorres,andJusticeThomashasabandoned  hisAlmendarezTorresmajoritytocallforitsoverruling.JusticeStevenshas  statedAlmendarezTorreswaswronglydecided,buthasexpressedtheview  staredecisismilitatesagainstoverrulingitnow.    ` Thus,whileitremainsindoubtwhetherthecourtwilloverrule   AlmendarezTorres,thecourtisplainlycommittedtolimitingthedecisionto   itsnarrowholdingthattherighttojurytrialdoesnotextendtoprior   convictions.Asstronglysuggestedbyanowmajorityofthejustices,the  courtsearlierdecisionsinWinshipand  Mullaneyrequirethataprior  convictionthatincreasesthesentencemustbefoundbeyondareasonable  doubt,evenifacourtmakesthedetermination.   ` Somefederalcourtshaverecentlyrejectedsimilarargumentsthata  courtsdeterminationofapriorisgovernedbythebeyondareasonabledoubt  standard.( $ UnitedStatesv.Smith(6thCir.2007)2007U.S.App.LEXIS  1707; & UnitedStatesv.Papay(7thCir.2004)119Fed.Appx.800,802.)These   decisionsreasonthat  AlmendarezTorresisstillgoodlawbecausetheSupreme " Courtdidnotoverruleitin  Apprendi.Butthisanalysisfailstosupportthe $  purportedresultbecausethecourtinAlmendarezTorresexpresslyrefrained &"" fromdecidingwhatstandardofproofappliesinsuchaproceeding.Andjust ($$ as  AlmendarezTorresitselfdidnotdecidetheburdenquestion,thecourts *&& failuretooverruleAlmendarezTorresdoesnotdecidethequestion.Tothe  contrary,theSupremeCourthasmadeclearthattheburdenquestionisanopen  one,and,forthereasonssetoutabove,thisquestionmustberesolvedby  findingthestandardisbeyondareasonabledoubt.    ` Californialawhaslongrequiredpriorconvictionschargedas   enhancementsbeprovedtoajurybeyondareasonabledoubt.(  1025,  1158;     InreYurko(1974)10Cal.3d857,862;seealso  Peoplev.Barre(1992)11   Cal.App.4th961,965-966[notingfederalconstitutionaldueprocessrequires  thesame,citing  InreWinship,supra,397U.S.358].)Inlightofthe  authoritiesdetailedante,thebeyondareasonabledoubtstandardisnow  constitutionallyrequired,bothforchargedenhancementpriorsandpriorsused  toselecttheupperterm.Itwouldbeanomalousiftheaggravatingfactorofa  defendantsremorselessness,forexample,hadtobedeterminedbyajury  beyondareasonabledoubt,butapriorconvictioncouldbeusedbasedononly  afindingitwasmorelikelythannotthedefendanthadsufferedaprior   conviction. "  ` Evenifthiscourtisnotconvincedconclusivelythatthebeyonda $  reasonabledoubtstandardapplies,thereisattheveryleast genuinedoubt &"" (see  AlmendarezTorres,supra,523U.S.atp.251)onthisissue.Underthe ($$ ruleof constitutionaldoubt,thiscourtshouldeschewanunnecessary *&& interpretationofCaliforniasentencinglawthatisconstitutionallydubiousand  willinvitefurtheruncertaintyandappellatelitigation. [W]hereastatuteis  susceptibleoftwoconstructions,byoneofwhichgraveanddoubtful  constitutionalquestionsariseandbytheotherofwhichsuchquestionsare   avoided,ourdutyistoadoptthelatter.( 1 UnitedStatesexrel.AttorneyGen.   v.Delaware&HudsonCo.(1909)213U.S.366,408[29S.Ct.527,53L.Ed.   836];seealso  AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates,supra,523U.S.224,248   250.)Thiscourtcanavoidthecloudofconstitutionaldoubtbyinterpreting    section1170asrequiringproofbeyondareasonabledoubtofanyaggravating  factnecessarytoimposetheupperterm,includingapriorconviction.; #  7      ׀   ` NoneofthefourfactorsusedtoselectPardosuppertermsentencewas  proper,becauseevenifoneormorewassubjecttothepriorconviction  exceptionofAlmendarezTorres,nonewasfoundtruebeyondareasonable  doubt.    `  E.0 TheErrorWasPrejudicial.   _ `   1.0  Overview    _ ` R  BlakelyerrorissubjecttotheChapman #  8      ׀testofprejudiceonreview,  whichrequirestheprosecutiontoestablishtheerrorwasharmlessbeyonda   reasonabledoubt.(  Washingtonv.Recuenco(2006)548U.S.__[126S.Ct.   2546,2550,165L.Ed.2d466][findingbyjudge,ratherthanjury,that   defendantpersonallyusedafirearm,triggering3yearsentenceenhancement,   subjectto  Chapman],citing   Nederv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S.1,8[119   S.Ct.1827,144L.Ed.2d35].)   ` NoneofthefourfactorsreliedoninPardoscasewasadmittedorfound  truebyajury,andnonefellwithinthepriorconvictionexceptionof    AlmendarezTorres.Further,asdetailedinthefollowingsection,itcannotbe  saidunderthe  Chapmantestthatanyofthefactorswouldhavebeenfound  truebyajurybeyondareasonabledoubt.Evenifanyfactor(s)fellwithinthe  AlmendarezTorrespriorconvictionexception,theresultisthesamebecause   onthisrecordthetrialcourtcouldnothavefoundsuchfactor(s)truebeyond " areasonabledoubt,asrequired.(SeeargumentI,D,ante.)Finally,evenif $  somefactorfellwithinAlmendarezTorres,andthatfactorwasproperlyfound &!" byapreponderance,thesentencingcourtsrelianceontheremaining,invalid  factorswasprejudicialbecauseitcannotbeestablishedbeyondareasonable  doubtthecourtwouldhavechosentheuppertermabsenttheinvalidfactors.   `   2.0  Therewasnoconstitutionallyvalidfactorin   aggravation,anditcannotbeestablishedbeyonda   reasonabledoubtthatanyfactorwouldhavebeen   foundtrueifproperlytried.      _7  ` Applyingthetestof  Chapman,therecordbelowcannotestablish   beyondareasonabledoubtthatajury(orthesentencingcourt,inthecaseof   any  AlmendarezTorresfactor)wouldhavefoundanyfactortruebeyonda  reasonabledoubt.  0 `   `     a.0h` ` Planningandsophistication  / h h   ` Theevidencewasfarfromoverwhelmingonthequestionofplanning  andsophisticationandleftampleroomforreasonabledoubtonthis  conclusion.Specifically,Pardowasaselfemployedandsemiliterate #  9        contractorwhopromisedworkonagradingjob,failedtoperform,and  misappropriatedpaymentsmade.WhileitispossiblePardoengagedin ! planningsufficienttomaketheoffenseaggravated,theevidencedoesnot # remotelycompelthisconclusion.ThefactitwasTiffanywhoapproached % ! Pardoaboutthework,andnottheotherwayaround(RT102103),suggests '"# alackofplanning.ItisentirelyplausiblePardotookthepaymentsintending  tofollowthroughonthework,butfailedtoperformduetoincompetence,  gamblingaddiction,horriblejudgment,orotherpersonaldifficulties.While  itwasstillunlawfulforhimtomisappropriateandspendthefunds,itcannot   besaidbeyondareasonabledoubtthatajurywouldhavefoundthisunlawful   actinvolvedplanningandsophistication.    ` Theevidencedoessuggestappellantatsomepointbeganputting   Tiffanyoffwithexcusesforthelackofprogress,whilestillaskingfor  additionalfunds.But,asmanyhomeownersareaware,thisisnotarare  practiceinthecontractingindustry.Ajurycouldmaintainareasonabledoubt  astowhethertheevidenceprovedplanningandsophisticationbyPardo.    `     b.0 h Lackofremorse  h h   ` Similarly,Pardossupposedremorselessnesswasahighlysubjective  factorastowhichajurycouldreadilyhaveformedareasonabledoubt.Given  thatafindingofremorselessnessnecessitatesplumbingadefendantsinner   thoughtsaboutacrimeafteritscommission,thiswouldbeanextremely " difficultfactortoprovebeyondareasonabledoubtunderanycircumstances. $  Inthisparticularcase,thecourtsfindingPardolackedremorsewaslargely &!" basedonPardoscontinuingdenialofculpability,inhistestimonyandtothe (#$ probationofficer.(2RT390391,Prob.Rpt.46.)Itisquestionablewhether *%& Pardosclaimsofinnocencebypleadingnotguiltyandtestifyingwerea  properbasisatalltofindlackofremorse.(See + Peoplev.Padilla(1995)11  Cal.4th891,958[errorforprosecutorincapitalmurderpenaltyphasetoargue  defendantsclaimofinnocenceshowedlackofremorse],overruledonanother   groundin D Peoplev.Hill(1998)17Cal.4th800,823.)Butevenassumingthis   isapermissibleinference,itcannotbesaidbeyondareasonabledoubtthata   jurywouldhadreachedthesameconclusion.Adesiretoavoidpunishmentfor   onesmisdeedsisavirtuallyuniversalfacetofhumannature,andthisdesire  oftencoexistswithremorseforthosemisdeeds.    `     c. h Pardosprobationstatus #    ` TheprobationreportpurportstoestablishPardowasonprobationatthe  timeoftheoffense.But,asdetailedante,theprobationreportonlyindicates  Pardowasplacedonprobation,onceonMay17,2001andinaseparatecase  onNovember21,2001.TheprobationreportdoesnotestablishwhetherPardo  wasstillonprobationatthetimeofthecurrentoffense.Infact,asexplained   ante,theindicationinthereportthatprobationinatleastoneofthecaseswas " revokedonMay1,2003,approximatelythreemonthsbeforethecurrent $  offense,createssubstantialdoubtastowhetherPardowasonprobationatall &!" atthetimeofthecurrentoffense.(SeeProb.Rpt.23.)  (#$  ` Morefundamentally,theprobationreportisacollectionofhearsay  compiledbytheprobationofficer,withnoguarantyofauthenticityor  accuracy.Theprobationreportwasanarguablyadequateformofproofunder  pre  CunninghamCalifornialaw. #  10      ׀However,asdetailedante,  Almendarez   Torres,  Apprendi,andCunningham,takentogetherwithWinshipand     Mullaney,requireapriorconvictiontobeprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt,   evenifthatdeterminationisbythecourt.    ` Acollectionofpurportedfactsinaprobationreportcannotsatisfythis  evidentiaryburden.Whereapriorconvictionmustbeprovedbeyonda  reasonabledoubt,aprobationreportisinadmissibleproof.( H Peoplev.Reed  (1996)13Cal.4th217,230.)Byparityofreasoning,aprobationreportcannot  provebeyondareasonabledoubtthatadefendantwasonprobationatagiven  time.   ` TheprobationreportinPardoscasewasplainlyinsufficienttoprove  hisprobationstatusbeyondareasonabledoubt.Theprobationreportwasthe   onlyevidenceofanykindthatPardowasonprobationatthetimeofthe " currentoffense,andsotherecordisinadequatetowithstandasufficiency $  challenge,letaloneestablishharmlessnessbeyondareasonabledoubt. &""  `     d. h Numerouspriorconvictions D   ` Toproveapriorconvictionbeyondareasonabledoubt,theprosecution  mustpresentcredible,substantialevidenceoftheprior.( 6 Peoplev.Jones  (1995)37Cal.App.4th1312,1315[prosecutionmustprovechallengedprior   convictionallegationbeyondreasonabledoubtU #  11      ]; N Peoplev.Hill(1967)67   Cal.2d105,121[minuteorderlistingconviction,togetherwithfingerprint   records,sufficienttoprovepriorbeyondreasonabledoubt]; - Peoplev.   Castellanos(1990)219Cal.App.3d1163,1175[pleadingandrecordofguilty   pleasufficient].   ` AswithPardosprobationstatus,hispurportedpriorconvictionswere  establishedsolelythroughtheprobationreport.Asdetailedante,theprobation  reporthadlittleornoevidentiaryweightandwasinadequatetoprovethe  existenceofpriorconvictionsbeyondareasonabledoubt.Onthisrecord,it  cannotbesaidtheabsenceofatruefindingbeyondareasonabledoubtwas  harmless.     `   3.0  Evenifanyfactorfellwithin  AlmendarezTorres,and  thiscourtconcludesthetruefindingbasedona  preponderancewasproper,thecourtsrelianceon  theremaining,improperfactorswasprejudicial.      9  ` EvenifthiscourtfindstherewasanAlmendarezTorresfactor,andthat   thecourtsfindingitbypreponderancewasproper,theuseoftheremaining   factorsinviolationof  Cunninghamwasprejudicial.Theprosecutionhasthe    burdenofestablishingbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheunconstitutionally   determinedsentencingfactorsdidnotcontributetothecourtsselectionofthe   upperterm.(  Chapman,supra,386U.S.atpp.2426[statemustdemonstrate  beyondreasonabledoubtthatthefederalconstitutionalerrordidnotcontribute  tofinding];L  M   ( Nederv.UnitedStates,supra,527U.S.atp.15.)   ` Preliminarily,Pardonotestherespondenthasarguedin  Peoplev.  Townethattheexistenceofasinglevalidaggravatingfactornegatesanyclaim  of  Blakelyerrorastootherfactorsusedbythesentencingcourtonthetheory  thatasingleaggravatingfactmakesthedefendant eligiblefortheupper  term,andthereforenoconstitutionalviolationoccurswhereasinglevalid ! factorexists,eventhoughthesentencingcourtreliedonother,constitutionally # invalidfactors.(RespondentsBriefontheMeritsin  Peoplev.Towne, % ! S125677)pp.4042,citing / Peoplev.Osband(1996)13Cal.4th622,728[one '"# factorsufficienttojustifyimpositionofupperterm].)Thisnovelpositionis )$% thataconstitutionalerrorthatcausallycontributestotheimpositionofan +&' increasedsentencecanbeignoredbecausethedefendantwas eligibleto  receivethesamesentenceonothergrounds.Thisismuchlikesayingthe  admissionofacoercedconfessiondoesnotviolatethe  FifthAmendmentif,  settingtheconfessionaside,theremainingevidencewassufficienttoconvict.    ` Thefallacyinrespondentspositionisitscategoricalassumptionthat   asingleaggravatingfactorisallCalifornialawrequirestosupportanupper   termsentence.Infact,Californialawrequiresnotonlytheexistenceofoneor   moreaggravatingfactors,butthattheaggravatingfactor(s)outweighany  mitigatingfactors.(R * ule4.420(b)); Q Peoplev.Black,supra,35Cal.4th1238,  1247,overruledonothergroundsin  Cunningham,supra; 4 ԀPeoplev.Combs  (1986)184Cal.App.3d508,511512[factorsinaggravationmustoutweigh  factorsinmitigationtosupportupperterm];accord,People 7  7 v.Jones(1985)  164Cal.App.3d1173,1181[middletermistheappropriatesentencewhen  aggravatingandmitigatingfactorsare rationallycounterbalance[d].)   ` Thus,thelawfulnessofanuppertermsentenceisdependentonthe   relativeweightoftheaggravatingandmitigatingfactors.Thisisinnoway " inconsistentwiththiscourtsholdingin 2 Osbandthatasingleaggravating $  factormaywarrantanupperterm,becauseinaparticularcasethesingle &"" aggravatingfactormayoutweighanymitigatingfactors.Inanothercase, ($$ however,asingleaggravatingfactormightnotoutweighthemitigatingfactors. *&& Inthelattercase,theexistenceofadditionalaggravatingfactorsbecomes  essentialtosupporttheupperterm.Thustheexistenceofasinglevalid  aggravatingfactordoesnotendtheconstitutionalinquiryintotheimpactof  another,  Blakelyviolative,aggravatingfactor.Whereoneofseveral   aggravatingfactorsisfoundtoviolatetherighttojurytrial,aBlakelyerrorhas   occurred,andthereviewingcourtmustconductaprejudiceanalysis.    ` InPardoscaseaprejudiceanalysisrequiresreversal.Evenifoneor   moreofthefourfactorsreliedonwasproper,atleasttwoviolatedBlakely.  Withatleasthalfofthefactorsreliedoninvalid,itcannotbesaidbeyonda  reasonabledoubttheerrorwasharmless.Whilethesentencingcourtfoundno  mitigatingfactors,itcannotsimplybeassumedthecourtwouldhavechosen  theuppertermabsentatleasttwoofthefactorsisreliedon.Eveninthe  absenceofanymitigatingfactors,theexistenceofanaggravatingfactordoes  notnecessitatetheimpositionoftheupperterm.Insuchacase,thecourt  retainsthediscretiontofindtheaggravatingfactor(s)insufficientlyweighty   toimposetheupperterm. "  ` Accordingly,eveniftherewasaproperaggravatingfactor,thiscourt $  shouldreversethesentenceandremandtothetrialcourt.Onremand,the &""  courtmayeitherredeterminethechoiceofterms,discardingtheBlakely ($$ violativefactors,. #  12      ׀orthecourtmaygivetheprosecutionanopportunityto   provethe  Blakelyviolativefactorstoajurybeyondareasonabledoubt,and  thenresentencePardo.5  #  13      ׀   `  F.0 PardosClaimIsNotWaivedbytheLackofObjectionat   Trial.      ~  ` PardossentencingoccurredonOctober26,2005,overfourmonths    afterthiscourtdecided Q Peoplev.Black,supra,35Cal.4th1238,1247,inJune   2005.Blackfoundthejurytrialrightsetoutin  ApprendiandBlakelydidnot   applytosentencingfactorsunderCaliforniasDSL.(Black,35Cal.4thatp.  1244.)AtthetimeofPardossentencing,thetrialcourtwasboundtofollow  Black.( q AutoEquitySales,Inc.v.SuperiorCourt(1962)57Cal2d450,455.)  Thus,anyobjectionbyPardotothecourtsdeterminationofsentencingfactors  wouldhavebeenfutile.   ` InL  M   ; Peoplev.BirksL  M  Ԁ(1998)19Cal.4th108,thiscourtheldthatbecause  lowercourtsareboundtofollowthedecisionsofhighercourtsadefendant  cannotbesaidtohavewaivedorforfeitedanissuewherethelowercourthad  noauthoritytooverruleahighercourt.(L  M  IdL  M  .atp.116,fn.6;accord, J Peoplev.  GuerraL  M  Ԁ(2006)37Cal.4th1067,1126;compareL  M   w Peoplev.HillL  M  Ԁ(2005)131  Cal.App.4th1089[defendantwaivedL  M    Blakelychallengebyfailingtoobjectto   acourttrialinapreBlacksentencingproceeding.])Therewasnowaiver.    `       II.0 ` THESTATUTECANNOTCONSTITUTIONALLYBE  REFORMED.WEREITTOBEREFORMED,  BOOKERISNOT  THEAPPROPRIATEAPPROACHANDCANNOTBEAPPLIED  RETROACTIVELYWITHOUTVIOLATINGEXPOSTFACTO  PROHIBITIONS.` `    w  `  A.0 Introduction "     ` The  Cunninghamcourtdidnotsetforthwhattypeofproceedings   shouldoccuronremand,notingonly [a]stotheadjustmentofCalifornias   sentencingsysteminlightofourdecision,[t]heball...liesinCalifornias   court.(Cunninghamv.California,supra,127S.Ct.atp.873.)Assetforth   inargumentI,E,3,ante,themostfittingremedyisaremandfor  constitutionallypermissiblesentencing,achievedbyjudicialsentencing  withoutuseofaggravatingfactorsorwithuseofthosefactorsonlyfoundby  ajurybeyondareasonabledoubt.   ` TheremedyproposedbyrespondentinTowneandadoptedbysome  otherjurisdictions!the  Bookerapproach!isnotsuitableforCalifornia.In  Booker,thecourtseveredtheprovisionofthe  FederalSentencingGuidelines   providingforamandatorybasetermabsentaggravatingormitigatingfactors, " thusrenderingtheselectionoftermsamatterofpurejudicialdiscretion. $  Californiasstatutecannotbejudiciallyreformedtocreateunrestrained &!" discretionbecauseitcannotbeshownthattheLegislaturewouldhavewanted (#$ thestatutereformedinsuchaway. *%&  ` Moreover,anyjudiciallyreformedstatute,particularlya  Booker  reformation,cannotconstitutionallybeappliedtoPardo,whocommittedhis  actsbeforethedateofthereformationoramendment,withoutviolatingthe  banagainstexpostfactolaws(U.S.Const.,   art.I,9,cl.3;Cal.Const.,art.   I,    9)andthedueprocessbaragainstjudicialdecisionschangingthelawin   amannerakintoexpostfactolaws.     `  B.0 TheStatuteCannotBeJudiciallyReformedToComply   WiththeCunninghamDecisionandthe  SixthAmendment.     +* `  [A]judicialnarrowingformationoftheinvalidatedstatuteis  permissible.( V Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th607,624,  citing Y Dombrowskiv.Pfister(1965)380U.S.479,491492[85S.Ct.1116,14  L.Ed.2d22].)However,thisactionisdrasticandshouldbeinvokedsparingly.  ( z Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395,407.)   ` Reformationtoavoidunconstitutionalityispermissibleonly when  doingsoismoreconsistentwithlegislativeintentthantheresultthatwould  attendoutrightinvalidation.( W Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.,supra,11 ! Cal.4thatp.641,quoting { Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.,supra,19Cal.3d # atpp.407408.)Anyreformationmust closelyeffectuate[]policyjudgments % ! clearlyarticulatedbytheenactingbody,anditmustbeshownthat the '"# enactingbodywouldhavepreferredsuchareformedversionofthestatute )$% overtheinvalidandunenforceablestatute.( W Kopp,atp.626.)Reformation +&' cannotbeperformed whenthesuggestedreformationisinconsistentwiththe  Legislaturesintent,orwhenthatintentcannotbeascertained.(Kopp,atpp.  642643,citingArp,atp.395.)   ` In { Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.,supra,19Cal.3d395,thiscourt   refusedtoreformastatutewheretherewas clear,ifantiqueevidencethe   Legislaturedidnotwantthestatutereformed,i.e.,itdidnotwantwidowed   husbandstoreceivecompensationgreaterthantheirlosses,asshownbyrepeal   ofapresumptionofsuchtotalbenefits.(Id.atpp.408409.)Similarly,after  theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtfoundanordinanceunconstitutional,this  courtheldtheordinancecouldnotbereformedbyalimitingconstructionor  severanceoftheunconstitutionalprovisionswithoutviolatingtheordinances  underlyingpolicy.( [ Metromedia,Inc.v.CityofSanDiego(1982)32Cal.3d  180,187.)   ` HereitcannotbeestablishedwhetherandhowtheLegislaturewould  havepreferredreformationoftheDSL.Thestatute,itsprovisions,andthe   legislativehistoryshownocleararticulationofwhichpoliciesitwanted " effectuated,attheexpenseofotherpolicies,andnostraightforwardindication $  ofwhatreformedversion,ifany,theLegislatureof1976wouldhave &"" preferred.Wherethe legislativepreferenceisuncertain...judicialcaution ($$ isappropriate.( W Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.,supra,11Cal.4thatp. *&& 643,citing { Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.,supra,19Cal.3datp.410.)   ` Aswithanystatutoryconstructionissue,thiscourtlooksfirsttothe  actualstatutorylanguageandprovisions. [I]tisthelanguageofthestatute  itselfthathassuccessfullybravedthelegislativegauntlet.(  HalbertsLumber,   Inc.v.LuckyStores,Inc.(1992)6Cal.App.4th1233,1238.)Theprovisions   finallyenactedherearerevealing.    ` Theearliersentencingprovisions,theIndeterminateSentencingLaw   (ISL),placedanemphasisuponreformationoftheoffender,withthe  punishmentfittingtheoffenderratherthanthecrime.( ] InreMinnis(1972)7  Cal.3d639,644,citing  InreApplicationofLee(1918)177Cal.690,692.)  TheLegislaturesprimarypurposeinenactingtheDSLwastoeliminatethe  ISL,whichhadbeen woefullyunsuccessfulfor60years.( ` Peoplev.Sutton  (1980)113Cal.App.3d162,164.)Nonformulaicpunishment,basedonthe  criminalandhisreformation,wasgone;formulaicpunishmentbasedonthe  offensewasinitsplace.Thepurposeofincarcerationwasnowpunishment,   notrehabilitation.( d 1170,subd.(a)9 #  14      ; b ԀPeoplev.Saffell(1979)25Cal.3d223, " 230.) $   ` TheLegislature,however,hadfurtherpurposesinenactingtheDSL. &"" Itwantedtoavoidthebroaddiscretioninsentencingexperiencedunderthe  ISL.Itstrovetocreatestatewidesentencinguniformity.Itsawtheneedto  providecertaintyforprisonersandtheirfamilies(thusreducingprison  violence).Nosolemotivation!punishmentinlieuofrehabilitation,   circumscribeddiscretion,uniformsentences,certaintyforprisoners!   predominated.    ` TheDSLtransferredthetermsettingresponsibilitytothejudiciary,but   thenstrictlylimitedthatjudicialdiscretion,asshowninmultipleprovisionsof  thenewlaw.Thesentencingcourtcouldchooseoneofthreespecificterms,  withinnarrowgradations.(  1170,subds.(a)(1),(b).)Themiddletermwas  mandatorilyandpresumptivelythechoice.(1170,subd.(b).)Deviation  fromthenormrequiredadditionalfactors,enumeratedbyexplicitdirections  inthestatutes(1170,subds.(a)(1),(b), f 1170.3)andintherulesauthorized  bysection1170.3.Thecourthadtostateitsreasonsfordeparturefromthe  presumptiveterm.(  1170,subd.(c).)Theevidenceintherecordhadto   supportthereasons.(1170,subd.(b).) "  ` Thejudiciarysactsofdiscretionweretobemonitored,publicized,and $  adjusted( i 1170.4),andjudgeswererequiredtoattendannualsentencing &"" institutes towardtheendofassistingthejudgeintheimpositionof ($$ appropriatesentences( l 1170.5),afurthercheckonexercisingdiscretion *&& beyondacceptableboundaries.TheCommunityReleaseBoardwastoreview  sentencingdecisionsandmakerecallrecommendationsifthecourtsexercise  ofdiscretiondidnotconform.7 #  15      ׀(  1170,subd.(f).)Alloftheserestraints  limitedandregulatedsentencingdiscretion.TheLegislaturedidnotmerely   wanttoeliminatetheroleoftheAdultAuthority;itwantedthenewsystemto   reininthenewauthoritytobeexercisedbyjudges.    ` TheLegislaturewasalsoconcernedwithdisparityinsentencing.(     1170,subd.(a)(1).)Itstatedsentencinguniformitywasbestservedby  determinatesentencesproportionatetotheoffense tobeimposedbythecourt  withspecifieddiscretion.( g 1170,subd.(a).)Uniformitywasalsotobe  achievedbyspecifyingthreeprecisetermsforeachoffense,bytellingjudges  howtheyshouldexercisetheirdiscretion(  Ԁ1170,subd.(a)(2)[applyJudicial  Councilrules],  1170.3,subd.(b)[JudicialCounciltopromoteuniformityby  adoptingcriteriatoguidecourt]),byanalyzingsentencingdataandadjusting  theJudicialCouncilRules( j 1170.4)andbymakingthemiddleterm   mandatoryfortheaverageoffender(1170,subd.(b)).  Section1170, " subdivision(b)detailedwhatmaterialscouldbeconsidered,suchasa $  statementinaggravationandaprobationofficersreport.Subdivision(c)  mandatedthecourttostateitsreasonsforasentencingchoice,i.e.,for  deviationfromthemiddletermtotheupperorlowerterm.Thecourtwas  permittedtotimelyrecallasentence,onitsownmotionorupon   recommendationofprisonauthorities,andimposeanewsentence to   eliminatedisparityofsentencesandtopromoteuniformityofsentencing.