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DP >B .  ͈  J 6A-w . ҋ - .1-_ . <O ,o 2&X @ 0K{ >NM 6ٗ @"I͛ 0 "FMh 8 (n 0 :N : .E 2ss 8sP :ç #  N,z 2;-m 0-ʬ 0*' *Q*{ **ϰ *(# &K-q 0δJ 2- "_ B6 &xK 4 $JA 0 D 4Խ  ( dP ( 29 0k BP 2 @w| >3Mq <  * (D*l  "|  (*T  T^N 0K0 4{{ D* (n* ( 0 6 "GMi 6q 8]o 2J6 6 " L :]    "K 8k- 8 " X H)Lq 4p 2ai 0l, 6l 4:n :)< 4em 6N< 0H>s Be; X 2 **T r >0 $nK 4j 2{  "t  :  * J  6-   c    D  $  1i  &`  % M  !  +  '  %"  0NG  ! 1 - -fAaC(Wp   0 ; 0 IV 0] 0qbm qs 72 -HP LaserJet 1200 Series PCL 60 ( &g$#cddd$P<7XXXHHHHT X7     `       Pn11{+3|xrJ2PLEADINGPleading Format - 28-Line PaperXX X XXX  X X      `    (A Z&Times New Romanx9 Z6Times New Roman RegularPldCaptionHere   H(X    hhTXA )h 0dEh 0AA )h 0dEh 0AA )p&h 0dEp&h 0A   T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9dd T10dd T11dd T12dd T13dd T14dd T15dd T16dd T17dd T18dd T19dd T20dd T21dd T22dd T23dd T24dd T25dd T26dd T27dd T28P.+(&3B^$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        (%2J%$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        ~6Times New Roman Regular(%2J%$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        'D1   Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   3  .  _AllfurtherreferencestorulesaretotheCaliforniaRulesofCourt  unlessotherwiseindicated.PldCourtText2`(B%2Z$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        T `   0  .(r$  0  /PldSignatureStartPldCaptionHere1TABLE C dPldDocTitleTABLE A`Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5TABLE BPldCourtText1PldAttyNamePldSignatureEndWPldJudgeName  '  0 .   @dMPMacroTypeCA Supreme Court"eCourtSupreme0fMPOfficeLos Angeles*gMPApplDistSECOND&hMPDivisionFOUR2iMPCountyLOS ANGELES LjMPAttyForPlaintiff and RespondentlkMPParty1NameTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIATlMPParty1TitlePlaintiff and Respondent8mMPParty2NameSHAWN TOWNERnMPParty2TitleDefendant and Appellant"oMPParty3Name@pMPParty3TitleSelect a Title"qMPParty4Name@rMPParty4TitleSelect a Title(sMPCaseNoS125677tMPCaseNo2&uMPCaseTypeNoneBvMPDocTitleRESPONDENT'S BRIEF(wMPApplNoB166312(xMPSupNoPA040926ByMPSupJudgeMeredith C. 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MARjMPSelectedNamesBill;Lockyer;BILL;LOCKYER;BL; ; ;Attorney General of the State of California; ; ;1; ; ; ; ; ; ;Robert R.;Anderson;ROBERT R.;ANDERSON; ; ; ;Chief Assistant Attorney General; ; ;1; ; ; ; ; ; ;Pamela C.;Hamanaka;PAMELA C.;HAMANAKA;PCH;125792;(213) 897-2382;Senior Assistant Attorney General; ; ;1;(213) 897-2806; ; ; ; ; ;Donald E.;de Nicola;DONALD E.;DE NICOLA;DED;81799;(213) 897-2388;Deputy Attorney General; ; ;1;(213) 897-2806; ; ; ; ; ;Chung L.;Mar;CHUNG L.;MAR;CLM;174004;(213) 897-2368;Deputy Attorney General; ; ;1;(213) 897-2806; ; ; ; ; *MPRespectSubmit1:MPDateFormatToday's Date>MPSigningAttyMar, Chung L.&MPTheOtherDate6637=CIOW_eI.A.1.a.(i)(i)1)a)4TCNumbersRAParagraph Numbers only (no styles).1.a.1.A.i.(a)(i)1)(;3$2#  0  .3  0  PldCaseNo1( $/Constitutional Provisions/Statutes/Court Rules/Other AuthoritiesTABLE B U  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Blakely_Ԁv.Washington  (2004)542U.S.___[124_S.Ct_Ԁ2531,159_L.Ed_.2d403]# ȍ#3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#(23'$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `         d 'dxd(%2J%$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        ("$ Figure    $<=;A<< c(%2J%$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        (b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#7Blakely v. Washington Cases ? &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,215,_subd_.(a)# <:#D215, subd. (a)Statutes ? &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,207,_subd_.(a)# <:#/Cases( $(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   1  .  _AllfurtherstatutoryreferencesaretothePenalCodeunlessotherwise  indicated. p Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   2  .  _Althoughappellanthadadmittedthetruthoffourpriorprisonterm  allegations,thePeopleacknowledgedatthesentencinghearingthatappellant  hadservedonlytwoseparatepriorprisontermsbecausetheotherprisonterms  hadbeenservedconcurrently.(RT2402.)PldCaseNo  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   4  .  _Havingfoundtheclaimforfeited,theCourtconsideredthe plain  errorforfeitureexceptionfoundinFederalRuleofCriminalProcedure  52(b)  andfoundnoplainerror.(  Cotton,supra,535U.S.atpp.631634.)Sincethe   plainerrorexceptionisaproductoffederalappellateprocedure,itdoesnot  applytothisstateappeal.Blakely v. Washington   Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   5  .  _Byreferringtothe statuteofconviction,respondentreferstothe  codesectionorsetofcodesectionsthatdefinesthecriminaloffenseand  prescribesthepenaltiesfortheoffense.(See,e.g.,  211[definingrobbery],    212.5[settingdegreesofrobbery],_  213_Ԁ[prescribingpenaltiesforrobbery].)  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   6  .  _Forinstance,seconddegreekidnappingispunishablebyarangeof  13to17months,andseconddegreekidnappingwithafirearmispunishableby  arangeof49to53months.(Wash.Rev.Code,  9.94A.310(1),  _  9.94A.310(3)(b).)_Ԁ  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   7  .  _Whilerule_  4.420(b)_Ԁreferstotheestablishingofaggravatingand  mitigatingfactsbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,theultimatesentencing  determinationisnotmeanttobetheanalogue,muchlesstheequivalent,ofjury  factfinding.AstheAdvisoryCommitteeCommentstates:  8 ` Determiningwhethercircumstancesinaggravationormitigation  preponderateisaqualitative,ratherthanaquantitative,process.   Itcannotbedeterminedbysimplycountingidentified   circumstancesofeachkind. ` x` x Thesentencingfactors,thus,merelyinformandguidethesentencingcourts   discretionwithinthestatutoryrange. b Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   8  .  _Aspreviouslynoted,appellantadmittedthathehadservedfourprior  prisonterms,buttheprosecutionlateracknowledgedthatonlytwooftheprison  termsqualifiedasseparatepriorprisontermsundersection   667.5,subdivision  (b).  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   9  .  _Usingthetrialcourtsdiscretionarysentencingdecisionstocalculate  thestatutorymaximuminvolvescircuitousreasoning.Todeterminewhethera  judiciallyfoundfactwasusedtoincreasethepunishmentbeyondthestatutory  maximum,itisnecessarytocomparetwobenchmarksthathavebeen  establishedatdifferenttimes,i.e.,thetrialcourtsactualsentencingdecisions  (the punishment)mustbecomparedwiththemaximumpotentialsentenceat   thetimeoftheguiltyverdictorplea(the statutorymaximum).Here,by   failingtoincludethetwopriorprisontermsinthestatutorymaximum   calculation,appellanterroneouslyconflatesthetwobenchmarks.Forinstance,   underthiserroneousanalysis,atrialcourtsultimatediscretionarydecisionto   imposethelowtermratherthanthemiddletermwouldillogicallyconvertthe   lowtermintothestatutorymaximum.Nothingin P _Blakely_suggestssucharesult.  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   11  .  _Evenifthe  _Almendarez_ԄTorresexceptionisstrictlylimitedtothe  merefactofapriorconviction,thetrialcourtsfindingneverthelessfellunder  theexceptionsincethefindingsimplyinvolvedaggregatingappellantsfour  priorconvictions.  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Apprendi_Ԁv.NewJersey  (2000)530U.S.466[120_S.Ct_.2348,147_L.Ed_.2d435]# ȍ# t Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   13  .  _Section  1170,subdivision(b),byitself,merelycreatesa statutory  preferenceforthemiddleterm,buta presumptionforthemiddletermis  createdwhenthestatuteiscoupledwiththerequirementinrule  4.420(b)thatan  uppertermisjustifiedonlyiftheaggravatingcircumstancesoutweighthe  mitigatingcircumstances.(See_  People_Ԁv._Avalos_(1984)37Cal.3d216,233.) o Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   14  .  _Althoughcertainaspectsofstatesentencinglawhavegenerated  somecontroversy(e.g.,theThreeStrikeslaw),therehasbeennocontroversy  aboutthefairnessorefficacyofatrialcourtsabilitytoimposeasentencefrom  athreetieredrangeofprisonterms.  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   15  .  _Suchanormativebalancingapproachhasalreadybeenendorsedin  thecapitalsentencingcontextandsatisfiestherequirementssetoutin t _Apprendi_  and P _Blakely_.(See > Griffin,supra,33Cal.4thatp.595.)F207, subd. (a)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,211# <:#\211Statutes ? &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,487,_subd_.(d)# <:#^487, subd. (d)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,422# <:#`422Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,209.5# <:#b209.5Statutes B &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,209,_subd_.(b)(1)# <:#d209, subd. (b)(1)Statutes a &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <_Veh_.Code,10851,_subd_.(a)# <:#f10851, subd. (a)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,666.5# <:#h666.5Statutes A &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,667.5,_subd_.(b)# <:#j667.5, subd. (b)Statutes d &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,667,_subds_.(b)(_i_)# <:#l667, subds. (b)-(i)Statutes H &g!#cddd$P< :  < :     _: <Pen.Code,1170.12,_subds_.(a)(d)# <:# * Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   12  .  _By prospectiveapplication,respondentmeansthatthissuggested  interpretationofsection | 1170shouldapplytoanysentencinghearingsoccurring  afterthisCourtissuesitsdecisioninthiscase.n1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)Statutes B &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,667,_subd_.(a)(1)# ȍ#q667, subd. (a)(1)StatutesWApprendi v. New Jersey CasesApprendi v. New Jersey   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ U.S.Const.,6thAmend.# ȍ#uSixthConstitutional Provisions  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Chapmanv.California  (1967)386U.S.18[87_S.Ct_.824,17_L.Ed_.2d705]# ȍ#wChapman v. California CasesChapman v. California   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1170# ȍ#z1170Statutes1170 @ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1170,_subd_.(b)# ȍ#}1170, subd. (b)Statutes # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(b)# ȍ#4.420(b)Court Rules1170, subd. (b)4.420(b) # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(c)# ȍ#4.420(c)Court Rules # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(d)# ȍ#4.420(d)Court Rules  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Takencareof_Ԁ  (1981)119_Cal.App_.3d492# ȍ#People v. TakencareofCasesPeople v. Takencareof e &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Lewis  (1991)229_Cal.App_.3d259# ȍ#People v. Lewis Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv.Watts  (1997)519U.S.148[117_S.Ct_.633,136_L.Ed_.2d554]# ȍ#United States v. Watts CasesUnited States v. Watts   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Witte_Ԁv.UnitedStates  (1995)515U.S.389[115_S.Ct_.2199,132_L.Ed_.2d351]# ȍ#Witte v. United StatesCases C &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Saunders  (1993)5Cal.4th580# ȍ#People v. SaundersCases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv._Olano_  (1993)507U.S.725[113_S.Ct_.1770,123_L.Ed_.2d508]# ȍ#United States v. Olano Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Osbornev.Ohio  (1990)495U.S.103[110_S.Ct_.1691,109_L.Ed_.2d98]# ȍ# ? &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Hall  (1994)8Cal.4th950# ȍ#People v. Hall CasesPeople v. Lewis  C &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Richards  (1976)17Cal.3d614# ȍ#People v. Richards CasesPeople v. Richards  d &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Cruz  (1995)38_Cal.App_.4th427# ȍ#People v. Cruz Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Monge_Ԁv.California  (1998)524U.S.721[118_S.Ct_.2246,141_L.Ed_.2d615]# ȍ#Monge v. California Cases D &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Hernandez  (1998)19Cal.3d835# ȍ#People v. Hernandez CasesWitte v. United StatesOsborne v. Ohio Cases i &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Marchand  (2002)98_Cal.App_.4th1056# ȍ#People v. Marchand Cases i &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Cleveland  (2001)87_Cal.App_.4th263# ȍ#People v. Cleveland CasesSixth  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ # ȍ#U.S.Const.,14thAmend.FourteenthConstitutional Provisions  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Ringv.Arizona  (2002)536U.S.584  [122_S.Ct_.2428,153_L.Ed_.2d556]# ȍ#Ring v. Arizona Cases # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9A.20.010(b)# ȍ#9A.20.010(b)Statutes # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9A.20.021(1)# ȍ#9A.20.021(1)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.515# ȍ#9.94A.515Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.525# ȍ#9.94A.525Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.510# ȍ#9.94A.510Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.5# ȍ#9.94A.5Statutes # &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.530(2)# ȍ#9.94A.530(2)Statutes    @ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Scott  (1994)9Cal.4th331# ȍ#People v. Scott CasesPeople v. Scott   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv.Cotton  (2002)535U.S.625[122_S.Ct_.1781,152_L.Ed_.2d860]# ȍ#United States v. Cotton CasesPeople v. Saunders A &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Holmes  (1960)54Cal.2d442# ȍ#People v. Holmes CasesPeople v. Holmes  @ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Vera  (1997)15Cal.4th269# ȍ#People v. Vera Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Bousley_Ԁv.UnitedStates  (1998)523U.S.614[118_S.Ct_.1604,140_L.Ed_.2d828]# ȍ#Bousley v. United States CasesCal. Const., art. I,  16People v. Vera   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ MonsantoCo.v.SprayRiteServiceCorp.  (1984)465U.S.752[104_S.Ct_.1464,79_L.Ed_.2d775]# ȍ#Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Engelv.Isaac  (1982)456U.S.107[102_S.Ct_.1558,71_L.Ed_.2d783]# ȍ#  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Fed.Rules_Crim_.Proc.,rule52(b),18U.S.C.52(b)Court RulesUnited States v. Cotton Engel v. Isaac Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Harrisv.UnitedStates  (2002)536U.S.545[122_S.Ct_.2406,153_L.Ed_.2d524]# ȍ#Harris v. United States CasesHarris v. United States   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv.Jones  (1999)526U.S.227[119_S.Ct_.1215,143_L.Ed_.2d311]# ȍ#United States v. Jones Cases r &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv.Koch  (6thCir.2004)___F.3d___[2004U.S.App.LEXIS18138,*20]# ȍ#United States v. Koch Cases C &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1170,_subd_.