WPC =F''ʜP*X4!{dΤȌ%+S8GB9 T%=rjʒX1n-Ӻ tH9lΈp(nsq^Em_gtlJ?A'ﬤ,,i\EԌOXQւZYޫlK[bBOܷhX4S!.Eb[Y│#-p{A'^+IJv:jc&M,G@evinh.ūVL2Id. 艔[Nd9e 6\Yߔʽe:Yc#jUWN3 % 0e ^ w 4   m!  8 0 0Dy} 07N:*!KNC!E!"b$0C&s)B-,/D 0M7{: 0AH==,@j@%H3&LYO*oOsOb RnZ,[\s\U^/Ob+~cd)wjU@kk"n,pHq,Ps 0AT|s 0hs 0|8tt t t8u:uVv  pv pv tw >tw hw px 6x `x b y Ly Ly z *6z F`z 0z "z vz pn{l{pJ|:|d|lX}2} B}\~^o~H~H]&uB, r'l\\orion\Front_Office_HP4000,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX(=2$  USUS.,I> gg:athryn3|xLU arrestee S.CtBRENDLINPalos J.L.LetnerWerdegarKennardWightman IvonPontbriantPointbrianDotson DMVIn InBakulicharticulableCripsTrevizopatdownMimmsKnowlesRobinetteMuehler MenaGallardoBurkettWardlowBostickPendeletonCal.AppGlaserYbarradis.opnStierLacieRishelMatlockwarrantlessRichelnonfatallySotomayorSlimakToronczakHochstaserSawzallJettaRubbermaidHochstraserStruckmancurtilagearguendo QuonOfficer]QuonsmartphoneChadwickarresteesPassaroBeltonChimelunhandcuffedstariedecisissmartphonesT]hereiPhoneo]nceWurieD.MassF.SuppPaytonGiberson DOJCODISe.g.UnitedsuspicionlessAssnnKrieselKincadePadgettTerhuneBergereleasees SafdatabankW]here opn transformative CCAPSafford USDSavananaproxen K.S.estoppedStephonSardinasbaggiesShafrirWhren S.W.breezewaydispositiveDuchiMcCaneKrullPeltierAlmeidaLevensonTolentinoSee.e.g.BrannerMcGaughranAtwater LagoMcKayCabellasTroyer BuieSchmitz H]ispossessory(Y(3'$ 2!  XXUSUS.,      0  (#$  0   s  '$փXXUSUS.,    11    _ԀForfurtherdiscussionofthesearchincidenttoarrestexceptiontotheFourth  Amendmentswarrantrequirement,seematerialspostedontheFDAPwebsite  (4 O  5  www.fdap.org6LO`   7 ):THEEVOLUTIONOFTHESEARCHINCIDENTTOARREST  DOCTRINE:ARIZONAV.GANT(2009)129S.CT.1710.(O$   '$փXXUSUS.,    3    _ԀJusticeWerdegar,joinedbyJusticeMoreno,heldthatthevehiclestopwas  unconstitutionalbutfoundtheadmissionoftheevidencediscoveredduringsubsequent  searchesofthecartobeharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.Consequently,they  dissentedfromtherulingthatthedetentionwaslawful,butconcurredinthemajoritys  decisiontoaffirmtheconvictions.JusticeKennarddissentedfromtherulingonthe   FourthAmendmentissueandfoundthatadmissionoftheillegallyseizedevidencewas  notharmless.Consequently,JusticeKennardwouldhavereversedbothdefendants  murderconvictionsandthejudgmentsofdeath.http://www.fdap.org)   '$փXXUSUS.,    4    _ԀInCalifornia,iftheownerofavehiclehasinitiatedbutnotcompletedthe  registrationprocess(e.g.shehasnotdonetherequiredsmogcheck),shecanobtaina  temporaryoperatingpermittodisplayinthevehicleswindow.Temporaryoperating  permitsarealsoissuedpendingtheissuanceoflicenseplatestoshowthatallfeeshave  beenpaidtotheDMV,andthatthevehicleownerisjustwaitingforthefrontandback  plates.Withatemporaryoperatingpermit,thevehiclecanbelawfullydrivenonthe   roadwaysuntiltheregistrationprocessiscompletedandthecurrenttabsand/orlicense   platesarereceived.Atemporaryoperatingpermitisredwithalargeboldfacewhite   number,representingthemonthinwhichthepermitexpires.Forexample,ifthenumber   onthepermitis 5",thatmeansthatthepermitexpiresonMay31.(SeePeoplev.    Saunders(2006)38Cal.4th1129,11321133,1136.)   '$փXXUSUS.,    5    _ԀEvenbeforeJohnson,thisdistinctionhadbeenstatedinPennsylvaniav.Mimms  (434U.S.at112),andin dictuminKnowlesv.Iowa(1998)525U.S.113,117118.  (SeeJohnson,supra.,at786,787.)   '$փXXUSUS.,    6    _ԀNote,however,thatinOhiov.Robinette(1996)519U.S.33,theSupremeCourt  heldthatpoliceofficersarenotconstitutionallyrequired,attheendofatrafficstop,to  tellthedriverthatheisfreetogobeforetheymayaskadditionalinvestigativequestions  andrequestconsenttosearchthecar. X  '$փXXUSUS.,    7    _ԀThisisconsistentwithrecentCaliforniadecisions.SeePeoplev.Brown(1995)  62Cal.App.4th493,49899;Peoplev.Gallardo(2005)130Cal.App.4th234,23839.) &  '$փXXUSUS.,    29    _ԀItisinterestingthatinthiscase,theThirdDistrictdidnotcitetheSupreme  Courtsmostrecentexigentcircumstances/emergencyaiddoctrinecase,Michiganv.  Fisher(2009)130S.Ct.546,whichallowedawarrantlessentryeventhoughtherewasno  reasontobelievethatthemantheycouldseeinsidethehousewasseriouslyinjured.(See  pages2021,supra.)Ofcourse,Fisherisnotdirectlyapplicablehere,becauseinthat  case,asinBrighamCity,thepolicewerecertainthataninjuredindividualwasinsidethe   house.   '$փXXUSUS.,    28    _ԀActually,theseholdingsareconsistentwithinMcGaughran,whichstatedthat  conductingawarrantcheckduringaroutinetrafficstopwaspermissiblesolongasit  couldbecompletedwithinthetimenecessarytodischargethedutiesincurredbyvirtueof  thetrafficstop(e.g.examiningthedriverslicenseandregistration,carryingoutany  equipmentinspectionandtests,assuringthatthedriverunderstandstheconducttobe  avoided),(McGaughran,supra.,25Cal.3dat584.)TheprobleminMcGaughranwas   thattheofficerperformedallofthesedutiesandthendidawarrantcheckwhichtookten    minutes.Inourcomputerage,recordschecksaremuchquicker.   '$փXXUSUS.,    8    _ԀToreadmoredetailedanalysesofJ.L.,Dolly,andrelatedcases,seethematerials  postedontheFDAPwebsite(4 O  5  www.fdap.org):6O#   7 <QԀ WHENDOESANANONYMOUSTIP  PROVIDEREASONABLESUSPICIONFORASTOPANDFRISK?:AnAnalysisof  RecentCaliforniaCasesonAnonymousTips,updatedinNovember2009.http://www.fdap.org): :  '$փXXUSUS.,    9    _ԀThecourtcitedpriorcasesapprovingpatsearchesofsuspectedburglars.(See  Peoplev.Myles(1975)50Cal..App.3d423,430;Peoplev.Smith(1973)30Cal.App.  3d277,279280;Peoplev.Castaneda(1995)35Cal.App.4th1222,1230.)Althoughthe  CaliforniaSupremeCourthasnotruledonthisissue,theyhavedeniedpetitionsfor  reviewwhichhavequestionedthispresumption.InOsborne,thecourtacknowledgedthat  asimilarpresumptionappliestoindividualsreasonablysuspectedofdrugtrafficking!i.e.   thatdrugdealershaveapropensitytocarryweaponstoprotectthemselves,theirnarcotics   suppliesandtheirmoney.(SeePeoplev.Limon(1993)17Cal.App.4th524,53435;see   alsoPeoplev.Glaser(1993)11Cal.4th354,367368;Ybarrav.Illinois(1979)444U.S.   85,106[dis.opn.ofRehnquist,J.].)A2008CaliforniaCourtofAppealcaseextendedthat   presumptiontosuspecteddrugusers.(SeePeoplev.Collier(2008)166Cal.App.4th   1374[SecondDistrict,DivisionSix;pet.forrev.denied12/17/08].)InCollier,thecourt   foundreasonablesuspiciontopatsearchthedefendantwhowasapassengerinacar   stoppedforaVehicleCodeviolation,becausethepolicesmelledtheodorofmarijuana   emanatingfromthecarspassengercompartment,thedefendantwastallandhewore  extremelybaggyclothing. v  '$փXXUSUS.,    10    _ԀTworecentCourtofAppealcasesdiscussedthecircumstancesunderwhich  officersmayhandcuffasuspectduringadetentionwithoutconvertingtheseizureintoa  defactoarrestwhichmustbesupportedbyprobablecause.(SeeInreAntonioB.(2008)  166Cal.App.4th435;Peoplev.Stier(2008)168Cal.App.4th21.)Handcuffingis  justifiedduringadetentionwhenthecircumstancessupportareasonablebeliefthatthe  suspectpresentseitheraflightriskorasafetythreat(e.g.isarmedorsuspectedof   committingaviolentoffense),sothathemustberestrained.(AntonioB.,supra.,at441.) q  '$փXXUSUS.,    23    _ԀSomeofthese quicktakesarebased,inpart,ontheRecentCaseSummaries  providedontheCCAPwebsite(4< O  5  www.capcentral.org),6 O   7 MԀanothergoodresearchsourcefor  searchissues.FDAPacknowledgestheassistanceoflawclerkTiffanyGatesinwriting  thissection.(Vm$0      '$փXXUSUS.,    2    _ԀIfyouhaveacaseinvolvingatiprelayedtothepolicebyananonymousor  unidentifiedinformant!eitherinpersonoroverthephone!takealookatthematerials  postedontheFDAPwebsite(4  O  5  www.fdap.org):6vO   7 <Ԁ WHENDOESANANONYMOUSTIP  PROVIDEREASONABLESUSPICIONFORASTOPANDFRISK?:AnAnalysisof  RecentCaliforniaCasesonAnonymousTips,updatedinNovember2009.http://www.fdap.org): `  '$փXXUSUS.,    13    _ԀThedistinctionrecognizedinDiaz󀄄betweenthesearchofeffectsassociated  withthepersonofthearresteeandthesearchofcontainerswithinthearresteesareaof  immediatecontrolhassignificanceforthevalidityofwarrantlessdelayedsearches!i.e.  searchesoftheseizeditemsconductedataplaceandtimeremotefromthearrest.Ifa  containerisseizedfromthevehiclespassengercompartmentduringaBeltonsearch  incidenttoarrest,orseizedfromtheareawithinthearresteesimmediatecontrolduringa   Chimelsearch,thecontentsofthecontainercanbeexaminedcontemporaneously,atthe   arrestscene,evenifofficerhasgained exclusivecontroloftheitematleastuntilthe   arresteeissecuredincustody.(SeeNewYorkv.Belton(1981)453U.S.454,462,n.5;   UnitedStatesv.Morales(8thCir.1991)923F.2d621[approvingtheimmediatesearchof   aduffelbagthatthedefendanthadbeenholdingatthetimeofhisarrest,conductedwhile   thedefendantstoodunhandcuffedbutspreadeagleagainstthewallaboutthreefeetaway   fromtheofficerwhohadthebagunderhisexclusivecontrol]butseeArizonav.Gant   (2009)129S.Ct.1710[thepolicecannotconductaBeltonsearchofthevehicles   passengercompartmentandcontainerstherein,incidenttoarrest,afterthearresteehas  beensecuredandcannotaccessthevehiclesinterior])   '$փXXUSUS.,    12    _ԀUnitedStatesv.Passaro,wascitedbyDiaz(footnote7),anditexemplifiesthe  ChadwickEdwardsdistinction.Inthatcase,thedefendantwasarrestedandtakeninto  custodyforassaultingpoliceofficerswhohadstoppedhimforaspeedingviolation.At  jail,hiswalletwasseizedfromhisperson.Thepoliceopenedthewallet,examinedits  contentsandseizedadocumentincriminatingthedefendantinadrugconspiracy.The  NinthCircuitappliedtheruleofEdwards,findingthatthewalletfoundinthedefendants   pocketwasanelementofhisclothingandhisperson(likethecigarettepackinRobinson)   sothatadelayedwarrantlesssearchofitscontentswasavalidsearchincidenttoarrest. )  '$փXXUSUS.,    14    _ԀThedissentacknowledgedthattherecorddidnotdisclosewhetherDefendant  Diazpossessedasmartphoneoralesssophisticateddevice.However,theruleadopted  bytheCourtwouldneedtoapplytoalltypesofhandheldelectronicdevicesconceivable  foundonarresteesintodaysworld;thevalidityofthedelayedsearchincidenttoarrest  shouldnotdependontheofficersassessmentofthetechnicalspecificationsofthe  particulardevice.Moreover,smartphonesmakeupagrowingshareoftheUnitedStates   marketandwillsoonbeubiquitous.  http://www.fdap.org) i  '$փXXUSUS.,    15    _ԀCaliforniasDNAprogramisconsistentwiththenationaltrend.Thefederal  governmentandall50statescollectandanalyzeDNAfromconvictedoffenders.Twenty  otherstatesmandateDNAcollectionfromindividualsarrestedforsomeorallfelony  offenses,andthefederalgovernmentcurrentlyrequiresDNAcollectionfromindividuals  arrestedforallfeloniesandanysexoffensesorviolentcrimes. X  '$փXXUSUS.,    16    _ԀEmployingthisbalancingtest,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasonly  approvedtwotypesofsuspicionlesssearches!specialneedssearchesandparolee  searches.Thefirsttypearepermittedwhenspecialneedsbeyondthenormalneedforlaw  enforcementrenderthewarrantandprobablecauserequirementsimpracticable.(See,e.g.  Skinnerv.RailwayLaborExecutiveAssnn(1989)489U.S.602[upholdingnon  consensualsuspicionlessdrugtestsofrailroademployeesfollowingrailaccidentsto   promotethegovernmentscompelling specialneedtoensurethesafetyofthepublic,   railpassengersandemployees].Asearchdoesnotqualifyasaspecialneedssearchwhen   itisconductedforcriminallawenforcementobjectives.(SeeIndianapolisv.Edmond   (2000)531U.S.32,44;Fergusonv.CityofCharleston(2001)532U.S.67,8386.)As   recognizedbytheNinthCircuit,mandatoryDNAcollection(whetherfromconvicted   felonsorfelonyarrestees)doesnotqualifyasaspecialneedsearchasitservesa   quintessentiallawenforcementinterest!thesolvingofcoldcases.(SeeUnitedStatesv.   Kriesel(9thCir.2007)508F.3d941,946;UnitedStatesv.Pool,supra,621F.3dat1218.)   Todate,theSupremeCourthasapprovedonlyonetypeofsuspicionlesssearchconducted  forlawenforcementofficersforcriminalinvestigativepurposes!asearchofaparolee  whohasaseverelyreducedexpectationorprivacyandadocumentedpropensitytore  offend,toassurethathedoesnotcommitnewcrimeswhileonsupervisedrelease.(See  Samson,supra,547U.S.at851857.)   '$փXXUSUS.,    1    _ԀFormoreonthistopic,seethematerialspostedontheFDAPwebsite  (4) O  5  www.fdap.org):6O   7 ^ !ԀTRAFFICSTOPSANDVEHICLESEARCHES,writteninJanuary  2007.http://www.fdap.org): i  '$փXXUSUS.,    17    _ԀAminorityoffederalcircuitsandtheCaliforniaCourtsofAppealusedthesame  balancingtest,butcharacterizedDNAcollectionasaspecialneedssearch!anapproach  rejectedbytheNinthCircuit.(See,e.g.Greenv.Berge(7thCir.2004)354F.3d675;  Peoplev.Travis,supra.,139Cal.App.4that1271;Peoplev.Johnson,supra,139Cal.  App.4that1135.) K  '$փXXUSUS.,    18    _ԀAnarresteewhoisnevercharged,whohashischargesdismissedpriorto  adjudicationorwhoisacquittedcanhaveapplytohavehisDNAsampledestroyedand  hisoffenderprofileexpungedfromCODIS.Buthemustinitiateandnavigatea  cumbersomeandlengthyprocess.Theprosecutorcanpreventexpungementbyobjecting  andthecourthasthediscretiontodenyit.Moreover,individualswhoarereleasedbefore  chargesarefiledmustwaitatleastthreeyearsuntilthestatuteoflimitationsrunsbefore   theycanapplyforexpungement.(SeeHaskell,supra.,677F.2dat11911192.) %  '$փXXUSUS.,    19    _ԀOnitsownmotion,theThirdDistrictorderedthatMitchellbereheardenbanc.  (3rdCir.No.094718;orderofOct.20,2010.) !  '$փXXUSUS.,    20    _ԀTheplaintiffsinHaskellappealedtotheNinthCircuitandthatcasewasargued  onJuly13,2010.(9thCir.No.1015152).   '$փXXUSUS.,    21    _ԀThenamedplaintiffsinHaskellincludedMs.Haskell,whowasarrestedata  peacerallyforallegedlytryingtofreeanotherprotestorwhowastakenintocustody.  Uponarrest,shewastakentojailandordered,overherobjection,toprovideaDNA  sample.Shewasreleasedfromcustodyandneverchargedwithanycrime.Another  plaintiffwasarrestedonsuspicionofpossessingstolenproperty.AfterhisDNAwas  extractedbybuccalswabwithouthisconsent,hewasreleasedwithouteverappearingin   courtoranychargesbeingbrought.Athirdplaintiffwasalsoarrestedatapolitical   demonstrationforallegedlytryingtotakeapersonfrompolicecustody.AfterhisDNA   samplewastaken,hewaschargedwithafelony,butthechargesweredropped.Afourth   plaintiffwasarrestedontheUniversityofCaliforniacampusforprotestingstafflayoffs   andtuitionfeehikes.Hewastoldhewasbeingchargedwithfelonyburglaryandafterhis   DNAwastaken,overhisobjection,hewasreleasedfromjail.Whenheshowedupat   arraignment,hewastoldthatnochargeshadbeenfiledagainsthim.   '$փXXUSUS.,    22    _ԀInPool,apetitionforrehearingenbanc,filedinOctober2010,iscurrently  pendingbeforetheNinthCircuit(No.0910303).(9 Z(Times New Roman    '$փXXUSUS.,    25    _ԀTheKentuckySupremeCourtalsorejectedthestatescontentionthatbecause  theofficersmistakenlybelievedthatthedrugdealerwasintheleftapartment,thegood  faithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleshouldapplyandallowtheadmissionofthe  evidencethatwasseizedduringtheunconstitutionalapartmentsearch.Thecourtrejected  thisbroadreadingofthegoodfaithexception,anditdoesnotappearthattheUnited  StatesSupremeCourthasgrantedreviewonthisissue.   '$փXXUSUS.,    26    _ԀForfurtheranalysisofGantandBelton,seethematerialspostedontheFDAP  website(43 O  5  www.fdap.org):6O   7 ( 3ԀTHEEVOLUTIONOFTHESEARCHINCIDENTTO  ARRESTDOCTRINE:ARIZONAV.GANT(2009)129S.Ct.1710.http://www.fdap.org): >  '$փXXUSUS.,    27    _ԀForafulldiscussionofHerring,itsbackgroundanditspotentialimpact,seethe  materialspostedontheFDAPwebsite(45 "O  5  www.fdap.org):6O'   7 UԀTHERISEANDFALLOFTHE  EXCLUSIONARYRULE:CANITSURVIVEHUDSON,HERRING,&BRENDLIN.http://www.fdap.org):(,!$0  0` (#(#  (@$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# ` (T$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (# VEHICLE STOPS678INTRODUCTIONhttp://www.capcentral.org),   '$փXXUSUS.,    24    _ԀThisdecisionispublishedbutdoesnotyethaveanofficialCaliforniareporter  citeasofthedateofthesematerials.INTRODUCTIONVEHICLE STOPSA. Reasonable Suspicion to Initiate the Vehicle StopB. Police Questioning and Conduct During a Vehicle StopON-THE-STREET STOP AND FRISKHOME SEARCHES WITHOUT A WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSEA. Co-occupants Consent to the Search of a ResidenceB. Exigent CircumstancesSEARCHES OF CELL PHONES, PAGERS AND COMPUTERSDNA SEARCHES OF CONVICTED FELONS AND ARRESTEESA. DNA Searches of Convicted FelonsB. DNA Searches of Felony ArresteesQUICK TAKESA. School SearchesB. Probation and Parole SearchesC. Inventory SearchesPENDING ISSUESA. Issues Pending Before the United States Supreme CourtB. Issues Pending Before the California Supreme CourtA. Reasonable Suspicion to Initiate the Vehicle StopB. Police Questioning and Conduct During a Vehicle StopON-THE-STREET STOP AND FRISKHOME SEARCHES WITHOUT A WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSEA. Co-occupants Consent to the Search of a ResidenceB. Exigent Circumstances dSEARCHES OF CELL PHONES, PAGERS AND COMPUTERSDNA SEARCHES OF CONVICTED FELONS AND ARRESTEESA. DNA Searches of Convicted FelonsB. DNA Searches of Felony ArresteesQUICK TAKESA. School SearchesB. Probation and Parole SearchesC. Inventory SearchesPENDING ISSUESA. Issues Pending Before the United States Supreme CourtB. Issues Pending Before the California Supreme Court 2!  փXXUSUS.,  _  yփFirstDistrictAppellateProject  TrainingSeminar ` #փyt#XXփJanuary21,2011#փXX# p yփ SELECTEDFOURTHAMENDMENTDECISIONS \ (20092010)   ANDPENDINGISSUES l #փy# UփKathryn_Seligman_#փ UJ#yփ < #փy#XXփ StaffAttorney,FirstDistrictAppellateProject v January2011 #փXX#փ  b #փ#8փdd8SELECTEDFOURTHAMENDMENTDECISIONS(20092010) $ ANDPENDINGISSUES " TABLEOFCONTENTS    Page     :  4> O  5  INTRODUCTION6;OO  7 p } ""J(#.p p 1   Vm  Vm!0     49 O  5  VEHICLESTOPS6vO  7 v  #""J(#.v v (#(##2Vm!=݌    Ќ  6!  6!0  0` (#(#     A.0` ` (#` (#4Q ` O  5  ReasonableSuspiciontoInitiatetheVehicleStop6 O  7 M #""J(#.E` (#` (##26!݌   Ќ  7  7F 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.PalosMarquez(9thCir.2010)591F.3d1272[cert.   denied10/4/10]:Combinedwithothercircumstances,aninperson   tipfromanunidentifiedinformantprovidedreasonablesuspicionfor   aninvestigativevehiclestop#""J(#.NN6 (# (##27F a ݌   Ќ  7  7b 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   7b } ݌  (# (# Ќ  7  7 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#Peoplev.LetnerandTobin(2010)50Cal.4th99:Officers   observationofraindropsonamovingvehiclesexteriorhoursafterit   hadstoppedraining,combinedwiththedrivertravelingslowlyon   thefreeway,providedreasonablesuspicionforavehiclestop#""J(#.\ \ V (# (##37 1 ݌   Ќ  7  7S0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   7Sn݌  (# (# Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Peoplev.Dotson(2009)179Cal.App.4th1045[ThirdDistrict;   petitionforreviewdenied3/18/10]:Theofficerhadreasonable   suspiciontostopavehiclewithoutlicenseplates,evenifa   temporaryoperatingpermitwaspostedinthewindow;therewasno   evidencethattheofficersawthepermitandhewasnotrequiredto   lookforitbeforeinitiatingthevehiclestop#""J(#.>>G (# (##57"݌   Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   4.0 (# (#Peoplev.Greenwood(2010)189Cal.App.4th742[SecondDistrict, "  DivisionFive;petitionforreviewfiled12/8/10]:Theofficerhad #  reasonablesuspiciontostopavehicleinordertoresolvean $  ambiguity;acomputercheckofDMVrecordsindicatedthatthe % !! vehiclesregistrationhadexpiredtwoyearsbefore,butaseemingly & "" validtemporaryoperatingpermitwasdisplayedonthevehiclesrear ' ## window#""J(#.pp (# (##77݌  ( $$ Ќ  6!  6!0  0` (#(#     B.0` ` (#` (#4R ` O  5  PoliceQuestioningandConductDuringaVehicleStop6eOy  7  #""J(#.H` (#` (##86!݌  Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Arizonav.Johnson(2009)129S.Ct.781:Lawenforcementofficers  mayorderalloccupantsoutofthevehicleduringatrafficstopand  questionthedriverorpassengersaboutmattersunrelatedtothe  trafficviolation,buttheymaynotfriskforweaponswithouta   reasonablebeliefthatthevehicleoccupantisarmedand   dangerous#""J(#.00" (# (##87݌   Ќ  7  7J0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.Burkett(9thCir.2010)612F.3d1103:Applyingthe   standardfromArizonav.Johnson,thecourtheldthatthepassengers   furtivemovementsandhisevasiveanswersprovidedreasonable   suspicionforaweaponsfrisk#P"P"I(#.6 (# (##107Je݌   Ќ  Vm  Vmp0     4S O  5  ONTHESTREETSTOPANDFRISK6O  7  #P"P"I(#.&(#(##11Vmp݌  Ќ  6!  6!0  0` (#(#     ` 1.0 ` (#` (#InreH.H.(2009)174Cal.App.4th653[FirstDistrict,Division5]:  Aminorsrefusaltoconsenttosearchdoesnotcreatereasonable  suspicionforapatdownsearch#P"P"I(#.vv8 (# (##116!݌  Ќ  6!  6!0  0` (#(#    6!݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  6!  6!N0  0` (#(#     ` 2.0 ` (#` (#InreRichardG.(2002)173Cal.App.4th1252[SecondDistrict,  DivisionSix;petitionforreviewdenied8/26/09]:Ananonymous  telephonetipreportingadisturbanceinvolvingafirearm,outsideof  aresidenceinknowngangterritory,justifiedadetention.Also,  evidenceofanewcrimecommittedduringanunlawfuldetentionis  notsubjecttotheexclusionaryrule#P"P"I(#.= (# (##126!Ni݌  Ќ  6!  6!"0  0` (#(#    6!"."݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  6!  6!"0  0` (#(#     ` 3.0 ` (#` (#Peoplev.Osborne(2009)175Cal.App.4th1052[FirstDistrict,  DivisionFour;PetitionforReviewdeniedon10/28/09]:     Circumstancessupportreasonablesuspicionofautotheftorburglary ! whichjustifiesadetention,apatsearchandhandcuffing#P"P"I(#.>>T (# (##146!""݌  " Ќ  4T O  5  HOMESEARCHESWITHOUTAWARRANTORPROBABLECAUSE6$O$   7 n%% P"P"I(#.nn;16  6!  6!%0  0` (#(#     A.0` ` (#` (#4U ` O  5  CooccupantsConsenttotheSearchofaResidence6q&O&   7 & #P"P"I(#.F` (#` (##166!% &݌  Ќ  7  7'0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.Brown(9thCir.2009)563F.3d410:Acooccupant  ofthedefendantsresidencevoluntarilyconsentedtoasearchof   theirsharedresidence,andherconsentwasnotrenderedinvalidby   thefactthatthepolicehadarrestedthedefendantandplacedhimina   squadcarpriortoaskingthecooccupantforconsent#P"P"I(#.N (# (##167''݌   Ќ  7  7E*0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#InreD.C.(2010)188Cal.App.4th978[FirstDistrict,DivisionOne;   petitionforreview1/12/11]:Aminorsparentmayvalidlyconsentto   asearchoftheminorsbedroom,eveniftheminorispresentand   expresslyobjects#P"P"I(#.||* (# (##187E*`*݌   Ќ  7  7a,0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   7a,|,݌  (# (# Ќ  6!  6!-0  0` (#(#     B.0` ` (#` (#4V ` O  5  ExigentCircumstances6-O-   7 z- #P"P"I(#.zz)` (#` (##196!-0-݌  Ќ  7  7.0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Michiganv.Fisher(2009)130S.Ct.546[72decision]:Officers  warrantlessentryintothedefendantsresidencewaslawfulunderthe   emergencyaidexceptionaftertheofficerssawdropsofblood  outsidethehouse,sawthedefendantinsidewithacutonhishand,  andobservedthedefendantscreamingandthrowingthings#P"P"I(#.Q (# (##197..