(     1170,subd.(d).)Furtheruniformitywasensuredbytheavailabilityofjudicial   reviewofdefendantssentences.(See   1238,subd.(a)(10)[noPeoples  appealfromcourtschoiceoflower,middleorupperterm];seeInre ^ Minnis,  supra,7Cal.3datp.642[underISL,remedyofhabeascorpuspetitionto  challengeAdultAuthorityslengthofsentencedeterminations].   ` TheLegislaturedelicatelybalancedcompetingconcernswhenit  enactedtheDSL.Thiscourtcannot,withconfidence,determinewhichpolicy  predominated,becausethestatuteanditshistorylackcleararticulationof  what,ifany,reformedversiontheLegislaturewouldhavepreferredinorder   toachieveitsobjectivesofpunishing,curbingtheexerciseofdiscretion,and " achievinguniformityofsentencingamonglikeoffenders.Onlypenalties $  consonantwiththedegreeofadefendantsblameworthinessmeetthegoalof &"" punishment.Broadeningtheexerciseofdiscretion,byremovingthemiddle ($$ termasthepresumptivemandatorymiddleterm,defeatstheLegislaturesgoal *&& ofensuringstatewideconformityinselectionofoneofthethreeterms,which  couldthenbesubjecttothenotionsofaparticularjudge.Impositionofthe  middletermfortheaverageoffenderwouldnolongerbealegalrequirement,  merelyahope,undercuttingtheobjectiveofstatewidesentencinguniformity.    ` Finally,thiscourtmustrespectthelimitationonjudicialreformation.   Itspowerislimitedtothepowertointerpretstatutesconstitutionally,notto   amendthem.( W Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.,supra,11Cal.4thatp.653,   citing   Blairv.Pitchess(1971)5Cal.3d258,282;seeCal.Const., t art.III,4.)  Definingcriminalchargesandprescribingpunishmentisalegislativefunction.  ( n Peoplev.Navarro(1972)7Cal.3d248,258; r Peoplev.Tanner(1935)3  Cal.2d279,298.)Where,ashere,thelegislativeintentisatbestuncertain,any  reformationwouldbeanunwarrantedinterferenceinCaliforniasstructured  sentencingscheme.   ` ItcannotbeshownthattheLegislature,knowingtheuppertermportion  ofthestatutewasunconstitutional,unambiguouslyarticulatedhowitwould   havewantedthestatutereformed.Thiscourtshoulddefertothelegislative " functionofsettingpunishmentandnotreformthestatute.(See  Kansasv. $  Gould(2001)271Kan.394,414[noreformation;vacatedandremandedfor &"" resentencing].)  ($$   `  C.0 EvenIfReformationWereAvailable,the  BookerModel  ShouldNotBeFollowed.    at^^ ` Therespondenthas,inanothercase,proposedconstruingthestatuteto  excisethemandatorynatureofthemiddleterm,givingthesentencingcourts   widediscretion.ThisisthesocalledBookerremedy.(SeeRespondents   SupplementalBriefin  Peoplev.Towne,S125677.)Anylegislativeintentthat    canbegleanedfromthestatuteanditshistorydoesnotsupporta  Booker   remedy,becausethatremedyisinconsistentwiththeLegislaturespolicy   decisions.(See W Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.,supra,11Cal.4thatp.642  643.)AppellantTownesreformationismoreinlinewiththelegislative  intent.(SeeAppellantsReplyBriefontheMeritsandAppellants  SupplementalLetterBrieffiledNovember17,2004,in  Peoplev.Towne,  S125677.)   ` InUnitedStatesv.  Booker,supra,543U.S.220,theUnitedStates  SupremeCourtconcludedthatCongresswouldhavepreferredreformationof  the  FederalSentencingGuidelinestomakethemconstitutionalbyremoving ! themandatorynatureoftheguidelines.(Id.atpp.258265.)However,such # asolutionforCaliforniagivesundulybroadleewaytothesentencingcourt, % ! reviewableonlyforabuseofdiscretion,contrarytothemandatory, '"# standardizedoptionsforeseenbytheLegislature.Rewritingtheword shall )$% as mayconvertstheacttheLegislaturewantedtorequireintoanactof +&' discretionandthreatenstheveryuniformityandpredictabilityitwantedto  achievebytheDSL.(SeeAppellantsSupplementalLetterBrieffiled  November17,2004,in  Peoplev.Towne,S125677;  Peoplev.Martin(1986)  42Cal.3d437,443.)TheDSLaimedfortheeliminationofuncertaintyand   disparitybyspecifyingonlythreepossibleterms,closeinlength,foreach   offense;thesettingforthofexplicitstepsinthesentencingprocess;identifying   factorstoguidethecourtschoices;providingformeaningfuljudicialreview   torestraindiscretion;andbyintroducingmandatorypresumptivemiddle  terms.   ` Theadoptionofthe  Bookerremedybyotherstatesdoesnotsupport  reformationhere.In  ԀNewJerseyv.Natale(2005)184N.J.458,forexample,  NewJerseyfoundaBookerreformationthebestremedyforitsstate.(Id.at  p.485.)However,thatstatessentencingschemeanditspenallawsarenotthe  sameasCalifornias.Theirstatutecontainsaseveranceclause(ibid.),but  CaliforniasLegislatureelectednottoincludeaseveranceclausein  section   1170orintheDSL.TheNewJerseycourtworriedabouttheimplicationsof " itsdecisiononpreindictmentgrandjuryproceedings(  Natale,184N.J.atpp. $  486487),whichisnotasignificantconcerninCalifornia.TheNewJersey &"" courtengagedinmultiplepresumptions!thatcourts,althoughnotcompelled, ($$ wouldstillpickthemiddletermandthatcourtswouldstillbalanceaggravating *&& andmitigatingfactors.(Id.atpp.487489.)Itisextremelydifficultto  conceivethattheDSLsenactingbody!soadamantaboutconfining  discretion!wouldhavereliedonsuchvoluntarycompliance.Also,theNew  Jerseycourtprojecteditscurrentpolicyconcerns!cost,unwieldiness,and   lengthofpenaltytrials!ontoapastenactingbody,withoutanyshowingof   specificlegislativepolicyatthetimeofenactment.(Id.atp.487.)Applying   theprinciplesofCaliforniareformation,thiscourtmustlooksolelytothe   Legislatureof1976.( W Kopp,supra,11Cal.4thatp.626.)   ` In  ԀMinnesotav.Shattuck(2005)704N.W.2d131,thecourtfound  severancepossible(id.atp.146),butrejectedthegovernmentsrequestit  follow  Bookerandmaketheguidelinesadvisory(id.atp.147).Thecourt  rejectedthispositionbecausethe  FederalSentencingGuidelineswere  significantlydifferentfromMinnesotas.Thereformationwouldhave  requiredinvalidationoftwoprovisions.Thecourtconcludedinthissituation  thejudicialroleisnottoselectasentencingsystemandreliedupona   deferentialapproach.(Id.atpp.146147.)Thecourtremandedforimposition " ofsentencewithinthepresumptiverange.(Id.atp.148.) $   ` AlloftheseconclusionsapplytoCaliforniasscheme.Federalcourts &"" alreadyhadsubstantiallymorediscretionthancourtsundertheDSL. ($$ CaliforniaalsoleavespenaltydecisionstotheLegislature.(Peoplev. u Tanner, *&& supra,3Cal.2datp.298.)  Bookerstylereformationwouldrequire  invalidationofmyriadstatutesandrulesofcourt.(See,e.g.,  1170.1,subd.  (a),  667,subd.(e)(2)(A)(i).)Finally,Californiacourtsgrantasmuch  deferenceasconstitutionallypossibletotheLegislature.  (Peoplev.Tilbury   (1991)54Cal.3d56,70;  Peoplev.Martinez(1999)76Cal.App.4th489,494   [greatjudicialdeferencetoLegislatureinfixingcriminalpenalties].)Thus,the     BookermodeldoesnotworkforCalifornia.    ` Californiassolutionisseveranceoftheonlypartofthestatutethatis  unconstitutional!theauthorityofasentencingcourttoimposetheupperterm,  baseduponitsfactualfindingsandapreponderanceoftheevidence,as  proposedinAppellantTownesReplyBriefontheMeritsandSupplemental  LetterBrief(S125677).    `  D.0 AnyJudicialReformationofTheStatuteCanNotBe  AppliedtoPardoBecauseApplicationWouldViolateEx  PostFactoProhibitionsandDenyPardoDueProcessof  Law.   at{{  ` TheUnitedStatesConstitutionprohibitslegislativelyenactedexpost ! factolaws(   art.I,9,cl.3;  art.I,10,cl.1),asdoestheCalifornia # Constitution(Cal.Const.,art    .I,9;  Tapiav.SuperiorCourt(1991)53Cal.3d % ! 282,288)whichisgenerallyinterpretedthesameasthefederalclause. '"# (  Peoplev.Snook(1997)16Cal.4th1210,1220.)Tofallwithintheexpost )$% factoprohibition,alawmustberetrospective!thatis, itmustapplytoevents +&' occurringbeforeitsenactment!andit mustdisadvantagetheoffender  affectedbyitbyalteringthedefinitionofcriminalconductorincreasingthe  punishmentforthecrime.