(a)(3)# ȍ#1170, subd. (a)(3)StatutesPeople v. Hall   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.408# ȍ#4.408Court Rules  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.421# ȍ#211 &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Pen.Code,212.5212.5Statutes &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Pen.Code,_213_213Statutes4.421Court Rules  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.423# ȍ# J &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Hernandez  (1988)46Cal.3d194# ȍ#People v. Hernandez 46 Cal.3d 194Cases D &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.King  (1993)5Cal.4th59# ȍ#People v. King Cases A &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Wright  (1982)30Cal.3d705# ȍ#People v. Wright Cases q &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv._Pineiro_  (5thCir.2004)377F.3d464# ȍ#United States v. Pineiro Cases4.423Court Rules  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420# ȍ#4.420Court Rules &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.310(1)9.94A.310(1)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Wash.Rev.Code,_9.94A.310(3)(b)_9.94A.310(3)(b)StatutesRing v. Arizona  C &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Griffin  (2004)33Cal.4th536# ȍ#People v. Griffin Cases g &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Thornton  (1985)167_Cal.App_.3d72# ȍ#People v. Thornton Cases e &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Myers  (1983)148_Cal.App_.3d699# ȍ#People v. Myers Cases @ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1170,_subd_.(a)# ȍ#1170, subd. (a)Statutes10851, subd. (a)  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,18# ȍ#18Statutes B &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1170.1,_subd_.(e)# ȍ#1170.1, subd. (e)Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1025# ȍ#1025Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1158# ȍ#1158 Statutes  Z$#cddd$P< y T y y      T `   10  .  _Indeed,theCourtexpresslypointedoutthatunderWashingtons  scheme, thejudgeacquiresthatauthority[toimposeanexceptionalsentence]  onlyuponfindingsomeadditionalfact.( P _Blakely_,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2538,  fn.7.) A &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,666.5,_subd_.(a)# ȍ#666.5, subd. (a)Statutes a &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Veh_.Code,10851,_subd_.(e)# ȍ# 10851, subd. (e)Statutes667.5, subd. (b)  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ _Almendarez_ԄTorresv.UnitedStates  (1998)523U.S.224[118_S.Ct_.1219,140_L.Ed_.2d350]# ȍ# Almendarez-Torres v. United States CasesAlmendarez-Torres v. United States  B &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Garcia  (1999)20Cal.4th490# ȍ#People v. Garcia Cases f &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Thomas  (2001)91_Cal.App_.4th212# ȍ#People v. ThomasCases _ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Epps_  (2001)25Cal.4th19# ȍ#People v. Epps Cases b &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Prather_  (1990)50Cal.3d428# ȍ#People v. Prather Cases b &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Osband_  (1996)13Cal.4th622# ȍ#People v. Osband Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Castellano_  (1983)140_Cal.App_.3d608# ȍ#People v. CastellanoCases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _Peoplev._Avalos_  (1984)37Cal.3d216People v. Avalos Cases c &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Carmony_  (2004)33Cal.4th367# ȍ#People v. Carmony Cases(,$ i &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Sengpadychith_  (2001)26Cal.4th316# ȍ#"People v. Sengpadychith Cases [ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ UnitedStatesv.SanchezCervantes  (9thCir.2002)282F.3d664# ȍ#$United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes CasesPeople v. Sengpadychith People v. Cleveland   &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,654# ȍ#(654Statutes  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Chamberlainv._Pliler_  (_C.D.Cal_.2004)307F.Supp.2d1128# ȍ#*Chamberlain v. Pliler CasesPeople v. Osband  A &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Watson  (1956)46Cal.2d818# ȍ#-People v. Watson Cases ` &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev._Roder_Ԁ  (1983)33Cal.3d491# ȍ#/People v. Roder Cases  &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,496# ȍ#1496StatutesPeople v. Roder  j &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Peoplev.Forrester  (1994)30_Cal.App_.4th1697# ȍ#4People v. Forrester CasesPeople v. Forrester  @ &g!#cddd$P< ȍ   ȍ     _ȍ Pen.Code,1320,_subd_.(b)# ȍ#71320, subd. (b)Statutes1320, subd. (b)4.420People v. Hernandez 46 Cal.3d 194People v. Wright $35;AGMU]c1I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)People v. Griffin /FEDERAL CASES/STATE CASES/FEDERAL STATUTES/STATE STATUTES/FEDERAL RULES(&3B^$ &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        /STATE RULES/FEDERAL REGULATIONS/STATE REGULATIONS/OTHER AUTHORITIESTABLE A f J%'#cddd$P< y T y y       _T@4 4  TABLEOFCONTENTS(continued)  B Page TOCBeginsTOCEnds(l$( $0  0 (#(#(4|$0  0 (#(#0\  (# (#(HC$0  0 (#(#0\  (# (#0\ (#\ (# HPQRST i J%'#cddd$P< y T y y       _T@  TABLEOFAUTHORITIES(continued)  B Page 8i)Hw &g!#cddd$P< y HHT y y     `        _ +(6638T  8zXXdd8   INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA H   *4ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,d!,` dd!+  : 'HH xx:%  THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA,  x dPlaintiffandRespondent, =  0 4 0 4d4d v.  u  d d  SHAWNTOWNE,  :   dDefendantandAppellant.% Ԉ 6,! o   6% N S125677%NC  x -#! x" xx  -  % & SecondAppellateDistrict,DivisionFour,No.B166312%& /  %  LosAngelesCountySuperiorCourtNo.PA040926% /  % ) TheHonorableMeredithC.Taylor,Judge%) /  % ! ANSWERBRIEFONTHEMERITS%!  /   *xddd!` dd!` 4(#(#x,<dd ,d +  -#-- -f &x% y# y% &x3# 'e,)6 '% '  &x% y%'fBILLLOCKYER -7 AttorneyGeneraloftheStateofCalifornia 8 MANUELM.MEDEIROS I: StateSolicitorGeneral !; ROBERTR.ANDERSON e= ChiefAssistantAttorneyGeneral => PAMELAC.HAMANAKA 9@ SeniorAssistantAttorneyGeneral YA DONALDE.DENICOLA UC SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral u -D JAIMEL.FUSTER !qF SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral "IG LAWRENCEM.DANIELS # I DeputyAttorneyGeneral $e!J CHUNGL.MAR %"L DeputyAttorneyGeneral &#M StateBarNo.174004 'Y$N Ӏ300SouthSpringStreet (%P ЀLosAngeles,CA90013 )u&Q ЀTelephone:(213)8972368 *M'R ӀFax:(213)8972806 m+%(S  y% &xAttorneysforPlaintiffandRespondent-#!,i)U 0  -  -*U   HXHINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA    *x#%dd<dd <d   x,d!,dd!+  : ' xx:%  THEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFCALIFORNIA,  ( x   PlaintiffandRespondent,   0 ` 0 ` `  v. % u     SHAWNTOWNE,      DefendantandAppellant.%Ԉ 6,!o   6% . S125677%. ( x -#!( x" xx  - ,X 4  ` &     ISSUESPRESENTED     '   4  ` y y1. Mayatrialcourtusefactsrelatingtocountsonwhichthedefendant  wasfoundnotguiltyasaggravatingfactorsindeterminingtheappropriate e sentence?   4  ` 2. Does C Blakelyv.Washington(2004)542U.S.___[124S.Ct2531,159 e L.Ed.2d403]precludeatrialcourtfrommakingtherequiredfindingson  aggravatingfactorsforanuppertermsentence? e  4  ` 3. Ifso,whatstandardofreviewapplies,andwastheerrorprejudicial ! inthiscase?# yyD# e# &     STATEMENTOFTHECASE  m "e& '"R   4  ` y yAppellantwaschargedinaneightcountinformationwithcarjacking $c( (Pen.Code, E 215,subd.(a))L r  1  /    ,kidnapping( [ 207,subd.(a)),seconddegree % * robbery( ] 211),grandtheftauto( _ 487,subd.(d)),makingacriminalthreat( 'c",  a 422),kidnappingforcarjacking( c 209.5),kidnappingtocommitrobbery( e 209, (#. subd.(b)(1)),andunlawfuldrivingortakingofavehicle(Veh.Code, g 10851, *c%0 subd.(a)).Astothecountsinvolvinggrandtheftautoandunlawfuldrivingor  takingofavehicle,itwasallegedthatappellanthadsufferedonepriortheft 0 convictioninvolvingavehicle( i 666.5).Astoallcounts,appellantwasalleged  tohaveservedfourpriorprisonterms( k 667.5,subd.(b)),andsufferedone 0  priorfelony strikeconviction( m 667,subds.(b)(i), p 1170.12,subds.(a)(d))   andonepriorseriousfelonyconviction( r 667,subd.(a)(1)).(CT7176.) 0   Appellantplednotguiltyanddeniedtheallegations.(CT7879.)    4  ` Attrial,thevictimtestifiedthathemetappellantwhiledrivinghomeand 0  theyagreedtogotoamotelroomtogether.Afterseveralunsuccessfulattempts   tofindamotelroom,thevictimstoppedhiscarandattemptedtowake 0  appellant,whowassleeping.Appellantbecameangryandinitiatedaphysical  altercationwiththevictim.Appellantmanagedtograbthecarkeysandtiethe 0 victimshandstogether.Appellantthendrovethecarforaboutanhourwiththe  victimasapassenger.Whenappellantstoppedthecarataconveniencestore, 0 thevictimuntiedhimself,exitedthecar,andrantoanapartmentbuildingto  obtainhelp.(RT611637.) 0  4  ` Duringtrial,appellantwaivedhisrightsandadmittedthetruthofallof   thechargedpriorconvictionandprisontermallegations.(RT12521260;CT 0" 109110,112.)Thejuryfoundappellantguiltyofunlawfuldrivingortakingof $ avehicle,andacquittedhimoftheremainingcharges.(CT185187.) 0!&  4  ` Atsentencing,thetrialcourtdeniedappellantsmotionstoreducethe "( offensetoamisdemeanorandtodismisstheprior strikeconviction.The 0$* courtimposedatotalsentenceofeightyears:theuppertermoffouryears, %!, doubledunderthesecondstrikeprovisionsoftheThreeStrikeslaw.Thecourt 0'". struckthepriorprisontermenhancements.M r  2  /    ׀(CT202204.) ($0  4  ` Thecourtexplaineditsreasoningfortheimpositionoftheuppertermas  follows: 0 Ѐ8 4  ` Withregardtosentencing,Ididhearthetestimony.Idobelievethat  thejurysorteditout.[]ItwasntaneasycaseIdontthinkforthejury. 0  Ithinkyoushouldbepleasedtheywereabletoweighitalloutand   returnverdictsandnottoreturnhung.0  44 8 4  ` Idoknowthat[thevictim]wasaliar.Ithinkitwasclear.[][The   prosecutor]knowshiswitnesswasaliar.Thevictimwasaliar;andthe 0  jurywasadvisedthatevenaliarisentitledtohisbodilyintegrityandbe   freefromthekindoftreatmentthatthePeopleallegedtohavebeen 0  inflictedonhimduringthecourseofthecontactbetweenthedefendant  and[thevictim].[]Iknowthatthedefendantisaliaralso.Thatcame 0 outinhistestimonywhenhewasbeforethecourt.44 8 4  ` Idoknowwithrespecttothechargeonwhich[appellant]stands 0 convictedthattheevidencethatwehavebeforetheCourtthatIbelieve  isentirelybelievableisthatwhen[thevictim]gotoutofthatcarhewas 0 terrified.Hewasafraidforhislife.Hethoughtifhedidntgetoutof   thereandhidehewasdead.[]SoIambelievingthatheleftthecarin 0" thatstateofmindandthatyouhadpossessionofthecaragainsthiswill $ andforyourownpurposes.[]Ibelievethatyouwereconvicted 0!& appropriatelyofthe10851(a),asdoyou.[]Youhaveadmittedit,that "( youbelievethatitwasassetforthaswell.0$*44 8 4  ` Idontbelieveitsjustasimple10851(a)asIvejustdescribedto %!, you,[appellant].Ibelievethatitsanaggravatedsituationbasedonwhat 0'". Ihavejustdescribed.[]TherewasawomanwhotestifiedIthink ($0 twopeoplefromtheapartmentwhere[thevictim]finallylanded 0*%2 testified;andtheirtestimonywasverycredible.[]Fromthatwoman +'4 Iunderstandthathewassignificantlyterrifiedandafraidforhisown 0-(6 physicalwellbeing.44 8 4  ` Idontbelieveitsappropriatetogiveyoulowterm,[appellant],or 0 midterm.Youvegotatenyearhistorybeforeyougotthiscase.Low  termandmidtermarenotappropriate.0 44 8 4  ` Ibelieve,[appellant],thatyouareaninnocentofsorts;thatyoudont   seemdespiteallofthiscontactwithlawenforcementandthecourt 0   systemtolearnwhatpunishmentisandwhatitmeans.[]Hereyouare.   Yourebackagain.0 44 8 4  ` SotheCourtisconsideringthetrialasittookplacebeforetheCourt,   theconvictiononthe10581(a),thefactthatyouhavealengthyhistory 0  inchoosingthehightermoffouryears;andthehightermisbecausethe  10851(a)isallegedpursuanttoIbelieveitsPenalCode[section]666.5.044 (RT24152417.)Appellantdidnotobjecttothesentence.   4  ` Onappeal,appellantraisedtwoclaimsofsentencingerror:(1)thetrial 0 courtabuseditsdiscretioninfailingtostriketheprior strikeconviction;and  (2)thecourtabuseditsdiscretioninimposingtheupperterm.Astothesecond 0 claim,appellantspecificallyassertedthat,inlightofthejurysacquittalon   sevenoftheeightcounts,thejurynecessarilyfoundthatappellantdidnotuse 0" any unlawfulforceonthevictim;thus,accordingtoappellant,thetrialcourt $ improperlyreliedonthefactofthevictimsfeartoimposetheupperterm. 0!&  4  ` TheCourtofAppealconcludedthatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseits "( discretionineitherdecliningtostrikethepriorconvictionorinimposingthe 0$* upperterm.Astotheimpositionoftheupperterm,theCourtofAppeal %!, concludedthatthetrialcourtsfindingsdidnotconflictwiththejurysnecessary 0'". findingsontheacquittedcounts.TheCourtofAppealfurtherdeterminedthat, ($0 eveniftherehadbeenerror,itwasharmlesssincethecourtcouldhavecited 0*%2 appellantspriorprisonterms,hisunsatisfactorypriorperformanceonprobation +'4 orparole,andhisparolestatusatthetimeofthecurrentoffenseasfurther 0-(6 reasonsinsupportoftheupperterm.(Opn.,atp.6.)   4  ` Appellantpetitionedforreviewontheissueofwhetheratrialcourtcould 0 usefactsrelatingtocountsonwhichthedefendantwasfoundnotguiltyas  aggravatingfactorsindeterminingtheappropriatesentence.Inasubsequent 0  letter,appellantcitedthedecisionin P Blakelyinsupportofhispetitionfor   review. 0    4  ` OnJuly14,2004,thisCourtgrantedthepetitionforreview,andordered   thepartiestoaddresstheissueraisedinthepetitionforreviewandtwo 0  additionalissues:whether P Blakelyprecludesatrialcourtfrommakingthe   requiredfindingsonaggravatingfactorsforanuppertermsentence;and,ifso, 0  whatstandardofreviewapplies,andwastheerrorinthiscaseprejudicial?# yy#  &     SUMMARYOFARGUMENT  =  '=   4  ` y yUnderCalifornialaw,atrialcourtmayproperlyusefactsrelatingto  countsonwhichthedefendantwasfoundnotguiltyasaggravatingfactorsin .~ determiningtheappropriatesentence.Atrialcourtmayproperlyusesuchfacts  becausethecourtisallowedtoconsiderawiderangeofinformationconcerning .~ thedefendantandthecrimeforsentencingpurposes,andbecausethe ! preponderanceoftheevidencestandardratherthanthereasonabledoubt . ~# standardmayapplyatsentencing.Moreover,itcannotbereasonablyinferred !% fromageneralnotguiltyverdictthatthejurynecessarilyrejectedallofthe .#~' prosecutionsevidenceinreturningsuchaverdict,andtheUnitedStates $) SupremeCourthasheldthattheDoubleJeopardyClausedoesnotprohibitthe .&~!+ useoffactsrelatedtoacquittedcountsinimposingasentencefortheoffenseof '"- conviction. .)~$/  4  ` Appellantforfeitedhis P Blakelyclaimbecausehefailedtoraiseany *%1 objectiontohissentence,letaloneanobjectionbasedonfederalconstitutional .,~'3 grounds.Since P Blakelyinvolvesanapplicationof s Apprendiv.NewJersey -(5 (2000)530U.S.466[120S.Ct.2348,147L.Ed.2d435],appellantcouldhave  raisedanobjectiontohissentenceonthebasisof t Apprendi. 0  4  ` Further,the P Blakelydecisiondoesnotprecludethetrialcourtfrom  makingtherequisitedeterminationsonaggravatingcircumstancestosupportan 0  uppertermsentence.InCalifornia,judicialfactfindingonaggravating   circumstancesmerelydeterminesasentencewithinthelegislativelyprescribed 0   sentencingrangefortheoffense,andthistypeofjudicialfactfindinghasbeen   upheldinUnitedStatesSupremeCourtprecedent.Becausethejurysverdict 0  thatthedefendantisguiltyofanoffensereflectsthestandardrangeoflower,   middle,anduppertermsforthatoffense,theuppertermisthestatutory 0  maximum.Accordingly,judiciallyfoundaggravatingcircumstancesthatare  usedtoimposeanuppertermsentencedonotviolatethedefendants 0 constitutionalrighttoajurytrialunderthe v SixthAmendmentbecausethese  findingsdonotincreasethesentencebeyondthestatutorymaximum. 0  4  ` EvenifthisCourtconcludesthat P Blakelygenerallyprecludesatrialcourt  frommakingtherequiredfindingstoimposeanuppertermsentence,andthat 0 themiddletermisthereforethestatutorymaximumofthethreetiered   sentencingrange,therewasnoviolationof P Blakelyintheinstantcasefortwo 0" reasons.First,appellantsadmissionsonthepriorprisontermallegationsraised $ thestatutorymaximumtoatleasteightyears,i.e.,theactualsentencehe 0!