݌  Ќ  7  7K10  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#Peoplev.Rogers(2009)46Cal.4th1136:Officerswarrantlessentry  intoresidentialstorageroomscontrolledbythedefendantwas  justifiedbythemissingpersonexigencyexception;the  circumstancessupportedareasonablebeliefthatthewomanwho  livedwiththedefendantwasmissingandmightbelockedinthe  storageroom#P"P"I(#.$$% (# (##207K1f1݌   Ќ  7  730  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Peoplev.Hochstaser(2009)178Cal.App.4th883[SixthDistrict; " petitionforreviewdenied2/3/10]:RelyingontheSupremeCourts # recentdecisioninRogers,thecourtheldthatexigentcircumstances $  justifiedawarrantlesspoliceentryintothedefendantsapartmentto %!! determinewhetheramissingdomesticviolencevictimandhertwo &"" yearoldchildwereinjuredandsafe.Observationsmadeinthehome '## supportedprobablecausetosearchthedefendantsmotherscar ($$ parkedjustoutsidehisapartment#P"P"I(#.: (# (##22734݌ )%%    *&& 7  770  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   4.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.Struckman(9thCir.2010)603F.3d731:The   officersdidnothaveprobablecausetoenterthebackyard,partof  thecurtilageofthehome,inordertoarrestthedefendantandtheir  warrantlessentrywasnotexcusedbyexigentcircumstances.  Therefore,thedistrictcourterredindenyingthemotionto  suppress#P"P"I(#.! (# (##24777݌   Ќ  Vm  VmV:0     4X O  5  SEARCHESOFCELLPHONES,PAGERSANDCOMPUTERS6:O:   7 J: #P"P"I(#.JJ7(#(##26VmV:r:݌   Ќ  6!  6!;0  0` (#(#     ` 1.0 ` (#` (#CityofOntariov.Quon(2010)130S.Ct.2619:TheOntarioPolice    DepartmentdidnotviolateanofficersFourthAmendmentrightsby   obtainingandreviewingthetranscriptsoftextmessagessentand   receivedonhisdepartmentissuedpager#P"P"I(#.NN@ (# (##266!;;݌   Ќ  6!  6!=0  0` (#(#     ` 6!=>݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  6!  6!>0  0` (#(#     ` 2.0 ` (#` (#Peoplev.Diaz(Cal._Sup.Ct_.January3,2011)2011WL6158:  Searchofthetextmessagefolderofthedefendantsseizedcell  phone,conductedatthedetentionfacility90minutesafterthe  defendantsarrest,wasalawfulsearchincidenttoarrestbecausethe  cellphonewaspersonalpropertyimmediatelyassociatedwiththe  defendantspersonandthuslawfullysubjecttoadelayed  warrantlesssearch#P"P"I(#.+ (# (##276!>>݌  Ќ  6!  6!A0  0` (#(#     ` 6!AA݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  6!  6!qB0  0` (#(#     ` 3.0 ` (#` (#UnitedStatesv.Payton(9thCir.2009)573F.3d859:Searchofthe  computerfoundinthedefendantsbedroomexceededthescopeofa  warrantwhichauthorizedasearchforevidenceofdrugsales,  includingfinancialrecords,becausethecircumstancesdidnot  supportareasonablebeliefthatitemsenumeratedinthewarrant  wouldbefoundonthecomputer#P"P"I(#.7 (# (##376!qBB݌    Ќ  4Y O  5  DNASEARCHESOFCONVICTEDFELONSANDARRESTEES6/EOCE  7qE P"P"I(#.840  6!  6!9F0  0` (#(#     A.0` ` (#` (#4Z` O  5  DNASearchesofConvictedFelons6FOF  7F #P"P"I(#.4` (#` (##416!9FTF݌  Ќ  7  7G0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Peoplev.Robinson(2010)47Cal.4th1104:Althoughthe1999  collectionofthedefendantsDNAwasnotauthorizedbythestate   lawineffectatthattime,the_unauthoized_Ԁsearchdidnotviolatethe   FourthAmendment.Andevenifitdid,theDNAevidence   implicatingthedefendantin1994sexcrimeswasproperlyadmitted   inhisprosecutionforthosecrimes,astheerroneouscollectionwas    basedontwoclerksnegligenterrors#P"P"I(#.66> (# (##447GH݌   Ќ  6!  6!)K0  0` (#(#     B.0` ` (#` (#4[` O  5  DNASearchesofFelonyArrestees6KOK  7K #P"P"I(#.4` (#` (##466!)KDK݌   Ќ  7  7L0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Friedmanv.Boucher(9thCir.2009)580F.3d847:Aprosecution  orderedDNAsearchofanarresteeinpretrialdetentionwithout  individualizedsuspicionviolatedtheFourthAmendment#P"P"I(#.O (# (##477LL݌  Ќ  7  7N0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.Mitchell(W.D.Pa.2009)681F.2d597:The  collectionofDNAfromanarresteeheldinpretrialdetention,  authorizedbyfederallaw,wasanunreasonablesearch.#P"P"I(#.JJO (# (##487NN݌  Ќ  7  7P0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Haskellv.Brown(N.D.Cal.2009)677F.Supp.2d1187:  CaliforniasmandatorycollectionofDNAfromeveryadultfelony  arresteedoesnotviolatetheFourthAmendment#P"P"I(#.G (# (##497PP݌  Ќ  7  7DR0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   7DR_R݌  (# (# Ќ  7  7R0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   4.0 (# (#UnitedStatesv.Pool(9thCir.2010)621F.3d1213:Collectionof  DNAarresteesuponpretrialrelease,afterajudicialfindingof  probablecause,doesnotviolatetheFourthAmendment.#P"P"I(#.O (# (##507RS݌   Ќ  Vm  VmT0     4\O  5  QUICKTAKES6*UO>U  7 lU #P"P"I(#. (#(##52VmTT݌ " Ќ  6!  6!=V0  0` (#(#     A.0` ` (#` (#4]` O  5  SchoolSearches6VOV  7W #P"P"I(#.#` (#` (##526!=VXV݌ $  Ќ  7  7W0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#SaffordUSDv.Redding(2009)129S.Ct.2633:Schoolofficialshad &"" reasonablesuspiciontosearchthe13yearoldmiddleschool '## studentsbackpackandouterclothingforprescriptionandoverthe ($$ counterdrugs,buta stripsearchofherunderwearwasexcessivein )%% scopeandunreasonable#P"P"I(#./ (# (##527WW݌ *&& Ќ   +'' 7  7[Z0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#InreK.S.(2010)183Cal.App.4th72[FirstDistrict,DivisionFive;  petitionforreviewdenied7/14/10]:_TLO_s reasonablesuspicion  standard,ratherthantheprobablecausestandard,appliestoa  searchbyaschoolofficialevenifthesearchisdonebasedon  informationprovidedbythepoliceandinthepresenceofpolice  officers#P"P"I(#.@@! (# (##537[ZvZ݌   Ќ  7  7;]0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#InreSeanA.(2010)2010WL5175177[FourthDistrict,Division   One]:Searchesofstudentsinpublicschoolsconductedpursuanttoa   schoolpolicyarespecialneedsadministrativesearchesthatdonot   requireindividualizedsuspicion#P"P"I(#.9 (# (##537;]V]݌   Ќ  6!  6!U_0  0` (#(#     B.0` ` (#` (#4^` O  5  ProbationandParoleSearches6_O_I(#  7P":` #P"P"I(#.::1` (#` (##546!U_p_݌   Ќ  7  7`0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Peoplev.Watkins(2009)170Cal.App.4th1403[ThirdDistrict]:  Becausetheestoppeldoctrineappliesinthecriminalcontestto  preventadefendantfromprofitingfromhiswrongdoing,adefendant  whoprovidesfalseidentitytoavoidaprobationsearchisestopped  fromchallengingthatsearchasnotbeingauthorizedbyaknown  probationsearchcondition#P"P"I(#.3 (# (##547`a݌  Ќ  7  7c0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#Peoplev.Sardinas(2009)170Cal.App.4th488[SecondDistrict,  DivisionFive;petitionforreviewdenied4/22/09]:Aparolesearch  ofthedefendantbythesameofficer,lessthan24hoursaftera  previousparolesearch,wasconductedforlegitimatelaw  enforcementpurposesandnotforpurposesofharassment#P"P"I(#.44P (# (##557cc݌  Ќ  7  7Cf0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   7Cf^f݌  (# (# Ќ  7  7f0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Peoplev.Pearl(2009)172Cal.App.4th1280[FourthDistrict,  DivisionThree]:Thethreesearchesofthedefendantslivingarea   whichproducedalloftheincriminatingevidencewerenotjustified ! as parolesearchesbecausetheprosecutiondidnotprovethatthe " defendantwasstillonparoleatthetimeofthesearches.Moreover, # theprosecutiondidnotmeetitsburdenofestablishingthatthegood $  faithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleshouldapply#P"P"I(#.llN (# (##557fg݌ %!! Ќ  7  7>j0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   4.0 (# (#Peoplev.Smith(2009)172Cal.App.4th1354[FirstDistrict, '## DivisionFive;petitionforreviewdenied7/15/09]:A reachin ($$ searchofaparoleeislawfulwhenthepolicetakeproperstepsto )%% diminishtheinvasionofasuspectsprivacyduringasearchina *&& publicarea#P"P"I(#.rr$ (# (##567>jYj݌ +'' Ќ  7  7l0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   5.0 (# (#Peoplev.Smith(2010)190Cal.App.4th572[SecondDistrict,  DivisionFive]:Openingthedoorforofficers,statingthattheycan  searchforaprobationer,andsteppingasidetoallowthementry  constitutessubstantialevidencethatadefendantvoluntarily  consentedtotheentry;openingaclothesdryerduringasearchfora  formerresidentwasreasonablebecausetheintrusionwasminimal   andstoppingthenoiseemanatingfromthedryerwasnecessaryto   safelyorderpersonswhowereupstairstocomedownstairs.#P"P"I(#.S (# (##577ll݌   Ќ  6!  6!-p0  0` (#(#     C.4_O  5  InventorySearches6pOpI(#  7P"p #P"P"I(#.$` (#` (##586!-pHp݌   Ќ  7  7q0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Peoplev.Shafrir(2010)183Cal.App.4th1238[FirstDistrict,   DivisionOne;petitionforreviewdenied6/30/10]:Thedecisionto   impoundavehiclepursuanttothecommunitycaretakingfunctionis   evaluatedundera reasonableunderallthecircumstances7qq݌ (# (# Ќ  7  7s0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `    standard#P"P"I(#.! (# (##587ss݌  Ќ  7  7t0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#Peoplev.Torres(2010)188Cal.App.4th775[FourthDistrict,  DivisionThree;petitionforrehearingdenied10/21/10]:An  inventorysearchisunlawfulwherethemotiveforimpoundingthe  vehicleisinvestigatory#P"P"I(#.1 (# (##587tt݌  Ќ  Vm  Vmv0     4`P"O  5  PENDINGISSUES6(wOx0  0` (#(#     A.4aP"O  5  IssuesPendingBeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt6xOxI(#  7P"x #P"P"I(#.G` (#` (##606!>xYx݌  Ќ  7  7y0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Kentuckyv.King(SupremeCourtDocketNo.091272;argued1/12/11)  DecisionBelow:Kingv.CommonwealthofKentucky(Sup.Ct.of  Kentucky2010)302S.W.3d649:Neitherhotpursuitofafleeing   suspectnorexigentcircumstances,basedonfeareddestructionof ! evidence,justifiedwarrantlessentryintothehome7yz݌" (# (# Ќ  7  7T|0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   0 (# (# ` QuestionsPresented: # 1)Whendoesunlawfulpoliceactionimpermissiblycreateexigent $  circumstanceswhichprecludewarrantlessentry,andwhichofthe %!! fivetestscurrentlybeingusedintheUnitedStatesCourtsofAppeal &"" ispropertodeterminewhenimpermissiblycreatedexigent '## circumstancesexist? ($$ 2)Doesthehotpursuitexceptiontothewarrantrequirementapply )%% onlyifthegovernmentcanprovethatthesuspectwasawarehewas *&& beingpursued?#P"P"I(#.' (# (##607T|o|݌ +'' Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   2.0 (# (#Davisv.UnitedStates(SupremeCourtDocketNo.0911328;setfor  argumenton3/21/11)  DecisionBelow:UnitedStatesv.Davis(11thCir.2010)598F.3d  1259:AlthoughtheSupremeCourtsopinioninArizonav.Gant  appliesretroactivelytothesearchconductedtwoyearsearlier,and   thesearchwouldbeunconstitutionalunderGant,theseizedevidence   neednotbeexcludedasthepolicereasonablyreliedonthewell   settledinterpretationofBeltonwhichallowedthesearch.7݌  (# (# Ќ  7  7 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   QuestionPresented:7 '݌  (# (# Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `    Doesthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleapplytoa   searchthatwaslegalatthetimeitwasdone,butwaslaterfoundto   beunconstitutional?#P"P"I(#.- (# (##637݌   Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Tolentinov.NewYork(SupremeCourtDocketNo.0911556;  argumentsetfor3/21/11)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Tolentino(Ct.ofAppealsofN.Y.2010)  14N.Y.3d382:  DMVrecordsacquiredbythepoliceaftertheylearnedthe  defendantsnameduringanunconstitutionaltrafficstoparenot  subjecttosuppressionasthefruitofthepoisonoustree7݌ (# (# Ќ  7  7@0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   Questionpresented:7@[݌ (# (# Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `    Whetherpreexistingidentityrelatedgovernmentaldocuments,such  asmotorvehiclerecords,obtainedasadirectresultofpoliceaction  _violative_ԀoftheFourthAmendment,aresubjecttotheexclusionary  rule#P"P"I(#.   (# (##6671݌   Ќ  6!  6!'0  0` (#(#     B.0` ` (#` (#4bP"` O  5  IssuesPendingBeforetheCaliforniaSupremeCourt6Oursu  7ot #P"P"I(#.F` (#` (##686!'B݌  Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   1.0 (# (#Peoplev.Branner(SupremeCourtNo.S179730;briefing  completedon11/10/10,butcasenotyetcalendaredfororalargument)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Branner(2010)180Cal.App.4th308  [ThirdDistrict]:Aprolongedtrafficdetention,asdefinedbyPeople   v.McGaughran(1979)25Cal.3d577,doesnotviolatetheFourth   Amendment,becausefederallawpermitsanarrestforaminor   VehicleCodeoffense.Astothesearchincidenttoarrest,theGant   rulesapplyretroactively,butundertheexclusionaryrule,evidence   seizedbythepoliceinreasonablerelianceontheprevailing   interpretationofBeltonisnotsubjecttosuppression.7݌  (# (# Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   QuestionsPresented:   1)DidthiscourtsopinioninPeoplev.McGaughran[citation   omitted]survivethepassageofProposition8?  2)IsthedefendantentitledtoretroactiveapplicationofArizonav.  Gant[citationomitted],inwhichthehighcourtlimitedvehicle  searchesincidenttothearrestofarecentoccupantafterthearrestee  hasbeensecuredandcannotaccesstheinteriorofthevehicle.  3)Ifso,didtheCourtofAppealerrbyapplyingthegoodfaith  exceptiontotheexclusionaryrule?#P"P"I(#.< (# (##687݌  Ќ     ` 2.0 Peoplev.Troyer(CaliforniaSupremeCourtNo.S180759;arguedon  12/7/10)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Troyer,unpublishedopinion(Third  District,1/27/10,_Westlaw_Ԁciteis2010WL891852):Forcibleentry  andwarrantlesssearchoflockedupstairsbedroomwasnotjustified  bytheprotectivesweeporemergencyaidexceptionstothewarrant  requirement.  (# (#    ` QuestionPresented: ! 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#Dideithertheprotectivesweepexceptionortheemergencyaid " exceptiontotheFourthAmendmentrequirementofawarrantpermit # policeofficerstomakeaforcibleentryintoalockedbedroomwhile $  respondingtoareportofashootingwithinjuriesatthehouse.#P"P"I(#. Y (# (##73  %!! 7  7И0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   3.0 (# (#Peoplev.Schmitz(SupremeCourtNo.S186707;petitionforreview  granted12/1/10)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Schmitz(2010)187Cal.App.4th722  [FourthDistrict,DivisionThree]:Theofficersnonconsensual  searchoftheentirepassengercompartmentofthedefendantscar  couldnotbejustifiedonthebasisoftheparolesearchconditionof   thefrontseatpassenger,becausethepassengerdidnothavecommon   authorityovertheentirevehicle.7И݌  (# (# Ќ  7  70  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   QuestionPresented:7"݌  (# (# Ќ  7  7ݜ0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `    Whenconductingavehiclesearchauthorizedbyapassengersparole   condition,canthepolicesearchanyareasofthevehiclesinterior   thatappearreasonablyaccessibletothepassenger?#P"P"I(#.L (# (##757ݜ݌   Ќ  /փ       SELECTEDFOURTHAMENDMENTDECISIONS(20092010)  ANDPENDINGISSUES $  #փ點#   `     h  Uփ % ; INTRODUCTION%; #փ U# l   In2009to2010,theappellatecourtstookanactiveroleindefiningthelimitsof V  policepowerandFourthAmendmentprotection.Theydecidedcasesestablishingthe V  circumstancesunderwhichthepolicecouldconductavehiclestop,aninventorysearch,a V  detentionandfrisk,orahomesearchwithoutawarrantandprobablecause.They V  struggledwiththeinterplaybetweentheFourthAmendmentandnewtechnologies, V  weighinginonissuesneverimaginedbytheFoundingFathers,oreventheWarrenCourt: V  Whencanthepolicesearchthecontentsofcellphonesandcomputerswithoutawarrant? V  CanthegovernmentsearchanarresteesDNAwithoutanyindividualizedsuspicion? V    ThesematerialsdiscussFourthAmendmentdecisionspublishedduringthistwo V yearperiodbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,theNinthCircuit,theCalifornia V SupremeCourt,andtheCaliforniaCourtofAppeal.Idiscusscases(facts,reasoningand V holdings)infiveareas:VehicleStops,StopandFrisk,HomeSearchesWithoutaWarrant V orProbableCause,SearchesofCellPhones,PagersandComputers,andDNASearches. V Then,Iincludeaseriesof QuickTakes!briefersummariesofthefactsandholdingsof V casesinthreeotherareas:SchoolSearches,ProbationandParoleSearchesandInventory V Searches.Finally,IdiscusscasescurrentlypendingbeforetheUnitedStatesand V CaliforniaSupremeCourtswhicharelikelytobedecidedthisyear. V   ThetwomostsignificantcasesdecidedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtin V 2009wereArizonav.Gant(2009)129S.Ct.1710,andHerringv.UnitedStates(2009) V 129S.Ct.695.InGant,theSupremeCourtredefinedthecircumstancespermittingan V officertosearchavehiclespassengercompartmentincidenttothearrestofarecent V  occupant.InHerring,theCourtexpandedthereachofthegoodfaithexceptiontothe V! exclusionaryrule.Neitherofthosecasesarediscussedinthesematerials.Arizonav.Gant, V" aswellasitsoriginsanditsaftermath,isdiscussedinaseparatesetofmaterials:THE V# EVOLUTIONOFTHESEARCHINCIDENTTOARRESTDOCTRINE:ARIZONAV. V$ GANT(2009)129S.Ct.1710.Herringisdiscussedatsomelengthinmaterialswhich V%  chronicleacenturyofSupremeCourtjurisprudenceinvolvingtheexclusionaryrule:THE V&!! RISEANDFALLOFTHEEXCLUSIONARYRULE:CANITSURVIVEHUDSON, V'"" HERRINGANDBRENDLIN?BothsetsofmaterialsareavailableontheFDAPwebsite V(## (4% O  5  www.fdap.org6O  7 Ѭ)inthe RESEARCHRESOURCESsection.ApapercopyoftheGant V)$$ materialsisavailableatthisseminar,havingjustbeenupdated.Theexclusionaryrule V*%% materialswerehandedoutatthe2010FDAPseminar. Uփ  V+&&   $O% ? VEHICLESTOPS%?#փ U?# (  #  1        v % @ A.ReasonableSuspiciontoInitiatetheVehicleStop%@f  :  1.UnitedStatesv.PalosMarquez(9thCir.2010)591F.3d1272[cert.denied10/4/10]: 4 Combinedwithothercircumstances,aninpersontipfromanunidentifiedinformant  . providedreasonablesuspicionforaninvestigativevehiclestop .  (   Herearethefacts:BorderPatrolAgentStauntonwasdrivingonaroadfivemiles  ( northoftheUnitedStates/Mexicanborderinanarea notoriousforaliensmuggling.  (  Theagenthadtoswervetoavoidcollidingwithanoncomingpickupthatwasspeeding (  asitpassedaUPStruck.ThedriveroftheUPStruckgesturedtoAgentStaunton, (  directinghisattentiontothepickup.Aboutoneminutelater,theUPSdriverreportedto (  anotherborderpatrolagentthathehadseenthepickuploadupwithseveralsuspected (  illegalaliens.ThisagentdidnotobtaintheUPSdriversnameorlicenseplatenumber, ( buthepassedthistipontoAgentStaunton.Stauntonthenradioedtoallagentsinthearea, ( describingthemakeandmodelofthepickupandincludingtheUPSdriverssuspected ( smugglingreport.Withinminutesofthisbroadcast,otheragentsspottedthepickup,still ( travelingatahighrateofspeed.Plainclothesagentsinanunmarkedcarpulledupalong ( sidethepickupandobservedthattheoccupantslooked nervousandshaky.Five ( minuteslater,agentsstoppedthepickupandfoundfourillegalaliensinside.Defendant ( wasthedriver.Hewasconvictedoftransportingillegalaliensafterthetrialcourtdenied ( hismotiontosuppressevidence. (   TheNinthCircuitaffirmedthelowercourtsdenialofthesuppressionmotion, ( findingthattheunidentifiedUPSdriverstipcombinedwithothercircumstancesto ( provideareasonablesuspicionthatthepickupdriverwasengagedincriminalactivity. ( ThecourtassessedthereliabilityofthetipprovidedinpersontoAgentSimonbythe ( unidentifiedUPSdriver.Thistipwaslocatedbetweenaninherentlyreliablereportfroma  ( knownandproveninformant(seeAdamsv.Williams(1972)407U.S.143),andatotally !( unreliabletipfromananonymousinformant.(SeeFloridav.J.L.(2000)529U.S.266.) "(  Whenthetipisprovidedinafacetofaceencounter,evenwhentheinformantis #( unidentified,wehavedeemedittobeclosertotheAdamsendofthisreliability $(  spectrum.(PalosMarquez,supra.,591F.3dat1275.) %(!!  &(""   Atipdeliveredinpersonhassubstantialindiciaofreliabilityfortworeasons:1)By  speakingfacetofacewithanofficer,theinformantriskslosinghisanonymity.2)The  officercanobservetheinformantsdemeanorandevaluatehiscredibility.Theriskoflost  anonymitywasparticularlygreatinthiscase,becausetheinformantwasaUPSdriveron  aspecificroute,sohisidentifywouldbeeasytotrace.Moreover,theUPSdriverstip!  thathedseenseveralsuspectedaliensloadintothepickupwasbasedonpersonal   observationanddeliveredsoonaftertheevent.  #  2           Finally,thecourtnotedthatothercircumstancesknowntoAgentStaunton,   combinedwiththereliableinformantstip,tosupportareasonablesuspicionofalien   smuggling:1)Thepickupwastravelingthroughanareaclosetotheborderthatwas   knownforsmuggling.2)Thedefendantwasdrivingerraticallyatahighrateofspeed.   2)Borderpatrolagentsobservedthatthepickupsoccupantsappearednervousandshaky.   Standingalone,eachofthesefactorswouldnothaveprovidedreasonablesuspicionforan   investigation.However,whenviewedintheirtotality(inlightoftheagentstrainingand  experience)andcombinedwiththeUPSdriversinpersontip,theyjustifiedthestop.  2. Peoplev.LetnerandTobin(2010)50Cal.4th99:Officersobservationofraindrops  onamovingvehiclesexteriorhoursafterithadstoppedraining,combinedwiththe  drivertravelingslowlyonthefreeway,providedreasonablesuspicionforavehiclestop .    Achallengetothetrialcourtsdenialofthedefendantsmotiontosuppresswas  oneofmultipleissuesraisedinthisautomaticappealtotheCaliforniaSupremeCourt.  Thetwodefendantsappealedafterbeingconvictedofmurderandsentencedtodeath.Ina  fourtothreedecision,theSupremeCourtaffirmedtheconvictionsandsentences.  JusticesWerdegar,MorenoandKennarddissentedononlyoneissue;theydisagreedwith  themajoritysfindingthatthestopofthevehicleoccupiedbyDefendantsLetnerand  Tobinwassupportedbyreasonablesuspicion.  #  3        Ї  Aroundmidnight,OfficerWightmanwaspatrollingacommercialareaofVisalia  whenhespottedacarthatsexteriorwasbeadedwithwater.Theofficerbelievedthiswas  significantbecauseithadstoppedrainingmorethantwohoursearlier.Onlyimmobile  vehicleswerestillbeadedwithwater,soWightmanconcludedthecarhadbeenparked  untilveryrecently.Wightmanknewthatinthepastthreemonths,cardealershipsinthe  areahadreportedcrimes,includingvehicletampering,cartheftsandburglaries.   Wightmanfollowedthecarbecausehethoughtitmighthavejustbeenstolenfromoneof   theselocaldealerships.However,whenheradioedapolicedispatchertocheckthecars   registration,helearnedthatitwasregisteredtoIvonPontbriantandhadnotbeenreported   asstolen.AsWightmancontinuedtofollowthecaroncitystreets,henotedthatitdidnot   breakanytrafficlaws.Whenthecarproceededontothefreeway,thedrivercontinuedto   goslowly,travelingat40mpheventhoughthepostedspeedlimitwas55mph.Noother   carswereonthehighwayatthistime.OfficerWightmanbelievedthattheslowrateof   speedmightindicatethatthedriverwasintoxicated.Afterfollowingthecarforonemile   onthehighway,Wightmaninitiatedatrafficstop.Thecarsdriverwasidentifiedas  LetnerandthepassengerasTobin.ThepolicesubsequentlylearnedthatPointbrian,the  carsregisteredowner,hadbeenmurdered.Duringsearchesofthevehicle,theofficers  foundevidencetyingLetnerandTobintothatcrime.    TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthetrialcourtsrulingdenyingsuppressionofthis  incriminatingevidence.TheCourtheldthatthetotalityofthecircumstancesprovidedthe  patrolofficerwithreasonablesuspicionthatthecarsoccupantswereengagedincriminal  activity,likelyautotheft.First,thefactthatthecarwasbeadedwithwatersupporteda  reasonablebeliefthatithadbeenparkeduntilfairlyrecently,possiblyatoneofthe  dealershipsthathadreportedvehiclecrimesintheprecedingmonths.Second,itwas  midnightinacommercialareaandthestreetswereempty,circumstancesunderwhicha  vehicletheftfromadealershipmightreadilybecommitted.Third,becausethecars  drivertraveled wellbelowthespeedlimitonthefreewayformorethanoneminute,the  officercouldreasonablysuspectthathewasattemptingtoavoidcontactwiththepolice,   indicatingconsciousnessofguilt. !   Thedefenseofferedinnocentexplanationsforthebeadedwateronthevehicleand # theslowrateofspeed(e.g.thecarmighthavehadmechanicaldifficultiesbecause,asthe $  officeradmitted,theenginewas runningrough).TheCourtrejectedtheseexplanations, %!! notingthatitwas theprinciplefunctionof[police]investigationtoresolvethatvery &"" $O $ X $  ambiguityandestablishwhethertheactivityisinfactlegalorillegal.(Letner,supra.,50  Cal.4that148,citingPeoplev.Souza(1994)9Cal.4th224,233.)    JusticesKennard,WerdegarandMorenodisagreedwiththemajoritysfindingof  reasonablesuspicion.JusticeKennardparticularlyobjectedtotherelianceonthedrivers  slowspeedasindicativeofcriminality. Itisnotatallunusualforadrivertoslowdown   uponseeingapolicecar,irrespectiveofanywrongdoing.Herethedriverdidnot   suddenlyslowdownwhenOfficerWightmanbeganfollowingthecar.Ratherthedriver   merelydidnotacceleratetothemaximumspeedlimitafterenteringthefreeway.   (Letner,supra.,at218.)Moreover,thereweremanyinnocentreasonswhyDefendant   Letnermayhavebeendrivingslowlygiventhecircumstances:thefreewaycouldhave   beenwet,thecarmayhavehadmechanicalproblems,thepostedspeedlimitdeclinedto   45mphafterthefirstmileoffreeway.Finally,thepresenceofraindropsonthecar   indicatedonlythatthecarhadnotbeendrivenalongdistance.Itdidnotsupportthe    hypotheticalassertionthatthecarhadbeenillegallytakenfromanearbydealership,  particularlyastheofficerlearnedbeforethestopthatitwasregisteredtoaprivateowner  andnotreportedstolen.   3.Peoplev.Dotson(2009)179Cal.App.4th1045[ThirdDistrict;petitionforreview  denied3/18/10]:Theofficerhadreasonablesuspiciontostopavehiclewithoutlicense  plates,evenifatemporaryoperatingpermitwaspostedinthewindow;therewasno  evidencethattheofficersawthepermitandhewasnotrequiredtolookforitbefore  initiatingthevehiclestop.     Thiscasepresentsanothervariationofanissuethathasgeneratedafairamountof  litigationinrecentyears:Underwhatcircumstancesmayapoliceofficerstopavehicle  forasuspectedregistrationviolation(i.e.expiredregistrationtags,nolicenseplates)  whenthereisalsoatemporaryoperatingpermitpostedinthevehicleswindow?  #  4        Ї  InPeoplev.Brendlin(2006)38Cal.4th1107,vacatedonothergroundsin  Brendlinv.California(2007)551U.S.249,theSupremeCourtacceptedthe  prosecutionsconcessionthatthevehiclestopwasillegalbecausetheofficerlacked  reasonablesuspicionthatthecarsregistrationhadexpired.Priortopullingthecarover,  theofficersawbothexpiredregistrationtabsandanunexpiredtemporaryoperating  permittapedtotherearwindow.Healsophoneddispatchandreceivedradio   confirmationthatthecarsregistrationhadexpiredtwomonthsearlier,butanapplication   forrenewalwasinprocess.     InthecompanioncaseofPeoplev.Saunders(2006)38Cal.4th1129,theSupreme   Courtheldthatthetrafficstopwaslawfuleventhoughtherewasacurrenttemporary   operatingpermittapedtotherearwindow.Beforepullingoverthedefendantstruck,the   officerhadnoticedbothexpiredregistrationtabsandamissingfrontlicenseplate.Hedid   notrecallseeingthetemporarypermitontherearwindow.Theofficerhadreasonable   suspiciontoinitiatethetrafficstoptoinvestigatewhetherthetemporaryoperatingpermit  excusedboththeexpiredregistrationandthemissinglicenseplate.Also,theofficerwas  notrequiredtocheckwiththeDMVbeforemakingthestop.    InPeoplev.Hernandez(2008)45Cal.4th295,theofficerobservedthatthe  defendantsvehiclelackedbothlicenseplatesrequiredbyCalifornialaw,buthedalso  observedaseeminglyvalidtemporaryoperatingpermitintherearwindow.Theofficer  discountedthepresenceofthepermitbecause,inhisexperience,suchpermitswereoften  forgedorotherwiseinvalid.TheSupremeCourtrejectedtheargumentthattheofficers  subjectivedistrustofanyandalltemporarypermitsjustifiedthestop.Theofficerlackeda  particularizedreasonablesuspicionthatthedefendantwasviolatingthelaw.    InInreRaymondC.(2008)45Cal.4th303,theSupremeCourtfoundreasonable  suspicionforthetrafficstop.Theofficerobservedthatthecardrivenbytheminorhadno  licenceplates,andhedidnotseeatemporaryoperatingpermitintherearwindow.After   makingthestop,theminorpointedoutthatatemporarypermitwasaffixedtothefront ! window.Thestopwasheldtobelawful,becausetherewasnopermitintheofficers " viewfromtherearandtheofficerwasnotrequiredtodriveinfrontofthedefendants # vehicletolookforapermitonthefrontwindowbeforepullingthecarover. $    Cognizantofthislineofcases,theThirdDistrictdecidedDotsonin2009.Inthat &"" case,atabout4:00inthemorning,SheriffsDeputyBakulichwaspatrollingacasinos '## poorlylitparkinglot.Henoticedthatatruckdrivingthroughthelotlackedboththefront ($$ andrearlicenseplates.Consequently,Bakulichstoppedthevehicle.Discoveringthatthe  defendantdriverwasundertheinfluenceofacontrolledsubstance,Bakulicharrestedhim  andsearchedthetruck,discoveringincriminatingevidence.Apparently,therewasa  temporaryoperatingpermitdisplayedinthetrucksrearwindow;thedefendanttestified  tothisatthetrialbutnotatthesuppressionhearing.Testifyingatthesuppressionhearing,  DeputyBakulichdidnotrecallseeingthispermitorlookingforit.     TheCourtofAppealaffirmedthetrialcourtsdenialofthesuppressionmotion.   Onappeal,thedefendantcontendedandtheprosecutionconcededthatthestopwas   unconstitutionalbecausetherewasatemporaryoperatingpermitinthewindow,andthe   deputydidnotsearchtheexteriorofthevehicleforthispermitbeforepullingthetruck   over.TheCourtrefusedtoacceptthisconcession.Becausethedeputyobservedthatthe   trucklackedbothlicenseplatesandtherewasnoevidencethathesawatemporary   operatingpermit,hereasonablysuspectedthatthedefendantwasviolatingvehicle   registrationlaws,justifyinganinvestigativestoptoconfirmordispelthatsuspicion.The  officerwasnotrequiredtolookforthetemporaryoperatingpermitbeforedetainingthe  vehicleanditsoccupants.   4.Peoplev.Greenwood(2010)189Cal.App.4th742[SecondDistrict,DivisionFive;  petitionforreviewfiled12/8/10]:Theofficerhadreasonablesuspiciontostopavehicle  inordertoresolveanambiguity;acomputercheckofDMVrecordsindicatedthatthe  vehiclesregistrationhadexpiredtwoyearsbefore,butaseeminglyvalidtemporary  operatingpermitwasdisplayedonthevehiclesrearwindow .      InMay2007,patrolofficersspottedavehicledrivenbythedefendant.Theyrana  computercheckofDMVrecordsanddiscoveredthatthevehiclesregistrationhad  expiredalmosttwoyearsearlier.Theofficersalsoobservedatemporaryoperatingpermit  affixedtothecarsrearwindow.Itborethenumber 5"indicatingthatitwasvalid  throughthemonthofMay.Nevertheless,theofficerspulledoverthecar,searcheditand   discoveredincriminatingevidence. !   AfterdiscussingtherulesdistilledfromthefourSupremeCourtcasessummarized # aboveandPeoplev.Dotson,theCourtofAppealheldthattheofficershadreasonable $  suspiciontostopDefendantGreenwoodscarinordertoresolvetheambiguousevidence % ! !theapparentinconsistencybetweentheDMVsrepresentationthatthecarsregistration &!" hadexpiredtwoyearsearlierandthepresenceofthetemporaryoperatingpermit, '"# indicatingregistrationinprocess. Thequestion[was]notwhetherthedefendants (#$ vehiclewasincompliancewiththelaw,butwhether[theofficers]hadanarticulable )$% suspicionitwasnot.(Greenwood,supra.,189Cal.App.4that750.) *%&   +&'  % A B.PoliceQuestioningandConductDuringaVehicleStop%A    1.Arizonav.Johnson(2009)129S.Ct.781:Lawenforcementofficersmayorderall  occupantsoutofthevehicleduringatrafficstopandquestionthedriverorpassengers  aboutmattersunrelatedtothetrafficviolation,buttheymaynotfriskforweapons  withoutareasonablebeliefthatthevehicleoccupantisarmedanddangerous .     Threeofficers,membersofArizonasgangtaskforce,werepatrollingaTucson   neighborhoodassociatedwiththeCripsgang.Theofficerspulledoveracarfora   suspectedvehicleregistrationviolation.Therewerethreepersonsinthecar,andthe    defendantwasthebackseatpassenger.Duringthetrafficstop,OfficerTrevizoattended   tothedefendantwhilethetwootherofficersdealtwiththedriverandthefrontsear   passenger.Trevizohadnoticedthatasthepoliceapproachedthecar,thedefendantstared   attheofficers.Also,hewaswearingclothingassociatedwithCripsmembership,andhe   hadascannerinhispocketadeviceoftenusedbycriminalstoevadethepolice.Officer   Trevizoquestionedthedefendantwhoadmittedhehadnoidentification,hedbeenoutof  prisonforayear,andheresidedinCripsterritory.Trevizothenaskedthedefendanttoget  outofthecarandshefriskedhimforweapons,findingagun.Thedefendantwas  ultimatelyconvictedofunlawfulweaponspossession.    Relyingonaseriesofprecedents,theSupremeCourtheldthatallofOfficer  Trevizosactionswereconstitutional.Thus,thegunwaslawfullyadmittedintoevidence.  InTerryv.Ohio(1968)392U.S.1,theCourtheldthataninvestigativestopwasjustified  whenthepolicereasonablysuspectthatthepersonapprehendediscommittingorhas  committedacriminaloffense.Thepolicemayproceedfromastoptoafriskiftheofficer  reasonablysuspectsthatthedetaineeisarmedanddangerous.    Thepolicecanlawfullystopacariftheyreasonablesuspectthatthedriverhas  committedaVehicleCodeviolation.InBrendlinv.California(2007)551U.S.249,the   Courtruledthatforthedurationofalawfultrafficstop,policeofficerseffectivelyseize ! everyoneinthevehicle,thedriverandallpassengers.Accordingly, inatrafficstop " setting,thefirstTerrycondition!alawfulinvestigatorystop!ismetwheneveritis # lawfulforthepolicetodetainanautomobileanditsoccupantspendinginquiryintoa $  vehicleviolation.Iftheofficersreasonablysuspectthatthedriverhascommitteda % ! violation,theycanbrieflydetainthedriverandallpassengers.Theydonotneedan &!" additionalreasonablesuspicionthatthepassengerisinvolvedinunrelatedcriminal '"# activity.(Arizonav.Johnson,supra.,129S.Ct.at784.) (#$   *%&   However,inordertojustifyapatdownofthedriverorapassengerduringatraffic   stop,thepoliceofficermustreasonablysuspect,basedonthetotalityofcircumstances,  thatthepersonsubjectedtothefriskisarmedanddangerous.Andgiventhe  circumstancesknowntoOfficerTrevizo,herpatdownofthedefendantwaslawful.    TheCourtalsoreviewedotherrulesthatapplyduringalawfultrafficstop.Inthe   generalinterestofofficersafety,thepolicecanorderboththedriverandanypassengers   toexitfromthevehicle.(Pennsylvaniav.Mimms(1977)434U.S.106[driver];Maryland   v.Wilson(1997)519U.S.408[passengers].)Officerscandothisasamatterofcourse   duringeveryvehiclestop;theydontneedtoobjectivelybelievethatthevehicle   occupantsarearmedanddangerous.However,oncetheoccupantsareoutofthecar,they   cannotbefriskedabsentsuchareasonablebelief.  #  5           Thelawfultrafficstopbeginswhenthepolicepullthevehicleovertoinvestigate   theVehicleCodeviolation.The temporaryseizureofthedriverandallpassengers  continuesandremainsreasonableforthedurationofthestop. Normally,thestopends  whenthepolicehavenofurtherneedtocontrolthesceneandinformthedriverand  passengerthattheyarefreetoleave.(Johnson,supra.,129S.Ct.at788,citingBrendlin,  551U.S.at258.)  #  6          Finally,duringthelegitimatetrafficstop,thepolicemayaskboththedriverand  thepassengerabout mattersunrelatedtothejustificationforthetrafficstop.These  questions donotconverttheencounterintosomethingotherthanalawfulseizure,so  longasthoseinquiriesdonotmeasurablyextendthedurationofthestop.(Johnson,  supra.,at788,citingMuehlerv.Mena(2005)544U.S.93,100101.)X   #  7            2.UnitedStatesv.Burkett(9thCir.2010)612F.3d1103:Applyingthestandardfrom  Arizonav.Johnson,thecourtheldthatthepassengersfurtivemovementsandhis  evasiveanswersprovidedreasonablesuspicionforaweaponsfrisk .     Inthiscase,apatrolofficerobservedacarspeedingdownthehighwayat1:00in  themorning.Theofficeractivatedhisemergencylightstoeffectatrafficstop,butthe   driverofthecardidnotpullover;instead,shecontinuedforalmostamile,finallyexiting   thehighwayandstoppingonasideroad.Believingthatthedriverwasattemptingto   evadethepolice,theofficercalledforbackupandshinedhisspotlightintothecars   passengercompartmentashefollowedbehindit.Heobservedthesolepassenger,the    defendant,making furtivemovements.Hewasleaningoverwhileholdinghishead   rigid,asthoughhewashidingorretrievingsomethingfromundertheseat.Afterthecar   finallypulledover,theofficertalkedtoboththedriverandthedefendant.Heaskedthe   defendantwhathehadbeendoingbeforethestopandtoldhimhedseenhimplace   somethingundertheseat.Thedefendantclaimedhewashavingadrinkandpointedtoa   cupofliquidinaholderonthecenterconsole.Theofficerfeltthisexplanationwas  inconsistentwiththemovementsthathedobserved.Whentheofficeraskedthe  defendanttoexitfromthecar,hereachedacrosshisbodytoopenthepassengerdoorwith  hislefthand,blockingtheofficersviewofhisrighthandandbody.Onceoutofthecar,  thedefendantappearedtobereachingwithhisrighthandintothepocketofhisknee  lengthjacket,causingtheofficertograbhimandcommencethepatdownwhichthe  defendantinitiallyresisted.Ultimately,agunwasfoundinhisrightjacketpocket.    TheNinthCircuitaffirmedthedistrictcourtsdenialofthemotiontosuppressthe  gun.CitingArizonav.Johnson,thecourtfoundthatthecircumstancesprovidedthe  officerwithareasonablebeliefthatthedefendantwasarmedanddangerous,justifying  thepatdownsearchafterhewasremovedfromthecar.TheNinthCircuitemphasizedthe  defendantsfurtiveandunusualmovements,bothbeforeandafterthedriverpulledover  thecar,hisevasiveanswerstotheofficersquestions,andthefactthathereachedforhis   coatpocketwhenhegotoutofthevehicle. !   "    Uփ % B ONTHESTREETSTOPANDFRISK%B  #փ U#   1.փ(V)#փ #ԀInreH.H.(2009)174Cal.App.4th653[FirstDistrict,Division5]:Aminors : refusaltoconsenttosearchdoesnotcreatereasonablesuspicionforapatdownsearch   Z   Theminorwasstoppedat11:30p.m.forridinghisbicyclewithoutproperlighting  T equipment,inviolationoftheVehicleCode.Theofficerdetainedtheminorandasked  T himtostepawayfromhisbikeandtakeoffhisbackpack.Astheminortookoffhis  T backpack,hespontaneouslystated, Imnotonprobation.Hethensaidthathewould  T notgiveconsenttosearch.Theofficerregardedtheminorscommentasa kindof T  warningflagsoheadvisedtheminorthathewasgoingtoconductapatsearch.The T  minorthenstatedforthesecondtime, Idonotgiveconsenttosearch.Theofficer T  pattedtheminordownandfoundarevolverinthepocketofhisbulkyjacket. T    TheminorwaslawfullydetainedfortheobservedVehicleCodeviolation,sothe T onlyissuewaswhetherthecircumstancessupportedareasonablesuspicionthattheminor T wasarmed,justifyingapatsearch.TheCourtofAppealheldthattheydidnot.Thecourt T reiteratedtheimportantprinciple,recognizedbyCaliforniaandfederalcourts,thatthe T policecannotrelyonanindividualsrefusalofconsent,singlyorincombinationwith T otherfactors,assupportingreasonablesuspicionorprobablecauseforasearch.(See T Peoplev.Miller(1972)7Cal.3d219,225226;Peoplev.Dickey(1994)21Cal.App.4th T 952,954;UnitedStatesv.Freeman(10thCir.2007)479F.3d743,749;UnitedStatesv. T Boyce(11thCir.2003)351F.3d1102,1110;UnitedStatesv.Smith(6thCir.2001)263 T F.3d571,594;UnitedStatesv.Prescott(9thCir.1978)581F.2d1343,1351.)Asthe T SupremeCourtstated: [The]statemaynottransformadefendantsrefusaltowaivehis T FourthAmendmentrightsintosuspiciousactivityevidencingcriminalconduct. T (Miller,supra,7Cal.3dat225226.) T   Thegovernmentconcededthisprinciple,butarguedthat theformoftheassertion !T oftherighttorefuseconsentmayberelevanttothejustificationforthesearch. "T Specifically,theyemphasizedthattheminorsrefusalinthiscasewasunprovoked, #T similartothedefendantsunprovokedflightfromthepoliceinahighcrimeareawhich $T wasconsideredsufficienttojustifyadetentioninIllinoisv.Wardlow(2000)528U.S. %T  119,124.)TheCourtofAppealrejectedthisanalogy,andnotedthatinWardlow,the &T!! Courtdistinguishedthedefendantsunprovokedflightfromanindividualsrefusalto 'T"" cooperate,notingthat refusaltocooperate,withoutmore,doesnotfurnishtheminimal (T## levelofobjectivejustificationneededforadetentionorseizure.(Wardlow,supra.,at )T$$ 125,quotingFloridav.Bostick(1991)501U.S.429.) *T%%   +T&&   Thecourtnotedthattheothercircumstancesinthepresentcase,didnotjustifythe   officersdecisiontopatsearchtheminor:Hewasstoppedforatrafficinfraction,nota  crimeofviolence.Therewasnoevidencethattheminorwasstoppedinahighcrime  area,andthelatehour(11:30p.m.)wasinsufficient,byitself,tojustifythepatdown.   2.InreRichardG.(2002)173Cal.App.4th1252[SecondDistrict,DivisionSix;   petitionforreviewdenied8/26/09]:Ananonymoustelephonetipreportinga   disturbanceinvolvingafirearmoutsideofaresidenceinknowngangterritoryjustified   adetention . Also,evidenceofanewcrimecommittedduringanunlawfuldetentionis   notsubjecttotheexclusionaryrule .      Afterreceivingananonymousphonecall,thepolicedispatcherradioedofficers   aroundmidnight,statingthattwomaleswere causingadisturbanceoutsidea   designatedresidenceandthatonewas possiblyinpossessionofahandgun.Onemale   wasreportedlywearingablacktshirtwhiletheotherwaswearingabluePendeletontype   jacket.TheywerewalkingtowardsColoniaPark,locatedacrossthestreetfromthe  residence.Theofficerswhorespondedhadpriorknowledgeofthisresidencewhichwas  locatedinknowngangterritory.Onlydaysbefore,officersinvestigatingadaytime  shootingattheresidencehadseizedtwofirearms.Moreover,theofficersknewthat  ColoniaParkwasfrequentedbygangmembers.Respondingtothelocation,theofficers  sawtwomales(oneofwhichwastheminorRichardG.)andtwofemaleswalking  towardsColoniapark.Themalesclothingmatchedtheanonymouscallersdescription  andthustheyweredetained.Theminorassertedthatthedetentionwasunlawful.    InreRichardG.joinedPeoplev.Lindsey(2007)148Cal.App.4th1390(First  District,DivisionFour),asthesecondpublishedCaliforniaCourtofAppealcaserelying  onPeoplev.Dolly(2007)40Cal.4th458,toupholdadetentionbasedonananonymous  tip.InDolly,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtdefinedanexceptiontotheUnitedStates  SupremeCourtssevenyearolddecisioninFloridav.J.L.(2000)529U.S.266.     InFloridav.J.L.,supra,at268,27174,theSupremeCourtheldthatan " anonymousphonetipstatingthatablackmalewearingaplaidshirtwasstandingata # particularbusstopandcarryingagundidnotjustifyadetentionandfrisk,eventhough $  officersspottedamanmeetingthisdescriptionatthedesignatedbusstopjustsixminutes % ! afterreceivingthereport.Theanonymoustipwasdevoidofdetailsindicatingthatthe &!" callerhadinsideinformationabouttheassertedillegalactivityanditwasuncorroborated. '"# Whentheyarrivedatthebusstop,theofficersdidnotobserveanythingcorroboratingthe (#$ tipstersassertionoffirearmpossession,asopposedtohisofherphysicaldescriptionof )$% thesubject. *%&  +&'   InPeoplev.Dolly,supra,40Cal.4that462,46569,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt  carvedoutanexceptiontotheFloridav.J.L.ruleforananonymous911callthatreported  anactualthreatofcurrentgunviolence.InDolly,ananonymousindividualtwicecalled  the911linereportingthatanindividualhad justpulledagunonthecallerandwas  threateninghimwiththefirearm.Intwocalls,hegavedetaileddescriptionsofthe  assailant,hislocationandhisvehicle.Inthesecondcall,thetipsteridentifiedhimselfas    Drew.Arrivingatthelocation,officersfoundthedefendant,whometthephysical   descriptionandwassittinginthedescribedcar.Searchingthatvehicle,theyfounda   firearm.TheCourtupheldthedetention,distinguishingJ.L.onthreepoints:1)InDolly,   therewasagreaterpublicsafetyinterest,asthetipsterreportedthreatenedgunviolence   andactualbrandishingratherthanmerefirearmpossession.2)Thepolicecouldinferthat   thecallerhadpersonalknowledgeofthedefendantscriminalactivity,enhancingthetips   reliability.3)Drew,the911caller,putforthaplausiblereasonforremainingmostly   anonymousfearofgangretaliation.  #  8           RelyingonDolly,supra.,40Cal.4that458,theCourtofAppealinRichardG.,  heldthattheanonymousphonecallprovidedreasonablesuspicionfortheminors  detention.TheinformantinRichardG.,likethetipsterinDolly,gaveacontemporaneous  descriptionofactivityposingagraveandimmediaterisknotonlytothecallerbutto  anyonenearby.TheCourtfounditsignificantthattheasserted latenightdisturbance  involvingafirearmwasoccurringinfrontofaspecificresidencewhereashootinghad  recentlyoccurredinknowngangterritory.Thiscorroboratedtheanonymouscallers  assertionofillegalactivity.(RichardG.,supra,173Cal.App.4that125758.)    Finally,RichardG.discusseslimitationsontheexclusionaryrule.Whenthe  officershadattemptedtodetaintheminorandhismalecompanion,byorderingthemto  stopandsitontheground,theminorrefusedtoobeyanypolicecommand.Theminor  repeatedlythreatenedoneoftheofficers.Whenthatofficergrabbedtheminorandtriedto  puthiminacontrolhold,heresistedandpunchedtheofficer.Theminorwascharged   withresistingtheofficerwiththreatsandviolence,andsoughttosuppresstheevidenceof ! thosecrimes,assertingthattheyoccurredinthecourseofanunlawfuldetention.Asnoted " above,thecourtupheldthedetentioneventhoughitwasbasedonananonymoustip. # However,thecourtalsonotedthatevenifthedetentionwasunlawful,thetestimony $  describingtheminorsviolentbehaviorandthreateningstatementswouldnothavebeen %!! suppressed.Agreeingwithotherfederalandstateappellatedecisions,thecourtheldthat   anindividualsdecisiontocommitanewanddistinctcrime,evenifmadeduringor  immediatelyafteranunlawfuldetention,isaninterveningactsufficienttopurgethetaint  ofatheoreticalunlawfuldetention.Thus,evidenceregardingthosenewcrimesisnot  subjecttotheexclusionaryrule.(RichardG.,supra,at126063.)   3.Peoplev.Osborne(2009)175Cal.App.4th1052[FirstDistrict,DivisionFour;   PetitionforReviewdeniedon10/28/09]:  Circumstancessupportedreasonable   suspicionofautotheftorburglarywhichjustifiedadetention,patsearchand   handcuffing .      