(  Lyncev.Mathis(1997)519U.S.433,436[117  S.Ct.891,137L.Ed.2d63];  Collinsv.Youngblood(1990)497U.S.37,50   [110S.Ct.2715,111L.Ed.2d30].)    ` Theprincipleagainstexpostfactolaws!thatpersonshavearightto   fairwarningofwhatconductwillleadtocriminalculpability!isfundamental   toourconceptofliberty.Judicialdecisionsthathavetheeffectofexpost  factolawsarethusprohibitedbytheDueProcessClausesofthe  Fifthand    FourteenthAmendments.  (Rogersv.Tennessee(2001)532U.S.451[121  S.Ct.1693,149L.Ed.2d697];  ԀMarksv.UnitedStates(1977)430U.S.188,  191[97S.Ct.990,51L.Ed.2d260];  Bouiev.CityofColumbia(1964)378  U.S.347[84S.Ct.1697,12L.Ed.2d894(Bouie);  Peoplev.Blakeley(2000)  23Cal.4th82,92;seealso  Peoplev.Huggins(2006)38Cal.4th175,236.)  8 ` [A]nunforeseeablejudicialenlargementofacriminalstatute,   appliedretroactively,operatespreciselylikeanexpostfacto ! law,suchas  Art.I,10,oftheConstitutionforbids....Ifa " statelegislatureisbarredbytheExPostFactoClausefrom # passingsuchalaw,itmustfollowthataStateSupremeCourtis $  barredbytheDueProcessClausefromachievingpreciselythe %!! sameresultbyjudicialconstruction.&""` x` x (  Bouie,atpp.353354.) [I]fajudicialconstructionofacriminalstatuteis ($$ unexpectedandindefensiblebyreferencetothelawwhichhadbeen *&& expressedpriortotheconductinissue,[theinterpretation]mustnotbegiven  retroactiveeffect.(Id.atpp.354355.)   ` Thiscourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthatthejudicialenlargement,  reinterpretation,orreformationofastatutecanviolateexpostfactoprinciples   whenappliedretrospectivelyandaccordinglyhasorderedthatarulingthat   changesthelawsignificantlybeprospectiveonly.p #  16      ׀(E.g.,Peoplev.  Blakeley,   supra,23Cal.4th82,9193[expandingdefinitionofvoluntarymanslaughter];     Peoplev.Morante(1999)20Cal.4th403,431432[eliminatinganact  requirementforconspiracyjurisdiction];Peoplev.Martinez(1999)20Cal.4th  225,238241[overrulingpreviouscaseondistancerequiredforkidnaping];    Mossv.SuperiorCourt(1998)17Cal.4th396,428430[changingburdenof  provinginabilitytopayinchildsupportcase];  Peoplev.Davis(1994)7  Cal.4th797,811[eliminatingviabilityrequirementforfetalmurder];  People  v.King(1993)5Cal.4th59,7981[overrulinglongstandinginterpretationof  Pen.Code,  12022.5];  Peoplev.Escobar(1992)3Cal.4th740,752   [overrulingpreviouscaseongreatbodilyinjury];seealso  InreBaert(1988) " 205Cal.App.3d514,518[SupremeCourtcaseeliminatingintentrequirement  forfelonymurderspecialcircumstancecannotbeappliedretroactively].)   ` If  section1170,subdivision(b)isreformedtomaketheuppertermthe  statutorymaximum!asproposedbyrespondentinTowne!suchajudicial   reinterpretationofthestatutewouldbeunforeseeableandcouldnotbe   retrospective.WhenPardocommittedhisoffensein2003,impositionofthe   uppertermhadformorethan20yearsrequiredproof,notonlyoftheelements   oftheunderlyingoffense,butalsoofthecircumstancesinaggravationofthe  crime.(  Cunninghamv.California,supra,127S.Ct.atpp.867868.)In  essence,theuppertermrepresentedagreateroffense,theelementsofwhich  werenotwithinthejurysverdictonthesubstantivecrime,butwhichrequired  thefindingofadditional elements.(Id.atp.21;1170,subd.(b).)   ` Ifthiscourtweretoreform  section1170,subdivision(b)bychanging  themaximumtermtotheupperterm,i.e.,bysubstituting mayimposeforthe  current shallinthestatute,asproposedbyrespondent,itwouldthereby   eliminatecertainelementsofthegreateroffense.Itwouldnolongerrequire " afindingofaggravatingfactorsbeforetheuppertermcouldbeimposed. $  Judiciallyremovingelementsofanoffenseisaclassicdueprocess/expost &"" factoviolation.(E.g.,Peoplev.  Morante,supra,atpp.431432; ($$  *&& Peoplev.  Davis,supra,7Cal.4thatp.797,811;Inre  Baert,supra,205  Cal.App.3datp.518.)   ` Lookedatanotherway,thereformationwouldincreasethemaximum  sentenceforthebareoffense,withnoaggravatingfactors,overthatapplicable   whenPardocommittedhisoffense. [A]nexpostfactoviolationoccurswhere   lawssettingthelengthofaprisonsentencearerevisedafterthecrimeto   containeitheralongermandatoryminimumterm(  Lindseyv.Washington   (1937)301U.S.397,400[57S.Ct.797,81L.Ed.1182])orahigher  presumptivesentencingrange(  [Millerv.Florida,supra,482U.S.atpp.432  433[107S.Ct.2446,96L.Ed.2d351]).Impermissibleincreasesin  punishmenthavebeenfoundwhereanewpostcrimeformulaforearninggain  timecreditspostponesaninmateseligibilityforearlyrelease([  Weaverv.  Graham(1981)450U.S.24,33[101S.Ct.960,67L.Ed.2d17]]),orwhere  retroactivecancellationofovercrowdingcreditsrequiresreimprisonmentofan  inmatewhohasbeenfreed.([  Lyncev.Mathis,supra,519U.S.atp.445.)   (  JohnL.v.SuperiorCourt(2004)33Cal.4th158,182.) "  ` Thereformationwouldalsoviolateexpostfactoprohibitionsby $  eliminatingabeneficialpresumption!thatPardocouldbesentencedonlyto &"" themiddletermabsentthefindingofadditionalelements.(See  ԀMillerv. ($$ Florida(1987)482U.S.423,433[107S.Ct.2446,96L.Ed.2d351][departure *&& fromthepresumptivesentenceunderrevisedsentencingguidelineviolatedex  postfactoprohibitions].)In  Peoplev.Williams(1987)196Cal.App.3d1157,  thecourtconsideredwhetheramendmentstosections  667and  1385toprohibit  thestrikingofgunuseenhancementsappliedtocrimescommittedpriortothe   effectivedateoftheamendment.Thecourtfoundthecriticalquestionis   whether thesystemitself[has]beenalteredtotheprisonersdetriment.(Id.   atp.1160.)Thecourtsaidthat,bymakingmandatorywhatwaspreviously   discretionary, theLegislaturehaschangedthestandardbywhichpunishment  willbeimposedtodefendantsdisadvantage.Applyingtheselawsto  defendantthusrunsafouloftheexpostfactoclause.(Ibid.)Thecourtheld  that [a]lterationofasubstantialright...isnotmerelyprocedural,evenifthe  statutetakesaseeminglyproceduralform.(Id.atp.1161,citing  Weaverv.  Graham,supra,450U.S.atp.29,fn.12.)Thisistruebecause, itisthe  effect,nottheform,ofthelawthatdetermineswhetheritisexpostfacto.  [Citations].(Peoplev.  Williams,supra,196Cal.App.3datp.1161,citing     Peoplev.Smith(1983)34Cal.3d251,260,citing  Weaverv.Graham,supra, " 450U.S.atp.21.) $   ` Additionally,whenPardowassentenced,  section1170,subdivision(b) &"" allowedaggravatingfactorstobefoundtruebyanunconstitutionallylow ($$ burdenofproof,apreponderanceoftheevidence.( * Rule4.420(b).)Thiswas *&& aviolationofPardos  SixthAmendmentrights.(See  Cunninghamv.  California,supra,127S.Ct.atpp.867868.)However,ifthiscourtwereto  rewritethestatutetofollow  Booker,itwouldreducetheburdenofprooffrom  theunconstitutionallylowpreponderancestandardtonothingatall.Lowering   oftheburdenofproofisanotherclassicexpostfactoviolation.(  Calderv.   Bull(1798)3U.S.(3Dall)386,390.)In  ԀCarmellv.Texas(2000)529U.S.   513[120S.Ct.162,146L.Ed.2d577],thecourtfoundastatutoryamendment   reducingtheamountoftestimonyneededtoobtainasexualassaultconviction  violatedexpostfactoprohibitions.(Id.atpp.518519.)Thecourtstated:  8 ` Alawreducingthequantumofevidencerequiredtoconvictan  offenderisasgrosslyunfairas,say,retrospectivelyeliminating  anelementoftheoffense,increasingthepunishmentforan  existingoffense,orloweringtheburdenofproof....Ineach  oftheseinstances,thegovernmentsubvertsthepresumptionof  innocencebyreducingthenumberofelementsitmustproveto  overcomethatpresumption;bythreateningsuchsevere  punishmentsoastoinduceapleatoalesseroffenseoralower  sentence;orbymakingiteasiertomeetthethresholdfor  overcomingthepresumption.Reducingthequantumof  evidencenecessarytomeettheburdenofproofissimply   anotherwayofachievingthesameend.!` x` x (Id.atpp.532533.)Here,anyreformationeliminatingelementsofthegreater # offenseandreducingtheburdenofproofonaggravatingfactorstonoburden %!! ofprooflikewiseimplicates  Carmellandisunconstitutional. '##  ` Forpurposesofanexpostfactodetermination,itisirrelevantthat )%% Pardocouldhavereceivedthesamesentenceunderthepreviousversionofthe +'' statuteashemightunderthereformedversionofthestatute.