& received.Second,thetrialcourtsfindingthatappellanthadalengthycriminal "( historyfellundertherecidivismexceptionto P Blakelyandwasalsoestablished 0$* byappellantsadmissionsregardinghispriorconvictions.Sincethisfinding,by %!, itself,wassufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofanuppertermsentence,the 0'". uppertermbecamethestatutorymaximum. ($0  4  ` Moreover,ifthisCourtconcludesthat P Blakelyappliestotheimposition 0*%2 oftheupperterm,thestandardof x Chapmanv.California(1967)386U.S.18, +'4 24[87S.Ct.824,17L.Ed.2d705]isappropriatefordeterminingwhetherthe 0-(6  P Blakelyerrorwasprejudicial.Underthe y Chapmantest,thereviewingcourt  mustdeterminewhetherthejurywouldhavefoundanyaggravating 0 circumstancestruebeyondareasonabledoubt.Ifthereviewingcourt  determinesthatthejurywouldhavefoundatleastoneaggravatingcircumstance 0  truebeyondareasonabledoubt,the P Blakelyerrorwasharmlessbecauseone   aggravatingcircumstanceisenoughtoauthorizeanuppertermsentenceunder 0   Californialaw.    4  ` Underthisstandardofreview,any P Blakelyerrorinthiscasewasnot 0  prejudicial.Thetrialcourtsfindingsthatappellanthadalengthycriminal   historyandthatthevictimfearedforhislifewouldhavebeenfoundbyajury 0  beyondareasonabledoubt.Becauseonlyoneaggravatingcircumstancewas  neededtoauthorizetheuppertermsentence,anyerrorwasharmless. 0  4  ` Finally,ifthisCourtweretoconcludethatsection { 1170is  unconstitutionalunder P Blakely,respondentwouldrequestthatthisCourt 0 interpretsection | 1170toeliminateanyrequirementthattrialcourtsmustengage  infactfindingbeforeatermotherthanthemiddletermcouldbeimposed.Such 0 aninterpretation,appliedprospectively,wouldbeconsistentwiththe   Legislaturesintentinenactingthedeterminatesentencingschemeandwould 0" preserveasystemthathasdispensedfairandeffectivejusticeformorethana $ quarterofacentury.# yyT>#  0!& &     ARGUMENT g{W  '`W& s  2 6  I  .3      8 4 8` 44ATRIALCOURTMAYPROPERLYUSEFACTS +{ RELATINGTOCOUNTSONWHICHTHEDEFENDANT )y WASFOUNDNOTGUILTYASAGGRAVATING ' w FACTORSINDETERMININGTHEAPPROPRIATE % u SENTENCE gWB  ԍ.C  # s` x` x 'sW 4  ` y yContrarytoappellantsposition(ABM1021),atrialcourtmayproperly ! q  usefactsrelatingtocountsonwhichthedefendantwasfoundnotguiltyas   aggravatingfactorsindeterminingtheappropriatesentence.Atrialcourtmay !q  properlyusesuchfactsbecausesection | 1170andtheapplicableRulesofCourt   allowthecourttoconsiderawiderangeofinformationconcerningthe !q defendantandthecrimeforsentencingpurposes,andthepreponderanceofthe  evidencestandardratherthanthereasonabledoubtstandardappliesat !q sentencing.Moreover,noreasonableinferencecanbedrawnfromageneral  notguiltyverdictthatthejurynecessarilyrejectedanyfactsinreturningsucha !q verdict,andtheDoubleJeopardyClausedoesnotprohibittheuseofacquitted  conductinimposingasentencefortheoffenseofconviction.# yy Z# !q   &  2 6  A  .3  8 4 UpperTermSentencing g^!q 44 '!^ 4  ` y yWhenastatuteprovidesforthreepossibletermsofimprisonment,the !o" courtshallimposethemiddletermunlesstherearecircumstancesinaggravation "$ ormitigationofthecrime.( ~ 1170,subd.(b).)Circumstancesinaggravation $o& andmitigationmustbeestablishedbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,andthe % ( uppertermis justifiedonlyif,afteraconsiderationofallrelevantfacts,the 'o"* circumstancesinaggravationoutweighthecircumstancesinmitigation.(Cal. (#, RulesofCourt,rule  4.420(b).) r  3  /    ׀The relevantfactsareincludedinthetrial *o%. record,theprobationreport,otherproperlyreceivedreportsandstatements,  statementsinaggravationormitigation,andanyadditionalevidencepresented 0 atasentencinghearing.(  1170,subd.(b);rule  4.420(b).)Afactchargedand  foundasanenhancementmaybeusedasareasontoimposetheuppertermonly 0  ifthecourtexerciseditsdiscretiontostriketheenhancement.(  1170,subd.   (b);rule  4.420(c).)Afactthatisanelementofthecrimecannotbeusedto 0   imposetheupperterm.(Rule  4.420(d).)# yy~_#     &  2 6  B  .3  8 4 ConflictingCourtOfAppealDecisions nde 44 'e 4  ` y yTwoCourtsofAppealhavereachedconflictingconclusionsastothe   issueofwhetheratrialcourtmayusefactsrelatingtocountsinwhichthe .~ defendantwasacquittedindeterminingtheappropriatesentence.In  Peoplev.  Takencareof(1981)119Cal.App.3d492,497500,theCourtofAppeal .~ concludedthatthetrialcourterredinusingevidenceofanarsonasabasisfor  denyingprobationbecausethedefendanthadbeenacquittedattrialofthearson .~ charge.The  TakencareofCourtacknowledgedthatthepreponderanceofthe  evidencestandardwasgenerallyapplicableatsentencing,butheldthatthe .~ standardofproofbeyondareasonabledoubtshouldapplytobothconviction ! andsentencinginthosecaseswherethetrieroffacthasfoundthedefendantnot . ~# guiltyofacountinamultiplecountprosecution.(Id.atp.498.)TheCourtof !% Appealreasonedthatitwouldbe anomaloustoholdthatifthejuryfoundthe .#~' defendantnotguiltyofacrimeunderthereasonabledoubtstandard,the $) defendantshouldfacethesameallegedcrimeatsentencingundera .&~!+ preponderancestandard.(Ibid.)The  TakencareofCourtsaidthatitwas '"- unpreparedtoholdthatthetwostandardsoperatedsimultaneouslyinacase .)~$/ whereadefendantwasacquittedbecausesuchaholdingwouldbe ludicrous. *%1 Ѐ(Ibid.) .,~'3  -(5  4  ` Bycontrast,in  Peoplev.Lewis(1991)229Cal.App.3d259,264265,the  CourtofAppealheldthatthejurysnottruefindingonaweaponuse 0 enhancementdidnotprecludethetrialcourtfromfindingthatthedefendantwas  armedwithorusedaweaponinthecommissionofthecrimeforthepurposeof 0  imposingaconsecutivesentence.TheCourtofAppealbaseditsholdingonthe   differingstandardsofproofthatareapplicableattrialandsentencing.(Ibid.)# yyf# 0     &  2 6  C  .3  8 4 AJuryVerdictOfAcquittalDoesNotPreventASentencingCourt 0  FromConsideringFactsRelatedToCountsOnWhichThe .~  DefendantWasAcquittedBecauseSentencingFactsCanBe ,|  ProperlyBasedOnAStandardOfPreponderanceOfTheEvidence ndp*z 44 '0p 4  ` y yThedecisionin  UnitedStatesv.Watts(1997)519U.S.148[117S.Ct. (x 633,136L.Ed.2d554]isinstructiveonthequestionofwhetheratrialcourtmay  properlyusefactsrelatedtocountsonwhichthedefendantwasacquittedfor (x sentencingpurposes.In  Watts,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsummarily  reversedtwodecisionsbytheNinthCircuitCourtofAppealsthathadheldthat (x thesentencingcourtscouldnotincreasethedefendantssentencesonthebasis  ofconductunderlyingchargesofwhichtheyhadbeenacquitted.The  Watts (x CourtfirstexplainedthatthefederalSentencingGuidelines,aswellasthe   longstandingprinciplethatsentencingcourtshadbroaddiscretiontoconsider ( x" varioustypesofinformation,allowedasentencingcourtto considerconduct !$ ofwhichadefendanthasbeenacquitted.(Id.atp.154.)The  WattsCourt (#x& furtherexplainedthattheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstdoublejeopardywas $( notimplicatedwhenasentencingcourtconsideredfactsunderlyingachargeon (&x!* whichthejuryreturnedanotguiltyverdictbecause sentencingenhancements '", donotpunishadefendantforcrimesofwhichhewasnotconvicted,butrather ()x$. increasehissentencebecauseofthemannerinwhichhecommittedthecrime *%0 ofconviction.(Ibid.)Citingitsearlierdecisionin  Wittev.UnitedStates -(4 (1995)515U.S.389[115S.Ct.2199,132L.Ed.2d351],theSupremeCourt  notedthatconsideringinformationaboutthedefendantscharacterandconduct 0 atsentencingresultedonlyinpunishmentfortheoffenseofconviction.(Id.at  pp.154155.) 0   4  ` TheSupremeCourtalsoconcludedthattheNinthCircuithad   misunderstoodthepreclusiveeffectofanacquittal,especiallyinlightofthe 0    differentstandardsofproofthatgovernattrialandsentencing.(  Watts,supra,   519U.S.atp.155.)TheSupremeCourtnotedthatanacquittalonacriminal 0  chargedidnotindicatethedefendantwasinnocent,butmerelyindicatedthe   existenceofreasonabledoubtastohisguilt.(Ibid.)Because itisimpossible 0  toknowwhyajuryfoundadefendantnotguiltyonacertaincharge,the jury  cannotbesaidtohavenecessarilyrejectedanyfactswhenitreturnsageneral 0 verdictofnotguilty.(Ibid.)TheSupremeCourtfurtherexplainedthatthe  federalSentencingGuidelinesprovidedthatfactsrelevanttosentencingwere 0 tobeprovedonastandardofpreponderanceoftheevidence,andthatthe  applicationofthepreponderancestandardgenerallysatisfieddueprocess.(Id. 0 atp.156.)Thus,the  WattsCourtheld,   Ѐ8 4 ajurysverdictofacquittaldoesnotpreventthesentencingcourtfrom 0" consideringconductunderlyingtheacquittedcharge,solongasthat $ conducthasbeenprovedbyapreponderanceoftheevidence.0!&44 (Id.atp.157.) "(  4  ` Thereasoningof  Wattsishighlypersuasiveandshouldbeappliedto 0$* Californiassentencingscheme.AlthoughthefederalSentencingGuidelines %!, andCaliforniassentencingschemedifferinmanyrespects,thereare 0'". similaritieswithrespecttothecriteriadiscussedinWatts.Likethefederal ($0 system,section  1170,subdivision(b),andrule  4.420(b)allowthesentencing 0*%2 courttoconsiderawiderangeofinformationand relevantfactsin +'4 determiningtheappropriatesentence.(  Peoplev.Hall(1994)8Cal.4th950,962 0-(6 [section  1170,subdivision(b), demonstratestheLegislaturesintentthat  aggravatingcircumstances,relatingtothedefendantandtheoffense,constitute 0 propermattersbyacourtinsentencing].)Moreover,thereisnothinginsection    1170,subdivision(b),ortheapplicableRulesofCourt,thatprohibitsthe 0  considerationoffactsrelatingtoanacquittedcharge.Also,asinthefederal   system,sentencingfacts,suchasaggravatingcircumstances,areestablishedby 0   apreponderancestandard.Furthermore,asthe  WattsCourtexplained,itcannot   bereasonablyinferredfromageneralverdictofnotguiltythatthejury 0  necessarilyrejectedanyfactsinrenderingitsverdict,andtheDoubleJeopardy   Clausedoesnotprohibitasentencingcourtfromconsideringfactsunderlying 0  anacquittedchargebecausethedefendantisbeingpunishedonlyforthefact  thathispresentoffensewascommittedinamannerthatwarrantsincreased 0 punishment.Accordingly,atrialcourtmayproperlyusefactsrelatingtocounts  onwhichthedefendantwasfoundnotguiltyasaggravatingfactorsin 0 determiningtheappropriatesentence.   4  ` Thecontraryholdingin  Takencareofishighlyunpersuasiveinlightof 0 thereasoningofthe  Wattsdecision,especiallysincetheUnitedStatesSupreme   Courtreadilyapprovedofasentencingprocedurethatthe  TakencareofCourt 0" haddeemed anomalousand ludicrous.Moreover,theSupremeCourt $ considereditsrationalein  Wattssoobviousthatitsummarilyreversedthelower 0!& federalcourtinapercuriamopinion.ThisCourtshouldadoptthereasoningin "(   Wattsand  Lewisratherthanthereasoningin  Takencareof. 0$*  4  ` Appellantscitationof  Peoplev.Richards(1976)17Cal.3d614,failsto %!, supporthiscontention.(ABM19.)In  Richards,thisCourtheldthatthetrial 0'". courterredinorderingthedefendanttopayrestitutionforconductrelatingto ($0 chargesinwhichthedefendantwasacquittedbecausethetrialcourtimposedthe 0*%2 restitutionordertoresolvethecivilliabilityofthedefendant.(Id.atp.620.) +'4 ThisCourtexplainedthattheresolutionofcivilliabilitywasnotaproperissue 0-(6 inacriminalcaseoraproperbasisfortherestitutionorder.(Id.atpp.620622.)  Ѐ  Richardsisentirelyinappositetotheinstantissuebecausetheuseoffacts 0 relatingtoacquittedcountsatsentencingisfortheproperpurposeofpunishing  thedefendantforthemannerinwhichhecommittedtheoffenseofconviction, 0  anddoesnotimplicateanyissueofresolvingcivilliability.Thus,asexplained   above,thisCourtshouldadoptthereasoningin  Wattsand  Lewis,andholdthat 0   atrialcourtmayproperlyusefactsrelatingtocountsonwhichthedefendant   wasfoundnotguiltyasaggravatingfactorsindeterminingtheappropriate 0  sentence.    4  ` Whenthisruleisappliedtotheinstantcase,itbecomesclearthatthetrial 0  courtclearlycommittednoerrorinusingthefactofthevictimsfearforhislife  inimposinganuppertermsentence.Evenifitwereassumedthisfindingwas 0 basedonfactsrelatingtotheacquittedcharges,noreasonableinferencecould  bedrawnthatthejurynecessarilyrejectedthefactthatthevictimwasinfearfor 0 hislifewithitsgeneralverdictofnotguilty.Thus,thetrialcourt,applyinga  preponderancestandard,properlyconsideredthevictimsfearasanaggravating 0 circumstance.# yyr#     &  2 6  D  .3  8 4 EvenIfItWereAssumedThatATrialCourtMayNotConsider # FactsFromAcquittedCountsForSentencingPurposes,No  $ PrejudicialErrorOccurredInTheInstantCase ll!%44 '" 4  ` y yContrarytoappellantscontention(ABM1920),thetrialcourtdidnot #' considerfactsrelatingtotheacquittedcountsinfindingthatthevictimsfear *%z ) constitutedanaggravatingcircumstance.Instead,therecorddemonstratesthat &!+ thetrialcourtfoundthatthevictimsfearresultedfromtheunlawfulconductof *(z#- takingordrivingthevictimsvehicle,i.e.,theoffenseofwhichappellantwas )$/ convicted,ratherthanfromtheallegedconductunderlyingtheacquittedcounts. *+z&1 Forinstance,thetrialcourtsstatement! Idoknowwithrespecttothecharge ,'3 onwhich[appellant]standsconvictedthattheevidencethatwehavebeforethe *.z)5 CourtthatIbelieveisentirelybelievableisthatwhenMr.Aranagotoutofthat  carhewasterrified!showsthatthetrialcourtwasfocusingontheevidence 0 ofthecountonwhichappellantwasconvicted.(RT2416.)Thetrialcourts  furtherreferencestoappellantspossessionofthecaragainstthevictimswill 0  andforhisownpurposes,andtothevictimsfearatthetimehelefthiscar,also   showthatthecourtwasbasingitsfindingsontheconductunderlyingthe 0   offenseofconviction.(RT2416.)Inaddition,thetrialcourtscommentsthat   boththevictimandappellantwereliarsandthatthejuryhadproperly weighed 0  italloutand sorteditoutinitsverdictsfurtherindicatedthatthetrialcourt   wasnotbasingitsfindingsontheevidenceunderlyingtheacquittedcounts. 0  (RT2415.)Accordingly,evenifatrialcourtisprohibitedfromconsidering  factsrelatingtoacquittedcounts,noerroroccurredintheinstantcase. 0  4  ` Moreover,evenifitwereassumedthatthetrialcourterred,therewasno  possibleprejudice.Thetrialcourtfoundthatappellantslengthycriminal 0 historywasanaggravatingcircumstanceandastheCourtofAppealnoted,  appellantsrecidivisthistorycouldhavesupportedthreeseparateaggravating 0 circumstancesundertheRulesofCourt.(Opn.,atp.6.fn.3.)Further,thetrial   courtfoundnomitigatingcircumstances.(RT24152417.)Accordingly,even 0" ifthetrialcourterred,itwasnotreasonablyprobablethatthecourtwouldhave $ sentencedappellanttoanytermotherthantheupperterm.Thus,anyerrorwas 0!& notprejudicial.(  Peoplev.Cruz(1995)38Cal.App.4th427,433434[ When "( atrialcourthasgivenbothproperandimproperreasonsforasentencechoice, 0$* areviewingcourtwillsetasidethesentenceonlyifitisreasonablyprobablethat %!, thetrialcourtwouldhavechosenalessersentencehaditknownthatsomeofits 0'". reasonswereimproper].)# yy# ($0   &  2 6  E  .3  8 4 AppellantsSentenceDidNotViolateTheDoubleJeopardyClause ll=+'344 '+J 4  ` y yThereisalsonomerittoappellantsclaimthatthetrialcourtviolatedthe -(5 DoubleJeopardyClausebyconsideringfactsfromacquittedcountsduring  sentencing.(ABM4951.)First,theDoubleJeopardyClausehasno 0 applicationtononcapitalsentencingdeterminations.(  Mongev.California  (1998)524U.S.721,724[118S.Ct.2246,141L.Ed.2d615];  Peoplev. 0  Hernandez(1998)19Cal.3d835,838.)Second,asexplainedabove,appellants   claimisbasedonthefaultypremisethatthetrialcourtsfindingastothe 0   victimsfearwasbasedonfactsfromanacquittedcount.Further,evenifthe   trialcourtconsideredfactsfromanacquittedcounttoimposeanenhanced 0  sentence,the  WattsdecisionconclusivelyestablishedthatappellantsDouble   Jeopardyrightswerenotviolated.