Inmidafternoon,twoofficersobservedthedefendantstandingnexttotheopen   trunkofaLexusvehicle.Heappearedtobehandlingexposedwiresinthetrunk.The   defendantlookedattheofficerspatrolcarasitpassed;hethenshutthetrunkandwalked   awayfromtheLexus,appearing realnervous.Thedefendantcameupbehindthe   officersastheydetainedanotherindividual.Concernedbecausethedefendantwasquite  large,anofficerorderedhimtostepback.Thedefendantwalkedbackandsatdowninthe  driversseatoftheLexus.Believingthatthedefendantwasaparolee,anofficerlooked  insidetheLexusandobservedthatpartsoftheinteriorwerestrippedandthattherewere   burglarytoolsstrewnacrossthefrontpassengerarea.Suspectingthatthedefendant  mightbeburglarizingthevehicle,theofficerorderedhimoutoftheLexusandprepared  topatsearchhim.Becauseheseemed realnervousandwasattemptingtoremovehis  handfromtheofficersgrasp,theofficerhandcuffedthedefendantandaskedhimifhe  hadagun.Headmittedthathedidandtheofficerseizedaloadedhandgunfromhispants  pocket.TheofficerthenenteredtheLexusandremovedabackpackfromthepassenger  compartment.Openingthebackpack,theofficerfounddrugs.    TheCourtofAppealaffirmedthetrialcourtsdenialofthedefendantsmotionto  suppressthefirearmanddrugs.First,theappellatecourtrejectedthedefendants   assertionthatthedetentionwasnotsupportedbyreasonablesuspicion.Althoughitsnot ! entirelyclear,thecourtseemedtoassumethatthedefendantwasnotdetaineduntilafter " theofficersawtheLexusspartiallystrippedinteriorandtheburglarytoolsstrewnacross # thepassengercompartment.Whenaddedtotheearlierobservationofthedefendant $  handlingexposedwiresinthetrunk,hiswalkingawayfromthepoliceandhisvery % ! nervousappearance,theofficerreasonablysuspectedthatthedefendantwasengagedin &!" autotheftorburglary.Thus,detainingthedefendantwas morethanreasonable. '"# (Osborne,supra,175Cal.App.4that105859.) (#$   TheCourtofAppealalsoupheldtheofficersdecisiontofriskappellantfor *%& weapons. Courtshaveconsistentlyrecognizedthatcertaincrimescarrywiththema +&' propensityforviolence[orweaponspossession]andindividualsbeinginvestigatedfor  thosecrimesmaybepatsearchedwithoutfurtherjustification.(Osborne,supra.,at  1059.)Althoughautomobileburglaryisnotrecognizedas aclassicviolentfelony,  courtshaveupheld socalledautomaticpatsearcheswhenanindividualissuspectedof  burglary,becauseburglarsarelikelytobearmedwithweapons,suchasknivesor  firearms,orwithburglarytoolsthatcouldbeusedasweapons.  #  9      ׀Thissamereasoning   justifiesapatdownofindividualssuspectedofautotheftorburglary.Moreover,inthe   presentcase,thedefendantsnervousnessandlargesizealsosupportedareasonable   suspicionthathewasarmedanddangerous.(Id.,at106061.)     Next,thecourtthattheofficersactofhandcuffingthedefendantpriortothepat   searchdidnotconvertthedetentionintoadefactoarrest,requiringprobablecause.   Underthecircumstances,thehandcuffingwasnecessaryastheofficerreasonably   suspectedthatthedefendantwasarmed,hewasverynervousandhetriedtopulloutof   theofficersgraspduringthepatsearch.(Osborne,supra,at1062.)  #  10        Ї  @փ% C HOMESEARCHESWITHOUTAWARRANTORPROBABLECAUSE%Ca#փ@a#փ  #փb#a% D A.CooccupantsConsenttotheSearchofaResidence%Db  8 c 1.UnitedStatesv.Brown(9thCir.2009)563F.3d410:Acooccupantofthe 2 defendantsresidencevoluntarilyconsentedtoasearchoftheirsharedresidence,and  , herconsentwasnotrenderedinvalidbythefactthatthepolicehadarrestedthe  & defendantandplacedhiminasquadcarpriortoaskingthecooccupantforconsent.        Thedefendant,DavidBrown,waswantedonawarrantforfelonyassault.Federal    AgentWatsonreceivedinformationfromaconfidentialinformantthatBrownwasstaying   ataresidenceonEastAugustaAvenueandthathepossessedtwofirearms.AgentWatson   andotherofficerssetupsurveillanceneartheEastAugustaresidenceandspottedBrown   walkingwithLacieRishel,oneoftwocooccupantsoftheresidence.Theagents   approachedBrownandRishelwithgunsdrawn,orderedthemtotheground,handcuffed  themandfriskedthemforweapons,findingnothing.Brownwasarrestedandplacedina  squadcarforeventualtransporttojail.HewasneveraskedforconsenttosearchtheEast  Augustaresidencebeforeorafterhewasputinthecar.AgentWatsontalkedtoRishel.  Aftertakingoffherhandcuffs,WatsontoldRishelthatBrownlikelyhadweaponsstored  attheresidencehesharedwithRishelandherabsentboyfriend.Shedeniedthisand  invitedtheagenttocomedownandlookforhimself.Oncetheywereinsidetheresidence,  RishelconsentedtotheagentsrequesttosearchtheareawhereBrownslept.Inthatarea,  Watsonfoundasemiautomaticpistolunderacouchcushion.    Consentfromanoccupantpossessingexclusiveorcommonauthorityisan  exceptiontothewarrantandprobablecauserequirements,allowingofficerstoenterand  searchahome.First,theNinthCircuitheldthatthegovernmenthadsatisfieditsburden  ofprovingthatRishelvoluntarilyconsentedtothesearchoftheEastAugustaResidence.  Shewasnotincustodyatthetimeshegaveconsent.Shewasnolongerinhandcuffsand   theofficershadputawaytheirweaponsrightafterhandcuffingRishelandBrown.The ! agentdidnotmisrepresenthisauthorityorthreatenRishelinordertoobtainherconsent. " Hedidnotnotifyherthatshehadtherighttorefuseconsent,butthisisnotanabsolute # requirementofvoluntariness.(Brown,supra.,563F.3dat414416.) $    Second,thecourtheldthatRishelsconsentwasvalideventhoughtheofficershad &"" placedBrown,acooccupant,inthepatrolcarpriortoaskingforherconsentandnever '## askedhimifheagreedtotheirsearchofthesharedresidence. ($$   TherearetwomainSupremeCourtcasesonthisissue.InUnitedStatesv.Matlock *&& (1974)415U.S.164,theCourthadheldthatacooccupantwhopossessescommon +'' authorityoverthesharedpremisescanvalidlyconsenttoasearchwhenthenon  consentingcooccupantisabsentfromthehome.InGeorgiav.Randolph(2006)547U.S.  103,theCourtheldthatacooccupantsconsenttothewarrantlesssearchofashared  residenceisinvalidifacooccupantisphysicallypresentandexpresslyrefusesconsent.  InRandolph,thedefendantsestrangedwifegavethepolicepermissiontosearchtheir  sharedmaritalresidenceforitemsofallegeddruguseafterthedefendant,whowasalso   present,unequivocallyrefusedtogivehisconsent.     InBrown,theNinthCircuitnotedthattheSupremeCourt,inRandolph,had   distinguishedandexpresslypreserveditspriorholdingsinMatlockandIllinoisv.   Rodriguez(1990)497U.S.177.Basically,acooccupantwhoisphysicallypresentand   voicesanobjectioncanoverridetheconsentofawillingcooccupant.However,an   absentcooccupantwhoismerelyapotentialobjectorhasnosuchvetopower,evenifhe   isnearby(andinapatrolcar).AstheSupremeCourtexplained:     ThesecondlooseendisthesignificanceofMatlockandRodriguez    aftertoday'sdecision.AlthoughtheMatlockdefendantwasnotpresent    withtheopportunitytoobject,hewasinasquadcarnotfaraway;    theRodriguezdefendantwasactuallyasleepintheapartment,and    thepolicemighthaverousedhimwithaknockonthedoorbefore    theyenteredwithonlytheconsentofanapparentco-tenant.Ifthose    casesarenottobeundercutbytoday'sholding,wehavetoadmitthat    wearedrawingafineline;ifapotentialdefendantwithself-interestin    objectingisinfactatthedoorandobjects,theco-tenant'spermission    doesnotsufficeforareasonablesearch,whereasthepotentialobjector,    nearbybutnotinvitedtotakepartinthethresholdcolloquy,losesout.    (Brown,supra,563F.3d410,quotingRandolph,supra,547U.S.at121.)    InBrown,thedefendantwasamerepotentialobjector.Hewasnotpresentto   overrulecooccupantRichelsconsenttothesearch.Moreover,therewasnoevidence ! thatAgentWatsonintentionallyputthedefendantinthepatrolcarinordertoavoid " askinghimforconsenttosearch.Browndidnotrefuseconsentpriortobeingplacedin # thecar,andtheagentwasnotobligatedtoseekhisconsentbeforeaskingRishel.  $   2.InreD.C.(2010)188Cal.App.4th978[FirstDistrict,DivisionOne;petitionfor  reviewdenied1/12/11]:Aminorsparentvalidlyconsentedtoasearchoftheminors  bedroom,eventhoughtheminorwaspresentandexpresslyobjected     Inthiscase,theCourtofAppealheldthattheprinciplesregardingacooccupants  consenttoapolicesearchofsharedpremises,includingtheruleofGeorgiav.Randolph   (2006)547U.S.103,donotapplywhenahomeissharedbyaparentandaminorchild.     TheminorD.C.,age15,sharedanapartmentwithhismotherandhisadultbrother.   Officerswenttotheirapartmentbuildinginresponsetoareportregardingpossible    narcoticsactivity.Whilethepolicewerethere,anotherresidentreportedthathis   apartmenthadbeenburglarized.Theofficersdetainedtheminorsadultbrother,   suspectinghewasinvolvedintheallegednarcoticsactivity.Theylearnedhewason   probationwithasearchcondition,andescortedhimtotheapartmenthesharedwiththe   minorandtheirmother.Onthewaythere,theofficersmetthemotherwhoconsented,   verballyandinwriting,toasearchoftheentireapartment.Theminorwasoutsidethe  apartment,butnearby.Astheofficersapproachedtheapartmentsfrontdoor,theminor  physicallybarredtheirwayandtoldthem, yourenotgoingtoentertheapartment.  Whenhismothertoldhimtogetoutoftheway,hesteppedoutside,Thepolicesearched  thewholeapartment,includingtheminorsbedroomwheretheyfoundsomeitems  reportedlytakenintheburglary.    Thecourtacknowledgedthatadultssharingaresidence,butmaintainingseparate  bedrooms,donothavetheapparentauthoritytoconsenttothesearchofoneanothers  bedrooms.However,differentrulesapplyintheparentchildcontext.Givenaparents  legalrightsandobligationstowardsherminorchild,shehasactualandapparentcommon  authorityoverthatchildsbedroom.Properexerciseofaparentssupervisoryduties  demandsthattheparenthavejointaccessandcontroltoherchildsbedroom.Therefore,   policeofficersmayreasonablyconcludethataparentcanvalidlyconsenttothesearchof   aminorchildsbedroom.(D.C.,supra,188Cal.App.4that98485.) !   Moreover,theminorsexpressobjectiontotheofficersentryintotheshared # home,deliveredatthethresholdoftheapartment,didnotinvalidatethesearch.Under $  Georgiav.Randolph,supra,547U.S.at103,anadultcooccupantcanoverrulethe % ! consentofanotheradultcooccupantifheisphysicallypresentandexpresslyrefuses &!" permissiontoenterandsearch.However,thisruledoesnotapplywhentheobjectingco '"# occupantisaminorchild.(D.C.,supra,at98889.)Finally,eventhoughanolderminor (#$ childcanvalidlyconsenttoasearchofaresidencesharedwithhisparentswhenthe )$% parentsareabsentfromhome,aminorchildcannotoverrulehisparentsconsentwhen *%& theyarepresent.(Id.,at990.) h  +&' Ї % E B.ExigentCircumstances%E       1.Michiganv.Fisher(2009)130S.Ct.546[72decision]:Officerswarrantlessentry  intothedefendantsresidencewaslawfulunderthe emergencyaidexception,even  thoughthepolicedidnotreasonablysuspectaseriousinjury,aftertheofficerssaw  dropsofbloodoutsidethehouse,sawthedefendantinsidewithacutonhishand,and   observedthedefendantscreamingandthrowingthings      Policeofficersrespondedtoacomplaintof adisturbance.Astwoofficers   approachedthedesignatedarea,acoupledirectedthemtoaresidence,claimingthata    manwas goingcrazy.Whentheofficersarrivedatthehouse,theysawapickuptruckin   thedrivewaywithitsfrontsmashed,damagedfencepostsalongthesideoftheproperty,   andthreebrokenhousewindows.Theysawdropsofbloodonthetruck,onclothes   visibleinsidethetruckandonthedoortothehouse.Throughawindow,theofficerssaw   thedefendant,insidethehouse,screamingandthrowingthings.Thebackdoorwas   lockedandacouchwasblockingthefrontdoor.Theofficersknockedbutthedefendant  refusedtoletthemin.Throughthewindow,theycouldseethatthedefendanthadacut  onhishand,butheignoredtheirinquiresastowhetherheneededmedicalattention.The  defendantdemandedthattheofficersobtainawarrantbeforeenteringhishome.One  officerpushedthefrontdoorpartwayopenandventuredintothehouse.Thedefendant  pointedalonggunathim,sohewithdrew.Thedefendantwaschargedwithassaultwitha  weaponandpossessionofafirearmduringcommissionofthatfelony.Thetrialcourt  grantedhismotiontosuppressevidence,findingthattheofficerswarrantlessentrywas  unconstitutional,andthestateappellatecourtaffirmedthatholding    TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtreversed,findingthattheofficersdidnotneeda  warranttoenterthedefendantshome.Theirentrywasjustifiedbytheexigenciesofthe  situation,specificallythe emergencyaidexceptionpreviouslydefinedinBrighamCity  v.Stuart(2006)547U.S.398.Underthisexception,officersmayenterahomewithouta   warranttorenderemergencyassistancetoaninjuredoccupantortoprotectanoccupant ! threatenedwithimminentinjury.Theofficersmusthaveanobjectivelyreasonablebasis " forbelievingthatapersonwithintheresidenceisinneedofimmediateaid.(Michiganv. # Fisher,supra,130S.Ct.at548,citingBrighamCity,supra,547U.S.at40305.) $    TheCourtheldthatthecircumstancesobservedbytheofficerssupporteda &!" reasonablyobjectivebeliefthatthedefendantmighthavehurthimself(albeitnonfatally), '"# orthathe wasabouttohurt,orhadalreadyhurt,others.(Fisher,supra.,at549.)They (#$ sawacutonthedefendantshand,andhewasthrowingobjectsthatmighthavehitan )$% unseenhumantarget.Itdidnotmatterthattheymerelysawacutonthedefendantshand *%& anddropsofbloodlikelyattributabletothatcut. Officersdonotneedironcladproofofa +&' likelyserious,lifethreateninginjurytoinvoketheemergencyaidexception.(Ibid.)  Apparently,anyinjurywilldo.Itdidnotmatterthattheofficersdidnotseeorhave  reasontobelievethatanyoneelsewasinthehouse.Thefactthat,inhindsight,therewas  noemergency,doesnotaffecttheCourtsobjectiveassessmentofthesituationobserved  bytheofficersbeforetheyenteredthehome.    JusticeStevensfiledadissent,joinedbyJusticeSotomayor.Theywereofthe   opinionthattheemergencyaidexceptiononlyexcusesawarrantwhentheofficers   objectivelybeliefthattheyneedtoenterahometoprotectorpreservelifeinorderto   avoidseriousinjury.(Fisher,supra.,at550.)Inthiscase,theofficersobservationsdidnot   suggestthatthedefendantwasseriouslyinjuredorthatanyoneelsewasinthehouse.    2.Peoplev.Rogers(2009)46Cal.4th1136:Officerswarrantlessentryintoresidential   storageroomscontrolledbythedefendantwasjustifiedbythemissingpersonexigency   exception;thecircumstancessupportedareasonablebeliefthatthewomanwholived   withthedefendantwasmissingandmightbelockedinthestorageroom.     Onceagain,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtdecidedaFourthAmendmentissuein  thecontextofanautomaticappealfrommultiplemurderandattemptedmurder  convictionsandasentenceofdeath.Thechallengetothedenialofthemotiontosuppress  evidenceseizedfromthedefendantsapartment,storageroomsandvehicleswasoneof  severalissuesraisedinthisappealwhichyieldedaunanimousopinion.    Herearethefacts:BarbaraSlimakcalledtheSanDiegopoliceandreportedthata  womannamedBeatriceToronczakwasmissing.Barbaramadethecallonbehalfof  BeatricesmotherwholivedinGermany.Themotherwasconcernedbecauseshehadnot  heardfromherdaughterinseveralweeks,andshefearedthedefendantwasresponsible  forherdisappearance.ShehadwitnessedthedefendantthreateningtolockBeatricein  hisapartmentsstoragearea.Beatricehadbeenlivingwiththedefendantina   SanDiegoapartment,andtheyhadafiveyearoldchild.Whenthemothercalledthe ! defendant,lookingforBeatrice,hesaidshejusttookoffandhedidntknowwhereshe " was.Herefusedtocallthepoliceandreporthermissing.DetectiveCarlsonreceivedthis # missingpersonsreportandcalledthedefendant.ThedefendantcurtlysaidthatBeatrice $  hadbeengoneaboutaweekandonehalfandhunguponCarlson. % !   Carlsonthentookanumberofofficerstothedefendantsapartment,whereheand '"# Beatricehadbeenliving.AresidentofthecomplextoldCarlsonthatshehadnotseen (#$ Beatriceforseveralweeks.ThedefendantdroveupafterCarlsonhadarrivedandstated )$% thatBeatricehadbeengoneinMexicoforaboutaweekandahalf.Hedidnotdenythat *%& hehadpreviouslythreatenedtolockBeatriceintheapartmentsstoragerooms.Asthe +&' apartmentmanager,thedefendantcontrolledaccesstothosestoragerooms.The  defendant,whoseemednervous,repeatedlyrefusedCarlsonsrequestforconsentto  searchthethreestorageroomslocatedunderhisapartment.Increasinglyconvincedthat  Beatricemightbeintheseareas,Carlsondirectedoneoftheofficerstobreakdownthe  doorofthefirststorageroom.Inthatroom,Carlsonsawablacknylonropethatlookedas  ifithadbeenusedtobindsomeoneswristsandankles,indiciaforthedefendantand   narcotics.Theroomsdirtfloorlookedasifitcouldhavebeendugup.Defendantwas   informedofthesediscoveriesandplacedintheofficerspatrolcar.Heagainrefused   consenttosearchtheothertwostoragerooms.Theofficersforcedentryintothesecond   storageroomwheretheyfoundluggagetaggedwithBeatricesnamewithherpersonal   belongingsinside.Afterforcingentryintothethirdstorageroom,theofficersfound   cardboardandwoodstainedwithdriedblood,ahammer,sawandbutcherknife.Carlson   believedhewaslookingatacrimescene.Hesealedoffthethreestorageroomand   obtainedatelephonicsearchwarrant,authorizingreentryandtheseizureofevidence.     TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtrejectedthedefendantscontentionthatexigent  circumstancesdidnotjustifytheofficerswarrantlessentryintothethreestoragerooms,  andthatthesearchwarrantobtainedbyDetectiveCarlsonwasbasedonobservations  madeduringtheinitialillegalentry,taintingthewarrantauthorizedsearchesandthe  resultingseizuresofevidence.TheCourtfoundthattheofficersinitialentriesintothe  threestorageroomswasjustifiedbythemissingpersonexigencyexceptiontothewarrant  requirement.ThisexceptionwaspreviouslydefinedbytheSupremeCourtinPeoplev.  Wharton(1991)53Cal.3d522andPeoplev.Lucero(1988)44Cal.3d1006.Ineachof  thosecases,lawenforcementofficershadreceivedreliablereportsthatindividualswere  missing.Moreover,additionalcircumstances,alongwiththosereports,ledtheofficersto  reasonablebelievethattheyneededtoquicklyenterahome,withoutawarrant,tolook  forthemissingindividualswhomightbeinimminentdanger.    Similarly,inthepresentcase,thetotalityofcircumstancesknowntoDetective   Carlsonsupportedhisassessmentof anobjectiveemergencyrequiringimmediate ! action!areasonablebeliefthatBeatrice,themissingwoman,mightbeindangerand " insidethethreestoragerooms.Thesecircumstancesincluded:thecrediblereportsthat # Beatricewasmissingandhadnotbeenseenforsometime;theinformationthatthe $  defendanthadpreviouslythreatenedtolockBeatriceinthestorageareaandhisfailureto %!! denythatallegation;thefactthatthedefendantgaveincorrectinformationabouthow &"" longBeatricehadbeengoneandhisfailuretoexhibitconcernoverherunexplained '## disappearance;andthedefendantssolecontroloverthestoragerooms.Oncetheofficers ($$ whereinthestoragerooms,theirobservationsprovidedprobablecauseforthewarrant. )%%   +''  3.Peoplev.Hochstaser(2009)178Cal.App.4th883[SixthDistrict;petitionforreview  denied2/3/10]:RelyingontheSupremeCourtsrecentdecisioninRogers,thecourt  heldthatexigentcircumstancesjustifiedawarrantlesspoliceentryintothedefendants  apartmenttodeterminewhetheramissingdomesticviolencevictimandhertwoyear  oldchildwereinjuredandsafe.Observationsmadeinthehomesupportedprobable  causetosearchthedefendantsmotherscarparkedjustoutsidehisapartment .      Inthisappealfromafirstdegreemurderconviction,thesoleissueraisedonappeal   waswhetherthetrialcourterredindenyingthedefendantsmotiontosuppressevidence,   includingthevictimsdismemberedbodyparts,discoveredduringasearchofhis    motherscarconductedafterawarrantlesssearchofthedefendantshome.     Ataround9:45atnight,awomancalledtheSantaClaraPoliceDepartmentand   toldthedispatcherthathermotherswhereaboutswereunknown.Thepreviousnight,   accordingtothecallersgrandmother(themissingwomansmother),hermothers   boyfriendhadstruckherduringaphysicalfight.Thewomantoldthedispatcherthather  mother.Dolores,livedwithherboyfriend,thedefendant,andtheirtwoyearoldson.  Neitherthewoman(Doloressdaughter)norhergrandmotherhadbeenabletocontact  Doloresallday.Aboutfifteenminuteslater,twoofficersweredispatchedtothe  defendantsapartmenttoconductawelfarecheck.Theofficersfoundtheapartment  completelydarkandsilent.Thefrontdoorwassecuredandtheblindswereshut.The  officersrepeatedlybangedonthefrontdoorandknockedonthewindow.Theyidentified  themselvesaspoliceandaskedoutloudifanyonewasinside,receivingnoresponse.One  officerthencalledbacktheDoloressdaughterandsheaddedthatDoloressfailureto  answerhercellphonetorepeatedcallswashighlyunusual.Becausethedaughterlivedin  Sacramento,itwouldtakeabouttwohoursforhertoarrivewiththekey,sosheaskedthe  officertocontinuethewelfarecheckandseeifanyonewasinsidetheapartment.    ConcernedaboutDoloresandhertwoyearoldchildandbelievingthatsomeone   insidethesilentapartmentmightbeseriouslyinjuredandincapacitated,theofficers ! decidedtoentertheapartmentbyremovingthescreenfromapartiallyopenwindow.As " theyenteredthe pitchdarkapartment,theofficersagainidentifiedthemselvesaspolice, # receivingnoresponse.Inthelastbedroomtheychecked,theofficersfoundthedefendant $  sittingonabedinthedark,wearingapairofearplugs.WhenaskedaboutDoloress % ! whereabouts,hesaidshewasnothome.Thedefendantsfacewasredandhehadcutson &!" hishands.HeacknowledgedthathedhadanargumentwithDoloresthenightbeforeand '"# saidhedreceivedtheinjuriesduringthataltercation.HesaidthatDoloreshadleftafter (#$ theargument,andhehadthendriventheirtwoyearoldtohismothershouseThe )$% defendantsdemeanorwaswithdrawandemotionlessandhisanswerswerevagueand *%& evasive.Theofficerswalkedaroundtheapartment,lookingforafemaleandasmall +&' child.TheynoticedSawzallbladesonthecouchandthekitchentable.Theapartment  smelledstronglyoffreshbleachorcleanserandthebathroomwasveryclean.Onthe  kitchentable,oneofficernoticedasmallfannypack.Insidethefannypack,hecouldsee  awomanswallet,andshininghisflashlightintothepack,theofficercouldseeDoloress  driverslicense,alongwithacellphone,keysandcreditcards.    ThedefendantadmittedthatheddrivenhismothersJettahomefromherhouse   whenhedroppedoffhisson,butherefusedofficersrequeststosearchtheJetta.One   officerlookedinsidetheJetta,noticingatarponthefloorandseverallargeRubbermaid   containersstackedontherearseat.Thecontainerslookedliketheywerelinedwith   garbagebags.TheofficerthendecidedtoentertheJettaandlookinsidethebins,Inside   thefirstone,hefoundhumanflesh.Thedefendantwasthentakenintocustody.Doloress   bodypartswerefoundinthecontainers,butthechildwasfound,aliveandsafe,athis   grandmothershouse.     Thetrialcourthadheldthatthewarrantlessentryintothedefendantsapartment  wasjustifiednotbyexigentcircumstances,butbythe communitycaretakerexception  definedinPeoplev.Ray(1999)21Cal.4th464.However,whilethiscasewaspendingon  appeal,theSupremeCourtdecidedPeoplev.Rogers(2009)46Cal.4th1136.TheSixth  DistrictfoundRogerscontrolling onthequestionofwhetherthesituationconfronting  theofficersinthiscasegaverisetoexigentcircumstances.(Hochstraser,supra.,178  Cal.App.4that89394.)    Thecourtconcludedthat,asinRogers,theofficersrespondedtoareliablemissing  personsreportandthecircumstancesknowntotheofficersstronglysuggestedthatthe  missingpersons,Doloresandheryoungchild,couldbeinsidethedefendantsapartment,  injuredorworse.Theofficerswerejustifiedinimmediatelyenteringtheapartment  withoutawarranttolookforDoloresandherson,todeterminewhethertheyneeded  emergencyaid.     