(  Lindseyv.  Washington,supra,301U.S.atpp.400401[57S.Ct.797,81L.Ed.1182];    Millerv.Florida,supra,482U.S.atpp.432433[accord].)Anyreformation  to  section1170,subdivision(b)thatwouldeliminateelementsrequiredto   imposetheupperterm,increasethemaximumsentenceforthebareoffense   fromthemiddletotheupperterm,eliminateabeneficial,statutorilyprescribed   presumption(themiddleterm)oflongstanding,andreducetheburdenof   provingaggravatingcircumstancesfromanunconstitutionallylow  preponderancestandardtonothingwouldviolateexpostfactoprohibitionsor  theirdueprocessequivalents.   `   Bookeritselforderedapplicationofitsrulingtocasespendingon  appeal,butonlyasaroutineacknowledgmentofthenormalprinciplesof  retroactivityestablishedin  Teaguev.Lane(1989)489U.S.288[109S.Ct.  1060,103L.Ed.2d334]and  Griffithv.Kentucky,supra,479U.S.314.  (UnitedStatesv.Booker,supra,543U.S.220,268.)Neitherthemajoritynor   thedissentconsideredexpostfactoordueprocessissues.Casesarenot " authorityforpropositionsnotconsidered.  (Peoplev.Dillon(1983)34Cal.3d $  441,473474;  InreTartar(1959)52Cal.2d250,258.) &""  ` Lowerfederalcourtcasesfollowing  Bookerhavegenerallyrejectedex ($$ postfactoargumentsagainstretrospectiveapplicationoftheBookerremedy. *&& (E.g.,  UnitedStatesv.Vaughn(2dCir.2005)430F.3d518;  ԀUnitedStatesv.  Lata(1stCir.2005)415F.3d107;  UnitedStatesv.PerezRuis(1stCir.2005)  421F.3d11.)Theyarenot,ofcourse,notbindingprecedent.Nordothey  appeartohaveaddressedtherangeofissuesraisedhere,suchasthechangein   theburdenofproofwroughtbytheremedialportionof  Booker.    ` In  UnitedStatesv.Dupas(9thCir.2005)419F.3d916,thecourt   rejecteddefendants  FifthAmendmentdueprocessargumentagainstapplying   theBookerremedytohisresentencing.Thecourtnotedthat,inBooker,the  SupremeCourthadstateditsholdingappliedtocasesondirectreview.(419  F.3datp.920.)  Dupasreliedon  UnitedStatesv.Duncan(11thCir.2005)400  F.3d1297,acasewhichdidnotfullyanalyzethedefendantsdueprocess  contentions.Thecourtalsonotedithadpreviouslyhelddueprocess/expost  factoprinciplesapplyonlytoafterthefactincreasesincriminalliabilityand  retroactivesentenceenhancements.(419F.3datpp.920921,citingitsown    pre  Apprendidecisionin  UnitedStatesv.Newman(9thCir.2000)203F.3d   700,703.)However,thisanalysisishighlysuspectafterApprendiandits " progeny.(See  Peoplev.Seel(2004)34Cal.4th535,549[Apprendicompels $  theconclusionasentenceenhancementbetreatedasanelementofthe &"" offense].) Finally,the  Dupascourtfoundthedefendanthadfairwarning ($$ ofhissentencingexposure.(UnitedStatesv.Dupas,supra,419F.3d916at *&& p.921.)Unlikethe  Dupasdefendant,Pardohaslonghadthestatutory  protectionof  section1170,subdivision(b),makingthemiddletermthe  presumptivemandatorytermandstatutorymaximum.Thus,anyjudicial  reformationofthestatuteraisingthestatutorymaximumtotheuppertermis   unforeseen.    ` Forthesereasons,post  Bookerfederalcasesdonotreliablyguidethis   courtwithrespecttotheconstitutionalityofapplyingareformed  section1170,   subdivision(b)toPardo,wherethatreformationincreasesthestatutory  maximumorlowerstheburdenofproofonaggravatingfactors.   ` Asthecourtstatedin  Cunningham, ourdecisionsfrom  Apprendito  BookerpointtothemiddletermspecifiedinCaliforniasstatutes,notthe  upperterm,astherelevantstatutorymaximum....(Cunninghamv.  California,supra,127S.Ct.atpp.867868.)ToapplytoPardoanyjudicial  reformationof  section1170,subdivision(b)makingtheuppertermthe  statutorymaximumwouldviolatetheDueProcessClauseofthe  Fourteenth   Amendment,inexactlythesamewayasretroactiveapplicationofanew " statutetoincreasepunishmentoverthatprovidedwhentheprohibitedconduct $  occurred.Themiddletermwasthestatutorymaximumforthebareoffense &"" undertheplainwordsof  section1170,subdivision(b)whenPardoallegedly ($$ committedhisoffenses.ApplyingdifferentprinciplestoPardowouldmake *&& punishmentforhiscrimesmoreburdensomeafterhecommittedthem.Pardo  isthereforeconstitutionallyentitledtosentencinginwhichthemiddletermis  themaximumhecansuffer,absentaggravatingfactsfoundtruebyajury  beyondareasonabledoubt.    ` PardoalsopointsoutthatanylegislativechangetoPenalCode  section   1170,subdivision(b)couldnotbeconstitutionallyappliedtohim,forthevery   samereasonsthatajudiciallyreformedstatutecouldnot.Theamendment   pendingintheLegislature( ) Sen.Bill40(20072008Reg.Sess.))wouldinpart  providethata courtshallselectthetermwhich,inthecourtsdiscretion,best  servestheinterestofjustice.Sinceitspassageishypotheticalatthistime,  Pardoreservesfurtherargumentforthateventuality.    `  E.0 Conclusion  O    ` Thestatutecannotbejudiciallyreformedbecausetheguiding  legislativeintentis,atbest,unclear.Evenifsuchreformationwerepossible,  the  BookermodelisnotCaliforniassolutionbecauseitcreatesunrestrained   discretioncontrarytotheenactingbodysintenttoseverelylimitdiscretionary " choices.Anyjudiciallyreformedstatute,particularlyonefollowingBooker, $  cannotconstitutionallybeappliedtoPardowithoutviolatingthebanagainst &!" expostfactolawsandthedueprocessbaragainstjudicialreformationakinto (#$ anexpostfactolaw.  *%&     CONCLUSION      ` Petitionerasksthatthiscourteithermodifyhissentencetothemiddle  termoftwoyears(see  1260),orremandthecaseforaredeterminationofthe  appropriateterm,withoutuseofanyconstitutionallyinvalidaggravating   factors.   Dated:0 0 0h  0h h Respectfullysubmitted,     `     h   APPELLATEDEFENDERS,INC.   V `     h    `     h   NeilAuwarter   `     h   StaffAttorney   `     h   StateBarNo.109576  0 ` 0 ` ` 0 0h    CynthiaM.Sormanh h   `     h   StaffAttorney   `     h   StateBarNo.122289   `     h   DianeNichols   `     h   StaffAttorney     x    `     h   StateBarNo.174830    #VN#    CERTIFICATION    Ѐ ` Icertifythat,basedonthewordcountofthecomputerprogramusedto  preparethisdocument,thereare13,511wordsinthisBriefontheMerits  excludingthetablesandthecasecaption.    ` VIdeclareunderpenaltyofperjuryunderthelawsoftheStateof   Californiathattheforegoingistrueandcorrect.ExecutedatSanDiego,   California.   Dated:    `     h    `     h   APPELLATEDEFENDERS,INC.#V#=  #=#V `     h   NeilAuwarter  #VL# `     h   StaffAttorney   V  SUPREMECOURTNO.    INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA  *xXdddd  dd X  x,dd , dd +   THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOF  d CALIFORNIA,  d PlaintiffandRespondent,  d vs.  d  GARYMITCHELLPARDO, d  DefendantandPetitioner. ,Xd  ,CourtofAppeal  d No.E039420  d SuperiorCourt d  No.FMB006545(d  X (@*  APPEALFROMTHESUPERIORCOURTOF D  SANBERNARDINOCOUNTY D  `   D   HonorableMarshaG.Slough,JudgePresiding D X `  򀀀 D   PETITIONERPARDOSBRIEFONTHEMERITS  D    `  򀀀 B  `     h   APPELLATEDEFENDERS,INC. B  `     h   NeilAuwarter B  `     h   StaffAttorney B   `     h   StateBarNo.109576 B! 0 ` 0 ` ` 0 0h    CynthiaM.SormanB!#h h   `     h   StaffAttorney B"$  `     h   StateBarNo.122289 B#%  `     h   DianeNichols B% '  `     h   StaffAttorney     x  B&!(  `     h   StateBarNo.174830 B'")  `     h   555WestBeechStreet,Suite300 B)$+  `     h   SanDiego,California92101 B*%,  `     h   619.696.0282 B+&-  `     h   AttorneysforDefendantand B,'.  `     h   Appellant B-(/ B B      TOPICALINDEX     PAGE        10 `    ISSUESPRESENTED#d d E .` ` #11L݌  Ќ    0 `    INTRODUCTION#d d E .h h ` ` #2 ݌   Ќ    0 `    STATEMENTOFTHECASE#d d E .$` ` #6݌   Ќ    r0 `    STATEMENTOFFACTS#d d E .,,!` ` #7r݌   Ќ    40 `    ARGUMENT4O݌ ` `  Ќ      0 `    I.0` ` ` THESENTENCINGCOURTVIOLATEDPARDOSSIXTHAND   FOURTEENTHAMENDMENTRIGHTSWHENITIMPOSEDTHE  UPPERTERMBASEDONFACTORSNEITHERADMITTEDNOR  FOUNDTRUEBYAJURY.#D .nn)` ` #11݌  Ќ  !  !0 ` 0 ` `  `   A.0 PardosSentencing#D .BB+ #11!݌  Ќ  !  !0 ` 0 ` `  `   B. Applicablecaselaw#D ., #12!