(  Watts,supra,519U.S.atpp.154155;see 0  also  Wittev.UnitedStates,supra,515U.S.atpp.401403[sentencingcourt  could,consistentwiththeDoubleJeopardyClause,considerunchargedoffense 0 inimposingasentenceonoffenseofconvictionwithoutprecludingsubsequent  prosecutionforunchargedoffense].) 0  4  ` Inaddition,thereisnomerittoappellantsattempttodistinguish  Watts  onthegroundthat,under P Blakely,theaggravatingfactsinCaliforniamustbe 0 determinedbyajuryonastandardofbeyondareasonabledoubt.First,as   explainedinArgumentII, P Blakelydoesnotapplytothesentencingschemein 0" California.Furthermore, P Blakelyonlyinvolvedthe  SixthAmendmentrightto $ ajurytrialratherthantheDoubleJeopardyClause,and P Blakelydidnot 0!& disapproveof  Watts.SincetheSupremeCourtdidnotaddresstheissueof "( DoubleJeopardyin P Blakely,the P BlakelydecisiondidnotchangetheSupreme 0$* CourtsDoubleJeopardyprecedent.Sincethe  Wattsdecisionisstillvalidin %!, lightof P Blakely,appellantsDoubleJeopardyclaimmustfail.# yyX#  0'". & y    P2 6  II  .3      8 4 8` 44APPELLANTSSENTENCEDIDNOTVIOLATEHIS -} CONSTITUTIONALRIGHTTOAJURYTRIAL tYB  ԍ.C  +{` x` x 'yA 4  ` y yUnderthe  Sixthand  FourteenthAmendments,adefendanthasarightto ) y ajuryfinding,basedonproofbeyondareasonabledoubt,onanyfactthat   increaseshisorherpunishmentbeyondthestatutorymaximumsentencesetby ) y  thelegislature.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.2531;  Ringv.Arizona(2002)536    U.S.584[122S.Ct.2428,153L.Ed.2d556]; t ԀApprendiv.NewJersey,supra, )y  530U.S.466.)In P Blakely,supra,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtrecently   appliedthisconstitutionalruletoan exceptionalsentenceimposedunderthe )y  sentencingschemeintheStateofWashington,andheldthatthedefendants  sentenceviolatedthefederalConstitution. )y  4  ` Appellantcontendsthatsection | 1170isunconstitutionalunder P Blakely  insofarthatitpermitstheimpositionoftheuppertermbasedonrequired )y findingsofaggravatedfactorsfoundonlybyajudgeonastandardof  preponderanceoftheevidence.Heassertsthat,undersection | 1170,themiddle )y termisthestatutorymaximumbecausethemiddletermisthemaximum  sentencethatisauthorizedbythejurysverdictalone,andtheuppertermcannot )y! beimposedwithoutadditionalfactfindingbythejudge.Appellanttherefore # arguesthat P Blakelyisviolatedbytheimpositionoftheuppertermbasedon )!y% factorsthatwerenotfoundbythejurybeyondareasonabledoubt.(ABM21 "' 38.)Respondentfirstsubmitsthatappellantforfeitedthisclaimbyfailingto )$y) objecttohissentenceonthefederalconstitutionalgroundshenowraiseson % + appeal.Respondentfurthersubmitsthat P Blakelydoesnotprecludethetrialcourt )'y"- frommakingtherequisitefindingsonaggravatingcircumstancestosupportan (#/ uppertermsentenceunderCalifornialaw,thatappellantssentencedidnot )*y%1 violate P Blakely,andthatanyerrorwasharmless.# yy# +&3  -(5 P      &  2 6  A  .3  8 4 Blakelyv.Washington t44 ' 4  ` y yAsnotedabove, P Blakelyinvolvedaconstitutionalchallengetoasentence  imposedunderthelawsoftheStateofWashington.InWashington,allfelonies .~ arelegislativelyclassifiedasClassA,B,orCfelonies:ClassAfelonieshavea   maximumsentenceoflifeimprisonment,ClassBfelonieshaveamaximum . ~ sentenceof10years,andClassCfelonieshaveamaximumsentenceof5years.    (Wash.Rev.Code,  9A.20.010(b),  9A.20.021(1).) .~   4  ` Inadditiontothemaximumpenaltiessetforthinthefelonyclassification   statutes,theWashingtonStateSentencingReformActof1981( Sentencing .~  ReformAct)createdasecondlevelofsentencing.Underthissystem,each   criminaloffenseischaracterizedaccordingtoitsseriousnesslevel,andevery .~ criminaldefendantisassignedanoffenderscorebasedlargelyonthe  defendantspriorcriminalhistory.(Wash.Rev.Code,  9.94A.515, .~   9.94A.525.)TheSentencingReformActalsosetforthatwofactorsentencing  gridthatprescribesastandardsentencingrangebasedontheoffenseseriousness .~ levelandtheoffenderscore.(Wash.Rev.Code,  9.94A.510.)Thetrialcourt  mustsentencethedefendantwithinthisstandardrangeunlessthereare .~  substantialandcompellingreasonsjustifyingan exceptionalsentencethat " departsfromthestandardrangesetforthinthegrid.(Wash.Rev.Code, . ~$   9.94A.5.)Factualfindingsinsupportofanexceptionalsentencearemadeby !& thecourtonastandardofpreponderanceoftheevidence.(Wash.Rev.Code, .#~(   9.94A.530(2).)   $*  4  ` In P Blakely,thedefendantpledguiltytoseconddegreekidnapping .&~!, involvingdomesticviolenceanduseofafirearm.Underthefelony '". classificationsystem,seconddegreekidnappingwasaClassBfelonywitha .)~$0 maximumsentenceof10years.UnderthesentencinggridoftheSentencing *%2  ReformAct,thedefendantsoffenseofseconddegreekidnappingwitha .,~'4 firearm,coupledwithhisoffenderscore,resultedinastandardrangeof49to  53months.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atpp.25342535.) 0   4  ` Pursuanttothepleaagreement,theprosecutionrecommendedasentence  withinthestandardrange.But,afterhearingthevictimsdescriptionofthe 0  offense,thetrialcourtimposedanexceptionalsentenceof90months,which   was37monthsbeyondthetopofthestandardrange.Thecourtjustifiedthe 0   sentenceonthegroundthatthedefendanthadactedwithdeliberatecruelty,a   statutorilyenumeratedgroundfordepartureindomesticviolencecases. Faced 0  withanunexpectedincreaseofmorethanthreeyearsinhissentence,the   defendantobjected.Thecourtthenheldabenchhearingwithwitness 0  testimony,butthecourtultimatelyadheredtoitspriorfindingofdeliberate  cruelty.Afterthedefendantunsuccessfullyappealedhissentenceinstatecourt, 0 theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtgrantedcertiorari.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.  atpp.25352536.) 0  4  ` TheSupremeCourtexplainedthatthecaserequiredtheapplicationof  the  SixthAmendmentrulesetforthin t Apprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S. 0 466,490: Otherthanthefactofapriorconviction,anyfactthatincreasesthe   penaltyforacrimebeyondtheprescribedstatutorymaximummustbesubmitted 0" toajury,andprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt.TheCourtthenfoundthatthe $ defendantsexceptionalsentenceviolatedthe  SixthAmendmentbecausethe 0!& sentenceexceededthe53monthstatutorymaximumofthestandardrangeand "( wasbasedonafact(deliberatecruelty)thatwasnotadmittedbythedefendant 0$* orfoundbyajury.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atpp.15372538.) %!,  4  ` The P BlakelyCourtrejectedthestatesclaimthattherewasno 0'". constitutionalviolationbecausetherelevantstatutorymaximumwasthe10year ($0 maximumsentenceforClassBfeloniesratherthanthe53monthmaximumof 0*%2 thestandardrange.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atpp.25372538.)TheCourt +'4 explainedthat: 0-(6 8 4 the statutorymaximumforApprendipurposesisthemaximum  sentenceajudgemayimposesolelyonthebasisofthefactsreflectedin 0 thejuryverdictoradmittedbythedefendant.[Citations.]Inother  words,therelevant statutorymaximumisnotthemaximumsentence 0  ajudgemayimposeafterfindingadditionalfacts,butthemaximumhe   mayimposewithoutanyadditionalfindings.Whenajudgeinflicts 0   punishmentthatthejurysverdictalonedoesnotallow,thejuryhasnot   foundallthefacts whichthelawmakesessentialtothepunishment, 0  [citation],andthejudgeexceedshisproperauthority. 44 (Id.atp.2537,italicsinoriginal.)TheCourtfoundthatthestatutorymaximum 0  was53monthsbecausethesentencingjudgeacquiredtheauthoritytoexceed  thatmaximumonlybyfindingsomeadditionalfact.(Id.atpp.25372538.)# yyy# 0   &  2 6  B  .3  8 4 AppellantForfeitedTheInstantClaim t044 '0 4  ` y yUnlikeappellant,thedefendantin P Blakelyobjectedwhenthecourt .~ imposedhissentence.(RT24142421; P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2535.)  Respondentsubmitsthatappellantsfailuretoobjecttohissentence,letalone .~ baseonanobjectiononfederalconstitutionalgrounds,forfeitedhispresent ! claimoferror. . ~# 8 4 NoproceduralprincipleismorefamiliartothisCourtthanthata !% constitutionalright,orarightofanyothersort,maybeforfeitedin .#~' criminalaswellascivilcasesbythefailuretomaketimelyassertionof $) therightbeforeatribunalhavingjurisdictiontodetermineit..&~!+44 (  Peoplev.Saunders(1993)5Cal.4th580,590,quoting  UnitedStatesv.Olano '"- (1993)507U.S.725,731[113S.Ct.1770,123L.Ed.2d508],internalquotation .)~$/ marksomitted.)Further,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasexplainedthat *%1  thisforfeitureapplieswheretheclaimassertsafailuretohaveajurydetermine .,~'3 thetruthofsomefact.(See,e.g.,  Osbornev.Ohio(1990)495U.S.103,122  123[110S.Ct.1691,109L.Ed.2d98].) 0   4  ` Courtshaveappliedtheseprinciplesto t Apprendiclaims,andbylogical  extension,shouldapplythemto P Blakelyclaims,sincetheyarisefroman 0  applicationof t Apprendi.(  Peoplev.Marchand(2002)98Cal.App.4th1056,   10601061[defendantforfeited t Apprendiclaimbyfailingtospecificallyobject 0   onthatgroundbelow];butsee  Peoplev.Cleveland(2001)87Cal.App.4th263,   268,fn.2.)Thus,appellantforfeitedtheinstantclaimbyfailingtoobjecttohis 0  sentenceonthefederalconstitutionalgroundsthathenowpresentsonappeal.    4  ` Moreover,thisCourtsholdingin  Peoplev.Scott(1994)9Cal.4th331 0  lendsfurtheranalogoussupportfortheconclusionthatappellantforfeitedhis  claim.In  Scott,thisCourtexplainedthatthe righttochallengeacriminal 0 sentenceonappealisnotunrestricted,andthat acriminaldefendantcannot  argueforthefirsttimeonappealthatthecourt...aggravatedasentencebased 0 onitemscontainedinaprobationreportthatwereerroneousorotherwise  flawed.[Citation.](Id.atpp.351352.)Likeadefendantwhoassertsthetrial 0 courterredbybasingitssentencingchoiceonflawedfactsfromaprobation   report,adefendantraisinga P Blakelyclaimalsoessentiallyassertsthatthetrial 0" courtconsideredflawedsentencingfactorsinimposingthesentence.Thus,it $ logicallyfollowsthatbothdefendantsforfeittheirclaimsbyfailingtoobjectto 0!& thesentence. "(  4  ` Furthermore,thefactthat P Blakelywasnotdecideduntilafterappellants 0$* sentencinghearingdoesnotprecludeafindingofforfeiture. P Blakelyinvolves %!, anapplicationoftheholdingin t Apprendithat,undertheSixthAmendment,all 0'". factsusedtoincreaseadefendantssentencebeyondthestatutorymaximum ($0 mustbechargedandproventoajury.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2536.) 0*%2  Thus,appellant,likethedefendantin P Blakely,couldhaveraisedachallengeto +'4 hissentenceonthebasisof t Apprendi.Moreover,in  UnitedStatesv.Cotton   (2002)535U.S.625[122S.Ct.1781,152L.Ed.2d860],theUnitedStates 0 SupremeCourtfoundthatthefederaldefendantshadforfeitedtheir t Apprendi  claimsbynotobjectingattrialdespitethefactthat t Apprendiwasdecidedwhile 0  thedefendantscasewasonappeal.O r  4  /    ׀(Id.atpp.628629,631.)Consequently,   becauseappellantdidnotobjecttohissentenceonthebasisof t Apprendiorthe 0   constitutionalrighttoajurytrial,hisclaimisforfeited.    4  ` WhilethisCourtin  Saundersindicatedindictathattheconstitutional 0  righttoajurytrialcannotbeforfeitedbythefailuretoobject(  Saunders,supra,   5Cal.4th580,589,fn.5,citing  Peoplev.Holmes(1960)54Cal.2d442,443 0  444),thisCourthasnotsoheldinthecontextof t Apprendierror.Thelatter  contextisaparadigmaticcaseoftrial,ratherthanstructural,errorforwhichthe 0 forfeiturerulewillgenerallyapply.Indeed,thisCourtin  Holmesand  Peoplev.  Vera(1997)15Cal.4th269,276277,dealtwithadifferentconstitutionaljury 0 trialright"the  CaliforniaConstitutionsspecificrecognitionunderArticleI,  section16,thatajurytrialwaivercanbeeffectedonlybyadefendantsand 0 counselsexpresswaiver.(  Vera,supra,15Cal.4thatpp.277278;  Holmes,   supra,54Cal.2datpp.443444.)Thereisnosuchrightinthefederal 0" Constitutions  SixthAmendment.Accordingly,thegeneralforfeiturerulefor $ constitutionalerrorshouldapply. 0!&  4  ` Inaddition,appellantsfailuretoobjectshouldnotbeexcusedonthe "( basisthatsuchanobjectionwouldhavebeenfutile.First,appellantraisedno 0$* objectiononanygroundstohissentence.Further,aspreviouslynoted, P Blakely %!, involvesanapplicationof t Apprendi,andthedefendantin P Blakelyobjectedtoan 0'". aggravatedsentenceatthetimeofsentencingunder t Apprendi.Sincethe  defendantin P Blakelyultimatelyprevailedonhis t Apprendiclaim,appellant 0 shouldhavealsoraisedanobjectionunder t Apprenditopreservehisinstant  claim.Moreover,inordertopreserveaclaim,apartymustadvanceit,evenif 0  allprecedentiscontrary.(See  Bousleyv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S.614,   62223[118S.Ct.1604,140L.Ed.2d828];  MonsantoCo.v.SprayRiteService 0   Corp.(1984)465U.S.752,76162,fn.7[104S.Ct.1464,79L.Ed.2d775];     Engelv.Isaac(1982)456U.S.107,130,fn.35[102S.Ct.1558,71L.Ed.2d 0  783].)Therefore,appellantspossiblebeliefatsentencingthathisclaimwould   notprevaildoesnotjustifyafailuretoraiseanobjection.Accordingly, 0  appellantsclaimisforfeited.# yy#    &  2 6  C  .3  8 4 JudicialFactfindingOnAggravatingCircumstancesToSupportAn  UpperTermSentenceDoesNotViolateBlakely C44 'P 4  ` y yThedecisionin P Blakelyv.Washingtondoesnotprecludeatrialcourt  frommakingtherequiredfindingsonaggravatingcircumstancesforthe ,| impositionofanuppertermsentenceunderCalifornialaw.TheUnitedStates  SupremeCourthasconsistentlyheldthatthefederalConstitutiondoesnot ,|  prohibitjudicialfactfindingonaggravatingcircumstancesthatsupportaspecific " sentencewithinthestandardsentencingrangeauthorizedbythejurysfinding ,!|$ thatthedefendantisguiltyofaparticularoffense.InCalifornia,therelevant "& sentencingrangeformostfeloniesandnumerousenhancementsconsistsofthree ,$|( possibletermsofimprisonment(lower,middle,andupperterm)thatare % * specifiedbythesamecodesectionorsetofcodesectionsthatenumeratethe ,'|", elementsoftheoffense.BecauseCalifornialawprovidesthatthejuryverdict (#. authorizesthetrialcourttoimposeanyofthethreetermswithinthisrange,the ,*|%0 uppertermofthetriadistherelevantstatutorymaximum.Accordingly,theuse +&2 ofjudiciallyfoundaggravatingcircumstancestoimposetheuppertermdoesnot ,-|(4 infringeupontheprovinceofthejury,butinsteadlimitsjudicialdiscretionin  imposingasentencewithinthestatutorymaximum. 0  4  ` Aproperreadingof P Blakelyrequiresanexaminationofthelegaland  factualcontextinwhich P Blakelywasdecided.The P Blakelycourtfirstexplained 0  thatitwas applyingthe  SixthAmendmentruleoriginallysetforthin    t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atpage490: Otherthanthefactofaprior 0   conviction,anyfactthatincreasesthepenaltyforacrimebeyondtheprescribed   statutorymaximummustbesubmittedtoajury,andprovedbeyondareasonable 0  doubt.    4  ` In t Apprendiv.NewJersey,supra,530U.S.466,thedefendantpled 0  guiltytoachargeofpossessionofafirearmforanunlawfulpurpose,a second  degreeoffensewhichwaspunishablewithamaximumsentenceof10years. 0 Subsequenttothedefendantsguiltyplea,andoverthedefendantsobjections,  thetrialcourtfound,onapreponderanceoftheevidence,thatthedefendanthad 0 committedtheoffensewitharaciallybiasedpurpose.Basedonthisfactual  finding,thetrialcourtdeterminedthatahatecrimesentenceenhancement 0 whichwassetforthinaseparatestatuteandwhichincreasedthemaximum   sentenceforaseconddegreeoffenseto20yearswasapplicable.Thetrial 0" courtthenimposeda12yearsentencefortheoffense.(Id.atpp.469471.) $  4  ` The t ApprendiCourtexplainedthattheimpositionoftheNewJersey 0!& hatecrimeenhancementbaseduponjudicialfindingsconflictedwith(1)the "( historiclinkagebetweenpunishmentandthestatutorydefinitionofthecrimeof 0$* whichthedefendantwasconvictedand(2)theconsistentlimitationonjudges %!, discretiontooperatewithinthelimitsoftheprescribedlegalpenalties. 