Oncetheofficerswerelawfullyinthehouse,theirplainviewobservations " providedprobablecausetocontinuesearchingthehouseandtosearchtheJetta.These # plainviewobservationsincluded:thebleachsmellandspotlessbathroomwhich $  suggestedacrimescenecleanup;thebladesinthekitchenandthefamilyroom;the %!! victimsfannybackwithcellphone,keysandidentification;andthedefendantsevident &"" injuries,demeanorandevasiveness.Pursuanttotheautomobileexception,theofficersdid '## notneedawarranttosearchtheJettaeventhoughthepolicehadakeyandthecarwas ($$ parkedandcurrentlyimmobile,asitwascapableofbeingusedfortransportation. )%%   *&&  4.փ(V)#փ#ԀUnitedStatesv.Struckman(9thCir.2010)603F.3d731:Theofficersdidnot   haveprobablecausetoenterthebackyard,partofthecurtilageofthehome,inorderto   arrestthedefendantandtheirwarrantlessentrywasnotexcusedbyexigent  circumstances.Therefore,thedistrictcourterredindenyingthemotiontosuppress.     Herearethefactsunderlyingthisraredefensevictory:Aroundmidday,awoman   called911andreportedthatshesawawhitemalewearingablackjacketandcarryinga   redbackpackclimboverherneighborsfenceintotheirbackyard.Shecouldnotseewhat   hewasdoingintheyard,butherneighborswerenotathome.Thedispatchersentofficers   toinvestigate.Whentheyarrivedatthedesignatedresidence,thetwoofficersfoundthat    thebackyardwasentirelyenclosedbyasixfoottallfence.However,byclimbingatopa   nearbyobjectandpeeringthroughahole,theofficerswereabletopeekintotheyard.   Theysawaperson,thedefendant,whometthe911callersdescriptionandtheysawared   backpacklyingnexttoadeckintheyard.Theofficerssawnosignsofaforcedentry.The   defendantwaswalkingtowardsthebackoftheyardwheretheofficersweresituated.He  lookedup,sawoneoftheofficersstaringathimfromoverthetopofthefence,looked  surprised,stoppedwalking,andtookoffhisjacket.Hedidnotattempttorunandthe  officerssawnovisibleweaponsorburglarytools.    Oneoftheofficersthendrewhisfirearm,pointeditatthedefendantandtoldhim  togetdownonhisknees.Thedefendantcomplied.Thisofficerthenclimbedoverthe  fenceandhandcuffedthedefendantwhiletwootherofficerskickedopenapadlocked  gateandenteredthebackyard.Thedefendantwascursingtheofficersandrepeatedly  statingthathelivedatthehouse.Heofferedtheuseofhiscellphonetocallhismotherto  confirmthathelivedthere.Theofficerignoredthisandconductedapatsearch.Whenthe  defendanttriedtopullaway,theofficerforcedhimtotheground,atwhichtimehefelta  hardobjectinthedefendantspocket.Thisobjectwasanunloadedhandgunmagazine.A  secondofficerthenliftedthetopflapoftheredbackpackandsawthebuttofahandgun,  whichheseized.Thereafter,theofficersobtainedthedefendantsnameandlearnedthat   hewasonprobationandthathelivedatthehouse. !   TheNinthCircuitoverturnedthedistrictcourtsdenialofthemotiontosuppress # themagazineandgun,findingthatthedefendantwasillegallyarrested.First,thecourt $  foundthatthesmall,enclosedbackyardadjacenttothehousewaspartofthecurtilage, %!! subjecttoFourthAmendmentprotection.Thus,theofficerscouldnotentertheyardin &"" ordertoarrestthedefendantwithoutprobablecauseandeitherawarrantorexigent '## circumstances. ($$   Second,thecourtheldthattheofficersdidnothaveprobablecausetoarrestthe *&& defendantforresidentialburglaryorattemptedburglary.Therewerenosignsofforced +'' entry,novisibleburglarytools,noindicationthatthedefendanthadenteredthehomeor  wastryingtodoso.Norwasthereprobablecausetobelievethatthedefendantwas  committingacriminaltrespass.Theneighborsinformationwasnotsufficient.Before  handcuffingthedefendantatgunpointandthuseffectinghisarrest,theofficersshould  havedonesomeinvestigation!findingoutwholivedatthehouseandascertainingthe  defendantsidentityandhispurposeforbeingintheyard.     Third,assumingarguendothattheofficershadprobablecausetoarrestthe   defendantformisdemeanortrespass,theydidnotobtainawarrantandexigent   circumstancesdidnotexcusetheirfailuretodoso.Thegovernmentdidnotsustaintheir   burdenofprovingthatanimmediatearrestwasnecessary.Thedefendantwasnotfleeing,   sotheofficerswerenotinhotpursuit.Thecircumstancesdidnotreasonablysuggestthat   hepresentedadangertotheofficersorthegeneralpublic.Hislookofsurprise,whenhe   sawtheofficerpeeringoverthefence,didnotsuggestathreat.Oneofficertestifiedthat   whenthedefendanttookoffhisjacket,hebelievedheintendedtoflee.Theofficers  subjectivemotivationwasirrelevantindeterminingwhetherhisactionswerereasonable  undertheFourthAmendment.Moreover,criminaltrespassisaminoroffense,a  misdemeanor,anditwasnotinherentlydangerous.Thus,awarrantwasnecessaryand  shouldhavebeenobtained. h      Uփ % F SEARCHESOFCELLPHONES,PAGERSANDCOMPUTERS%F #փ U#     1.CityofOntariov.Quon(2010)130S.Ct.2619:TheOntarioPoliceDepartmentdid : notviolateanofficersFourthAmendmentrightsbyobtainingandreviewingthe 4 transcriptsoftextmessagessentandreceivedonhisdepartmentissuedpager.  .   TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwadedintothedangerouswatersofassessing  ( theinterplaybetweenFourthAmendmentprotectionandnewtechnologies.However,  ( theywerecarefultolimittheirrulingtothefactsofthisparticularcase.  (   OfficerQuonwasemployedbytheOntarioPoliceDepartmentasaSWATteam (  member.Thedepartmentacquiredpagerscapableofsendingandreceivingtextmessages (  andissuedthemtoQuonandotherSWATteamofficerstohelpthemmobilizeand (  respondtoemergencies.Pursuanttoacontractwiththewirelessserviceprovider,the (  officerscouldonlysendandreceivealimitednumberoftextmessagecharactersevery ( month.Theyweretoldthattheirtextmessagescouldbeaudited.Forseveralmonths, ( OfficerQuonexceededthemonthlylimit.Hewaspermittedtoavoidanauditby ( reimbursingthedepartmentfortheincurredoveragefees.Afteranotherofficeralsowent ( overthelimit,thedepartmentdecidedtodeterminewhethertheexistingcharacterlimit ( wastolow!i.e.whetherofficerslikeQuonweregoingoveronworkrelatedorpersonal ( messages.Tomakethisassessment,thedepartmentobtainedtranscriptsoftwomonths ( textmessagessentandreceivedbyQuonandtheotherofficer.Theydiscoveredthatmost ( ofthemessagessentandreceivedbyQuonwerenotworkrelatedandthatmanywere ( sexuallyexplicitmessagessentduringworkhours.Quonwasdisciplinedforviolating ( departmentrulesandhefiledacivilrightsactionagainstthedepartmentandothers ( allegingthatthereviewofhistextmessagesviolatedhisFourthAmendmentrights. (   TheSupremeCourtreversedtheNinthCircuitsfindingsthatthedepartments ( reviewofQuonstextmessagesviolatedhisreasonableexpectationofprivacyandwas  ( excessiveinscope.TheCourtacknowledgedthattheFourthAmendmentprotects !( governmentemployeesfromunreasonableinvasionsoftheirprivacybygovernment "( officials,includingtheiremployers.(SeeOConnorv.Ortega(1987)480U.S.709.)The #( Courtassumedwithoutdecidingthat:1)Quonhadareasonableexpectationofprivacyin $(  thetextmessagessentandreceivedonthepagerprovidedtohimbythepolice %(!! department;2)thedepartmentsreviewofthetranscriptsofQuonstextmessageswasa &("" searchwithinthemeaningoftheFourthAmendment;and3) principlesapplicabletoa '(## governmentemployerssearchofanemployeesphysicalofficeapplywithatleastthe (($$ sameforcewhentheemployerintrudesontheemployeesprivacyintheelectronic )(%% sphere.(Quon,supra.,130S.Ct.At2630.) *(&&  +(''   TheCourtconcludedthatthereviewofthemessagesonQuonsemployer  providedpagerwaslessintrusivethanasearchofhispersonalemailaccountora  wiretapofhishomephoneline.Thefactthatthesearchrevealedintimatedetailsof  Quonslifedidnotmakeitunreasonable,because,underthecircumstances,areasonable  employerwouldnothaveexpectedthatthereviewwouldintrudeonsuchmatters.    TheCourtappliedthestandardsetforthbythepluralityinOConnorv.Ortega;a   governmentemployerswarrantlesssearchthatinvadesanemployeesreasonable   expectationofprivacyandisconductedfor noninvestigatoryworkrelatedpurposesis   reasonableifitisjustifiedatitsinceptionandnotexcessiveinscope,giventheobjectives   ofthesearch.InQuon,thesearchwasjustifiedatitsinceptionforthenoninvestigatory   workrelatedpurposeofdeterminingwhetherthetextmessagecharacterlimitimposedby   thewirelessserviceproviderwassufficienttomeetthepolicedepartmentsneeds.The   searchofthetranscriptswasreasonableinscopeasthiswas anefficientandexpedient   waytodeterminewhether[Officer]Quonsoveragesweretheresultofworkrelated  messagingorpersonaluse.Moreover,thedepartmentonlyreviewedthemessagessent  whiletheofficerwasondutyforatwomonthperiod.(Quon,supra,at2631.)    TheCourttookcaretodecidethiscaseonnarrowgrounds,notingthatitmust  proceedwithcarewhenconsideringonesprivacyexpectationsincommunicationsmade  onelectronicequipment,includingcellphonesprovidedbygovernmentemployers. The  judiciaryriskserrorbyelaboratingtoofullyontheFourthAmendmentimplicationsof  emergingtechnologybeforeitsroleinsocietyhasbecomeclear.(Id.at2629.)   2.Peoplev.Diaz(Cal.Sup.Ct.January3,2011)2011WL6158:Searchofthetext  messagefolderofthedefendantsseizedcellphone,conductedatthedetentionfacility  90minutesafterthedefendantsarrest,wasalawfulsearchincidenttoarrestbecause  thecellphonewaspersonalpropertyimmediatelyassociatedwiththedefendants  personandthuslawfullysubjecttoadelayedwarrantlesssearch.      TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtjustrecentlyweighedinonanissuethatwilllikely " beresolved,atsomefuturetime,bytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt:Underwhat # circumstancesmaylawenforcementofficerssearchthecontentsofacellphoneseized $  fromanindividualatthetimeofherarrest? % !   Herearethefacts:DeputySheriffFaziowitnessedthedefendantparticipateina '"# controlledsaleofEcstasytoaninformant.Themonitoredtransactiontookplaceinthe (#$ backseatofacarthatthedefendantwasdriving.Rightafterthesale,Faziostoppedthe )$% carandarrestedthedefendantforbeingconspiringtoselldrugs.Inimmediatesearches *%& incidenttothisarrest,FazioseizedsixtabsofEcstasyandasmallamountofmarijuana. +&' Themarijuanawasfoundinthedefendantspocket.Thedefendanthadacellphone on  hisperson,butthatphonewasnotseizeduntilafterthedefendantwastransportedtothe  sheriffsstation.Atthesheriffsstation,Faziointerrogatedthedefendant,whodenied  knowledgeofthedrugtransaction.About30minutesafterdiscoveringthecellphoneand  approximately90minutesafterarrestingthedefendant,Faziolookedatthecellphones  textmessagefolderanddiscoveredamessagethatsaid 6480".Faziointerpretedthis   messagetomean sixpillsofEcstasyfor$80".Fazioshowedthetextmessagetothe   defendantwhothenadmittedparticipatinginthedrugsale,forwhichhewas   subsequentlyprosecuted.Therecorddoesnotestablishwhetherthedefendantscell   phonewasa smartphoneoradevicewithlessercapacity.Faziodidnotrecallifthe   phonewasonwhenhepickedituptolookatit.However,hedidhavetomanipulatethe   phoneandgothroughseveraldifferentscreenstoaccessthetextmessagefolder.     TheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,inafivetotwodecision,affirmedthetrialcourt   andCourtofAppealsdecisionsdenyingthedefendantsmotiontosuppressthefruitsof  thecellphonesearch!thetextmessagesandthedefendantsincriminatingadmissions.    Thegovernmentconcededthatthedefendanthadaprotectedexpectationof  privacyinhiscellphonestextmessagefolderandthatDeputyFaziosreviewofthetext  messageswasasearch.Thedefendantdidnotattackthelegalityofhisarrestorchallenge  theofficersrighttoseizethecellphonefromhisperson,withoutawarrantincidentto  thatarrest.TheonlyissuewaswhetherFazioneededawarranttoreviewinformationon  thecellphone,specifically,thetextmessagefolder,becausethatsearchoccurred90  minutesfollowingthearrestatadifferentlocation,afterthedefendantwassecuredin  custodyandlawenforcementhadexclusivecontrolofthephone.Accordingtothe  SupremeCourt,resolutionofthisissue!theconstitutionalityofthewarrantlessdelayed  searchturnedonwhetherthecellphone,atthetimeofthearrest,wasanitemof  personalpropertyimmediatelyassociatedwiththearresteespersonorpropertywithinthe  arresteesareaofimmediatecontrol.       TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtreiteratedthatincidenttoalawfulcustodialarrest, " theofficercanpromptlysearchthearresteespersonandtheareawithinhisimmediate # control(hisreachingdistance)forweaponsanddestructibleevidence.Thesesearches $  maybeconductedwithoutawarrant,regardlessofwhetherthereisprobablecauseto %!!  believethatthepersonarrestedmayhaveaweaponoranysuchevidence.Itisthefactof &"" thelawfularrestthatgivestheofficertherighttomakeanimmediatesearchtoprotect  policeandpublicsafetyandpreserveevidence.  #  11           TheDiazdecisionthenreviewedthreecasesfromtheUnitedStatesSupreme  Courtregardingthedistinctionbetweenthepostarrestsearchofpropertyfoundonthe  personandthesearchofcontainersfoundwithinhisareaofimmediatecontrol.First,in   UnitedStatesv.Robinson(1973)414U.S.218,theCourtclarifiedthepolicemay   conductafullsearchofthearresteespersonincidenttoacustodialarrest.Inthatcase,   policearrestedthedefendantfordrivingwitharevokedlicenseandthenconducteda   patdown.Theofficerfeltanobjecthecouldntidentifyinthedefendantsbreastpocket,   pulleditout,andfounditwasacrumpledupcigarettepackage.Determiningbytouch   thatitcontainedobjectsthatwerenotcigarettes,theofficeropenedthepackageand   foundheroin.TheCourtheldthattheofficerhadtherighttofullysearchthearrestee,   seizethepackagefromhispocketandinspectitscontents.     Second,inPeoplev.Edwards(1974)415U.S.800,theSupremeCourtheldthata  searchorseizureofthedefendantspersonandeffects thatcouldbemadeonthespotat  thetimeofthearrestmaylegallybeconductedlaterwhentheaccusedarrivesattheplace  ofdetention.(Edwards,supra.,at803.)InEdwards,thepolicearrestedthedefendant  lateatnightforattemptingtobreakintoapostoffice.Hewastakentojailandplacedina  cell.Tenhourslater,suspectingthathisclothesmightcontainpaintchipsfromthe  windowthroughwhichhehadtriedtoenterthepostoffice,policemadethedefendant  changeintonewclothesandtookhisoldclothesasevidence.Subsequentexaminationof  thoseclothesrevealedpaintchipsmatchingsamplestakenfromthepostofficewindow.  TheCourtheldthatoncethedefendantwaslawfullyarrestedandtakenintocustody,the  policehadtherighttoseizetheclotheshewaswearing(propertyinhisimmediate  possession)andexaminethem.Theycouldhavedonethisatthesceneorwhenthe  defendantarrivedattheplaceofdetention.Itdidnotmatterthattheydidnotactually  seizeandexaminetheclothinguntilhoursafterthedefendanthadbeenadministratively   processedandincarceratedinjail.Thedelayherewasreasonable,particularlybecausethe ! defendantwasarrestedandjailedlateatnightandnewclothingcouldnotbeobtained " untilthenextmorning. #   $    InthethirdSupremeCourtcase,UnitedStatesv.Chadwick(1977)433U.S.1,the   highcourtcutbackontheseeminglybroadruleofEdwards.InChadwick,narcotics  agentsobservedthedefendantloada200pound,doublelockedfootlockerintoacar.  Havingprobablecausetobelievethatthefootlockercontainedcontrolledsubstances,the  agentsarrestedthedefendantandhistwocompanions.Thethreearresteeswere  transportedtothefederalbuilding,alongwiththecarandthefootlocker.There,the   footlockerremainedintheexclusivecontroloflawenforcementagentsinasecureplace.   About90minutesafterthedefendantsarrestandwithoutobtainingawarrant,theagents   openedthefootlocker,withakeyseizedfromoneofthearrestees,andfoundsubstantial   amountsofmarijuanainside.     ThequestioninChadwickwaswhetherthedelayedopeningandsearchofthe   footlockerwasconstitutional.TheCourthelditwasnot.Theofficerslawfullyseizedthe   footlockeratthetimeofarrest,asitwasintheareaofthedefendantsimmediatecontrol,   buttheywerenotentitledtosearchthatpropertyataremotetimeandplaceunlessthere  wasanexigency(e.g.areasonablebeliefthatthefootlockercontainedexplosivesor  evidencethatwouldloseitsvalueiftheofficersdelayed). Oncelawenforcement  officershavereducedluggageorotherpersonalpropertynotimmediatelyassociatedwith  thepersonofthearresteetotheirexclusivecontrol,andthereisnolongeranydangerthat  thearresteemightgainaccesstothepropertytoseizeaweaponordestroyevidence,a  searchofthatpropertyisnolongeranincidentofthearrest.(Chadwick,supra,433U.S.  at15[emphasisadded].)TheCourtdidnotoverruleRobinsonandEdwards,but  distinguishedthemasinvolvingsearchesof thepersonratherthan searchesof  possessionswithinanarresteesimmediatecontrol(Chadwick,supra.,at16,n.10.)    Basedonthesethreecases,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt,inDiaz,reasonedthat  thecrucialquestionwaswhetherthedefendantscellphonewaspersonalproperty  immediatelyassociatedwithhisperson(likethecigarettepackinRobinson,theclothing  inEdwards,orthewalletinUnitedStatesv.Passaro(9thCir.1980)624F.2d938),so   thatthedelayedpostarrestsearchofitscontentswasjustified."  #  12      ׀Or,alternatively, ! whetherthephonewaslikethefootlockerinChadwick,anitemseparatefromthe  defendantspersonandmerelywithintheareaofhisimmediatecontrol,sothatthe  officersshouldhaveobtainedawarrant,basedonprobablecause,beforesearchingthe  phonescontents,includingthetextmessagefolder,90minutesafterthearrest.!  #  13      ׀    TheCourtansweredthisquestionbyholdingthatthecellphonewasanitemof   personalpropertyimmediatelyassociatedwiththedefendantspersonatthetimeofarrest   andduringbooking.Thus,thedelayedwarrantlesssearchofitscontentswasvalid.   Presumably,theofficerscouldhaveseizedthecellphoneandviewedthetextmessage   folderimmediatelyafterarrestingthedefendant.Thus,undertheruleofEdwards,they   couldalsolookatthetextmessages90minutesafterthearrest,eventhoughthephone   waswithintheofficersexclusivecontrolandnolongeraccessiblebythedefendant.       Becausetheyfoundthedelayedsearchofthecellphonestextmessagefolderwas   validunderEdwards,theCourtdeclinedtoaddressthegovernmentsargumentthat  exigentcircumstancesjustifiedthewarrantlesssearchbecausethecellphonescontents  weredynamicinnatureandsubjecttochangeordeletionwithoutwarning(e.g.thatnew  messagescouldreplaceoldones,apowerlosscouldwipeoutthedata,orsomeonecould  contactthecellphoneproviderandhavetextmessagesremotelydeleted.)TheCourt  notedthatthePeoplehadofferednoevidencetosupporttheseclaims.Norhadthey  shownthattextmessagesdeletedfromacellphonecouldnotobtainedfromthecell  phoneprovider.  Ї  TheDiazmajoritythenproceededtorejectargumentsofferedbythedefenseand  thedissentingjustices.First,thedefensehadarguedthattheconstitutionalityofthe  searchshouldnotrestonthefortuitousfactthatthedefendantwascarryingthecellphone  onhispersonatthetimeofarrest.Afterall,cellphonesareoftenkeptwithinthepersons  reachingareaoratanevengreaterdistance(e.g.inapurse,abackpackorabriefcase,on  adesk,orpluggedintoacharger).Thus,theCourtshouldfocusonthecellphones   uniquecharacterratherthanitslocationatthetimeofthearrest.Thedefenseemphasized   thatcellphonescontainlargequantitiesofprivatedata,muchmorethancanbekeptinan   arresteespocket,hiswallet,orothersmallcontainerscarriedonhisperson.     TheCaliforniaCourtnotedthatnothinginRobinson,EdwardsorChadwick   suggestedthatthenecessityofobtainingawarrantforthesearchofpropertyseized   incidenttoarrestshoulddependonthecharacteroftheitemratherthanitslocation.   Moreover,thistheoryhasbeenrejectedbySupremeCourtcasesholdingthatthenatureof   alawfullyseizedcontainerisirrelevanttothevalidityofasubsequentsearch.(See,  UnitedStatesv.Ross(1982)456U.S.798[ifthepolicehaveprobablecausetobelievea  lawfullystoppedcarcontainscontraband,theymaysearchanycontainerinsidethecar  thatmightcontaintheobjectofthesearch,regardlessofthenatureofthecontainerin  whichthecontrabandissecreted];NewYorkv.Belton(1981)453U.S.454[duringa  searchincidenttoarrestofavehicleanyopenorclosedcontainerfoundinthepassenger  compartmentmaybesearched];Arizonav.Gant(2009)129S.Ct.1710,1720[notingthat   Beltonauthorizespoliceofficerstosearchnotjustthepassengercompartmentbutevery  purse,briefcase,orothercontainerwithinthatspace].)    Moreover,theCourtnotedthatindividualsalsocarryhighlypersonalmaterials,  suchasphotos,lettersanddiaries,intheirpockets,wallets,andpursues.Thoseitems  wouldbesubjecttoexamination,withoutthenecessityofseekingawarrant,ifseized  fromanindividualspersonduringasearchincidenttoarrest.InEdwards,thehighcourt  approvedseveralcourtofappealdecisionswhichhadupheldthedelayedandwarrantless   examinationofpersonalpapersseizedfromarrestees,includingthoseinwalletsorpurses. ! (SeeEdwards,supra.,415U.S.at803804,fn.4.) "   TheCourtrejectedanyfocusontheallegedhighstoragecapacityofcellphones! $  thattheycouldholdlargeamountsofprivatedata,muchmorethansmallspacial %!! containerslikepocketsorwallets.First,therecordcontainednoevidenceregardingthe &"" storagecapacityofcellphonesingeneralorthedefendantscellphoneinparticular. '## Second,thequantityofinformationstoredshouldnotbedeterminativeofthe ($$ constitutionalityofthesearch.Underthistheory,thepolicemightbeprohibitedfrom )%% searchingasophisticatedsmartphonewithhugestoragecapacity,unlesstheyobtaineda *&& warrant,butpermittedtosearchanunsophisticatedphonewithlimitedstoragecapacity. +'' Thiscouldcreatesignificantlinedrawingproblemsforpoliceofficersandthecourts.  Thosechargedwithenforcingthelawneedastraightforwardrulethatiseasytoapply!  eithertheycanexaminethecontentsofcellphonesseizedfromanarresteeatanytime,or  theycannotdoso(atleastmanyminutesafterthearrest)withoutawarrant.    Next,theDiazmajorityrefusedtodistinguishbetweenthecellphoneitselfandits   contents!i.e.thestoreddata.SuchadistinctioniscontrarytoRobinson,whichheldthat   thepolicecouldopenandexamineanycontainerfoundonthearresteespersonduringa   fullsearchincidenttoarrest.ItisalsocontrarytoEdwards,whichheldthatafterthe   policehadseizedthedefendantsclothingandreducedthemtopolicecontrol,theydid   notneedawarrantbeforesubjectingthoseclothestolaboratorytesting.Thus,according   totheCourt,ifthepolicehavetherighttoseizethearresteescellphoneincidentto   arrest,theycanexamineitscontentsatanytimewithoutgettingawarrant.     TheDiazmajorityrejectedtheassertionthattherationaleforallowingdelayed  warrantlesssearchesshouldnotapplytoitems,likecellphones,thatareeasilyremoved  fromthearresteespossessionandsecuredbythepolice.TheCourtemphasizedthatthe  wholepointofEdwards,isthatanyitemthatcanbeseizedfromthearresteespersonat  thetimeofarrest,andthereaftersearchedandexaminedonthespot,canalsobeseized  andsearchedatalatertime,withoutobtainingawarrant.Itsuptothepolicetodecide  whenandwheretoconductthesearchofanitemassociatedwiththearresteesperson.    