݌  Ќ  !  !f0 ` 0 ` `  `   C.0 PardosUpperTermSentenceViolatedCunninghamBecause  ItWasBasedonFactsNotAdmittedorFoundTruebyaJury,  andNoFactFellWithinthe PriorConvictionException.  #D .  #16!f݌  Ќ    A0 ` 0 ` ` 0    1.  Theonprobationfactor#D .""5  #21A\݌   Ќ    ?0 ` 0 ` ` 0    2.  Numerouspriors#D ./  #22?Z݌ " Ќ  !  !=0 ` 0 ` `  `   D.0 EvenIfAnyAggravatingFactorWasWithinthePrior $  ConvictionException,PermittingaJudicialDetermination, % ! SuchFactorIsStillImproperBecauseItWasFoundbya &!" PreponderanceoftheEvidenceRatherThanBeyonda '"# ReasonableDoubt.#D .$$* #24!=X݌ (#$ Ќ  !  !S0 ` 0 ` `  `   E.0 TheErrorWasPrejudicial.#D .4 #30!Sn݌ *%& Ќ   +&'   ]0 ` 0 ` ` 0    1.0  Overview#D .dd&  #30]x݌  Ќ    T0 ` 0 ` ` 0    2.0  ThereWasNoConstitutionallyValidFactorin  Aggravation,anditCannotBeEstablishedBeyonda  ReasonableDoubtThatAnyFactorWouldHaveBeen  FoundTrueIfProperlyTried.#D .&&;  #31To݌   Ќ  #VN# `   `    a.0 h PlanningandsophisticationV#D .>h h #31#V#VԈ   #V# `    b.0 h LackofremorseV#D .2h h #32#V#VԈ   #V# `    c. h PardosprobationstatusVD .;#V#V33   #V!# `    d. h NumerouspriorconvictionsVD .=#V#V35     ]0 ` 0 ` ` 0    3.0  EvenIfAnyFactorFellWithinAlmendareztorres,and  thisCourtConcludestheTrueFindingBasedona  PreponderanceWasProper,theCourtsRelianceonthe  Remaining,ImproperFactorsWasPrejudicial.#D .K  #36]x݌  Ќ  !  ![0 ` 0 ` `  `   F.0 PardosClaimIsNotWaivedbytheLackofObjectionatTrial.  #D .  #39![v݌  Ќ    0 `    II.0` ` ` THESTATUTECANNOTCONSTITUTIONALLYBEREFORMED.  WEREITTOBEREFORMED,BOOKERISNOTTHE  APPROPRIATEAPPROACHANDCANNOTBEAPPLIED  RETROACTIVELYWITHOUTVIOLATINGEXPOSTFACTOPROHIBITIONS.  #D .` ` ` ` #41݌  Ќ  !  !o0 ` 0 ` `  `   A.0 Introduction#D .% #41!o݌ ! Ќ  !  !W0 ` 0 ` `  `   B.0 TheStatuteCannotBeJudiciallyReformedToComplyWiththe # CunninghamDecisionandtheSixthAmendment.#D .E #42!Wr݌ $  Ќ  !  !0 ` 0 ` `  `   C.0 EvenIfReformationWereAvailable,theBookerModelShould &"" NotBeFollowed.#D .) #49!݌ '## Ќ  !  !0 ` 0 ` `  `   D.0 AnyJudicialReformationofTheStatuteCanNotBeAppliedto )%% PardoBecauseApplicationWouldViolateExPostFacto *&& ProhibitionsandDenyPardoDueProcessofLaw.#D .H #52!݌ +'' Ќ  !  ! 0 ` 0 ` `  `   E.0 Conclusion#D .# #62!  ݌  Ќ     0 `    CONCLUSION#D .x x ` ` #63  ݌  Ќ    C 0 `    CERTIFICATION#D .h h ` ` #64C ^ ݌   Ќ  %      TABLEOFAUTHORITIES   &   PAGE(S)   r  ` CASES      AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S.224    ` [118S.Ct.1219,140L.Ed.2d350]ee& .52,12,17-20,22,24,26-31,34,     D 36   ~  ~  Apprendiv.NewJersey(2000)530U.S.466     ` [120S.Ct.2348,147L.Ed2d435]ww& .PP62,13-19,21,27,34,39,60,61~݌   Ќ  ~  ~'  ~'B݌̌  Arpv.WorkersComp.AppealBd.(1977)19Cal.3d395A .DDD42-44   ~  ~  ~݌̌  AutoEquitySales,Inc.v.SuperiorCourt(1962)57Cal2d450  D .PPM39   ~  ~  ~݌̌  Blairv.Pitchess(1971)5Cal.3d258  D .448  ~  ~  ~݌̌  Blakelyv.Washington(2004)542U.S.296   ` [124S.Ct.2531,159L.Ed.2d403]##/ .PP62,14-16,30,36,38-40  ~  ~  ~݌̌  Bouiev.CityofColumbia(1964)378U.S.347  D .((=53  ~  ~n   ` [84S.Ct.1697,12L.Ed.2d894]~n݌  Ќ  Calderv.Bull(1798)3U.S.(3Dall)386  D .$$958  ~  ~u  ~u݌̌  Carmellv.Texas(2000)529U.S.513   ` [120S.Ct.162,146L.Ed.2d577]  D .458  #V%#VChamberlainv.Pliler !  ` (C.D.Cal.2004)307F.Supp.2d1128  D .620 " ~  ~I  ~Id݌̌  Chapmanv.California(1967)386U.S.18 $   ` [87S.Ct.824,17L.Ed.2d705]< .230,31,36 % ! ~  ~P  ~Pk݌̌  Collinsv.Youngblood(1990)497U.S.37 '"#  ` [110S.Ct.2715,111L.Ed.2d30]  D .453 (#$ ~  ~Q  ~Ql݌̌  Cunninghamv.California(2007)549U.S.___ *%&  ` [127S.Ct.856,166L.Ed.2d856]% .41,2,16,19,24,34,36,37,39, +&' ;;8 41,55,58,61  ~  ~  Dombrowskiv.Pfister(1965)380U.S.479   ` [85S.Ct.1116,14L.Ed.2d22]  D .242~݌  Ќ  ~  ~  ~݌̌  Griffithv.Kentucky(1987)479U.S.314   ` [107S.Ct.708,93L.Ed.2d649].@ .xx454,59   ~  ~  ~݌̌  ~  ~  HalbertsLumber,Inc.v.LuckyStores,Inc.    ` (1992)6Cal.App.4th1233  D .~~-44~3݌   Ќ  ~  ~  ~1݌̌  InreApplicationofLee(1918)177Cal.690  D .;44   ~  ~  ~݌̌  InreBaert(1988)205Cal.App.3d514@ .@@454,56   ~  ~  ~݌̌  InreMinnis(1972)7Cal.3d639@ .66/44,47  ~  ~T  ~To݌̌  InreTartar(1959)52Cal.2d250  D .~~059  ~  ~   ~ ' ݌̌  InreWinship(1970)397U.S.358   ` [90S.Ct.1068,25L.Ed.2d368]@ .BB325,28  ~  ~ !  ~ !$!݌̌  InreYurko(1974)10Cal.3d857  D .PP/28  ~  ~!  ~!!݌̌  JohnL.v.SuperiorCourt(2004)33Cal.4th158  D .^^>56  ~  ~"  ~""݌̌  Jonesv.UnitedStates(1999)526U.S.227   ` [119S.Ct1215,1143L.Ed.2d311]@ .PP513,18  ~  ~#  ~##݌̌  Kansasv.Gould(2001)271Kan.394  D .248   ~  ~I$  ~I$d$݌̌  Koppv.FairPol.PracticesCom.(1995)11Cal.4th6075 .  E42-44,48,49,51 " ~  ~%%  ~%%@%݌̌  Lindseyv.Washington(1937)301U.S.397 $   ` [57S.Ct.797,81L.Ed.1182]@ .jj156,59 %!! ~  ~(&  ~(&C&݌̌  Lyncev.Mathis(1997)519U.S.433 '##  ` [117S.Ct.891,137L.Ed.2d63]@ .BB353,56 ($$ ~  ~''  ~''B'݌̌  Marksv.UnitedStates(1977)430U.S.188 *&&  ` [97S.Ct.990,51L.Ed.2d260]  D .253 +'' ~  ~((  ~((C(݌̌  McMillanv.Pennsylvania(1986)477U.S.79   ` [106S.Ct.2411,91L.Ed.2d67]  D .BB326  ~  ~,)  ~,)G)݌̌  Metromedia,Inc.v.CityofSanDiego(1982)32Cal.3d180  D .TTI43  Millerv.Florida(1987)482U.S.423    ` [107S.Ct.2446,96L.Ed.2d351]@ .556,59   ~  ~*  #V#V~**݌̌  Mossv.SuperiorCourt(1998)17Cal.4th396  D .;54   ~  ~+  ~++݌̌  Mullaneyv.Wilbur(1975)421U.S.684    ` [95S.Ct.1881,44L.Ed.2d508]= .BB325-27,34   ~  ~,  ~,,݌̌  Nederv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S.1   ` [119S.Ct.1827,144L.Ed.2d35]@ .430,36  ~  ~-  ~--݌̌  NewJerseyv.Natale(2005)184N.J.458  D .$$750  ~  ~r.  ~r..݌̌  Peoplev.Barre(1992)11Cal.App.4th961  D .828  ~  ~2/  ~2/M/݌̌  Peoplev.Berry(1981)117Cal.App.3d184  D .823  ~  ~/  ~/ 0݌̌  Peoplev.BirksL  M  Ԁ(1998)19Cal.4th108  D .439  ~  ~0  ~00݌̌  Peoplev.Black(2005)35Cal.4th1238< .635,37,39  ~  ~1  ~11݌̌  Peoplev.Blakeley(2000)23Cal.4th82@ .653,54  ~  ~J2  ~J2e2݌̌  Peoplev.Castellanos(1990)219Cal.App.3d1163  D .NN?35 ! ~  ~3  ~3,3݌̌  Peoplev.Combs(1986)184Cal.App.3d508  D .>>837 # ~  ~3  ~33݌̌  Peoplev.Davis(1994)7Cal.4th797@ .354,56 %!! ~  ~4  ~44݌̌  Peoplev.Dillon(1983)34Cal.3d441  D .459 '## ~  ~R5  ~R5m5݌̌  Peoplev.Escobar(1992)3Cal.4th740  D .pp554 )%% ~  ~6  ~6*6݌̌  Peoplev.Ferguson(2003)109Cal.App.4th367  D .^^<21 +'' ~  ~6  ~66݌̌  Peoplev.Fernandez(1990)226Cal.App.3d669  D .<23  ~  ~7  ~77݌̌  Peoplev.GuerraL  M  Ԁ(2006)37Cal.4th1067  D .640  ~  ~i8  ~i88݌̌  Peoplev.Hill(1967)67Cal.2d105  D .  235   ~  ~#9  ~#9>9݌̌  Peoplev.Hill(1998)17Cal.4th800  D .\\333   ~  ~9  ~99݌̌  Peoplev.HillL  M  Ԁ(2005)131Cal.App.4th1089  D .:40   ~  ~:  ~::݌̌  Peoplev.Huggins(2006)38Cal.4th175  D .653   ~  ~r;  ~r;;݌̌  Peoplev.Jones(1995)37Cal.App.4th1312@ .935,37   ~  ~7<  ~7<R<݌̌  Peoplev.Kelii(1999)21Cal.4th452  D .420  ~  ~<  ~<=݌̌  Peoplev.King(1993)5Cal.4th59  D .154  ~  ~=  ~==݌̌  Peoplev.Martin(1986)42Cal.3d437  D .((450  ~  ~h>  ~h>>݌̌  Peoplev.Martinez(1999)76Cal.App.4th489  D .;52  ~  ~+?  ~+?F?݌̌  Peoplev.McGee(2006)38Cal.4th682  D .||420  ~  ~?  ~?@݌̌  Peoplev.Morante(1999)20Cal.4th403@ .654,55  ~  ~@  ~@@݌̌  Peoplev.Navarro(1972)7Cal.3d248  D .@@448  ~  ~eA  ~eAA݌̌  Peoplev.Osband(1996)13Cal.4th622@ .536,37 ! ~  ~&B  ~&BAB݌̌  Peoplev.Padilla(1995)11Cal.4th891  D .633 # ~  ~B  ~BB݌̌  Peoplev.Reed(1996)13Cal.4th217  D .334 %!! ~  ~C  ~CC݌̌  Peoplev.Saffell(1979)25Cal.3d223  D .544 '## ~  ~\D  ~\DwD݌̌  Peoplev.Seel(2004)34Cal.4th535  D .tt360 )%% ~  ~E  ~E2E݌̌  Peoplev.Smith(1983)34Cal.3d251  D .357 +'' ~  ~E  ~EE݌̌  Peoplev.Snook(1997)16Cal.4th1210  D .552  ~  ~F  ~FF݌̌  Peoplev.Sutton(1980)113Cal.App.3d162  D .944  ~  ~PG  ~PGkG݌̌  Peoplev.Tanner(1935)3Cal.2d279@ .348,51   ~  ~H  ~H*H݌̌  Peoplev.Tilbury(1991)54Cal.3d56  D .452   ~  ~H  ~HH݌̌  Peoplev.Totari(2003)28Cal.4th876  D .((521   ~  ~I  ~II݌̌  ~  ~I  Peoplev.Williams(1987)196Cal.App.3d1157  D .PP<57~IJ݌   Ќ  ~  ~J  ~JJ݌̌  Peoplev.Willis(2002)28Cal.4th22  D .421   ~  ~eK  ~eKK݌̌  Rangel,etal.v.UnitedStates(2006)__U.S.