0'". ( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atpp.482483.)The t ApprendiCourtexplainedthat ($0 ajudgestraditionalexerciseofsentencingdiscretion wasboundbytherange 0*%2 ofsentencingoptionsprescribedbythelegislatureandthatthejudgesrolein +'4 sentencingwas constrainedatitsouterlimitsbythefactsallegedinthe 0-(6 indictmentandfoundbythejury.(Id.atpp.481,483,fn.10.)Adefendant  wasableto discernfromthestatuteofindictmentwhatmaximumpunishment 0 convictionunderthatstatutecouldbringsince punishmentwas,bylaw,tied  totheoffenseandjudgesonly exercisedsentencingdiscretionwithinalegally 0  prescribedrange.(Id.atp.483,fn.10;seealsoid.atp.478.)TheNewJersey   hatecrimeenhancementprovisionconflictedwiththeseprinciplesandtherefore 0   violatedthedefendants  SixthAmendmentrighttoajurytrialbecauseitallowed   thejurytoberemovedfromthedeterminationofafactthatexposedthe 0  defendanttoapenaltyexceedingthe prescribedrangeofpenaltiesbeyondthe   statutorymaximumfortheoffenseestablishedbythejurysverdict.(Id.atpp. 0  482483,490.)   4  ` The t ԀApprendiCourtexplained,however,thatadifferentconstitutional 0 outcomewouldresultwhenjudicialfactfindingoccurredwithinthestatutory  rangeauthorizedbythejurysverdict.The t ApprendiCourtnotedtherewas 0 nothinginthecommonlawhistorytosuggestthatitwas impermissiblefor  judgestoexercisediscretiontakingintoconsiderationvariousfactorsrelating 0 bothtooffenseandoffenderinimposingajudgmentwithintherange   prescribedbystatute,andthat judgesinthiscountryhavelongexercised 0" discretionofthisnatureinimposingsentencewithinstatutorylimitsinthe $ individualcase.( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.481,originalitalics.) 0!&  4  ` The t ApprendiCourtalsonotedthattheterm sentencingfactorwasstill "( viableinlightof t Apprendisholding.TheCourtexplained, 0$* 8 4 thetermappropriatelydescribesacircumstance,whichmaybeeither %!, aggravatingormitigatingincharacter,thatsupportsaspecificsentence 0'". withintherangeauthorizedbythejurysfindingthatthedefendantis ($0 guiltyofaparticularoffense.0*%244  ( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.494,fn.19,originalitalics.)Bycontrast, +'4 8 4 whentheterm sentenceenhancementisusedtodescribeanincrease   beyondthemaximumauthorizedstatutorysentence,itisthefunctional 0 equivalentofanelementofagreateroffensethantheonecoveredbythe  jurysguiltyverdict.Indeed,itfitssquarelywithintheusualdefinition 0  ofan elementoftheoffense. 44 (Ibid.)Thus,in t Apprendi,theNewJerseyhatecrimeprovisionclearlyinvolved 0   anenhancementorfunctionalelementofanoffenseratherthanasentencing   factorsinceitallowedthejudgetoimposepunishmentidenticaltoafirstdegree 0  offenseeventhoughthejuryconvictedthedefendantonlyofaseconddegree   offense.(Id.atpp.491492,494.) 0   4  ` Twoyearsafteritsdecisionin t Apprendi,theSupremeCourtheldin    Harrisv.UnitedStates(2002)536U.S.545[122S.Ct.2406,153L.Ed.2d524] 0 that t Apprendididnotapplytoafactincreasingthedefendantsminimum  sentence.Inreachingitsholding,theHarrisCourtfirstnoted, 0 8 4 Judicialfactfindinginthecourseofselectingasentencewithinthe  authorizedrangedoesnotimplicatetheindictment,jurytrial,and 0 reasonabledoubtcomponentsoftheFifthandSixthAmendments. 44 (  Harris,supra,536U.S.atp.558.) 0"  4  ` The  HarrisCourtalsostated, $ 8 4 Whetherchosenbythejudgeorthelegislature,thefactsguidingjudicial 0!& discretionbelowthestatutorymaximumneednotbeallegedinthe "( indictment,submittedtothejury,orprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt. 0$* ...whenthejudgechoosesasentencewithintherange,thegrandand %!, petitjuriesalreadyhavefoundallofthefactsnecessarytoauthorizethe 0'". Governmenttoimposethesentence.Thejudgemayimposethe ($0 minimum,themaximum,oranyothersentencewithintherangewithout 0*%2 seekingfurtherauthorizationfromthosejuries!andwithout +'4 contradictingApprendi.0-(644 (  Harris,supra,536U.S.atp.565.)   4 TheCourtfurtherexplained, 0 8 4 Thejudgemayselectanysentencewithintherange,basedonfactsnot  allegedintheindictmentorprovedtothejuryevenifthosefactsare 0  specifiedbythelegislature,andeveniftheypersuadethejudgeto   chooseamuchhighersentencethanheorsheotherwisewouldhave 0   imposed.Thatafactaffectsthedefendantssentence,evendramatically   so,doesnotbyitselfmakeitanelement.0 44 (Id.atp.566.)    4  ` Indeed,threeyearsbefore  Harris,thesamefivejusticesasinthe P Blakely 0  majorityexplainedthatfactsthatraisethe sentencingrangeor penalty  rangeforacrimeareordinarilysubjecttojurydeterminations,butexplicitly 0 rejectedthepositionthat everyfindingunderlyingasentencingdetermination  mustbemadebyajury.(  UnitedStatesv.Jones(1999)526U.S.227,242, 0 248,251[119S.Ct.1215,143L.Ed.2d311].)   4  ` Thus,whenviewedwithinthelegalcontextoftheaboveprecedent, 0  P Blakelymeansthatadefendantchargedwithaspecificoffensemustnotonly   havenoticeofthesentencingrangelegislativelymandatedforthatparticular 0" offense,butmustalsohavetherighttoajurydeterminationofthefacts $ subjectinghimtothatsentencingrange.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2543.) 0!& Inotherwords,the t Apprendi/ P Blakelyinquiryseekstoidentifyfunctional "( elementsofanoffensethataremasqueradingasfactorslefttothesentencing 0$* judgesdiscretion.Indeed,anexpansivereadingof P Blakelyanditsdefinitionof %!, the statutorymaximumtomeanthatallfactsincreasingasentencemustbe 0'". foundbyajury,regardlessofwhetherthosefactsmerelyincreasethesentence ($0 withinthelegislativelyprescribedrangeforacrime,isinconsistentwiththe 0*%2 UnitedStatesSupremeCourtspronouncementsin  Harrisand t Apprendithat +'4 judicialfactfindingwithintheauthorizedrangeisconstitutionallypermissible. 0-(6 (  UnitedStatesv.Koch(6thCir.2004)___F.3d___[2004U.S.App.LEXIS  18138,*20](enbanc)[abroadreadingofBlakely wouldcreatetensionwith 0 theCourtsotherdecisionsgivinglegislatureswideberthindistinguishing  betweensentencingfactsandelementsofthecrimefacts].) 0   4  ` InCalifornia,adefendantchargedwithaspecificoffensehasnoticeof   thesentencingrangelegislativelymandatedforthatparticularoffense,andhas 0   therighttoajurydeterminationofthefactssubjectinghimtothatsentencing   range.UnderCaliforniasdeterminatesentencingscheme,thethreepossible 0  termsofimprisonmentspecifiedinthestatuteofconvictionQ r  5  /    ׀constitutethe   prescribed rangeofpunishmentauthorizedbythejurysverdictthatthe 0  defendantisguiltyofaparticularoffense.(  1170,subd.(a)(3)[upon  conviction,thecourtshallsentencethedefendanttoanyoneofthethree 0 specifiedtermsofimprisonmentprescribedfortheoffenseofconviction];  Hall,  supra,8Cal.4thatp.957[DeterminateSentencingActof1976 replaced 0 indeterminatesentencesforsubstantiveoffenseswitharangeofthreepossible  sentences(lower,middle,andupperterms)].)Thus,itisthejurys 0 determinationthattheelementsoftheoffensehavebeenprovedbeyonda   reasonabledoubt,asreflectedbythejurysguiltyverdict,thatexposesthe 0" defendanttotheentirerangeofpunishmentthatisspecifiedforthatoffensein $ thestatuteofconviction.( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.491,fn.16[ Ifthe 0!& factsfoundbyajurysupportaguiltyverdictofmurder,thejudgeisauthorized "( bythatjuryverdicttosentencethedefendanttothemaximumsentenceprovided 0$* bythemurderstatute].) %!,  4  ` Becausetheelementsofaparticularoffense,asreflectedbythejurys 0'". verdictthatthedefendantcommittedthatoffense,arethefactsthatauthorizethe ($0 impositionofanyofthethreepossiblesentenceswithinthethreetieredrange  ofpunishment,theuppertermsentenceistherefore themaximumsentencea 0 judgemayimposesolelyonthebasisofthefactsreflectedinthejuryverdictor  admittedbythedefendant.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2537,original 0  italics.)Anyadditionalpostverdictfactfindingbyajudgeundersection  1170,   subdivision(b),merelysetstheappropriatepunishmentwithintherange 0   authorizedbythejurysverdict.Inotherwords,thesejudiciallyfoundfactsare   merely factsguidingjudicialdiscretionbelowthestatutorymaximum,and 0  therefore neednotbeallegedintheindictment,submittedtothejury,orproved   beyondareasonabledoubt.(  Harris,supra,536U.S.atp.565.)Becausethe 0  SupremeCourtexplainedin t Apprendiand  Harristhatthistypeofjudicial  factfindingisconstitutionallypermissibleunder t Apprendi,theupperterm 0 sentenceisthestatutorymaximum,asdefinedby t Apprendiand P Blakely.   4  ` Inaddition,thisCourthaspreviouslyexplainedthattheaggravating 0 circumstancesnecessarytoimposetheuppertermaresimplythetypeof  sentencingfactorsthatsupportaspecificsentencewithintherangeauthorized 0 bythejurysfindingthatthedefendantisguiltyofaparticularoffense:   8 4 [TheCourtofAppeal]failstodistinguishatrialcourtsdecisionin 0" fashioningappropriatepunishmentfromtheneedtoestablishbeforethe $ trieroffactthewrongfulcriminalconductforwhichpunishmentisbeing 0!& imposed. Sentencingfactssuchasaggravatingandmitigating "( circumstancesassistajudgeinselectingfromamongtheoptionsof 0$* punishmentthetrieroffactsverdicthasmadeavailable.Theyhelpthe %!, courtselect,forexample,thehigher,middle,orlowertermandwhether 0'". termsshouldbeconsecutiveorconcurrent.Suchfactorsarelargelythe ($0 articulationofconsiderationssentencingjudgeshavealwaysusedin 0*%2  makingthesedecisions.+'444 (  Peoplev.Hernandez(1988)46Cal.3d194,205,italicsadded,abrogatedon   anothergroundin  Peoplev.King(1993)5Cal.4th59,78,fn.5;seealso  People 0 v.Wright(1982)30Cal.3d705,713[ termsweretobefixedbychoosingone  ofthealternativesonthebasisofcircumstancesrelatingtothecrimeandtothe 0  defendant].)GiventhisCourtsdescriptionoftheroleofaggravating   circumstancesinimposingtheuppertermadescriptionthatcloselymirrors 0   theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsdescriptionofconstitutionallypermissible   sentencingfactorsin t Apprendiand  Harris󀄄judicialfactfindingonaggravating 0  circumstancesdoesnotviolateadefendants  SixthAmendmentrights.    4  ` Moreover, P Blakelyisinapplicabletotheimpositionoftheupperterm 0  sentencebecausetherearecriticalandconstitutionallysignificantdifferences  betweenCaliforniassentencingschemeandtheWashingtonsentencingscheme 0 atissuein P Blakely.InWashington,itisthesentencinggridratherthanthe  generalfelonyclassificationstatutethatspecificallylinkstheactualelementsof 0 theoffensecommittedbythedefendantwithaparticularrangeofpenalties.R r  6  /    ׀  Washington,however,alsohasastatuteofgeneralapplicabilitythatallows 0 departurefromthestandardrangeofpenaltiessetforthinthesentencinggrid.   Thus,itwasinthatcontextthatthe P BlakelyCourtdescribedtherelevant 0" statutorymaximumasthemaximumajudge mayimposewithoutadditional $ findings.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2537.)AsthefederalFifthCircuit 0!& CourtofAppealsexplained,theWashingtonsentencingscheme essentially "( establishedtwodistinctstatutorymaximumsentences,andinsucha 0$* circumstance, itmakessensetosaythatthelegislaturehaseffectivelycreated %!, twodistinctoffenses.(  UnitedStatesv.Pineiro(5thCir.2004)377F.3d464, 0'". 473.) ($0  4  ` Bycontrast,itmakesnosensetosaythattheCaliforniaLegislaturehas  essentiallycreatedtwodistinctoffensesjustbecausethestatuteofconviction 0 providesthatamiddletermandanuppertermarepotentialpenaltiesforthe  sameoffense.UnliketheWashingtonscheme,wherethelinkbetweenthe 0  specificelementsoftheoffenseandthecorrespondingprescribedpunishment   forthoseelements(asmanifestedinthesentencinggrid)canbesupersededby 0   adeparturestatuteofgeneralapplicability,theCaliforniaschemespecifically   tiesaparticulartriadofprisontermswiththeelementsoftheoffenseof 0  convictioninthesamestatute.TheLegislaturehasthusdeterminedthatajury   findingonthoseelementsauthorizesanyofthethreepossibleterms,andhas 0  thereforeeffectivelysettheloweranduppertermsastheouterparametersofa  singlerangeofpenaltiesforasinglecriminaloffense.Thus,theelementsofa 0 particularoffensearethe legallyessentialfactsthatexposethedefendantto  thelower,middle,anduppertermsthattheLegislaturehasprescribedforthat 0 offense.Accordingly,thecoreconstitutionalprinciplesunderlyingthe t Apprendi  doctrinethenecessarylinkbetweenverdictandpunishment,andthe 0 constraintonjudicialsentencingdiscretiontooperatewithinthepenalties   prescribedbythelegislaturearenotoffendedbyjudicialfactfindingon 0" aggravatingcircumstancestoimposetheuppertermbecausetheuppertermis $ themaximumsentenceauthorizedbythejuryverdictandprovidedbythestatute 0!& ofconviction.( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.491,fn.16[ Ifthefactsfound "( byajurysupportaguiltyverdictofmurder,thejudgeisauthorizedbythatjury 0$* verdicttosentencethedefendanttothemaximumsentenceprovidedbythe %!, murderstatute].) 0'".  4  ` ThisCourtsdecisionsconcerningtheinapplicabilityof t Apprendiand ($0   Ringv.Arizona,supra,536U.S.584(whichapplied t ApprenditoArizonas 0*%2 capitalsentencingscheme)tothepenaltydeterminationinacapitalcaseunder +'4 Californialawarealsoinstructive.Forinstance,inacasedecidedafter P Blakely, 0-(6 thisCourtexplainedthatoncethejuryhasfoundonespecialcircumstancetrue  beyondareasonabledoubt,nofurtherfactsneedtobeprovedinorderto 0 increasethepunishmentforfirstdegreemurdertoeitherdeathorlifewithout  thepossibilityofparolebecausebothwere prescribedaspotentialpenalties 0  insection190.2.(  Peoplev.Griffin(2004)33Cal.4th536,595.)ThisCourt   furtherexplainedthat,eventhoughtheultimatepenaltydecisiondependson 0   determinationsastowhichofthetwopenaltiesisappropriateandwhetherthe   evidenceinaggravationoutweighedtheevidenceinmitigation, those 0  determinationsdonotentailthefindingsoffactsthatcanincreasethe   punishmentformurderofthefirstdegreebeyondthemaximumotherwise 0  providedbylaw.(Ibid.)   4  ` Similarly,oncethejuryhasfoundthedefendantguiltyofaparticular 0 offense,nofurtherfactsneedtobeprovedtothejuryinordertoimposethe  uppertermbecausetheuppertermisspecificallyprescribedasapotential 0 penaltyinthestatuteofconviction.Thus,anyfactfindingonaggravating  circumstancesdoesnotentailthefindingsoffactsthatcanincreasethe 0 punishmentfortheoffensebeyondthemaximumotherwiseprovidedbythefull   rangeofpenaltiesprescribedfortheoffense. 0"  4  ` Moreover,itcannotbesaidthatadefendantinCaliforniahasa legal $ rightoris entitledtothemiddletermuponconviction.( P Blakely,supra,124 0!& S.Ct.atp.2540.)In P Blakely,theCourtexplainedthataburglarknowsheis "( riskinga40yearsentenceinasystemthatpunishesburglarywitharangeof10 0$* to40years,whereas,inasystemthatpunishesburglarywitha10yearsentence %!, andtheuseofagunwithanadditional30yearsentence,theunarmedburglar 0'". isentitledtonomorethana10yearsentence.(Ibid.)Applyingthis ($0 hypotheticaltotheimpositionoftheuppertermdemonstratesthatCalifornias 0*%2 sentencingschemeisfarmoreanalogoustotheformersystemratherthanthe +'4 latter. 0-(6  4  ` InCalifornia,adefendantisonfullnoticethatheorsherisksanupper  termsentencewhenhecommitsaparticularoffensebecausetheuppertermis 0 identifiedasapotentialpenaltyinthecodesectionorsetofcodesectionsthat  enumeratestheelementsoftheoffensethatthedefendanthascommitted.Thus, 0  thedefendantinCalifornia,unlikethedefendantinWashington,isable to   discernfromthestatuteofindictmentwhatmaximumpunishmentconviction 0   underthatstatutecouldbring.( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.483,fn.10.)   Further,thecharginginformation,liketheinformationintheinstantcase(CT 0  7177),willoftensetforththefullsentencingrangeforthechargedoffense.   