TheCourtconcludedthatthedelayedwarrantlesssearchofthecontentsofthe  defendantscellphonewasvalidundertheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsbinding  precedents. If,asthedissentasserts,thewisdomofthehighcourtsdecisionsmustbe  newlyevaluatedinlightofmoderntechnology,thenthatevaluationmustbetakenbythe  highcourtitself.    ThemajorityopinioninDiazwasauthoredbyJusticeChinandjoinedbyJustices   Kennard,Baxter,CorriganandGeorge.ActingChiefJusticeKennardwroteashort ! concurringopinionexplainingwhyshejoinedthemajority.ShereasonedthattheCourt " wascompelledtoupholdthesearchbasedonapplicableUnitedStatesSupremeCourt # precedents(Robinson,EdwardsandChadwick),eventhoughtheremightbereasonto $  reconsiderorcreateexceptionstothoseprecedentsinlightofnewtechnology.Anysuch %!! reconsiderationwouldhavetobeperformedbytheSupremeCourt. &""   JusticeWerdegarfiledadissentingopinion,joinedbyJusticeMoreno.Thedissent ($$ waswillingtorecognizethatelectroniccommunicationanddatastoragedevicescarried )%% ontheperson!cellularphones,smartphonesandhandheldcomputers!presentunique *&& challengestoexistingFourthAmendmentprinciples.Inshort,mobilephonesarenotlike +'' anarresteesclothing,cigarettepackages,smallspatialcontainers,orevenwallets.They  arecapableofholdingvastamountsofhighlyprivatepersonalandbusinessinformation.  Indeed,theymaynotqualifyas containersatall,astheSupremeCourthasdefineda  containeras anyobjectcapableofcontaininganotherobject.(SeeNewYorkv.Belton,  supra,453U.S.at460,fn.4.)Mobilephonesandotherhandheldelectronicdeviceshold  data,notphysicalobjects.     Inlightofthesedistinctions,thedissentassertedthatacontextdependent   balancingoftheindividualsprotectedinterestsininformationalprivacyagainstthe   policeinterestsinsafetyandpreservationofevidencewascalledfor.Thedissentdidnot   necessarilyconsidertheCourtboundbyRobinson,EdwardsandChadwick,asthosecases   werefactuallydistinctandnotdirectlyapplicableprecedents.TheSupremeCourthad   recentlyemphasized,inArizonav.Gant,thatstariedecisisshouldnotbeused tojustify   thecontinuanceofanunconstitutionalpolicepractice...inacasesoeasilydistinguishable   formthedecisionsthatarguablycompelit.(Gant,supra,129S.Ct.at1722.)    Thesearchofthecontentsofapersonsmobilephone,smartphoneorhandheld  computerposesanenormousthreattotheindividualsinterestininformationalprivacy  becauseofthelargeamountofprivateinformationstoredonthesedevices(e.g.thousands  ofmessages,photos,videos,contacts,financialrecords).#  #  14      ׀ Thequestionofwhenand  howtheymaybesearchedisthereforeanimportantone.    Thedissentacknowledgedthatthepolicewereentitledtoseizeandsecureacell  phonefoundonthepersonatthetimeofhisarrest.Theissuewaswhethertheycould  searchthephonescontentsafteritwassecuredandintheexclusivecontrolofthepolice  withoutobtainingawarrantbasedonprobablecause.Suchasearchcouldnotbe  rationalizedbythetraditionaljustificationsforasearchincidenttoarrest!protecting  officersafetyandpreservingevidence.Aweaponcannotbehiddeninacellphone.   [T]hereisapparentlyno appthatwillturnaniPhoneoranyothermobilephoneintoan   effectiveweaponforuseagainstanarrestingofficer.Moreover,onceamobilephone ! hasbeenseizedfromthearresteeandsecuredinthegovernmentsexclusivecontrol,the " arrestee,whoisalsoinpolicecustody,cannotdestroyanyevidencestoreduponit.  Althoughsomesmartphonescanbe remotelywiped(dataerasedbyanaccomplice),  remotewipingcanbeavoidedbyremovingthesmartphonesbatteryorstoringthephone  inashieldedcontaineruntilawarrantisobtained.Thus, [o]nceanarresteesmobile  phoneorsimilardeviceissecurely undertheexclusivedominionofpoliceauthority,  thearrestitselfnolongerservestoauthorizeawarrantlesssearchofitsstoreddata.     TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsrecentdecisioninArizonav.Gant(2009)129   S.Ct.1710,andtheSixthDistrictCourtofAppealsdecisioninPeoplev.Leal(2009)178   Cal.App.4th1051,bothholdingthattherationalesforasearchincidenttoarrest,   articulatedinChimelv.California(1969)395U.S.752,donotpermitasearchofthe   vehiclespassengercompartmentoroftheareawithinthearresteesimmediatecontrol,   afterthearresteeissecuredinthepatrolcar,seemtosupportthedissentsanalysis.     Moreover,thedissentsreasoningisalsovalidatedbytheNinthCircuitsvery  recentholdinginUnitedStatesv.Maddox(9thCir.2010)614F.3d1046,decidedinfive  monthsbeforeDiaz.InMaddox,afterstoppingthedefendantforrecklessdriving,the  policeofficerdiscoveredfromacomputercheckthathehadasuspendedlicense.Just  priortohandcuffingandarrestingthedefendant,theofficertookakeychainwithan  attachedvial,thatthedefendantwasapparentlyholdinginhishands,andtossedthemon  thefrontseatofthevehicle.Afterthedefendantwassecuredintheofficerspatrolcar,  theofficerenteredthedefendantsvehicle,retrievedthekeychain,unscrewedthetopof  theattachedvialanddiscoveredmethamphetamineinside.TheNinthCircuitheldthatthe  searchofthekeychainvialwasnotjustifiedasincidenttoarrestbecausethedefendant  couldnotaccesstheitembythetimeofthesearch.TheCourtofAppealdidnottreatthe  keychainandattachedvialasanitemintimatelyassociatedwiththedefendantatthetime  ofhisarrest!eventhoughhewasapparentlyholdingthekeychainrightbeforehewas  arrested.Instead,thecourttreatedthekeychainsearchasaChimelChadwicksearchof  anitemthatwaswithinthearresteesreachingdistanceatthetimeofarrest.First,relying   onpreGantNinthCircuitprecedent(UnitedStatesv.Turner(9thCir.1991)926F.2d ! 883,887),Maddoxheldthatthesearchofthekeychainvialwasunreasonablebecause " thedefendantcouldnotdestroyevidenceinsidethevialoncehewashandcuffedinthe # patrolcar.Second,relyingonlanguagefromChadwick,theNinthCircuitemphasizedthat $  oncetheofficerreducedthekeychainwithitsattachedvialtohis exclusivecontrol,it %!! couldnotbesearchedincidenttoarrestbecausethearresteecouldnotaccessthevialto &"" obtainaweaponordestroyevidence.(Maddox,supra.,614F.3dat1049,citingUnited '## Statesv.Chadwick,supra.,433U.S.at15.)Arguably,thislimitationcouldapplyoncethe ($$ officerseizedandsecuredtheitemevenbeforethearresteewasplacedinthepatrolcar. )%%  UnderthereasoningofMaddox,oncethepolicehadexclusivecontrolofDefendant *&& Diazscellphone,particularlybecausehewasalreadyinpolicecustody,theyshouldnot  havebeenabletoexamineitscontents,includingthetextmessagefolder.     TheDiazdissentnotedthatthemajorityhadreliedontheruleofEdwards!that  becausethemobilephonewasanitemonthedefendantspersonatthetimeofarrest,it  couldhavebeenseizedandsearchedatthetimeandplaceofarrest.Thus,itcouldalsobe   searchedlater,afterthedefendantwassecurelyincustody,withoutoffendingtheFourth   Amendment.ThedissentnotedthattheEdwardsCourtdidnotsuggestthatitsholding   permittingthedelayedwarrantlessseizureandinspectionofthedefendantsclothinguntil   replacementclothingcouldbesecuredshouldnecessarilyapplytodistinctfactual   situations.Thehighcourtdidnotexplainwhatpoliceinterestjustifiedadelayed   warrantlesssearchoncethearresteeandhiseffectsweresafelyinpolicecontrol.Rather,   theEdwardscourtsuggestedthattherationalewastoavoidalogisticallyawkwardor   embarrassingpublicsearch!e.g.forcingthearresteetoremovehisclothesatthearrest   site.Indeed,manycourtsandcommentatorshavesuggestedanarrowreadingofEdwards,  allowingdelayedsearchesincidenttoarrestonlyofthearresteesactualpersonor  clothing.Nevertheless,thedissentacknowledgedthatsubsequently,inChadwick,the  SupremeCourtsuggestedthatitemsbeyondclothing,includingcontainers,maybe  subjecttodelayedwarrantlesssearchiftheyareimmediatelyassociatedwiththeperson  ofthearrestee.    However,accordingtothedissent,evenabroadreadingofEdwardsshouldnot  applytomobilephonesseizedfromanindividualatthetimeofarrest.Thesehandheld  electronicdevices,areverydifferentfromtheclothingandsmallspatialcontainerswhich  existedatthetimeofEdwardsandChadwick.Theyholdmuchmoreinformationand  theirownershaveamuchgreaterexpectationofprivacyintheirstoreddata,an  expectationthatcontinuesevenaftertheyaretakenintocustody.    Thedissentwouldholdthat mobilephones,smartphonesandhandheldcomputers   arenotordinarilysubjecttodelayedwarrantlesssearchesincidenttoarrest.Indeed,it ! seemsthatexceptinrarecircumstances,thedissentmightrequireawarrantbasedon " probablecausetoexaminethedatastoredontheseizedcellphone,evenatthesceneof # arrest.Thedissentproposedthatpolicecouldonlyexamineanarresteesphonewithouta $  warrantinexigentcircumstances!e.g.wherethearrestingofficershavereasontofear %!! imminentlossofevidencefromthedevice.Also,uponseizingthecellphone,thepolice &"" mightbepermittedtolookatthephones wallpaper(butnotitsdatafolders)to '## discoveridentifyinginformationregardingthearrestee. ($$   Obviously,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtsdividedopinioninDiazwillnotbethe *&& endofthediscussionofthisparticularissue,orofrelatedissuesregardingwarrantless +'' searchesofcellphones,handheldelectronicdevices,laptopcomputersandevendesktop  computers.Asnotedattheendofthemajorityopinion,theSupremeCourtofOhio,  reachedtheoppositeconclusion,holdingthatafterseizingacellphonefromanarrestee,  thepolicemustobtainawarrantbeforeintrudingintothephonescontents.(SeeStatev.  Smith(Ohio2009)920N.E.2d949.)Otherappellatecourtshaveupheldwarrantlesscell  phonesearches.(SeeUnitedStatesv.Murphy(4thCir.2009)552F.3d405;UnitedStates   v.Finley(5thCir.2007)477F.3d250;UnitedStatesv.Wurie(D.Mass2009)612F.Supp.   2d104.)AlthoughtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdeniedthegovernmentspetitionfor   certiorariinStatev.Smith,theywilllikelyhavetotakeupthisissueatsomepoint.    3.փ(V)#փ#ԀUnitedStatesv.Payton(9thCir.2009)573F.3d859:Searchofthecomputer   foundinthedefendantsbedroomexceededthescopeofawarrantwhichauthorizeda   searchforevidenceofdrugsales,includingfinancialrecords,becausethe   circumstancesdidnotsupportareasonablebeliefthatitemsenumeratedinthewarrant   wouldbefoundonthecomputer.     UnlikethemajorityoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,theNinthCircuitseems  willingtotreatcomputersslightlydifferentlyfromothercontainers.Inthiscase,officers  obtainedawarranttosearchthedefendantsresidenceforevidenceofdrugselling.The  warrantauthorizedofficerstosearchforitemsincludingmethamphetamine,packaging  materials,salesledgersshowingnarcoticstransactions(suchaspay/owesheets),financial  recordsofpersonsincontroloftheresidence,bankaccountsandincomeandexpense  records.Theofficersprobablecausestatementhadrequestedpermissiontosearchany  computerfoundattheresidencebutthewarrantissuedbythejudgedidnotexplicitly  authorizetheseizureorsearchofanycomputers.Duringtheexecutionofthewarrant,the  officersfoundnoevidenceofdrugsalesintheresidence.Oneofficerfoundacomputerin  thedefendantsbedroom,whichwasturnedonwiththescreensaveractivated.The  officerclickedopenafileonthiscomputerwhichshowedanimageoflikelychild  pornography.Thisandotherimagesfoundonthecomputerledthegovernmenttocharge   thedefendantwithpossessionofchildpornography. !   TheNinthCircuitoverturnedthedistrictcourtsdenialofthedefendantsmotion # tosuppressevidence.TheCourtofAppealheldthatthesearchofthecomputerexceeded $  thescopeofthewarrant. %!!   Thejudgewhohadissuedthewarranttestifiedatthesuppressionhearingthathe '## hadintendedtoexpresslyauthorizethesearchofanycomputerfoundinthedefendants ($$ residence,buthadneglectedtodoso.TheNinthCircuitheldthatthisafterthefact )%% testimonydidnotcurethewarrantsfailuretoauthorizethecomputersearch.Moreover, *&& thecourtheldthatthewarrantsauthorizationofasearchforsalesledgersandfinancial +'' recordsdidnotauthorizetheofficertolookforsuchrecordsonthecomputer,even  thoughthecomputerwascapableofholdingthisinformation.    TheCourtofAppealfoundthatthecurrentcasewascontrolledbyitsoneyearold  decisioninUnitedStatesv.Giberson(9thCir.2008)527F.3d882.Inthatcase,thecourt  upheldtheseizureofacomputerfoundduringaresidentialsearcheventhoughthe   warranthadnotexpresslyauthorizedacomputersearchorseizure.InGiberson,officers   hadobtainedawarranttosearchthedefendantsresidenceforevidenceofhisuseoffalse   identification.Thewarrantauthorizedthepolicetosearchforrecords,documentsor   correspondencerelatedtotheuseofothersidentity.Duringthesearch,theofficersfound   acomputerinthedefendantsbedroom.Nexttotheconnectedprinterwerefake   identificationcardsthatlookedliketheydbeenprintedonthatdevice.Onthedesknear   thecomputerwereotherdocumentsevidencingtheproductionoffalseidentification,   includingfakesocialsecuritycardsandbirthcertificates.Basedonthesediscoveries,   officersseizedandsecuredthecomputeruntiltheyobtainedasecondwarrantexpressly  authorizingasearchofthecomputerforfalseidentificationdocumentation.Thethen  officerssearchedthecomputerandfoundimagesofchildpornography.    TheNinthCircuit,inGiberson,heldthesearchwasreasonablebecausethe  circumstances(e.g.thefalseidentitydocumentsfoundneartheprinterandonthedesk)  madeitreasonabletobelievethatthecomputercontaineddocumentsenumeratedinthe  warrant.Thepolicethushadtherighttoseizethecomputerandthenobtainawarrantto  searchit.Thecourtreiteratedthat wehavelongheldthatasearchwarrantauthorizing  theseizureofmaterialsalsoauthorizesthesearchofobjectsthatcouldcontainthose  materials,includinglockedbriefcasesandcassettetapes.(Giberson,supra.,527F.3dat  886887.)Computers,likebriefcasesandcassettetapes,canberepositoriesfor  incriminatingdocumentsandrecords,buttheyalsocanstorelargequantitiesofpersonal  andprivateinformationthatisintermingledwiththematerialdocumentssoughtina  searchwarrant.Consequently,thedefensehadarguedthatcomputersarenotlikeother   containers,includingbriefcasesandfilingcabinets;theyshouldbeabsolutelyexempt ! fromthegeneralruleandgivenheightenedFourthAmendmentprotection.Thecourt,in " Giberson,declinedtosucha brightlineexceptiontotheacceptedrulebasedonthe # quantityofinformationstoredincomputersortheforminwhichitisstored.(Giberson, $  supra.,at888.)Thecourtheldthatunderthecircumstancesof thiscase,itwas %!! reasonablefortheofficerstosecurethecomputerwhileapplyingforawarrantbecause &"" theyreasonablybelievedthatitemsspecifiedinthewarrantwerestoredonthatcomputer. '## (Giberson,supra.,at889.) ($$   InPayton,theNinthCircuitreadGibersonasrequiringsomethingmoretoseizure *&& acomputerandtosearchitscontentsthanrequiredtosearchafilingcabinetorevena +'' lockedbriefcases.ThePaytoncourtstatedthattheruleofGibersoninthismanner:  Computerscanbesearchedfordocumentsandrecordsspecifiedinawarrantwhenthere  arecircumstancesobjectivelyindicatingthatthespecifiedevidenceislikelytobefound  onthecomputer.However,thefactthatthedesignatedevidenceiscapableofbeingkept  onthecomputerisnotsufficientTothisextent,computersaredistinctfromotherphysical  containers.Nevertheless,computersarenotsodifferentfromothercontainersthatthey   canneverbeseizedandsearchedwithoutexpressauthorizationinthewarrant.     ThecourtappliedthisruletothefactsofPaytonandfoundthatthesearchofthe   computerfoundonthedefendantsdeskwasnotreasonable.IncontrasttoGiberson,   therewerenocircumstancesreasonablyindicatingthatrecordsspecifiedinthewarrant   (e.g.payowesheetsindicatingdrugsales)wouldlikelybefoundonthedefendants   computer,particularlyasnoevidenceofdrugdealinghadbeenfoundintheresidence.   Moreover,itwassignificantthatunlikeinGiberson,theofficerswhosearchedthe   defendantshousedidnotmerelyseizethecomputerandthenseekasecondwarrant.     փ % G DNASEARCHESOFCONVICTEDFELONSANDARRESTEES%G#փԩ#   ȩ  CalifornialawmandatesthecollectionofDNAsamplesfromalladultsconvicted $ ofanyfelonies,alljuvenilesfoundtohavecommittedfelonies,andalladultsarrestedfor $ anyfelonyoffense.&  #  15      ׀TheprovisionrequiringthatDNAbetakenfromalladultfelony $ arrestees,assoonaspracticableafterarrest,waspassedintolawbythevotersin  $ November2004,aspartofProposition69.However,thisprovisiondidnotgointoeffect  $ untilJanuary1,2009.(SeePen.Code,sec.296(a)(2)(C).)  $   DNAsamplesarecollectedfromfelonyarresteesandconvictedfelonsforthesole  $  purposeofseekingmatchesonunsolvedcases,unrelatedtothecrimeofarrestor $  conviction.Afterthesampleistakenbybuccalswab!repeatedlyscrapingtheinner $  cheekwithasmallstick!itissenttotheDOJlaboratoryforanalysisandindefinite $  storage.An offenderprofileiscreated,revealingtheindividualsuniquegenetic $  identity.ThatprofileisuploadedintoCaliforniasdatabase,whichispartofthe $ nationwideCombinedDNAIndexSystem(CODIS);itisplacedintheoffenderindex $ withprofilesfromotherarresteesandconvictedfelons,andthencomparedtoDNA $ samplesleftatcrimescenesbyunknownperpetratorsmaintainedinaseparatecrime $ sceneindex.Thearresteesorconvictedfelonsoffenderprofileiscomparedtoallofthe $ crimesceneprofileswhenthenewprofileisfirstenteredintoCODISandonaweekly $ basisthereafter. $   ItisundisputedthatthestatesuseofabuccalswabtoextractDNAfromtheinner $ cheekofthearresteeorconvictedfelonisasearchwithinthemeaningoftheFourth $ Amendment.(See,e.g.Haskellv.Brown(N.D.Cal.2009)677F.Supp.2d1187,1193; $ UnitedStatesv.Pool(9thCir.2010)621F.3d1213,1217.)Moreover,severalcourtshave $ heldthattheensuinganalysisoftheextractedsampletocreatetheDNAoffenderprofile $ isalsoasearch.(See,e.g.UnitedStatesv.Mitchell(W.D.Pa.2009)681F.2d597,600; $ Peoplev.King(2000)82Cal.App.4th1363,1370.)  $   Moreover,lawenforcementofficerstakeDNAfromeveryconvictedfelonand "$ felonyarresteeasamatterofroutine;neitherawarrantnorindividualizedsuspicionis #$ required.Thestateneednotreasonablybelievethattheindividualhascommittedany $$  crime,otherthanthecrimeofarrestorconviction,letaloneaseriousorviolentcrime  likelytoyieldDNAevidence.Consequently,itisthestatesburdentoprovethatthe  warrantlessandsuspicionlesssearchisreasonableundertheFourthAmendment.To  assessthereasonablenessofDNAsearchesofconvictedfelonsandarrestees,thecourts  haveemployedthebalancingtestusedbytheUnitedStateSupremeCourtinUnited  Statesv.Knights(2001)534U.S.112[nomorethanreasonablesuspicionisrequiredto   conductasearchofaprobationershomeauthorizedbyaprobationsearchcondition]and   Samsonv.California(2006)547U.S.843[paroleescanbesearchedwithoutawarrantor   anyindividualizedsuspicion].Underthistest,thecourtweighsthedegreetowhichthe   searchintrudesupontheindividualsreasonableexpectationofprivacyagainstthedegree   towhichitisneededtopromotealegitimategovernmentalinterest.(SeeKnights,supra,   at118119;Samson,supra,at848.)'  #  16          % H A.DNASearchesofConvictedFelons%H      Californiaandotherjurisdictionshavebeenrequiringconvictedfelonstosubmit  DNAsamplesformanyyears.Althoughthematterhasgeneratedsomesharplydivided  opinions,theNinthCircuitandotherfederalcircuitcourtshaveupheldthe  constitutionalityoffederalandstateprovisionsmandatingDNAcollectionfrom  convictedfelons.(See,e.g.UnitedStatesv.Kincade(9thCir.2004)379F.3d813[a  dividedNinthCircuitenbancpanelupheldafederalstatuterequiringDNAcollection  fromoffendersconvictedofviolentfeloniesandplacedonsupervisedrelease];United  Statesv.Kriesel(9thCir.2007)508F.3d941.[byatwotoonevote,thecourtvalidateda  subsequentfederallaw,mandatingthecollectionofDNAfromallconvictedfelons];  Jonesv.Murray(4thCir.1992)962F.2d302[adividedcourtupheldaVirginiastatute   authorizingthetakingofDNAfromallconvictedfelons];Padgettv.Donald(11thCir.   2005)401F.3d1273,12771278[validatingaGeorgiastatuterequiringallconvicted   felonstoprovideDNAsamples].)     Nofederalcasesaddressedtheconstitutionalityofearlieriterationsofthe   CalifornialawwhichrequiredDNAcollectiononlyfromconvictedfelons,butnotfrom   felonyarrestees.However,severalCaliforniaCourtofAppealdecisionsvalidatedthis   practice.(SeePeoplev.Travis(2006)139Cal.App.4th1271[upholdingpostProposition   69lawthatmandatedDNAcollectionfromallconvictedfelons];Peoplev.Johnson  (2006)139Cal.App.4th1135[upholdingCalifornialawrequiringdesignatedconvicted  felonsreleasedonparoletoprovideDNAsamplesforprofiling];Peoplev.Adams(2004)  115Cal.App.4th243[validatingstatuterequiringDNAcollectionfromoffenders  convictedofseriousfelonies];Alfarov.Terhune(2002)98Cal.App.4th492[rejecting  constitutionalchallengebydeathrowinmatestoactrequiringallpersonsconvictedof  specifiedfeloniestosubmitDNA];Peoplev.King(2000)82Cal.App.4th1363  [upholdingDNAcollectionfromoffendersconvictedofdesignatedfeloniesandreleased  onparole].)TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtdidnotweighinonthisconstitutionalissue  untiljustlastyearwhenitvalidatedaDNAsearchofaconvictedfeloninPeoplev.  Robinson(2010)47Cal.4th1104(discussedbelow).    Mostofthefederalcases,includingthosedecidedbytheNinthCircuit,upheldthe  suspicionlessDNAsearchesofconvictedfelonsbyapplyingthe totalityofthe  circumstancesbalancingtestemployedinKnightsandSamson.(See,e.g.Kincade,   supra.,379F.3dat832;Kriesel,supra.,508F.3dat946947..)*  #  17      ׀Thesecasesbalanced ! theintrusionupontheconvictedfelonsprivacyinterestsagainstthegovernmental " interestspromotedbyDNAcollectionandanalysis,concludingthatthegovernments # interestsprevailed.(See,e.g.Kincade,supra.,379F.3dat839.) $  Ї  Convictedfelons,whetherinprisonoronconditionalrelease,havesignificantly  diminishedprivacyexpectations.(See,e.g.Kincade,supra.,379F.3dat833835[because  oftherestrictionsontheirlibertywroughtbyalawfulconvictionandtheaccompanying  termofsupervisedrelease,conditionalreleaseeshaveseverelyrestrictedexpectationsof  privacyrelativetothegeneralcitizenry];Kriesel,supra.,508F.3dat947[asconfirmedin  Samson,paroleeshaveseverelydiminishedexpectationsorprivacy].)Moreover,   convictedoffendershavedemonstrablyhighratesofrecidivismcomparedtothegeneral   crimerate.(See,e.g.Kincade,supra.,at833;.)Thepresumptionthatconvictedfelonsare   likelytoreoffendaftertheirreleasefromcustodyunderliesthegovernmentsinterestsin   collectingtheirDNA.     TheNinthCircuitidentifiedthreegovernmentalintereststhatareadvancedby   takingconvictedfelonsDNAanduploadingtheiroffenderprofilesintoCODIS.By   regularlycomparingthoseprofilestocrimescenesamplesstoredinCODIS,including   thosenewlyaddedtothecrimesceneindex,thegovernmentcanascertainwhether  probationersandparoleesarecommittingcrimeswhileatlarge!aconcernduetothe  convictedoffendersextraordinaryrecidivismrates.(Kincade,supra.,379F.3dat838.)  Thisprocesspromotestwosignificantgovernmentalinterests.First,itenablesthe  governmenttocloselysupervisetheconditionalreleaseestoassuretheyarenotre  offending.(Kincade,supra.,at838839;Kriesel,supra.,508F.3dat949.)Second,the  processfurthersthegovernmentsinterestindeterringtheirrecidivismbyincreasingthe  chancestheywillbecaught.(Kincade,supra.,at838840.)Thethirdgovernmental  interestpromotedbycollectingDNAfromconvictedoffendersisthesolutionofpast  unsolvedcrimes.