__   ` [126S.Ct.2873,165L.Ed.2d910]  D .518  ~  ~wL  ~wLL݌̌  Rogersv.Tennessee(2001)532U.S.451   ` [121S.Ct.1693,149L.Ed.2d697]  D .553  ~  ~yM  ~yMM݌̌  Shepardv.UnitedStates(2005)544U.S.13   ` [125S.Ct.1254,161L.Ed.2d205]  D .517  ~  ~N  ~NN݌̌  Tapiav.SuperiorCourt(1991)53Cal.3d282  D .;52  ~  ~BO  ~BO]O݌̌  Teaguev.Lane(1989)489U.S.288   ` [109S.Ct.1060,103L.Ed.2d334]  D .PP659  ~  ~@P  ~@P[P݌̌  UnitedStatesexrel.AttorneyGen.v.Delaware&HudsonCo. !  ` (1909)213U.S.366 "  ` [29S.Ct.527,53L.Ed.836]  D .029 # ~  ~Q  ~QQ݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Booker(2005)543U.S.220 %!!  ` [125S.Ct.738,160L.Ed.2d621]$ .43,4,15,29,41,42,49-52,58-62 &"" ~  ~R  ~RR݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Duncan ($$  ` (11thCir.2005)400F.3d1297  D .260 )%% ~  ~S  ~SS݌  *&& Ќ  UnitedStatesv.Dupas   ` (9thCir.2005)419F.3d916@ .060,61  ~  ~T  ~TT݌̌  UnitedStatesv.KempisBonola   ` (8thCir.2002)287F.3d699  D .019   ~  ~U  ~UU݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Lata    ` (1stCir.2005)415F.3d107  D .060   ~  ~V  ~VV݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Newman    ` (9thCir.2000)203F.3d700  D .060   ~  ~xW  ~xWW݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Papay    ` (7thCir.2004)119Fed.Appx.800  D .ZZ627  ~  ~jX  ~jXX݌̌  UnitedStatesv.PerezRuis   ` (1stCir.2005)421F.3d11  D ./60  ~  ~`Y   `     h      p     ~`Y{Y݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Santiago   ` (2ndCir.2001)268F.3d151  D .JJ019  ~  ~Z  ~ZZ݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Smith   ` (6thCir.2007)2007U.S.App.LEXIS1707  D .>27  ~  ~[  ~[[݌̌  UnitedStatesv.Vaughn   ` (2dCir.2005)430F.3d518  D ./60  ~  ~\  ~\\݌̌  Washingtonv.Recuenco(2006)548U.S.__    ` [126S.Ct.2546,2550,165L.Ed.2d466]@ .66;30,39 ! ~  ~]  ~]]݌̌  Weaverv.Graham(1981)450U.S.24 #  ` [101S.Ct.960,67L.Ed.2d17]@ .256,57 $      &""  ` CONSTITUTIONS   r   ~  ~$_  _UnitedStatesConstitution~$_?_݌  Ќ  9   0 ` ArticleI,section9,clause3#= .2` ` #4,42,52  0 ` ArticleI,section10#  D .)` ` #53  ~  0 ` ~`  ArticleI,section10,clause1#  D .>>3` ` #52~``݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~ga  #V+#VArticleIII,section2,clause1#  D .bb4` ` #54~gaa݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~mb  FifthAmendment#;;8 .$` ` #13,37,53,60~mbb݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~-c  SixthAmendment#1 .#` ` #1,13,15,26,42,58~-cTc݌   Ќ  _0 ` FourteenthAmendment#9 .ff(` ` #2,11,53,61#Va#VԈ    CaliforniaConstitution   r   ~  0 ` ~d  ArticleI,section9#= .(` ` #4,42,52~de݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~e  ArticleIII,section4#  D .88*` ` #48~ee݌   Ќ  d0 `     ` `   ` STATUTES      fBusinessandProfessionsCode     ~  ~bg   ` section7028,subdivision(a)s s E .  16~bg}g݌  Ќ  VgPenalCode  0 ` section484b#s s E . ` ` #6  ~  0 ` ~h  section487,subdivision(a)#s s E .0` ` #6~hh݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~[i  section506#s s E .> > ` ` #6~[ii݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~ j  section654#//A .> > ` ` #6,23~ j0j݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~j  section667#  D .t t ` ` #57~jj݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~kk  section667,subdivision(e)(2)(A)(i)#  D .9` ` #52~kkk݌  Ќ  #Vvd#V   ~  0 ` ~l  section1025#  D . ` ` #28~ll݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~Bm  section1158#  D . ` ` #28~Bmim݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~m  section1170#< . ` ` #16,29,50~mn݌ ! Ќ  ~  0 ` ~n  section1170,subdivision(a)#@ .  1` ` #44,46~nn݌ " Ќ  ~  0 ` ~oo  section1170,subdivision(a)(1)#@ .RR5` ` #45,46~ooo݌ # Ќ  0 ` section1170,subdivision(a)(2)#  D .RR5` ` #46#VWl#VԈ $  ~  0 ` ~p  section1170,subdivision(b)#* .,,1` ` #4,45,46,55,57,59,61,62~p q݌ % ! Ќ  ~  0 ` ~q  section1170,subdivision(c)#  D .  1` ` #45~qq݌ &!" Ќ  ~  0 ` ~~r  section1170,subdivision(d)#@ .,,1` ` #46,47~~rr݌ '"# Ќ  ~  0 ` ~Cs  section1170,subdivision(f)#  D .  1` ` #46~Csjs݌ (#$ Ќ  ~  0 ` ~t  #Vp#Vsection1170.1subdivision(a)#  D .2` ` #52#Vlt#V~t+t݌ )$% Ќ  ~  0 ` ~Ju  section1170.3#  D .LL"` ` #45~Juqu݌ *%& Ќ  ~  0 ` ~u  section1170.3,subdivision(b)#  D .4` ` #46~u#v݌ +&' Ќ  ~  0 ` ~v  section1170.4#@ .LL"` ` #45,46~vv݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~vw  section1170.5#  D .LL"` ` #45~vww݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~(x  #Vt#Vsection1203.1,subdivision(a)#  D .3` ` #21~(xOx݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~-y  section1203.2,subdivision(a)#  D .3` ` #21~-yTy݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~y  section1203.2,subdivision(b)#  D .3` ` #21~yz݌  Ќ  0 ` section1203,subdivision(a)#  D .  1` ` #21   ~  0 ` ~{  section1203a#  D .  !` ` #21~{>{݌   Ќ  0 ` section1203.3#  D .LL"` ` #21   ~  0 ` ~|  #Vx#Vsection1238,subdivision(a)(10)#  D .6` ` #47~|D|݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~%}  section1260#= . ` ` #3,63,64~%}L}݌   Ќ  ~  0 ` ~}  section1385#  D . ` ` #57~}~݌   Ќ  l0 ` section12022.5#  D .#` ` #54#V|#VԈ    ` RULES    CaliforniaRulesofCourt     ~  0 ` ~  rule4.420(b)#;;8 . !` ` #24,34,37,57~݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~i  rule4.421(b)(4)#  D .$` ` #22~i݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~  rule4.423#  D . ` ` #11~D݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~ˁ  rule408(a)#  D .  ` ` #23~ˁ݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~z  rule409#  D .* * ` ` #23~z݌  Ќ  ~  0 ` ~&  rule421(b)#  D .& & ` ` #23~&M݌  Ќ  0 `  ` `   `   #V~# OUTOFSTATE   8   ~  ~  Arizona  Statev.Brown(2004)209Ariz.200)  D .339~݌  Ќ  ~  ~o  Colorado  Lopezv.People(Colo.2005)113P.3d713  D .839~o݌   Ќ  ~  ~N  Maine " Statev.Schofield(2005)2005ME82  D .339~Ni݌ # Ќ  ~  ~%  Minnesota % ! Statev.Shattuck(2005)704N.W.2d131  D .639~%@݌ &!" Ќ  ~  ~  Minnesotav.Shattuck(2005)704N.W.2d131  D .:51~݌ '"# Ќ  ~  ~Ĉ  NorthCarolina )$% Statev.Allen(2005)359N.C.425  D .139~Ĉ߈݌ *%& Ќ   +&' ~  ~  Oregon  Statev.Dilts(2004)337Ore.645  D .xx139~щ݌  Ќ  Washington  Statev.Hughes(2005)154Wn.2d118  D .22339       &4%  @ DECLARATIONOFSERVICE   CaseName:0   GARYMITCHELLPARDO: No.E039420 ` Ideclare: ` IamemployedintheCountyofSanDiego,California.Iamover18yearsofageandnot   apartytothewithinentitledcause;mybusinessaddressis555WestBeechStreet,Suite   300,SanDiego,California921012939. p  On"US ,   February28,2007!  ,Iservedtheattached  p  @ PETITIONERSBRIEFONTHEMERITS     #%&4/#&4%  ofwhichatrueandcorrectcopyofthedocumentfiledinthecauseisaffixed,byplacinga   copythereofinaseparateenvelopeforeachaddresseenamedhereafter,addressedtoeach X  suchaddresseerespectivelyasfollows: 0  (X  (AttorneyGeneral 0 110W."A"St.,Ste.1100  P.O.Box85266  SanDiego,CA921865266 h Hon.MarshaG.Slough 0 c/oClerk,SanBernardinoCounty  ЀSuperiorCourt  JoshuaTreeDist. h 6527WhiteFeatherRoad @ JoshuaTree,CA92252 h  @ 1 X X 1SanBernardinoCountyDistrictAttorney  Attn:AppealsDivision x MarkA.Vos,LeadDeputy P 412HospitalityLn,1stFl. (x SanBernardino,CA92415 P GaryM.Pardo#F04132  ChuckawallaValleyStatePrison x  P.O.Box2349 P! Blythe,CA92226 (x" RalphF.George,Jr. " AttorneyatLaw  # PublicDefendersOffice `!$ 6527WhiteFeatherRoad 8"% JoshuaTree,CA92252 #`&  #8' Clerk,CourtofAppeal ' FourthAppellateDistrict,  ( ЀDivisionTwo `!) 338912thStreet 8"* Riverside,CA92501 #`+ ( X (Eachenvelopewasthensealedandwiththepostagethereonfullyprepaiddepositedinthe % + UnitedStatesmailbymeatSanDiego,Californiaon  February28,2007!  . p&!, Ideclareunderpenaltyofperjurythattheforegoingistrueandcorrect,andthisdeclaration  (p#. wasexecutedatSanDiego,California,on"*US , US , *  February28,2007!  . (H$/ DOROTHYJIMENEZ  0 h 򀀀X,'3h h  (TypedName) 0  0h  (Signature)0-(4h h  #%&4=#&4% .X)5 #%&4.#