Thus,unliketheimpositionofanexceptionalsentenceinWashington,orthe 0  sentencingschemementionedin P Blakelywhereadefendanthasnowarningthat  hismaximumpotentialsentencecouldballoonfromfiveyearstolife 0 imprisonment( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2542),theimpositionoftheupper  termdoesnotresultinanunexpectedincreaseinthedefendantssentence. 0  4  ` ThisCourtsholdingin  Peoplev.Scott,supra,alsobeliesthenotionthat  adefendanthadalegal righttothemiddletermuponconviction.In  Scott, 0 thisCourtexplainedthatthechoiceofwhethertoimpose thelowerorupper   terminsteadofthemiddletermofimprisonmentiscommittedtothe 0" sentencingcourts broaddiscretiontotailorthesentencetotheparticularcase. $ (  Scott,supra,9Cal.4thatp.349.)Becausetheimpositionofanyofthethree 0!& termsisconsideredan authorizedsentence,thisCourtheldthatadefendant "( forfeitsallclaimsofsentencingerrorifheorshefailstointerposeatimely 0$* objectiontosuchanauthorizedsentence.(  Scott,supra,9Cal.4thatpp.353 %!, 354.)Thus,uponconviction,adefendantdoesnothavealegalrighttoanything 0'". otherthanoneofthethreespecifiedterms.Ifoneofthosetermsisimposed,a ($0 defendantcanmerelyseekreviewonthegroundthatthecourtabusedits 0*%2 discretioninmakingaparticularchoice.(Seeid.atp.354[ [i]nessence,claims +'4 deemedwaivedonappealinvolvesentenceswhich,thoughotherwisepermitted 0-(6 bylaw,wereimposedinaprocedurallyorfactuallyflawedmanner],italics  added.) 0 Ѐ 4  ` Further,adefendantdoesnotobtainalegalrightorentitlementtothe  middletermfromthelegislativedirectiveinsection  1170,subdivision(b),that 0  whenthreepossibleprisontermsarepredicatedonconvictionforagiven   offense, thecourtshallorderimpositionofthemiddleterm,unlessthereare 0   circumstancesinaggravationormitigationofthecrime.Themerefactthatthe   Legislaturehasindicatedastatutorypreferenceforthemiddleterminorderto 0  promotethepolicygoalsofeliminatingsentencingdisparityandpromoting   uniformityofsentencesdoesnotmeanthatithasessentiallycreatedseparate, 0  enhancedcrimescontainingthemyriad,nonexclusivesentencingfactors  enumeratedintheRulesofCourt.(Seerules  4.408,  4.421,  4.423.)Indeed, 0 giventhatthelegislativeintentwastosimplymakethemiddletermthe   averageorusualterm(AdvisoryComm.com.,foll.Cal.RulesofCourt,rule 0   4.420),itcannotbesaidthatadefendanthasalegalrightorentitlementtothe  tothemostcommonorthestatisticalmeanofthethreepossibletermsimposed 0 foraparticularoffense.    4  ` Morefundamentally,section  1170,subdivision(b),mustbereadin 0" propercontext.Theapplicationofthemiddletermisnotthefirststepinthe $ determinationoftheappropriatebaseterm;rather,itisthedefaultconclusionif 0!& thetrialcourtfindsno circumstancesinaggravationormitigationofthe "( crime.(  1170,subd.(b).)Thus,itisintheabsenceofsuchcircumstances 0$* thatacourt shallthenimposethemiddleterm.(  Peoplev.Thornton(1985) %!, 167Cal.App.3d72,7677;  Peoplev.Myers(1983)148Cal.App.3d699,703.) 0'". Becausetheapplicationofthemiddletermisnotthefirststepinthe ($0 determinationofthebaseterm,anuppertermcannotbeviewedasagraduated 0*%2 stepabovethemiddletermthatcanbereachedandauthorizedonlyby +'4 additionalfactfindingfromajudge.Instead,theuppertermissimplythetop 0-(6 tieroftherangeauthorizedbythejurysverdict,withthetrialcourthavingthe  discretionaryauthoritytoimposeanyofthethreetermsintherange. 0  4  ` Thus,anyjudicialfactfindingpredicatedundersection  1170,subdivision  (b),issimplyintendedtobeadiscretionarydeterminationoftheproperterm 0  withinthesentencingrangefortheparticularoffense.(  Scott,supra,9Cal.4th   atp.349.)Indeed,theLegislatureexpresslyfoundthatitssentencingpolicy 0   goals canbestbeachievedbydeterminatesentencesfixedbystatutein   proportiontotheseriousnessoftheoffenseasdeterminedbytheLegislatureto 0  beimposedbythecourtwithspecifieddiscretion.S r  7  /    ׀(  1170,subd.(a).)Thus,   section  1170,subdivision(b),andtherelatedRulesofCourtmerelychanneland 0  guidejudicialdiscretionwithinthelegislativelyauthorizedlimits,anddonot  setthemiddletermasthe statutorymaximum,asdefinedby P Blakely. 0  4  ` Insum,determinatesentencingschemescomplywith P Blakelywhere,as  inCalifornia,thelegislaturesetsamaximum,offensespecificpenalty,solong 0 asthedefendantreceivesasentencethatisnotgreaterthanthatmaximum.  КCaliforniassystemdoesnotsufferfromtheconstitutionalflawsidentifiedby 0  P Blakely.CaliforniasLegislaturecreatedasysteminwhichmostoffenseshave   anassociatedlower,middle,andupperterm,ofwhichdefendantsnecessarily 0" havenoticeandafullunderstandingoftheirlegalrighttoreceiveoneofthe $ threeterms,absentanadditionaljuryfinding.Thus,anaggravating 0!& circumstanceusedtoimposetheuppertermisnotafunctionalelementofa "( greateroffense;rather,itissimplythetypeofsentencingfactorthatjudgeshave  historicallyusedintheirbroaddiscretiontoimposetheappropriatesentence 0 withintherangeofpenaltiesthatisauthorizedbythejurysverdict.   4  ` NordoesCaliforniahaveageneralizeddeparturestatuteallowingfora 0  greatersentencetobeimposedabovethestatutorilymandatedtriadassociated   witheveryoffense.Asexplainedearlier,Washingtonsdeparturestatute 0   violatedtheconstitutionalconcernsof t Apprendiand P Blakelybecauseitbroke   thenecessarylinkbetweenthejurysfindingsandthecorresponding 0  punishment.UnlikeWashington,Californiahasasystemofenhancementsand   alternatesentencingschemes,bywhichasentencecanbeextendedbeyondthe 0  standardrangeimposedbytheLegislature.Critically,underCaliforniastatutes,  sentenceenhancementsandalternatesentencingschemesthathavethepotential 0 toelevateadefendantssentencebeyondthestandardrangestatutorilyassigned  toagivenoffensemustbepledandproventothejurybeyondareasonable 0 doubt.(See,e.g.,  1170.1,subd.(e)[enhancements],and  1025,  1158[prior  convictionallegations].)Accordingly,Californiasatisfies P Blakelysrequirement 0 that,beforeadefendantcanbesentencedoutsidethestandardrangeidentified   bytheLegislatureasappropriateforaparticularoffense,ajurymustfind 0" beyondareasonabledoubtthatthedefendantiseligibleforanenhancementor $ alternativeschemethatexposesthedefendanttoahighersentence.Asappellant 0!& receivedoneofthethreelegislativelyauthorizedtermsforhisoffenseof "( conviction,no  SixthAmendmentviolationoccurred.# yy# 0$*   &  2 6  D  .3  8 4 EvenIfThisCourtConcludesThatBlakelyAppliesToUpperTerm 0'"- Sentences,ThereWasNoBlakelyErrorInTheInstantCase ی.(~#.44 '0' 4  ` y yEvenifthisCourtshouldconcludethat P Blakelygenerallyprecludesatrial ,*|%0 courtfrommakingtherequiredfindingstoimposeanuppertermsentence,and +&2 themiddletermisthereforethestatutorymaximumofthetriad,therewasno ,-|(4 violationof P Blakelyintheinstantcasefortwoindependentreasons.First,  appellantsadmissionsonthepriorprisontermenhancementsraisedthe 0 statutorymaximumtoatleasteightyears,andappellantseightyearsentence  didnotexceedthatmaximum.Secondly,thetrialcourtsfindingthatappellant 0  hadalengthycriminalhistoryfellundertherecidivismexceptionto P Blakelyand   wasalsoestablishedbyappellantsadmissionsregardinghispriorconvictions, 0   andthisfindingwassufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionoftheupperterm.# yyM#    4 &   2 6  1  .3  8 ` BecauseAppellantsAdmissionsOnThePriorPrisonTerm   EnhancementsIncreasedTheStatutoryMaximumToEight   Years,TheJudicialFactfindingDidNotIncreaseAppellants   SentenceBeyondTheStatutoryMaximum ` x` x 'ܒ 4  ` y y P Blakelydefinedthestatutorymaximumas themaximumsentencea  judgemayimposesolelyonthebasisofthefactsreflectedinthejuryverdictor (x admittedbythedefendant.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2537,original  italics.)Here,eventhemiddletermoftheprescribedstatutoryrangeforthe (x substantiveoffense,combinedwithappellantsadmissionsonthechargedprior  convictionandprisontermallegations,resultedinanauthorizedsentenceof (x eightyears,i.e.,thesamesentencethetrialcourtactuallyimposed.    4  ` Thissentenceiscalculatedasfollows.Appellantsfelonyconvictionof ( x" unlawfultakingordrivingofavehiclecarriedthestandardrangeofsixteen !$ months,twoyears,orthreeyears.(Veh.Code,  10851,subd.(a);  18.) (#x& Becauseappellantadmittedthathehadsufferedapriorfelonyconvictionof $( unlawfultakingordrivingofavehicle,thestandardrangewasincreasedtotwo, (&x!* three,orfouryearsundersection666.5.(   666.5,subd.(a);Veh.Code, '",    10851,subd.(e).)Thisstandardrangewasthendoubledtoarangeoffour,six, ()x$. oreightyearsbyappellantsadmissionthathehadsufferedaprior strike *%0 conviction.Appellantwasfurtherexposedtoanadditionaltwoyearsof (,x'2 imprisonmentbecauseofhisadmissionsthathehadservedtwovalidprior -(4 prisonterms.(   667.5,subd.(b)).T r  8  /    ׀Thus,eventhemiddletermofsixyears,  coupledwiththetwooneyearpriorprisontermenhancements,yieldedan 0 exposuretoaprisontermofatleasteightyears.Inotherwords,thetrialcourt  couldhaveimposedamaximumsentenceofatleasteightyears withoutany 0  additionalfindings.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2537,originalitalics.)    4  ` Inlightofthiseightyearexposure,thetrialcourtssentencingdecision 0   couldrelyonfactualfindingsthatwerenotreflectedinthejuryverdictor   admittedbyappellanttosentencehimtoeightyears.Accordingly,appellants 0  eightyearsentenceisvalid.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2538[asentence   basedinpartonjudiciallyfoundfactsdoesnotviolateadefendantsrighttojury 0  wherethesentenceisnot inexcessofthatotherwiseallowedfor[the  underlying]offense];id.atp.2537[aconstitutionalviolationoccurredifthe 0 judge imposedasentencegreaterthanthemaximumhecouldhaveimposed  understatelawwithoutthechallengedfactualfinding].) 0  4  ` Appellant,however,contendsthatthestatutorymaximumwasonlysix  years,themiddletermofthesubstantiveoffense.Heconcedesthathissentence 0 wassubjecttofurtherenhancementbythepriorprisonterms,butheomitsthe   twopriorprisontermsfromhiscomputationofthestatutorymaximumonthe 0" apparentbasisthatthesetwoenhancementswereultimatelystrickenbythetrial $ court.(ABM36.)Appellantisincorrect. 0!&  4  ` Contrarytoappellantsapparentsuggestion,thetrialcourtsultimate "( strikingofthetwopriorprisontermenhancementshadnoeffectonthe 0$* computationofthestatutorymaximum,asdefinedby P Blakely.In t Apprendi,the %!, SupremeCourtinstructedthatthestatutorymaximuminvolvesthemaximum 0'". penalty towhichacriminaldefendantisexposedonaparticularcount. ($0 ( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.490.)Similarly, P Blakelysdefinitionofthe  statutorymaximuminvolvesthemaximumpotentialsentencetowhicha 0 defendantisexposedatthetimeoftheguiltyverdictorplea.( P Blakely,supra,  124S.Ct.atp.2537.)TheSupremeCourtexplainedin P Blakelythatthe 0  statutorymaximumisthemaximumsentenceajudge mayimposebasedon   factsfromthejuryverdictoradmittedbythedefendant,andwithoutadditional 0   findings.(Ibid.)TheCourtalsoexplainedthattheWashingtontrialjudge    couldnothaveimposedtheexceptionalsentencewithoutadditional 0  factfinding.(Ibid.)Thus,thestatutorymaximumisthedefendantsmaximum   sentenceexposurepriortothetrialcourtsactualexerciseofitsdiscretionary 0  choicesinimposingasentence.U r  9  /       4  ` Moreover,strikingapriordoesnotinvalidatetheunderlyingtruefinding 0 oradmissionoftheprior.(  Peoplev.Garcia(1999)20Cal.4th490,496[ the  strikingordismissalofachargeofpriorconviction...isnottheequivalentof 0 adeterminationthatdefendantdidnotinfactsuffertheconviction[citations];  suchjudicialactionistaken...forthepurposeofsentencingonly,internal 0 quotationmarksomitted].)Therefore,under P Blakely,atrialcourts    discretionarysentencingdecisiontodismissapriorissimplyadownward 0" departurefrom,anddoesnotchange,thestatutorymaximumthatwasalready  establishedbythefactsfoundbythejuryoradmittedbythedefendant. 0   4  ` Thus,intheinstantcase,thetrialcourtsdiscretionarysentencing  decisiontoultimatelystrikethetwopriorprisontermenhancementsdidnot 0  affectappellantsexposuretoaneightyearprisonsentence.Asexplained   above,atthetimeoftheguiltyverdictandappellantsadmissions,thecourt 0   couldhaveimposedasentenceofatleasteightyearswithoutanyadditional   factfinding.Accordingly, P Blakelywasnotviolatedbecausethetrialcourt 0  imposedasentencethatdidnotexceedthestatutorymaximum.# yyʔ#    4 &   2 6  2  .3  8 ` TheTrialCourtsAggravatedCircumstanceFindingThat  AppellantHadALengthyCriminalHistoryProvidedThe  TrialCourtWithTheAuthorityToImposeTheUpperTerm 4` x` x '( 4  ` y yInaddition, P Blakelywasnotviolatedbecausethetrialcourtsaggravated  circumstancefindingthatappellanthadalengthycriminalhistoryfellunderthe *z recidivismexceptionto P Blakely,andbecausethefactualbasisofthefindingwas  fullyestablishedbyappellantsadmissionsonhispriorconvictionsandprison *z terms.Sinceasingleaggravatingcircumstanceissufficienttoauthorizean  uppertermsentence,thetrialcourtsrecidivismfindingauthorizedthe *z! impositionoftheuppertermsentence.Accordingly,evenunderappellants  # expansivereadingof P Blakely,theuppertermsentencebecamethestatutory *"z% maximumandanyadditionaljudicialfactfindingwasconstitutionally #' permissiblebecausesuchfactfindingdidnotincreaseappellantsactualsentence *%z ) beyondthestatutorymaximum.# yyг# &!+   ,'1  4  `  2 6  a  .3  8 TheAlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStatesRecidivism   Exception Ъ L L  4  ` y yIn  AlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)523U.S.224,226[118  S.Ct.1219,140L.Ed.2d350],theSupremeCourtheldthatthefactofa , | defendantsrecidivismdidnotneedtobeincludedintheindictmentorproved   toajurybeyondareasonabledoubtbecauseitwasnotan elementofthe , |  offense,eventhoughthefactcouldincreasethedefendantspunishment.(Id.    atpp.226,223249.)The  AlmendarezTorresCourtexplainedthatthe ,|   sentencingfactoratissuehere!recidivismisatraditional,ifnotthemost   traditional,basisforasentencingcourtsincreasinganoffenderssentence. ,|  (Id.atp.243.)Citing  AlmendarezTorres,the t ApprendiCourtexcluded the  factofapriorconvictionfromthegeneralrulerequiringanyfactthatincreased ,| thepenaltybeyondtheprescribedstatutorymaximumtobesubmittedtoajury  andprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt.( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atpp.489 ,| 490.)TheSupremeCourtretainedthe  AlmendarezTorresexceptionin P Blakely.  ( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2536.) ,|  4  ` Moreover,the  AlmendarezTorresexceptionisnotlimitedtothemere  factofapriorconviction.Rather,theexceptionincludesfactsinvolving ,|! recidivism,suchasmattersinvolvingthesentenceimposedandthestatusand # timingofthedefendantsincarcerationinrelationtowhenhecommitted ,!|% subsequentoffenses.(  Peoplev.Thomas(2001)91Cal.App.4th212,215223; "' seealso  Peoplev.Epps(2001)25Cal.4th19,26[thedeterminationwhethera ,$|) defendantwassentencedtoprisonis largelylegal];  Peoplev.Prather(1990) % + 50Cal.3d428,439440[consideringpriorprisontermstobea subsetofprior ,'|"- convictionsforpurposesofthe doublethebasetermlimitation].) (#/  4  ` Thus,evenif P Blakelyappliestotheimpositionofupperterms,a ,*|%1  defendanthasnorighttoajurytrialonanyaggravatingcircumstancebasedon +&3 hisorherrecidivism,andacourtcanproperlymakesentencingfindings   regardingthedefendantsrecidivismwithoutviolatingthefederalConstitution. 0 # yyù# 4  ` &   2 6  b  .3  8 ASingleAggravatingCircumstanceProvidesThe   TrialCourtWithAuthorityToImposeTheUpper   Term   L L '  4  ` y yFurthermore,what P Blakelymakesclearisthatthefederalconstitutional    inquirylookssolelytowhetherthefactorfactsthatrenderthedefendanteligible *z  foranenhancedoraggravatedsentencehavebeenprovedtothejury.The    P BlakelyCourtexplainedthattheConstitutiondefinesthe statutorymaximum *z  as themaximumsentencethetrialcourtmayimposesolelyonthebasisofthe  factsreflectedinthejuryverdictoradmittedbythedefendant.( P Blakely,supra, *z 124S.Ct.atp.2537,firstitalicsadded.)Theconstitutionaltestsetforthin   P Blakelyfocusesonthejudges authoritytoimposeanenhancedsentence,and *z theCourtdrewnodistinctionbetweensystemsinwhichthedefendants  eligibilityfor anenhancedsentencedependsonafindingofaspecifiedfact(as *z inApprendi),oneofseveralspecifiedfacts(asinRing),oranyaggravatingfacts  (ashere).( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atp.2538,italicsadded.) r  10  /     *z   4  ` UnderCalifornialaw,asingleaggravatingcircumstanceissufficientto " renderadefendanteligiblefortheupperterm.(  Peoplev.Osband(1996)13 *!z$ Cal.4th622,728;  Peoplev.Castellano(1983)140Cal.App.3d608,615.)Thus, "& thepresenceofasinglecircumstanceinaggravationrendersadefendanteligible *$z( fortheuppertermandprovidesthetrialcourtwiththestatutoryauthorityto % * imposetheupperterm,irrespectiveoftheparticulartermthecourtultimately *'z", imposesafterconductingtherequisitebalancing.Accordingly,ajuryverdictas (#. tooneaggravatingcircumstancebeyondareasonabledoubtorthedefendants  admissionastooneaggravatingcircumstancesatisfiestheconstitutional 0 requirementsetforthin P Blakelythatajurymakethenecessaryfindingbeyond  areasonabledoubtbeforeadefendantcanbeexposedtoahighersentence. 0   4  `  P Blakelyissimilarlysatisfiedifthetrialcourtfindsasingleaggravating   circumstancebasedonthedefendantsrecidivism.Becausesucharecidivism 0   findingfallswithinthe  AlmendarezTorresexceptiontothejuryverdict   requirement,andbecausetherecidivismcircumstance,standingalone,is 0  sufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionofanuppertermsentence,theSixth   Amendmentdoesnotprohibitthetrialcourtfromimposinganupperterm 0  sentence.Insuchacase,theuppertermwouldnecessarilybecomethestatutory  maximumunder P Blakely,evenunderappellantsexpansivereadingof P Blakely, 0 becausethecourtmayimposetheuppertermwithoutmakinganyotherfindings  offact.( P Blakely,supra,124S.Ct.atpp.2531,2537.) 0  4  ` Moreover,oncethefederalconstitutionalrequirementissatisfied,the  statestatutoryschemebecomestheonlycontrollingauthoritylimitingthe 0 courtsabilitytoimposeanappropriatesentence,includinganupperterm.   ( t Apprendi,supra,530U.S.atp.481[ Weshouldbeclearthatnothinginthis 0" historysuggestsitisimpermissibleforjudgestoexercisediscretion!!taking $ intoconsiderationvariousfactorsrelatingbothtooffenseandoffender!!in 0!& imposingajudgmentwithintherangeprescribedbystatute].)Under "( Californiasstatutoryscheme,thecourtcanconsideranyotheraggravating 0$* factorsitfindsbyapreponderanceoftheevidence,aswellasmitigatingfactors %!, foundbyapreponderancestandard. 0'".  4  ` Although P Blakelywouldcontinuetorestrictthefactorsthatthecourt ($0 couldconsiderinimposingasentenceaboveandbeyondthetopofthetriad 0*%2 associatedwithanoffenseoranenhancement,itwouldnotrestrictthefactors +'4 thatthecourtcouldconsiderindecidingwhethertoimposetheuppertermof 0-(6 thetriaditself.Rather,thecourtsexerciseofsentencingdiscretionwithinthe  rangepermittedbythejurysfindingisguidedandrestrainedonlybystatelaw. 0 Understatelaw,thecourtmayconsideranyfactorthatthecourtitselffindsby  apreponderanceoftheevidence.(Rule  4.420(b).)Asaresult,whenthecourt 0  findsavalidrecidivismfactorthatfallswithinthe  AlmendarezTorres   recidivismexceptiontothejuryverdictrequirement,theuppertermwould 0   becomethestatutorymaximumfor  SixthAmendmentpurposes,andthe   sentencingreturnstopurelystatestatutoryconsiderations.Insuchacase,the 0  courtmayconsideranyadditionalcircumstancesitfindsbyapreponderanceof   theevidencewhendecidingwhethertoimposetheupperterm. 0   4  ` Accordingly,ifoneaggravatingcircumstanceissupportedbyeithera  juryfindingorthedefendantsadmission,oroneaggravatingcircumstanceis 0 basedonthedefendantsrecidivism, P Blakelyisnotviolatedandthedefendants  uppertermsentenceisconstitutionallyvalid. 0  4  ` Here,thetrialcourtsaggravatedcircumstancefindingthatappellanthad  a lengthy[criminal]historydidnotviolate P Blakely.First,thisfindingasto 0 appellantsrecidivismclearlyfellwithinthe  AlmendarezTorresexceptionto    P Blakely.V r  11  /    ׀Moreover,thefactualbasisforthetrialcourtsrecidivismfinding 0" wasfullyestablishedbyappellantsadmissionsthathehadsufferedfourprior $ convictions(robberyin1995,unlawfultakingofavehiclein1996,grandtheft 0!& in1995,andobstructingorresistinganofficerin2000)andthathehadserved "( prisontermsforthoseconvictions.(RT12571259.) 0$*  4  ` Sincethisrecidivismfinding,byitself,authorizedanupperterm %!, sentence,theuppertermbecamethestatutorymaximumandthetrialcourtwas 0'". freetoconsideranyotheraggravatingfactorsfoundbyapreponderancein ($0 evaluatingwhethertoimposetheupperterm.Underthesecircumstances,the  trialcourtsadditionalaggravatingcircumstancefindingthatthevictimwasin 0 fearforhislife,andtheuseofthatfindingtosupportanuppertermsentence,  didnotviolate P Blakely.Accordingly,appellantssentencewasconstitutionally 0  valid.# yy#     &  2 6  E  .3  8 4 BlakelyErrorIsReviewedUnderTheChapmanStandard,And   UnderThisStandardOfReview,AnyBlakelyErrorWasHarmless   InTheInstantCase en'  44  4 &   2 6  1  .3  8 ` BlakelyerrorIsNotPrejudicialUnderTheChapman   StandardIfTheJuryWouldHaveFoundAtLeastOneOf   TheAggravatingCircumstancesTrueBeyondAReasonable  Doubt en}` x` x 'q 4  `  y y yEvenifthesentencingproceduresinthiscaseviolated P Blakely,  appellantssentencewasneverthelessvalidbecauseany P Blakelyerrorwas "r harmless.Contrarytoappellantscontention(ABM3945), P Blakelyerrorisnot  structuralerrorthatisreversibleperse.In # Peoplev.Sengpadychith(2001)26 "r Cal.4th316,thisCourtfoundthat t Apprendierrordoesnotwarrantreliefifitis  harmlessbeyondareasonabledoubtand,since P Blakelyisanapplicationof "r  t Apprendi,thesamestandardshouldapplyto P Blakelyerror.(Id.atp.327;see   also  Cotton,supra,535U.S.atpp.627,631,634[applyingplainerroranalysis "!r" to t Apprendiclaimwherethedefendantdidnotobjectonthatgroundattrial]; "$  % UnitedStatesv.SanchezCervantes(9thCir.2002)282F.3d664,668671 "$r& [ t Apprendierrornotstructuralerror].) % (  4  ` Indeterminingwhether P Blakelyerrorwasprejudicial,thereviewingcourt "'r"* mustapplythestandardofreviewsetforthin y Chapman,supra,386U.S.atpage (#, 24,todeterminewhetherthejurywouldhavefoundanyoftheaggravating "*r%. circumstancestruebeyondareasonabledoubt.Anyerrorastoaparticular +&0 aggravatingcircumstancewouldbeharmlessunderthisstandardiftheevidence "-r(2 attrialandsentencingconsistedofoverwhelmingoruncontradictedevidence  asthatcircumstance.( & Sengpadychith,supra,26Cal.4thatp.327; ' Cleveland, 0 supra,87Cal.App.4thatp.271[findingany t Apprendierrorforajudgessection   ) 654findingtobeharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubtbecause [w]ehaveno 0  doubtajurywouldhavereachedthesameconclusion[asthetrialcourt]under   thereasonabledoubtstandard]; + Chamberlainv.Pliler(C.D.Cal.2004)307F. 0   Supp.2d1128,11421143[holdingthatany t Apprendierrorfromthefailureto   submitapersonalusefindingtothejurywasharmlessbecause [p]etitionerhas 0  adducednoevidencetocontradicttheevidenceconsideredbythetrialcourt,   whichincludedthevictimstestimonythatpetitionerhadpulledoutaknifeand 0  struckthevictimintheheadwithashinyobjectcuttinghimandleavinga  scar].)Inasimilarcontext,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasfoundno 0 plainerrorsfroman t Apprendiviolationinvolvingadrugquantityenhancement  reasoningthattheevidencewas overwhelmingand essentially 0 uncontroverted.(  Cotton,supra,535U.S.atpp.633634.)   4  ` Ifthereviewingcourtdeterminesthatthejurywouldhavefoundatleast 0 oneoftheaggravatingcircumstancestruebeyondareasonabledoubt,the   prejudiceinquiryendsandthereviewingcourtmustdeemthe P Blakelyerrornot 0" prejudicial.Asexplained,ante,inArgumentII(D)(2), P Blakelyerroroccursif $ thejurydidnotfindthenecessaryfactthatauthorizestheimpositionof,or 0!& makesthedefendanteligiblefor,theincreasedsentence.Sinceasingle "( aggravatingcircumstanceissufficienttoauthorizetheimpositionoftheupper 0$* termunderstatelaw( , Osband,supra,13Cal.4thatp.728),adeterminationthat %!, thejurywouldhavefoundatleastoneaggravatingcircumstancetruebeyonda 0'". reasonabledoubtnecessarilyrendersthe P Blakelyerrorharmlessbecausethat ($0 singleaggravatingcircumstancewouldhaveauthorizedtheupperterm 0*%2 sentence.Thereviewingcourtwouldthereforeaffirmthedefendantssentence +'4 undersuchcircumstances. 0-(6  4  ` Oncethereviewingcourtdeterminesthatany P Blakelyerrorwasharmless  becausethejurywouldhavefoundatleastoneaggravatingcircumstancetrue, 0 thereviewingcourtdoesnotneedtofurtherdeterminewhetherthetrialcourt  wouldhavesentencedthedefendanttothesameuppertermsentenceinlightof 0  the P Blakelyerror.Suchaninquiryisnotrequiredbecause P Blakelyfocuseson   theissueofwhetherthejurymadethenecessaryfindingtoexposethedefendant 0   toahighersentence,ratherthantheissueofwhetherthetrialcourtmadethe   properdiscretionarysentencingchoice.Inotherwords,thedefendantsfederal 0  constitutionalrighttoajurytrialisimplicatedintheformerissue,butnotthe   latterissue.Thus,the y Chapmaninquiryrequiredtovindicatethatfederal 0  constitutionalrightislimitedtothequestionofwhetherthejurywouldhave  foundatleastoneaggravatingcircumstancetrue. 0  4  ` Thisconclusionthattheultimatesentencingdecisiondoesnotimplicate  the  SixthAmendmentrighttoajurytrialisdemonstratedbytheconcurring 0 opinionin  Ringv.Arizona,supra,byJusticeScalia,theauthorofthe P Blakely  opinion.Inthisconcurringopinion,JusticeScaliaexplainedthat  Ring,and 0 implicitly t Apprendi,had nothingtodowithjurysentencing.(  Ring,supra,   536U.S.atp.612(conc.opn.ofScalia,J.).)Instead,the  Ringdecisionmeant 0" that: $ 8 4 thejurymustfindtheexistenceofthefactthatanaggravatingfactor 0!& existed.ThoseStatesthatleavetheultimatelifeordeathdecisiontothe "( judgemaycontinuetodoso!byrequiringapriorjuryfindingof 0$* aggravatingfactorinthesentencingphaseor,moresimplybyplacingthe %!, aggravatingfactordetermination(whereitlogicallybelongsanyway)in 0'". theguiltphase.($044 (Id.atpp.612613,originalitalics.)Thus,thisconcurringopinionclearlyshows 0*%2 thatthefederalconstitutionalconcernsin t Apprendiand P Blakelyonlyreachthe +'4 issueoffactfindingtoauthorizetheincreasedsentenceanddonotextendtoa 0-(6 trialcourtsultimatesentencingdecision.Accordingly,oncethereviewingcourt  determinesthatthejurywouldhavefoundatleastoneaggravatingcircumstance 0 true,thereviewingcourtdoesnotneedtofurtherexamineunderthe y Chapman  standardwhetherthedefendantwouldhavereceivedthesamesentenceinlight 0  ofthe P Blakelyerror.    4  ` Finally,any P Blakelyerrordoesnotinvolveanystatelawquestionof 0   whetherthetrialcourterredinitsdiscretionaryweighingoftheaggravatingand   mitigatingcircumstancesandresultingselectionofthebaseterm.Buttothe 0  extentthatthisCourtconcludesthatareviewingcourtmustexaminewhether   thetrialcourtwouldhaveneverthelesssentencedthedefendanttotheupper 0  termsentencebecausetherewassomestatelawerrorintheselectionofthe  sentence,thisinquiryshouldbeconductedunderthestatelawstandardof 0  . Peoplev.Watson(1956)46Cal.2d818,836.# yyD#   4 &   2 6  2  .3  8 ` AnyBlakelyErrorWasHarmlessInTheInstantCase ` x` x ' 4  ` y yAnapplicationofthestandardofreviewintheinstantcasedemonstrates  thatany P Blakelyerrorwasharmless.EvenifthisCourtweretoconcludethat .~ thetrialcourtsfindingastoappellantslengthycriminalhistorydidnotfall ! undertherecidivismexceptionto P Blakelyorwasunsupportedbyappellants . ~# admissions,itisclearthejurywouldhavereachedthesameconclusionasthe !% trialcourtbecauseappellanttestifiedattrialthathehadsufferedfourfelony .#~' convictionsoverafiveyearperiod.(RT12211222.)Sincethejurywould $) havefoundthisaggravatingcircumstancetruebeyondareasonabledoubt,the .&~!+ uppertermsentencewouldhavebeenauthorizedbythiscircumstance. '"- Accordingly,any P Blakelyerrorwasharmlessandappellantssentenceshouldbe .)~$/ affirmed. *%1  4  ` Further,appellantssentenceshouldbeaffirmedbecausethejurywould .,~'3 havereachedthesameconclusionasthetrialcourtthatthevictimfearedforhis -(5 life.Eventhoughmostofthefactualissuesattrialinvolvedacredibilitycontest  betweenappellantandthevictim,thespecificfactualissueofthevictimsfear 0 atthetimehelefthiscarwasfirmlyestablishedbyanindependentwitnesswho  describedthevictimas frantic,veryscaredandverynervous,and pretty 0  terrified.(RT722724.)Inaddition,asexplained,ante,inArgumentI(D),the   trialcourtbaseditsfindingontheconductunderlyingtheoffenseofconviction, 0   i.e.,thatthevictimsfearresultedfromappellantscommissionoftheoffense   oftakingordrivingavehicleratherthanfromanyconductunderlyingthe 0  acquittedcounts.Thus,iftheissueofthevictimsfearhadbeenpresentedto   thejury,thejurywouldhavemadethesamefindingasthetrialcourt. 0  Accordingly,any P Blakelyerrorwasharmlessbecausetheuppertermsentence  wouldhavebeenauthorizedbythisaggravatingcircumstance. L  x Finally, 0 evenassumingthisCourtmustexaminewhetherthetrialcourtwouldhave  imposedtheuppertermsentenceinlightoftheaggravatingcircumstancesthat 0 wouldhavebeenfoundtruebythejury,itisnotreasonablyprobablethetrial  courtwouldhaveimposedalessersentencesince,asexplainedabove,thejury 0 wouldhavefoundbothoftheaggravatingcircumstancestrue.Moreover,even   iftheaggravatingcircumstancebasedonappellantsrecidivismwastheonly 0" viableaggravatingcircumstance,itisstillnotreasonablyprobablethatthetrial $ courtwouldhaveimposedalessersentence.Aspreviouslyexplained,andas 0!& notedbytheCourtofAppeal,appellantsrecidivismcouldhavesupportedthree "( separateaggravatingcircumstancesundertheRulesofCourt.Theimportance 0$* ofappellantsrecidivisminthedeterminationofhissentenceisfurther %!, demonstratedbythetrialcourtscommentsthatappellanthada lengthy 0'". historyand tenyearhistory,andthat,despiteallofthispreviousexperience, ($0 appellantwasagainbeforethecriminaljusticesystemawaitingsentencing.(RT 0*%2 24162417.)Inaddition,thetrialcourtfoundnomitigatingcircumstances.(RT +'4 24152417.)Accordingly,anyerrorwasnotprejudicial.# yy#  0-(6 & s    2 6  III  .3      8 4 8` 44IFTHISCOURTCONCLUDESTHATSECTION1170IS -} UNCONSTITUTIONALUNDERBLAKELY,THISCOURT +{ SHOULDINTERPRETSECTION1170,FOR )y PROSPECTIVEAPPLICATION,INA ' w CONSTITUTIONALMANNER ng B  ԍ.C  % u` x` x 's  4  ` y yIfthisCourtshouldconcludethatsection | 1170isunconstitutional # s because P Blakelyprecludesthetrialcourtfrommakingthenecessaryfindingsto    imposeanuppertermsentence,respondentrespectfullyrequeststhatthisCourt #s  construesection | 1170,forprospectiveapplication,asallowingthetrialcourtthe   discretiontoimposetheuppertermwithouttherequirementofanyadditional #s  factfinding.Thisconstructionofthestatutewouldpreserveatripartite  sentencingschemethathasworkedeffectivelyformorethanaquartercentury, #s andwouldbefullyconsistentwiththeLegislaturesintenttoprovidetrialcourts  thediscretiontoimposeanuppertermsentenceintheappropriate #s circumstances.   4  ` ThisCourthas,onaprioroccasion,prospectivelyconstruedastatuteto #s preservethestatutesconstitutionality.In 0 Peoplev.Roder(1983)33Cal.3d  491,499502,thisCourtheldthattheprovisionsofsection 2 496createdan #s  unconstitutionalmandatorypresumption.Inordertosavethestatutes " constitutionalityandpreventitfrombeingstruckdowninitsentirety,thePeople #!s$ requestedthatthisCourtprospectivelyconstruethestatuteasalegislatively "& prescribedpermissiveinference.AlthoughthePeoplesrequestrequired some #$s( creativestatutoryconstruction,the 3 RoderCourtfoundthetransformationofthe % * statutorypresumptionintoapermissiveinferencereasonableandfeasible.This #'s", Courtexplainedthatpreservingthestatutoryprovisionsinarestrainedformstill (#. enabledthetrialcourtstoinformthejuryofaninferencethattheLegislaturehad #*s%0  concludedcouldbereasonablydrawnfromproofofthebasicfacts,andthatthe +&2 permissiveinferenceservedanimportantsubstantivefunctioninregulatingthe  conductaddressedinthesection.(Id.atpp.505507.) 0   4  ` Thisapproachofconstruingastatuteforprospectiveapplicationwas  followedbytheCourtofAppealin 5 Peoplev.Forrester(1994)30Cal.App.4th 0  1697.In 6 Forrester,theCourtofAppealfirstheldthatsection 8 1320,subdivision   (b),containedanunconstitutionalmandatorypresumption.(Id.atpp.1701 0   1703.)Expresslyfollowingtheapproachtakenin 3 Roder,the 6 ForresterCourt   furtherheldthat,infutureprosecutionsforviolationsofsection 9 1320, 0  subdivision(b),thesectionshouldbeconstruedascontainingapermissive   inferenceinordertopreservethestatutesconstitutionality.(Id.atp.1703.) 0   4  ` Here,ifthisCourtconcludesthatsection | 1170isunconstitutionalunder   P Blakely,thisCourtshouldconstruesection | 1170,forprospectiveapplication,o r  12  /     0 inaconstitutionalmanner.Thus,section | 1170shouldbeconstruedtoallowa  trialcourtthediscretiontoimposeanuppertermwithoutadditionalfactfinding. 0 Inotherwords,thesectionshouldbeconstruedtoeliminateanyrequirement  thatatrialcourtmustfindfactsbeforeitcouldimposeanytermotherthanthe 0 middleterm.Furthermore,suchaninterpretationcouldstillpreserveastatutory   preferenceforthemiddleterm,X r  13  /    ׀inaccordancewiththeLegislaturesintentto 0" havethemiddletermbethe averageorusualterm.(AdvisoryComm.com., $  foll.rule : 4.420.) 0!&  4  ` Thisinterpretationofsection | 1170wouldbefullyconsistentwiththe   Legislaturesoverallintentinenactingthetripartitesentencingscheme.Under 0 theDeterminateSentencingActof1976,theLegislatureintendedtoprovidethe  trialcourtstheabilitytoimposeanyofthethreepossibletermsinanyparticular 0  case,withthetrialcourtexercisingitsdiscretiontoselecttheappropriateterm   onthebasisofthecircumstancesrelatingtothecrimeandthedefendant. 0   ( ; Hernandez,supra,46Cal.3datp.205; < Wright,supra,30Cal.3datp.713[in   enactingtheDeterminateSentencingActof1976, theLegislaturemadethe 0  fundamentalpolicydecisionthattermsweretobefixedbychoosingoneofthe   alternativesonthebasisofcircumstancesrelatingtothecrimeandtothe 0  defendant].)Thus,aninterpretationofsection | 1170inamannerthatpreserves  itsconstitutionalityunder P BlakelywouldeffectuatetheLegislaturesintentto 0 givethetrialcourtsthefullflexibilitytotailoranappropriatesentenceunderthe  circumstancesofeachindividualcase,andwouldpreserveasystemthathas 0 workedeffectivelyformorethanaquarterofacentury.Y r  14  /    ׀Certainly,inenacting  section | 1170,theLegislatureneverintendedthatanyrequirementofadditional 0 factfindingwouldprecludethetrialcourtfromimposingtheuppertermunless   theaggravatingcircumstanceswerefoundbythejurybeyondareasonable 0" doubt. $  4  ` Moreover,construingsection | 1170inabalancedmannertoeliminatethe 0!& requirementoffactfindingwouldnotinureonlytothebenefitofthePeople. "( Forinstance,byeliminatinganyrequirementthatatrialcourtmustfind 0$* additionalfactsbeforeimposingatermotherthanthemiddleterm,defendants %!, wouldbeabletoreceivethelowtermwithouttheneedforanyrequisite 0'". findingsonmitigatingcircumstances. ($0  4  ` Inaddition,suchastatutoryconstructionwouldnoteliminatethe  balancingundertakenbythetrialcourtinselectingtheappropriateterm,nor 0 woulditmaketheselectionoftheappropriatetermunboundedorarbitrary.The  trialcourtwouldstillneedtoconsiderandbalancetherelevantcircumstances 0  intheirtotalitytodeterminetheappropriatesentence,andthecourtwouldalso   needtotakeintoaccountthelegislativepreferencethatthetypicalcaseshould 0   receivethemiddleterm.Z r  15  /    ׀Finally,thetrialcourtsdecisiontoimposeaterm   otherthanthemiddletermwouldstillbereviewableonappealforabuseof 0  discretion,muchlikeanyotherdiscretionarysentencingdecision(see,e.g.,     Peoplev.Carmony(2004)33Cal.4th367,373376),andthetrialcourts 0  statementofreasonsfortheimpositionofaparticulartermwouldbetakeninto  considerationbytheappellatecourtinreviewingthedecision. 0  4  ` Insum,ifthisCourtconcludesthatsection | 1170isunconstitutional  under P Blakely,respondentrequeststhatthisCourtinterpretsection | 1170to 0 eliminatetherequirementthattrialcourtsmustengageinfactfindingbeforea  termotherthanthemiddletermcouldbeimposedbecausesuchan 0 interpretationwouldpreserveasentencingschemethathasdispensedfairand   effectivejusticesince1977.# yy"#  0" &     CONCLUSION PF  'F   4  ` y yAccordingly,forthereasonsstated,respondentrespectfullyasksthatthe  judgmentbeaffirmed.# yyG# .~ %  & H  4  ` Dated:  October4,2004!     f*x"ddd!dd!#%  x, ,x +  #. ~. ~ #  . ~  Respectfullysubmitted, . ~   XzX yfBILLLOCKYER  J  AttorneyGeneraloftheStateofCalifornia  6  MANUELM.MEDEIROS H  StateSolicitorGeneral 4  ROBERTR.ANDERSON   ChiefAssistantAttorneyGeneral   PAMELAC.HAMANAKA 4 SeniorAssistantAttorneyGeneral   DONALDE.DENICOLA 2 SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral n JAIMEL.FUSTER  SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral l LAWRENCEM.DANIELS  DeputyAttorneyGeneral   CHUNGL.MAR 0% DeputyAttorneyGeneral  &  yX XzAttorneysforPlaintiffandRespondent."~( 'H YH% ( CLM:mg v$( LA2003DA0908  v% )  s 8 ,8zXXdXXd8 @-- CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE   B  ԍ(seenextpage)0 FormMustBeSignedByAttorneyorUnrepresentedLitigantAndAttachedtothe p( BackofEachCopyoftheBrief`  # # ЎC     $ IcertifythattheattachedRESPONDENTSBRIEFusesa13pointTimesNew  Romanfontandcontains16,030words. . ~ &     $ Dated:  October4,2004!     f*xJKdd x "##x, ,x +  #. ~ . ~ #  . ~  Respectfullysubmitted, . ~  f XzX yBILLLOCKYER  J  AttorneyGeneraloftheStateofCalifornia 6  CHUNGL.MAR   DeputyAttorneyGeneral# yX XzR#  AttorneysforPlaintiffandRespondent4 '  4Q  ,| !  !78dXXd88M  @oo" TABLEOFCONTENTS   B  Page   % N U%    H   H U  ISSUESPRESENTEDf f E 1H UU݌  Ќ  H   H [V  STATEMENTOFTHECASEf f E 1H [VwV݌   Ќ  H   H V  SUMMARYOFARGUMENTf f E 5H VW݌   Ќ  H   H W  ARGUMENTf f E 8H WW݌   Ќ  Pl  Pl X4  I.8  ATRIALCOURTMAYPROPERLYUSEFACTS   RELATINGTOCOUNTSONWHICHTHE   DEFENDANTWASFOUNDNOTGUILTYAS   AGGRAVATINGFACTORSINDETERMINING  THEAPPROPRIATESENTENCE f f E   8Pl X>4  III.8  IFTHISCOURTCONCLUDESTHATSECTION t 1170ISUNCONSTITUTIONALUNDER r BLAKELY,THISCOURTSHOULDINTERPRET p SECTION1170,FORPROSPECTIVE n  APPLICATION,INACONSTITUTIONAL l  MANNER D   50Pl(qDq݌ j  Ќ  H   H r  CONCLUSIOND 54H rs݌ n  Ќ  U% O  n  VM s @  TABLEOFAUTHORITIES   B  Page    Cases   Gus  /   / t  t  y yAlmendarezTorresv.UnitedStates   (1998)523U.S.224   [118S.Ct.1219,   140L.Ed.2d350]# yyt#< 40,42,43/ tt݈    Ќ̌  /   / v  y yApprendiv.NewJersey   (2000)530U.S.466   [120S.Ct.2348,   147L.Ed.2d435]# yy[v# 5,6,16,18,20-30,32,35,37,38,40,42,44-47,53/ v:v݈   Ќ̌  /   / w  y yBlakelyv.Washington  (2004)542U.S.___  [124S.Ct2531,  159L.Ed.2d403]# yyw#DD 1,5-7,15-23,26,28-32,34-48,50-53/ ww݈  Ќ̌  /   / 1y  y yBousleyv.UnitedStates  (1998)523U.S.614  [118S.Ct.1604,  140L.Ed.2d828]# yymy#D 22/ 1yLy݈  Ќ̌  /   / z  y yChamberlainv.Pliler  (C.D.Cal.2004)307F.Supp.2d1128# yyz#D 45/ zz݈  Ќ̌  /   / {  y yChapmanv.California ! (1967)386U.S.18 " [87S.Ct.824, # 17L.Ed.2d705]# yy{#6 6,7,44,46,47/ {{݈ $  Ќ̌  /   / }  y yEngelv.Isaac &!" (1982)456U.S.107 '"# [102S.Ct.1558, (#$ 71L.Ed.2d783]# yyR}#D 22/ }1}݈ )$% Ќ̌  /   / j~  y y/ j~~  ,'( Ќ  /   /   Harrisv.UnitedStates t  (2002)536U.S.545 t  [122S.Ct.2406, t  153L.Ed.2d524]# yy~#BB8 25,26,28,29/ (݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / `  y yMongev.California t  (1998)524U.S.721 t [118S.Ct.2246, t 141L.Ed.2d615]# yy#D 15/ `{݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yMonsantoCo.v.SprayRiteServiceCorp. t  (1984)465U.S.752 t  [104S.Ct.1464, t  79L.Ed.2d775]# yy#D 22/ Ձ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / (  y yOsbornev.Ohio t (1990)495U.S.103 t [110S.Ct.1691, t 109L.Ed.2d98]# yyd#D 20/ (C݈ t Ќ̌  /   / }  Peoplev.Avalos t (1984)37Cal.3d216D 51/ }݈ t Ќ̌  /   / F  y yPeoplev.Carmony t (2004)33Cal.4th367# yy#D 53/ Fa݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / S  y yPeoplev.Castellano t" (1983)140Cal.App.3d608# yy#D 41/ Sn݈ t# Ќ̌  /   / g  y yPeoplev.Cleveland t% (2001)87Cal.App.4th263# yy#@ 20,45/ g݈ t& Ќ̌  /   / ~  y yPeoplev.Cruz t(  (1995)38Cal.App.4th427# yy#D 14/ ~݈ t)!! Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Epps t+## (2001)25Cal.4th19# yyȉ#D 40/ ݈ t,$$ Ќ t-%% Ќ  /   /   y yPeoplev.Forrester t (1994)30Cal.App.4th1697# yy#D 51/ Ċ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Garcia t  (1999)20Cal.4th490# yy#D 38/ ؋݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / Ɍ  y yPeoplev.Griffin t (2004)33Cal.4th536# yy#@ 31,53/ Ɍ݈ t Ќ̌  /   / ڍ  y yPeoplev.Hall t  (1994)8Cal.4th950# yy#@ 12,27/ ڍ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Hernandez t  (1988)46Cal.3d194# yy##@ 29,52/ ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Hernandez t (1998)19Cal.3d835# yy;#D 15/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Holmes t (1960)54Cal.2d442# yyI#D 21/ (݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.King t (1993)5Cal.4th59# yyT#D 29/ 3݈ t Ќ̌  /   / &  y yPeoplev.Lewis t  (1991)229Cal.App.3d259# yyb#< 10,12,13/ &A݈ t! Ќ̌  /   / =  y yPeoplev.Marchand t# (2002)98Cal.App.4th1056# yyy#D 20/ =X݈ t$ Ќ̌  /   / P  y yPeoplev.Myers t& (1983)148Cal.App.3d699# yy#D 33/ Pk݈ t' Ќ̌  /   / _  y yPeoplev.Osband t)!! (1996)13Cal.4th622# yy#@ 41,45/ _z݈ t*"" Ќ̌  /   / o  y yPeoplev.Prather t,$$ (1990)50Cal.3d428# yy#D 40/o݈ t-%% Ќ  /   / {  y yPeoplev.Richards t (1976)17Cal.3d614# yy#@ 12,13/ {݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Roder t  (1983)33Cal.3d491# yyș#@ 50,51/ ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Saunders t (1993)5Cal.4th580# yy֚#@ 19,21/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Scott t  (1994)9Cal.4th331# yy#< 20,32,34/ ƛ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Sengpadychith t  (2001)26Cal.4th316# yy#@ 44,45/ ؜݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / ԝ  y yPeoplev.Takencareof t (1981)119Cal.App.3d492# yy#((A 9,12/ ԝ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Thomas t (2001)91Cal.App.4th212# yy(#D 40/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Thornton t (1985)167Cal.App.3d72# yy8#D 33/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Vera t  (1997)15Cal.4th269# yyI#D 21/ (݈ t! Ќ̌  /   /   y yPeoplev.Watson t# (1956)46Cal.2d818# yyS#D 47/ 2݈ t$ Ќ̌  /   / "  y yPeoplev.Wright t& (1982)30Cal.3d705# yy^#@ 29,52/ "=݈ t' Ќ̌  /   / 1  y yRingv.Arizona t)!! (2002)536U.S.584 t*"" [122S.Ct.2428, t+## 153L.Ed.2d556]# yym#< 16,30,46/ 1L݈ t,$$ Ќ t-%% Ќ  /   /   y yUnitedStatesv.Cotton t (2002)535U.S.625 t  [122S.Ct.1781, t  152L.Ed.2d860]# yy#< 21,44,45/ ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yUnitedStatesv.Jones t  (1999)526U.S.227 t [119S.Ct.1215, t 143L.Ed.2d311]# yyG#D 26/ &݈ t Ќ̌  /   / h  y yUnitedStatesv.Koch t  (6thCir.2004)򀀀F.3d򀀀 t  [2004U.S.App.LEXIS18138,*20]# yy#D 27/ h݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / ȩ  y yUnitedStatesv.Olano t (1993)507U.S.725 t [113S.Ct.1770, t 123L.Ed.2d508]# yy#D 19/ ȩ݈ t Ќ̌  /   / %  y yUnitedStatesv.Pineiro t (5thCir.2004)377F.3d464# yya#D 29/ %@݈ t Ќ̌  /   / @  y yUnitedStatesv.SanchezCervantes t (9thCir.2002)282F.3d664# yy|#D 44/ @[݈ t Ќ̌  /   / e  y yUnitedStatesv.Watts t! (1997)519U.S.148 t" [117S.Ct.633, t# 136L.Ed.2d554]# yy#= 10-13,15/ e݈ t$ Ќ̌  /   / ɮ  y yWittev.UnitedStates t& (1995)515U.S.389 t' [115S.Ct.2199, t(  132L.Ed.2d351]# yy#@ 11,15/ ɮ݈ t)!! Ќ̌  t t-%%  ConstitutionalProvisions  t Cal.Const.,art.I,16D 21 r  /   / Ͱ  y yU.S.Const.,6thAmend.# yy# 6,15,16,18,21,23,24,29,35,43,46/ Ͱ݈ r  Ќ̌  0us/   /   U.S.Const.,14thAmend.D 16/ ݈ r Ќ̌  Statutes  r  y yPen.Code,18# yy#D 36 p  /   / )  y yPen.Code,207,subd.(a)# yyb#f f E 1/ )D݈ p  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,209,subd.(b)(1)# yyI#y yf f E 1/ +݈ p Ќ̌  /   /   # yy#y yPen.Code,209.5# yyu#y yf f E 1# yy̵#y y/ 4݈ p Ќ̌  /   / {  # yy!#y yPen.Code,211# yy׶#y y((A 1,27/ {݈ p Ќ̌  /   /   Pen.Code,212.5D 27/ ݈ p Ќ̌  /   / :  Pen.Code,213D 27/ :U݈ p Ќ̌  /   / ո  # yy,#y yPen.Code,215,subd.(a)# yy1#y yf f E 1/ ո݈ p! Ќ̌  /   /   # yy#y yPen.Code,422# yyZ#y yf f E 1/ ݈ p# Ќ̌  /   /   # yy#y yPen.Code,487,subd.(d)# yyx#y yf f E 1/ 7݈ p% Ќ̌  /   / E  # yyػ#y yPen.Code,496# yy#y yD 50/ E`݈ p' Ќ̌  /   / d  # yy#y yPen.Code,654# yy#y yD 45/ d݈ p) ! Ќ̌  /   /   # yy#y yPen.Code,666.5# yy߾#y yf f E 2/ ݈ p+"# Ќ̌  /   /   # yy6#y yPen.Code,666.5,subd.(a)# yy#D 36/݈ p-$% Ќ p.%& Ќ  /   /   y yPen.Code,667,subd.(a)(1)# yy#y yf f E 2/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   # yy`#y yPen.Code,667,subds.(b)(i)# yy)#y yf f E 2# yy#/ ݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,667.5,subd.(b)# yyW#y y((A 2,37# yy#/ 9݈ t  Ќ̌  1us  /   / i  y yPen.Code,1025# yy#D 35/ i݈ t Ќ̌  /   / G  y yPen.Code,1158# yy#D 35/ Gb݈ t Ќ̌  /   / &  y yPen.Code,1170# yy_#7 7,8,16,50-53/ &A݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,1170,subd.(a)# yyJ#D 34/ ,݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,1170,subd.(a)(3)# yy3#D 27/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,1170,subd.(b)# yy#* 8,9,11,12,28,33,34,51/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,1170.1,subd.(e)# yy"#D 35/ ݈ t Ќ̌  /   /   y yPen.Code,1170.12,subds.(a)(d)# yy #f f E 2/ ݈ t Ќ̌  y yPen.Code,1320,subd.(b)# yy#D 51 t /   / P  y yVeh.Code,10851,subd.(a)# yy#((A 2,36/ Pk݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / =  y yVeh.Code,10851,subd.(e)# yyv#D 36/ =X݈ t" Ќ̌  /   / '  y yWash.Rev.Code,9A.20.010(b)# yy`#D 17/ 'B݈ t$ Ќ̌  /   /   y yWash.Rev.Code,9A.20.021(1)# yyL#D 17/ .݈ t& Ќ̌  /   /   Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.310(1)D 29/ ݈ t(  Ќ̌  /   /   Wash.Rev.Code,9.94A.310(3)(b)D 29/ ݈ t*"" Ќ̌  /   / V  y yWash.Rev.Code,9.94A.5# yy#D 17/ Vq݈ t,$$ Ќ t-%% Ќ  /   / Q  y yWash.Rev.Code,9.94A.510# yy#D 17/ Ql݈ t Ќ̌  /   / :  y yWash.Rev.Code,9.94A.515# yys#D 17/ :U݈ t  Ќ̌  /   / #  y yWash.Rev.Code,9.94A.525# yy\#D 17/ #>݈ t  Ќ̌  /   /   y yWash.Rev.Code,9.94A.530(2)# yyE#D 17/ '݈ t Ќ̌  ] CourtRules  t  2us  /   / M  y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.408# yy#D 33/ Mh݈ r  Ќ̌  /   / 6  y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420# yyo#@ 33,51/ 6Q݈ r  Ќ̌  /   / #  y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(b)# yy\#2 8,9,11,34,43,51/ #>݈ r Ќ̌  /   / !  y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(c)# yyZ#f f E 9/ !<݈ r Ќ̌  /   /   y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.420(d)# yyE#f f E 9/ '݈ r Ќ̌  /   /   y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.421# yy0#D 33/ ݈ r Ќ̌  /   /   y yCal.RulesofCourt,rule4.423# yy#D 33/ ݈ r  Ќ̌  /   /   Fed.RulesCrim.Proc.,rule52(b),18U.S.C.D 21/ ݈ r" Ќ̌  A