(Id.,at839;Kriesel,supra.,at949.)    Insummary,theoffendersstatusasconvictedoffendersonprobationorparole  affectedbothsidesofthebalancewhichisstruckinfavorofthegovernmentalinterests.  Becauseconvictedfelonswithhighrecidivismratesarebeingreturnedtosocietyon  supervisedrelease,thegovernmenthasastronginterestincloselymonitoringtheir   activitiestoassuretheydonotreoffend,andthisintensesupervisiondiminishestheir ! reasonableexpectationsofprivacy.(SeeKincade,supra,at834835.) "   #  1.Peoplev.Robinson(2010)47Cal.4th1104:Althoughthe1999collectionofthe  defendantsDNAwasnotauthorizedbythestatelawineffectatthattime,the  unauthorizedsearchdidnotviolatetheFourthAmendment.Andevenifitdid,the  DNAevidenceimplicatingthedefendantin1994sexcrimeswasproperlyadmittedin  hisprosecutionforthosecrimes,astheerroneouscollectionwasbasedontwoclerks  negligenterrors.      InlastyearsdecisioninRobinson,theSupremeCourtfinallyheldthatDNA   collectionfromalawfullyconvictedfelondidnotviolatedtheFourthAmendment.Here   arethefacts:AnoffenderprofilewascreatedfromaDNAsamplecollectedfromthe    defendantinMarch1999.ThedefendantsDNAoffenderprofilematchedaDNAprofile   createdfromasemensamplewhichhadbeenleftbyanunknownperpetratorduringa   rapecommittedfiveyearsearlier,in1994.The coldhitwasdiscoveredafterthe   defendantwasarrestedonanunrelatedwarrantinSeptember2000,andthedefendant   wasthenprosecutedforthe1994rapeandothersexoffenses.ItturnedoutthattheDNA   samplehadbeenunlawfullycollectedfromthedefendantinMarch1999,threemonths  aftertheDNAActof1998wentintoeffect.The1998ActrequiredDNAcollectiononly  frompersonsconvictedofspecified qualifyingfelonyoffenses.Whenlawenforcement  tookthedefendantsDNAinMarch1999,theymistakenlybelieved!basedonerrors  madebytwodifferentrecordsclerks!thatthedefendanthadbeenconvictedofoneof  thesequalifyingfelonies.Theywerewrong;hehadnot.    Inhisprosecutionforthe1994sexoffenses,thedefendantfiledamotionto  suppressevidence,arguingthattheDNAevidencewhichlinkedhimtothosecrimes  shouldhavebeenexcluded,becauseitscollectionwasnotauthorizedbythelawthenin  effect.TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtupheldthelowercourtsdenialofthedefendants  suppressionmotion.First,theSupremeCourtruledthatthetrialcourtshouldonlyhave  excludedtheDNAevidenceiftheDNAcollectionwasunconstitutional,aviolationofthe  FourthAmendment,andnotmerelyaviolationofstatelaw.(Robinson,supra,at1119.)     Second,theCourtheldthatthenonconsensualextractionofbloodforDNA " profilingfromthedefendant,alawfullyconvictedfelon,didnotviolatetheFourth # Amendment.TheCourtapprovedthepriorCaliforniaCourtofAppealdecisionswhich $  hadupheldpostconvictionDNAsearches.ApplyingthetestfromSamsonv.California, % ! theCourtupheldthereasonablenessoftheDNAsearchafterbalancingitsintrusionon &!" theconvictedfelonsprivacyinterestsagainstthesearchspromotionoflegitimate '"# governmentalobjectives.(Robinson,supra.,at11201121.)Relyingonpriorpost (#$ convictionDNAcases,theCourtheldthat: convictedcriminalsdonotenjoythesame )$% expectationofprivacythatnonconvictshave(Robinson,supra.,at1120,citingAdams, *%& supra.,115Cal.App.4that2580; theintrusionsauthorizedbythe[DNA]actare +&' minimal(Robinson,supra.,at1121,citingAlfaro,supra.,98Cal.App.4that506);and   DNAcollectionservescompellinggovernmentalinterests,includingtheoverwhelming  publicinterestinprosecutingcrimesaccurately.(Ibid.)Finally,theCourtnotedthatthe  factthatthecollectionofthedefendantsDNAviolatedstatelaw,ineffectatthetime,  didnotaltertheFourthAmendmentanalysis.(Robinson,supra,at1122;citingVirginiav.  Moore(2008)533U.S.16[holdingthatasfarasthefederalconstitutionisconcerned,   whetherstatelawauthorizedthesearchisirrelevant].)     AfterholdingthattheDNAsearchofthedefendantdidnotviolatetheFourth   Amendment,theSupremeCourtproceededtoengageinawhollyunnecessary   exclusionaryruleanalysis.TheCourtstated: However,evenassumingwithoutdeciding,   thatthestatestatutoryviolationthatledtothenonconsensualextractionofdefendants   bloodforthe[March1999DNAsample]constitutedaFourthAmendmentviolation,   applicationofthefederalexclusionaryrulewouldnotbeappropriateforsucha   violation.(Robinson,supra,at1124.)    TheCaliforniacourtfirstreviewedthefactsandholdingoftheUnitedStates  SupremeCourtsveryrecentdecisioninHerringv.UnitedStates(2009)129S.Ct.695.  InHerring,theCourtexpandedthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruletoapply  whentheofficer,conductingthesearchandseizure,reasonablyreliedingoodfaithon  falseinformationresultingfromalawenforcementemployeesnegligentrecordkeeping  error.InHerring,adeputysheriffarrestedthedefendantandsearchedhiscar,discovering  incriminatingevidence,becausehereliedoninformationsuppliedbythewarrantsclerk  ofaneighboringcountyindicatingthatthedefendanthadanoutstandingarrestwarrant.It  wassubsequentlylearnedthatthisinformationwaserroneous.Thedefendantswarrant  hadbeenrecalledfivemonthsearlier,butalawenforcementemployeehadnegligently  failedtoupdatethecountyscomputerizedrecordssothattherecalledwarrantstill  showedasactiveinthecomputersystem.Becausethedeputylackedprobablecauseto  arrestthedefendantandtherewasnooutstandingwarrant,thearrestandsubsequent   searchwereunconstitutional.(SeeHerring,supra.,at698699,705706.)TheSupreme ! Courtheldthattheevidenceseizedduringtheunconstitutionalsearchwasnevertheless " admissiblebecausethedeputydidnothingwrong.Hereasonablyreliedingoodfaithona # negligentrecordkeepingerrormadebyalawenforcementclerkinanothercounty. $  Applyingtheexclusionaryruleunderthesecircumstanceswouldnotresultinappreciable %!! deterrence,thepurposeofsuppression.(Herring,supra,at698701.) &""   AfteraverybriefdiscussionofHerring,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtfoundthe ($$ factsofDefendantRobinsonscasetobesufficientlyanalogous.ThedefendantsDNA )%% waserroneouslycollectedonlythreemonthsafterthe1998DNAActwentintoeffect *&& requiringwidescaleDNAcollectionfromindividualsconvictedofqualifyingseriousand +'' violentfeloniesfortheveryfirsttime.Apparently,therewasarushtotrainlaw  enforcementpersonneltodeterminewhichfelonswereeligibleforDNAextraction,  collecttheirDNAandgettheirprofilesintothedatabank.Inthiscontext,thetwoclerks  whoseparatelylookedatthedefendantsrecordanderroneouslyconcludedthathedbeen  convictedofaqualifyingoffenseweremerelynegligent.Thelawenforcementofficer  whocollectedthedefendantsbloodforDNAprofilingthenreasonablyreliedonthis   mistakeninformation.Consequently,theexclusionaryrulewouldnotapply!evenifthe   DNAsearchhadviolatedtheFourthAmendment.(Robinson,supra,at11241129.)    % I B.DNASearchesofFelonyArrestees%I      Asnoted,thefederalgovernmentand21states,includingCalifornia,nowmandate   thecollectionofDNAfromsomeorallfelonyarrestees.OurstatehascollectedaDNA   samplefromeveryadultarrestedforanyfelonysinceJanuary1,2009.Thesamplemust   betakenduringbookingorassoonasadministrativelypracticableafterarrest.(Pen.Code,   sec.296.1(a)(1).)Ifthearresteerefuses,theDNAsampleisforciblyextracted,andthe  individualmaybechargedwithamisdemeanor.(298.1.)    AlladultfelonyarresteesmustprovideDNAsamples,including:1)personswho  arereleasedandneverchargedwithacrime;2)personswhoarechargedbuthavetheir  chargesdismissedfollowingajudicialfindingnoprobablecauseorthatthearrestwas  unconstitutional;and3)personswhoareprosecutedbutacquitted.(SeeHaskellv.Brown,  supra,677F.Supp.2dat1192.)Evenifthearresteeisreleasedthesamedaywithout  chargesbeingfiled,hisDNAsamplewillbestoredindefinitelyandhisDNAprofile  (whichtakes30daystocreate)willremaininthenationwidedatabankforever,compared  tocoldcaseDNAprofilesonaweeklybasis.+  #  18          DNAiscollectedfrompersonsarrestedforanyfelonyoffense.Thecrimeofarrest  neednotbeaviolentfelonyorasexualoffenselikelytoproduceDNAevidence.Those   arrestedfordrugpossession,checkfraud,orresistingthepoliceatapoliticalrallyare ! requiredtoprovidetheirDNAtothegovernment.(SeeHealth&Saf,Code11350; " 476(a);69.)Thelawgivesunbridleddiscretiontothearrestingofficer.Heneedonly  claimprobablecausetoarresttheindividualforanoffensethatcanbeconsidereda  felony,andthearresteesDNAwillbeseized.ThearresteesDNAistakenandanalyzed  onthemerechancethatitwillassistlawenforcementinsolvingcoldcases.(Haskell,  supra.,at12001201;Friedmanv.Boucher(9thCir.2009)580F.3d847,857.)    ThemandatorycollectionofDNAfromallfelonyarrestees,includingthosenever   chargedwithanycrime,raisesmuchdifferentFourthAmendmentissuesthanthe   extractionofDNAfromconvictedfelons.Todate,noCaliforniaappellateopinionhas   addressedthislatestversionoftheCaliforniaprogramalthoughithasbeenineffectfor   twoyears.Onfederaldistrictcourtcase,Haskellv.Brown,supra.,677F.Supp.at1187,   hasupheldthisCalifornialawagainstaFourthAmendmentchallenge.Haskellwillnotbe   thefinalwordonthismatter,asanappealtotheNinthCircuitispendingandhasalready   beenfullybriefedandargued,onJuly13,2010.     In2009and2010,fourfederalcasesaddressedtheconstitutionalityofcollecting  DNAsamplesfromarrestees.Twocasesheldthatthegovernmentconductsan  unconstitutionalsearchwhenitextractsDNAfromanarresteewithoutindividualized  suspicion.Theothertwocasesupheldthepractice.   1.Friedmanv.Boucher(9thCir.2009)580F.3d847:AprosecutionorderedDNA  searchofanarresteeinpretrialdetentionwithoutindividualizedsuspicionviolatedthe  FourthAmendment.     Withoutauthorizationbystateorfederallaw,alocalprosecutordirectedapolice  officertoobtainaDNAsamplefromFriedman,aNevadaarresteeheldinpretrial  detention.SheaimedtousetheDNAtoinvestigateunsolvedcrimes,eventhough  Friedmanwasnotasuspectinanycoldcases.WhentheofficertookFriedmansDNA  sample,he hadnowarrant,nocourtorder,[and]noindividualizedsuspicion.Norhad   he articulatedanoffenseforwhichaDNAsamplewasrequiredorjustified.(Friedman, ! supra,580F.3dat851.) "   TheNinthCircuitheldthatthesuspicionlesssearchwasnotjustifiedbythespecial $  needsexception,asFriedmansDNAwastakenfor purelylawenforcementpurposes. % ! (Id.,at853.)Thecourtthenrejectedthegovernmentsargumentthatthesearchwas &!" reasonableunderthebalancingtestpreviouslyemployedtoupholdDNAcollectionfrom '"# convictedfelons.(Id.,at857858.)ThecourtemphasizedthatFriedmanwasapretrial (#$ detainee,notaconvictedfelononrelease.Thestatedidnotneedtointenselysupervise )$%  hisactivitiestoaidhisreintegrationintosociety.ThegovernmenttookFriedmansDNA *%& tosolvecrimesunrelatedtotheoffenseofarrest, onthemerechancethatdesired  evidencemightbeobtained.TheDNAsearchwasunconstitutional.(Id.,at857858.)   2.UnitedStatesv.Mitchell(W.D.Pa.2009)681F.2d597:ThecollectionofDNAfrom  anarresteeheldinpretrialdetention,authorizedbyfederallaw,wasanunreasonable  search. ,  #  19           Asauthorizedbyfederalstatute,thedefendantsDNAsamplewastakenfollowing   hisarrest,andthenanalyzedandstoredinCODISforthesolepurposeofsolvingpastand   futureunsolvedcrimes.(Mitchell,supra,681F.2dat604605.)DNAcollectionforthis    criminalinvestigativepurpose,conductedwithout anymeasureofindividualized   suspicionwasnotjustifiedbya specialneed.Todetermineifthesuspicionless   intrusionwasneverthelessreasonable,thecourtappliedtheSamsonbalancingtestand   consideredwhetherthelegitimategovernmentinterestincrimesolvingoutweighedthe    expectationofprivacyofanindividualwhohasbeenarrestedandincarceratedasa   pretrialdetainee.(Id.,at605606.)    Thecourtemphasizedthatanarresteehasamuchgreaterreasonableexpectation  ofprivacythanaconvictedfelon,particularly inthecomprehensive,inherentlyprivate  informationcontainedinhisDNA.(Mitchell,supra.,at606609)TheDNAsampleis  theindividualsgeneticblueprint.Itmayrevealprivateinformationregardingthe  arresteesfamiliallineage,hishealth,hisraceandgender,hispredispositiontoover  4,000typesofgeneticconditionsanddiseases,andgeneticmarkersfortraitsincluding  aggression,sexualorientation,substanceaddictionandcriminaltendencies.(Id.at608.)  Thecourtwasalsotroubledbythefactthatwithcontinuedtechnologicaladvances,the  informationpotentiallyobtainedfromtheDNAsamples,permanentlystoredbythe  laboratories,wouldbe everevolvingandincreasinglycomprehensive.(Ibid.)After  weighingthecompetingindividualandgovernmentalinterests(i.e.onlytosolvecold  cases),theCourtfoundthat auniversalrequirementthatachargeddefendantsubmita   DNAsampleforanalysisandinclusioninalawenforcementdatabankforcriminallaw ! enforcementand/oridentificationpurposesisunreasonableunder...theFourth " Amendment.(Id.,at610.)Itdidnotmatterthatthedefendantwasheldinpretrial # detention,because theSupremeCourthasneverheldthatlawenforcementofficersmay $  conductsuspicionlesssearchesonpretrialdetaineesforreasonsotherthanprison[orjail] % ! security.(Id.,at607.) &!"  '"#  3.Haskellv.Brown(N.D.Cal.2009)677F.Supp.2d1187:Californiasmandatory  collectionofDNAfromeveryadultfelonyarresteedoesnotviolatetheFourth  Amendment. -  #  20          Severalarresteeswhohadbeenreleasedwithoutchargesorwhosechargeswere  dismissedbeforetrialfiledafederalcivilrightssuitchallengingtheCalifornialaw..  #  21      ׀The   courtdeclinedtoenjoinenforcement,uponfindingthattheplaintiffswereunlikelyto   succeedonthemeritsoftheirFourthAmendmentchallenge.(Haskell,supra.,at1190.)     HaskellfoundthatsuspicionlessDNAsearches,conductedforthelaw    enforcementpurposeofsolvingcoldcases,didnotqualifyforthespecialneeds   exception.ThecourtthenanalyzedthereasonablenessofDNAcollectionbyemploying   thebalancingtestusedinKincadeandKriesel.(Id.,at11931196.)Thecourt   acknowledgedthatindividualsmerelyarrestedorchargedwithacrimeenjoyamuch   higherexpectationofprivacythanconvictedfelons.Yettheyalsohavealesserprivacy   interestthanthegeneralpopulation,particularlyintheir identity.(Id.,at11961197.)    AsforthestatespurposesadvancedbycollectingarresteesDNA,thedistrict  courtadmitted thegovernmentinterestsinthiscasearenotasgreatasthoseidentifiedin  KincadeandKriesel.Arrestees,unlikeconvictedfelons,arenotinneedofclose  supervisiontoassurethattheydonotreoffend.Noevidencehadbeenpresentedshowing   thatarresteesaremorelikelytocommitfuturecrimesthanmembersofthegeneral  public.Nevertheless,thecourtheldthatthegovernments compellinginterestin  identifyingarrestees(bothwhotheyareandwhattheyhavedone)andinusingtheirDNA  tosolvepastcrimesoutweighedthearresteesprivacyinterests.TheDNAsearcheswere  reasonableundertheFourthAmendment.(Id.,at11981202.)   4.UnitedStatesv.Pool(9thCir.2010)621F.3d1213:CollectionofDNAarrestees  uponpretrialrelease,afterajudicialfindingofprobablecause,doesnotviolatethe   FourthAmendment. /  #  22           AdividedNinthCircuitpanelapprovedaprovisionoftheFederalBailReform   ActrequiringDNAcollectionfromarresteesasaconditionofpretrialreleasefollowing    ajudicialfindingofprobablecause.(Pool,supra.,621F.3dat12141215.) Taking[its]   cuefromSamson,thecourtevaluatedthereasonablenessoftheDNAsearchconducted   forlawenforcementpurposesbybalancingtheintrusionuponthearresteesprivacy   againstthegovernmentsinterests.(Id.,at1218.)Thecourtacknowledgedthattheremust   be aprerequisitetotheapplicationofthistest!i.e. somelegitimatereasonforthe   individualhavinglessthanthefullrightsofacitizen.Thatprerequisitewasmet  becausethearresteewasnotrequiredtoprovideDNAuntilafterajudicialorgrandjury  findingofprobablecause.Thatfindingandthedecisiontoreleasetheindividualonbail  allowedthecourttorestricthisprivacy.(Id.,at1219.)    Assessingtheintrusiononprivacy,the compulsoryprofilingofqualifiedfederal  offenderswasminimallyinvasivebothintermsofthebodilyintrusionandthe  informationregardingthearresteesidentitythatitproduces.(Id.,at12201222.)The  governmentsinterestincollectingtheDNAandrunningoffenderprofilesthrough  CODISistoidentifythearresteeandsolvecoldcases.Also,aftertheprobablecause  finding, thegovernmenthasaninterestindeterminingwhethertheindividualmaybe  releasedpendingtrialwithoutendangeringsocietyandensuringcompliancewithpre  trialreleaseconditions.(Id.,at12221223.) [W]hereacourthasdeterminedthatthereis  probablecausetobelievethatthedefendantcommittedafelonyandhesreleasedon   bail,thegovernmentinterestsoutweightheindividualsprivacyinterests.(Id.,at1226.) !    `     h      p      x    InadditiontotheleadopinionbyJudgeCallahan,thereweretwootheropinionsin # Pool.JudgeLucerosconcurringopinionstressedthethatthemajorityonlyapproved $  DNAcollectionfromindividualsafterajudicialfindingofprobablecause.Theywerenot % !  upholdingDNAtestingfrommerearrestees.(Pool,supra.,621F.3dat1231.)  &!"   JudgeSchroederdissentedfromtheconclusionthatsuspicionlessDNAsearchesof   arresteeswerereasonable.ShecriticizedthemajorityforrelyingonKincadeandKriesel,  whileignoringtherationaleofthosedecisions!thatalawfulconvictionreducedthe  individualsexpectationofprivacywhileenhancingthegovernmentsinterestininvading  thatprivacy.(Id.,at12351237[dis.opn.ofSchroeder,J.])PriortoPool,inFriedmanv.  Boucher,supra,580F.3d847,andinUnitedStatesv.Scott(9thCir.2006)450F.3d863,   theNinthCircuitheldthatsuspicionlesssearchesviolateanarresteesFourthAmendment   rights,evenifheisheldoverfortrialandreleasedordetainedinjail.(SeeScott,supra.,   at874[policeofficersneedprobablecausetodrugtestanindividualonpretrialrelease   orsearchhishome];Friedman,supra.,at847[suspicionlessDNAsearchofapretrial   detaineeisunconstitutional].)JudgeSchroedercriticizedthemajorityforignoringtheir   previousrulingsinFriedmanandScottandholdingthatajudicialprobablecausefinding   isthe watershedeventwhichdiminishestheindividualsexpectationofprivacyand   justifiesasuspicionlessDNAsearchthereafter.(Id.,at12361237.)AccordingtoJudge   Schroeder,theactualtransformativeeventisalawfulconviction,asthatiswhat  distinguishesoffendersonconditionalreleasefrommembersofthegeneralpublic.(Ibid.)     Uփ  % J QUICKTAKES%J< #փ U;#  #  23        ; % K A.SchoolSearches%K<  :  1.SaffordUSDv.Redding(2009)129S.Ct.2633:Schoolofficialshadreasonable 4 suspiciontosearchthe13yearoldmiddleschoolstudentsbackpackandouter  2 clothingforprescriptionandoverthecounterdrugs,buta stripsearchofher  0 underwearwasexcessiveinscopeandunreasonable.   .   SavanaRedding,age13,wasastudentatSaffordMiddleSchool.Schoolrules  ,  prohibitedthepossessionorsaleofanydrugsonschoolgrounds,includingprescription ,  oroverthecounterdrugswithoutadvancepermission.Schooladministratorshad ,  receivedtipsfromtwostudentsindicatingthatSavanahadbeengivingprescription ,  ibuprofenandoverthecounternaproxentootherstudents.Basedonthesereports,the ,  assistantprincipalcalledSavanaintohisofficewhereshewasshownfouribuprofen , tabletsandonenaproxenpillthathadbeentakenfromotherstudents.Savanadenied , knowinganythingaboutthesedrugs,butsheagreedtolettheassistantprincipalsearch , herbelongings.TheassistantprincipalsearchedSavanasbackpack,findingnothing. , Savanawasthensenttotheschoolnursesofficewhereafemaleadministratoranda , femalenursesearchedherouterclothingforthepills,findingnothing.Savanawasthen , subjectedtoa stripsearch;shewasaskedtostripdowntoherunderpantsandbraandto , pullbothgarmentsawayfromherbody,exposingherbreastsandpelvicareatosome , degree.Again,nopillswerefound.Savanasmotherfiledacivilrightsactionagainstthe , schooldistrictandschoolofficials,assertingthatthestripsearchviolatedSavanasFourth , Amendmentrights. ,   TheSupremeCourtbeganbyreiteratingtherulesforschoolsearchessetforthin , NewJerseyv.T.L.O.(1985)469U.S.325.Inordertoinitiatethesearchofapublic , schoolstudentand/orherproperty,schoolofficialsneedonlyreasonablesuspicion! a  , moderatechanceoffindingevidenceofwrongdoing.(Safford,supra,at2639.)A !, lawfullyinitiatedschoolsearchispermissibleititsscope whenthemeasuresadoptedare ", reasonablyrelatedtotheobjectivesofthesearchandnotexcessivelyintrusiveinlightof #, theageandsexofthestudentandthenatureoftheinfraction.(Ibid.,citingNewJersey $,  v.T.L.O.,supra.,at342.) %,!! Ї  Applyingthisstandardtothecurrentcase,theCourtheldthattheschoolofficials  hadreasonablesuspiciontosearchSavanasbackpackandouterclothingforthe  prescriptionibuprofenandtheoverthecounternaproxen.However,thestripsearch!the  intrusionintoSavanasunderwearandtheexposureofherbreastsandpelvicarea!was  excessiveinscopegivenherageandsex,andtheminornatureofthesuspected  infraction. Herethecontentofthesuspicionfailedtomatchthedegreeoftheintrusion.   (Safford,supra,at2642.)TheofficialshadnoreasontobelievethatSavanawasstashing   largequantitiesofcontrabandinherunderwear.    0փփ2.InreK.S.(2010)183Cal.App.4th72[FirstDistrict,DivisionFive;petitionfor   reviewdenied7/14/10]:ThereasonablesuspicionstandardofNewJerseyv.T.L.O.   (1985)469U.S.325,ratherthantheprobablecausestandard,appliedtoasearchbya   schoolofficialeventhoughthesearchwasinitiatedbasedoninformationprovidedby   thepoliceandconductedinthepresenceofpoliceofficers.      AreliableconfidentialinformantgaveanofficeratipthatK.S.,ahighschool  student,possessedEcstasypills.Thetipwaspassedontotheschoolresourcepolice  officerassignedtoK.S.shighschool,whothenrelayedtheinformationtothevice  principal.Theviceprincipalhadtwoofficersaccompanyher(forhercomfortandsafety)  whilesheconductedasearchofK.S.sP.E.locker.ThesearchyieldedsuspectedEcstasy  pills,andadelinquencypetitionwasfiledagainstK.S.,allegingdrugpossession.The  appellatecourtupheldthesearch,holdingthatthereasonablesuspicionstandardofNew  Jerseyv.T.L.O.applied,despitethepresenceofpoliceofficersduringthesearch,because  theviceprincipal,andnottheofficers,hadmadethedecisiontosearchtoprotectschool  safety.Thefactthatthepoliceplayedaroleinprovidingtheinformationsupportingthe  searchdidnotrequireahigherstandardthanreasonablesuspicionbecausethepolices  involvementwasmerelythatofaninformationconduit.Theinformantcouldhavejustas  easilycalledtheviceprincipaldirectly.#փ0փK#0փփ   3.InreSeanA.(December22,2010)2010WL5175177[FourthDistrict,Division ! One]:Searchesofstudentsinpublicschoolsconductedpursuanttoaschoolpolicyare " specialneedsadministrativesearchesthatdonotrequireindividualizedsuspicion. =  #  24       #   Thedefendantshighschoolhadawrittenpolicyauthorizingsearchesofstudents % ! whohadleftcampusandthenreturnedduringtheschoolday.Thedefendantwasseen &!" leavingschool,anduponhisreturn,wasorderedtotheassistantprincipalsofficeand '"# toldtoemptyhispockets,whichcontaineddrugs.Inatwotoonedecision,theappellate (#$ courtheldthatthesearchwasunconstitutional.TheFourthAmendmentisnotstrictly  appliedinpublicschoolsduetothesocietalinterestinsafeschools,andsoallthatis  requiredtoupholdasearchisreasonablesuspicionbyschooladministrators.School  searchcasesarepartofabodyoflawallowing specialneedsadministrativesearches  withoutindividualizedsuspicion.Sincethesearchherewasconductedpursuanttoan  establishedpolicyofwhichthestudenthadnoticeandbecausethesearchwaslimitedin   nature,itwaslawful.Thedissentingjusticewouldhavereversed,findingthatunderNew   Jerseyv.T.L.O.,thiswasanindividualizedsearchthatrequiredreasonablesuspicion.     #փ0փS# % L B.ProbationandParoleSearches%LZ     1.Peoplev.Watkins(2009)170Cal.App.4th1403[ThirdDistrict]:Becausethe   estoppeldoctrineappliesinthecriminalcontesttopreventadefendantfromprofiting   fromhiswrongdoing,adefendantwhoprovidesfalseidentitytoavoidaprobation   searchisestoppedfromchallengingthatsearchasnotbeingauthorizedbyaknown  probationsearchcondition     Ataround2:30a.m.,anofficersstoppedthedefendantscarafternoticingthatone  ofthebrakelightswasnotoperating.Duringthetrafficdetention,thedefendant,Stephon  Watkins,identifiedhimselfas MarquisWatkins,hisbrother.Hesaidhewason  probationbutdidnotindicatewhetherhehadasearchcondition.Hedidnothavea  driverslicenseandarecordscheckunderMarquisWatkinsnamerevealedthatthe  brotherslicensewassuspendedorrevoked.Atthatpoint,theofficerhandcuffedthe  defendantandputhiminthepatrolcar.Althoughtherecordscheckhadnotshownthat  MarquisWatkinswasonprobation,theofficerreliedonthedefendantsstatementto  performaprobationsearchofthecar,findingcocainebase.Afterhisarrest,thedefendant  gavehistruenameandtheofficerlearnedhewasonprobationwithasearchcondition.  Theappellatecourtdeclinedtoconsiderthedefendantsclaimthatthevehiclesearchwas   invalidbecausetheofficerdidnotknowthathewasonprobationwithasearchcondition. ! (See,e.g.,Peoplev.Sanders(2003)31Cal.4th1180[asearchpursuanttoaparoleor " probationsearchconditionisvalidonlyiftheofficerknowsoftheconditionwhenhe # initiatesthesearch].)Thedefendantconcealedhistruenameandhisprobationsearch $  conditionfromtheofficer,andthatinformationwouldhaveprovidedtheofficerwitha % ! validbasisforthesearch.Therefore,thedefendantwasestoppedfromchallengingthe &!" validityofthesearch.  '"#  2.Peoplev.Sardinas(2009)170Cal.App.4th488[SecondDistrict,DivisionFive;  petitionforreviewdenied4/22/09]:Aparolesearchofthedefendantbythesame  officer,lessthan24hoursafterapreviousparolesearch,wasconductedforlegitimate  lawenforcementpurposesandnotforpurposesofharassment.     Inthefiveyearspriortothesearchesatissue,OfficerSamuelshadfrequentlyseen   thedefendantassociatingwithcocainebaseaddicts,andhehadcontactedthedefendant   atleastsixorseventimes!thelasttimebeingabout30daysearlier.Healways   confirmedthatthedefendantwasonparole.OnthenightofDecember20th,Samuels   pulledoveravandrivenbythedefendantbecausethetaillightswerenotworking.During    thetrafficstop,heconductedaparolesearchofthedefendant,findingnothing.Thatsame   night,Samuelssearchedthedefendantshomeandfoundnothingillegal.Lessthan24   hourslater,onDecember21st,Samuelssawthedefendantinaconveniencestoreparking   lot,inanareaknownfornarcoticssales.Althoughhedidnotreasonablysuspectthatthe   defendantwasengagedincriminality,theofficerconductedaparolesearchandfound   severalpiecesofrockcocaine.TheCourtofAppealupheldthetrialcourtsdenialofthe  motiontosuppress.Althoughindividualizedsuspicionisnotrequiredforaparolesearch,  suchasearchwouldbeunreasonableifitwasperformedforarbitraryorcapricious  reasonsorpurposesofharassment.(See,e.g.Peoplev.Reyes(1998)19Cal.4th743,753  54.)However,thefactsofthiscasesupportedtheconclusionthatOfficerSamuels  searchedthedefendantonDecember21,lessthan24hoursafterthepriorparolesearch,  forlegitimatelawenforcementpurposesandnotinordertoharasshim.Therewasno  evidencethathewasfollowingthedefendantorharboredanyanimustowardshim.   3.(V)Peoplev.Pearl(2009)172Cal.App.4th1280[FourthDistrict,DivisionThree]:  Thethreesearchesofthedefendantslivingareawhichproducedallofthe  incriminatingevidencewerenotjustifiedas parolesearchesbecausetheprosecution  didnotprovethatthedefendantwasstillonparoleatthetimeofthesearches.  Moreover,theprosecutiondidnotmeetitsburdenofestablishingthatthegoodfaith   exceptiontotheexclusionaryruleshouldapply.  z!   AfterthedefendantwasarrestedonDecember13,2004,officerssearchedthe t# roominwhichhewaslivingthreetimes!onDecember13,14and28,2004.During t$  thesesearches,theofficersfoundevidenceimplicatingthedefendantinburglaryand t% ! receivingstolenproperty.Theofficerwhoinitiatedthefirsttwosearchesknewthe t&!" defendantfrompreviousarrestsandbelievedhehadrecentlybeenreleasedfromprison. t'"# Atthesuppressionhearing,thisofficertestifiedthathetalkedtotheparoledepartment t(#$ beforetheinitialDecember13thsearch,buthedidnotidentifythepersonhespokewith t)$% orspecifywhatthatpersonsaid.Thedefendanttestifiedthathewasreleasedfrom t*%& custodyonDecember12,2000,andthathisparoleterm,originallythreeyears,was t+&' increasedtofouryears.Hewasnevertoldthatitextendedbeyondfouryears.Thus,  defendantwouldhavebeendischargedfromparolebyDecember11,2004!twodays  beforethefirstsearch.Evenafterthetrialcourtstatedthatitappeared,fromtheevidence,  thatthedefendantsparolehadexpiredpriortothefirstsearch,theprosecutiondidnot  presenttestimonyfromaparoleofficeroranyotherevidenceclearlyestablishingthat  appellantwasstillonparoleasofDecember13,2004.TheCourtofAppealnotedthat   pursuanttotheapplicablePenalCodesections,thedefendantcouldonlyhavebeenon   paroleforamaximumoffouryears.Hisparoleperiodcouldonlyhavebeenextended   beyondthatdateforanyperiodduringwhichhewasafugitivefromjustice,andthe   evidencepresenteddidnotestablishthatappellantwasafugitivefromjusticeduringhis   fouryearparoleterm.Thus,theprosecutionfailedtoestablishthatthedefendantwason   paroleasofDecember13,2004,thedateofthefirstsearch.Moreover,itwasthe   prosecutionsburdentoprovethatthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule   applied!i.e.thattheofficersreasonablyreliedingoodfaithonincorrectinformation   regardingthedefendantsparolestatusprovidedbytheparoledepartment.(SeePeoplev.  Willis(2002)28Cal.4th22.)Theprosecutiondidnotarguethatthegoodfaithexception  applied,inthetrialcourtoronappeal,andtheydidnotpresentanyevidencetomeetthat  burden.Consequently,theevidencediscoveredduringthethreesearchesmustbe  suppressed.Asthiswastheonlyevidencesupportingthedefendantsconvictions,those  convictionswerereversed.   0փփ4.Peoplev.Smith(2009)172Cal.App.4th1354[FirstDistrict,DivisionFive;petition  forreview#փ0փa|#0փփdenied7/15/09]:A reachinsearchofaparoleesunderwearwas  reasonablewhenthepolicetookproperstepstodiminishtheinvasionoftheparolees  privacyalthoughthesearchoccurredinapublicareaduringdaylight.#փ0փ"}#0փփ   #փ0փw~#0փփ  Twopoliceofficersdetainedthedefendantonsuspicionofburglaryoutsideahotel  inanareawitha highincidenceofdrugactivity.Uponlearningthatthedefendantwas  onparoleforpossessionofdrugsforsale,oneoftheofficersconductedaweaponsfrisk   andsearchedthedefendantscar.Findingnothing,theofficerdecidedtocheckifthe ! defendantwasconcealingdrugsinhisunderwear.Theofficerremovedthedefendants " belt,unbuttonedandunzippedthedefendantspantsandpulledthemdownapproximately # onefoot,thenpulledtheelasticwaistbandofthedefendantsunderwearawayfromthe $  defendantsbodyandlookedinside.#փ0փ~#0փփThissearchtookplaceinthebackofthehotels % ! parkinglot(whichfacedawayfromthestreet),withthedefendantpositionedinsidethe &!" crookofthepatrolcarsopenbackdoorTwootherofficerspositionedthemselvessoas '"# toblocktheview.Thesearchyieldedseveralbaggiesofheroin,cocaine,and (#$ methamphetamine.#փ0փL#0փփ Theappellatecourtupheldthesearchagainstthedefendantsclaim )$% thatitwasunreasonable!arbitrary,capriciousorharassing.Thecourtexplainedthat *%& pullingbackthewaistbandofdefendantsunderwearandvisuallyinspectinghiscrotch +&' areadidnotconstituteapublicstripsearchandmetconstitutionalstandards,inlightof  defendantsparolestatusandhisreducedexpectationofprivacy.Theintrusionwas  limitedtothatnecessarytodeterminewhetherdefendantwasconcealingnarcoticsand  therewasnoevidencethattheofficeractedwithanimpropermotive.#փ0փ)#0փփ   5.Peoplev.Smith(2010)190Cal.App.4th572[SecondDistrict,DivisionFive]:   Openingthedoorforofficers,statingthattheycansearchforaprobationer,and   steppingasidetoallowthementryconstitutedsubstantialevidencethatadefendant   voluntarilyconsentedtotheentry;openingaclothesdryerduringasearchforaformer   residentwasreasonablebecausetheintrusionwasminimalandstoppingthenoise    emanatingfromthedryerwasnecessarytosafelyorderpersonswhowereupstairsto   comedownstairs.      Atapproximately6a.m.,policeandprobationofficerswereconductingaseriesof z  probationcompliancechecksatahousingcomplex.Theywenttodefendantsapartment z  tosearchforaprobationerwhohadbeenconvictedofdomesticviolenceandhadlisted z defendantsaddressashisresidence.Whentheyarrivedatthedefendantsapartment,one z oftheofficerssawthedefendantthroughawindownexttothefrontdoor.Theofficer z spoketothedefendantthroughthewindowandadvisedheroftheirreasonforbeing z there.Thedefendantstatedthattheprobationerdidnotlivethereandindicatedthatonly z herbrotherandchildrenwereupstairs,butsheagreedtoallowtheofficerstocheckfor z themselves.Beforeopeningthedoorfortheofficers,thedefendantwalkedoutofthe z officerssightandtheofficerheardaclothesdryerbeingstarted.Afterthedefendant z openedthedoor,oneoftheofficersnotedthattheclothesdryerwasmakingaloudnoise, z asiftherewassomethingmetalinsideit.Whenheopenedthedoortoturnthedryeroff, z heobservedpackagedmarijuanaandchangeinsidethedryer. Theappellatecourtupheld z thetrialcourtsdenialofthemotiontosuppress.Astotheinitialentry,theappellate z courtfoundthattherewassubstantialevidencethatdefendantvoluntarilyconsentedwhen z sheopenedthedoorfortheofficers,statedthattheycouldlookforprobationer,and z  steppedaside,allowingthemtoenter.Thecourtfurtherfoundthattheintrusionof z! openingthedryerdoortostopthenoisewasobjectivelyreasonable.Althoughthe z" defendantindicatedthatonlyherbrotherandchildrenwereupstairs,thesoughtafter z# probationeralsocouldhavebeenupstairs.Therewasevidenceofnarcoticspresentinthe z$  residence,andfirearmsare toolsofthetradeinthenarcoticsbusiness.Inordertosafely z% ! orderanypeoplethatwereupstairstocomedownstairs,theofficerneededtostopthe z&!" noisefromthedryer.Openingthedoortothedryerwasaminimalintrusiontoachieve z'"# thisendwhichwasreasonableunderthesecircumstances.Oncethedryerdoorwasopen, z(#$ thecontrabandwasinplainview.  z)$%  % M C.InventorySearches%M    1.Peoplev.Shafrir(2010)183Cal.App.4th1238[FirstDistrict,DivisionOne;petition  forreviewdenied6/30/10]:Thedecisiontoimpoundandinventoryavehiclepursuant  tothecommunitycaretakingfunctionisevaluatedundera reasonableunderallthe  circumstancesstandard.     Afterarrestingthedefendantfordrivingundertheinfluenceofalcohol,two   CaliforniaHighwayPatrolOfficersdecidedtoremoveandstorethedefendantsvehicle   forsafekeepingpursuanttoVehicleCodesection22651,subdivision(h),ratherthan    leaveitparkedwhereitwas.Theofficerstestifiedthattheydidsobecause:therewasno   passengertodrivethecaraway;thestophadoccurredinahighcrimeareawhereauto   theftwascommon;andthevehiclewasabrandnewMercedes.Duringthesubsequent   inventorysearchofthevehicle,theofficersfoundmarijuanaandalargeamountofcash   inthetrunk.Theappellatecourtupheldthesearch,explainingthattheofficersdecision   toremovethevehicleforsafekeepingwasreasonableunderallthecircumstancesand  thereforedidnotviolatetheFourthAmendment.Caselawhadnotimposedacategorical  testrequiringthatadecisiontoimpoundavehiclebegovernedinallinstancesby  standardcriteria.Rather,thequestionwaswhetheradecisiontoimpoundavehicle  pursuanttothecommunitycaretakingfunctionwasreasonableunderallthe  circumstances.Here,theofficersreasonsforimpoundingandsearchingthevehiclemet  theFourthAmendmentscriteriaofreasonableness.Moreover,becausethevehiclehad  beenlawfullyimpounded,aninventorysearchofthevehicle,conductedpursuantto  standardpoliceprocedures,wasnotunreasonable.   2.0@0փ(V)#0փ0@u#ԀPeoplev.Torres(2010)188Cal.App.4th775[FourthDistrict,DivisionThree;  petitionforrehearingdenied10/21/10]:Aninventorysearchwasunlawfulwherethe  officerssubjectivemotiveforimpoundingthevehiclewasinvestigatory.     Asheriffsdeputyobservedthedefendantmakeanunsafelanechangeand ! signaledhimtostop.Thedefendantcompliedbypullingintoastallatapublicparking " lot.Whenthedeputylearnedthatthedefendantdidnothaveadriverslicense,hedecided # toimpoundthetruckandconductaninventorysearchofitscontents.Incourt,thedeputy $  admittedthatanarcoticsofficerhadaskedhimtodevelopsomebasisforstoppingthe % ! defendant.Thedeputyalsoadmitted#փ0փ;#0փփthathedecidedtheimpoundthetruckinorderto &!" facilitateaninventorysearchtolookfornarcoticsrelatedevidence.Inthecourseofthe '"# search,thedeputyfoundmethamphetamineandapay/owesheet.Narcoticsofficerslater (#$ searchedthedefendantsresidencepursuanttoawarrantandfoundmethamphetamine, )$% #փ0փe#0փփover$133,000incash,andarifle.Whenthedefendantsmotiontosuppresswasdenied, *%& hepledguiltytovariousdrugrelatedcharges,possessionofafirearmbyafelon,and +&' drivingwithoutalicense.Theappellatecourtfoundthattheinitialtrafficdetentionwas  lawful#փ0փ5#0փփԀ(despitebeingapretext)becausethedeputyhadobservedthedefendantcommita  trafficviolationandpretextstopsarelawfulifbasedonreasonablesuspiciontobelieve  thedriverhadcommittedatrafficinfraction.(SeeWhrenv.UnitedStates(1996)517U.S.  806,813.)However,thecourtheldthattheinventorysearchwasunlawfulbecausethe  deputysmotiveforimpoundingthecarwasinvestigatory(i.e.,heusedtheimpoundand   inventorysearchtolookforcriminalevidence).Furthermore,therewasnothinginthe   recordtojustifyimpounding#փ0փɤ#0փփthedefendantstruckforcommunitycaretakingpurposes.   Thetruckwasnotillegallyparked,wasnotatanenhancedriskofvandalism,wasnot   impedingtrafficorpedestrians,andtherewasnoevidencethatitcouldnotbedriven   awaybysomeoneotherthandefendant.#փ0փ#          Uփ % N PENDINGISSUES%N #փ U{#  o % O A.IssuesPendingBeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt%O  :  1.Kentuckyv.King(SupremeCourtDocketNo.091272;argued1/12/11) 4 DecisionBelow:Kingv.CommonwealthofKentucky(Sup.Ct.ofKentucky2010)302  . S.W.3d649:Neitherhotpursuitofafleeingsuspectnorexigentcircumstances,based  ( onfeareddestructionofevidence,justifiedwarrantlessentryintothehome.  " QuestionsPresented:    1)Whendoesunlawfulpoliceactionimpermissiblycreateexigentcircumstanceswhich   precludewarrantlessentry,andwhichofthefivetestscurrentlybeingusedinthe   UnitedStatesCourtsofAppealispropertodeterminewhenimpermissiblycreated   exigentcircumstancesexist?   2)Doesthehotpursuitexceptiontothewarrantrequirementapplyonlyifthe   governmentcanprovethatthesuspectwasawarehewasbeingpursued?     ThisisanappealbytheCommonwealthofKentuckyfromadecisionofthat  statessupremecourtfindingawarrantlesshomeentryandsearchunconstitutionaland  reversingthedenialofamotiontosuppressevidence.    Herearethefacts:Narcoticsofficerswereconductingabuybustoperationatan  apartmentcomplex.Afterastreetleveldealersoldcrackcocainetoaconfidential  informant,OfficerGibbonsgaveaprearrangedsignaldirectingotherofficerstomovein  andmakeanarrest.Gibbonsradioedadescriptionofthesuspecteddealerandstatedthat  hehadenteredaspecificbreezewayattheapartmentcomplex.Gibbonstoldofficersto  hurryandarrestthesuspectbeforeheenteredanapartment.Hearingthisbroadcast,  OfficerCobbandtwootherdetectivesheadedtowardsthebreezeway.Theyheardadoor  slamshut,butdidnotknowwhichdoorhadclosedanddidnotseewhichapartmentthe   suspecthadentered.Becausetheywerenolongernearapoliceradio,theofficersdidnot ! hearCobbsmessagethatthesuspecthadenteredthebackrightapartment.Asthey " reachedthebreezeway,theofficersdetectedaverystrongodorofmarijuanaemanating # fromthebackleftapartment.Theyinferredfromthisthatthedoortothatapartmenthad $  recentlybeenopenedandthatthesuspecthadentered.Anofficerknockedloudlyonthe % ! leftbackapartmentdoorandannounced police.Theofficersthenheardmovement &!" insidetheapartmentwhichledthemtobelievethatevidencewaspossiblybeing '"# destroyed.Theyforcedentryintothatapartmentandconductedaprotectivesweep (#$ lookingforthesuspecteddrugdealer.Theydidnotfindhim.Instead,theyobservedthe )$% defendantandtwootherpeoplesittingoncouches.Onepersonwassmokingmarijuana *%& whilethedefendantsatnearby.Insidetheapartment,thepolicefoundsubstantial +&' quantitiesofmarijuanaandpowdercocaineinplainview.Uponfurthersearch,they  foundcrackcocaineandparaphernaliaassociatedwithdrugsales.Policeeventually  enteredthebackrightapartmentwheretheyfoundthesuspecteddrugdealer.    DefendantKingandhiscodefendantsfiledmotionstosuppresstheevidence  seizedfromtheapartment,allegingthatthepoliceentryintothehomewas   unconstitutional.Thetrialcourtdeniedthesuppressionmotion,findingthatbothprobable   cause(basedonthesmellofmarijuana)andexigentcircumstances(feareddestructionof   evidence)justifiedtheentrywithoutawarrant.Theintermediateappellatecourtaffirmed   andtheKentuckySupremeCourtreversed.     TheKentuckySupremeCourtreiteratedthewellestablishedrulethatthepolice   maynotenterandsearchanapartmentwithoutawarrantunlesstheyhavebothprobable   causeandexigentcircumstances.Inthiscase,thedistinctiveodorofmarijuanaemanating   fromtheapartmentprovidedprobablecause whichwouldhavebeensufficientforthe  policetoobtainawarrant.(Kingv.Commonwealth,supra,302S.W.2dat653.)The  Courtfound,however,thatthestatedidnotestablishexigentcircumstancesthatjustified  theirfailuretoseekawarrant.Neitherhotpursuitnorfearedimminentdestructionof  evidencejustifiedthewarrantlessentry.Thepoliceofficerscouldhaveandshouldhave  postedofficersinthebreezewaywhiletheyobtainedasearchwarrant.    First,thepolicewerenotinhotpursuitofafleeingsuspect!anexigent  circumstancesthatjustifiesawarrantlessentrywhenaccompaniedbyprobablecause.   Animportantelementofthehotpursuitexceptionisthesuspectsknowledgethatheis,  infact,beingpursued.(Id.,at653654.)Inthiscase,theprosecutiondidnotpresentany  evidenceestablishingthatthesuspecteddrugdealerknewthatpoliceofficerswere  pursuinghimafterhesoldthedrugstoaninformant.Nordidthepolicereasonablyfear  thathewouldescapefromtheapartment.    Second,standingalone,theodorofmarijuanaemanatingfromtheapartmentdid ! notsupportareasonablefearthatpersonsinsidethehomewoulddestroyevidence. " Although,adrugodorwillallowawarrantlesssearchofavehicle,itdoesnotexcusethe # warrantrequirementforahomesearch. $    Third,thesoundsthatthepoliceheardcomingfrominsidetheapartmentdidnot &"" justifythewarrantlessentry,basedonfearedimminentdestructionofevidence,because '## thepolicecreatedanyexigencybyknockingonthedoorandannouncingtheirpresence. ($$ Citingnumerousfederalcircuitcases,theKentuckySupremeCourtstatedthat police )%% maynotrelyonanexigentcircumstanceoftheirowncreation.Theynoted,however, *&& thatthisrule israrelydispositivebecauseinsomesensethepolicealwayscreatethe +'' exigentcircumstancesthatjustifywarrantlessentriesandarrests.(King,supra,at655,  quotingUnitedStatesv.Duchi(8thCir.1990)906F.2d1278.)    BecausethiswasanissueoffirstimpressioninKentucky,thecourtreviewedthe  fourtestsusedbythevariouscircuitstoassesswhetheranexigencywaspolicecreated.  TheKentuckycourtthencobbledtogetheritsownfifthtest.First,thecourtmust   determinewhethertheofficersactedinbadfaith,creatingtheexigentcircumstanceina   deliberateattempttoevadethewarrantrequirement.Ifso,thenthepolicecannotrelyon   theresultingexigency.Second,evenwhenthepolicedidnotactinbadfaith,thecourt   mustdeterminewhetheritwasreasonablyforeseeablethattheinvestigativetactics   employedbythepolicewouldcreatetheexigentcircumstancesreliedupontojustifythe   warrantlessentry.(Id.,at656.)     Applyingthistest,thecourtconcludedthattheofficersdidnotactinbadfaithto   deliberatelyavoidthewarrantrequirement.Whentheyknockedonthedooroftheleft  apartment,theofficerswereunawarethatthesuspecteddrugdealerhadbeenseen  enteringtherightapartment.However,eventhoughtheofficersactedingoodfaith, it  wasreasonablyforeseeablethatknockingontheapartmentdoorandannouncingpolice  afterhavingsmelledmarijuanaemanatingfromtheapartmentwouldcreatedtheexigent  circumstancereliedupon,i.e.destructionofevidence,Inotherwords,thepolicecould  inferthatsomeonewassmokingmarijuanainsidetheapartmentandthattheywould  proceedtodestroytheevidenceoncetheyknewthepolicewererightoutsidethedoor.  Because anyexigencythatdidarisewhenthepoliceknockedandannouncedtheir  presencewaspolicecreateditcouldnotbereliedupontojustifythewarrantlessentry  intotheapartment,andtheseizedevidenceshouldhavebeensuppressed.(Id.,at657.)1  #  25          Presumably,theSupremeCourtgrantedreviewinthiscasebecausetheywantto  clarifythetesttobeusedwhenassessingwhetheranexigentcircumstancewaspolice  created!i.e.whetherthewarrantlessentryshouldonlybeinvalidatedwhenthereissome   evidenceofbadfaithor,atleast, someshowingofdeliberateconductonthepartofthe ! policeevincinganeffortintentionallytoevadethewarrantrequirement.(SeeUnited " Statesv.Chambers(6thCir.2005)395F.3d563,566.)  #  2.Davisv.UnitedStates(SupremeCourtDocketNo.0911328;setforargumenton  3/21/11)  DecisionBelow:UnitedStatesv.Davis(11thCir.2010)598F.3d1259:Althoughthe  SupremeCourtsopinioninArizonav.Gantappliesretroactivelytothesearch  conductedtwoyearsearlier,andthesearchwouldbeunconstitutionalunderGant,the  seizedevidenceneednotbeexcludedasthepolicereasonablyreliedonthewellsettled   interpretationofBeltonwhichallowedthesearch.     QuestionPresented:Doesthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleapplytoa   searchthatwaslegalatthetimeitwasdone,butwaslaterfoundtobe    unconstitutional?  z    Thesearchinthiscaseoccurredin2007,twoyearsbeforetheUnitedStates t  SupremeCourtsdecisioninArizonav.Gant(2009)129S.Ct.1710.Thedefendantwas t  apassengerinastoppedcar.Thedriverwasarrestedfordrivingwhileintoxicated,and t  thedefendantwasarrestedforgivingafalsename.Boththedriverandpassengerwere t handcuffedandplacedinseparatepatrolcars.Theofficerthensearchedthevehicle t theydrecentlyoccupiedandfoundarevolverinthepocketofthedefendantsjacket, t whichhehadleftinthecar.Thetrialcourtdeniedthedefendantsmotiontosuppress, t findingthatthefirearmwasdiscoveredduringalawfulsearchincidenttoarrest.The t courtreliedonestablishedEleventhCircuitprecedentwhich, likemostothercourts,read t Belton[(1981)453U.S.654]tomeanthatpolicecouldsearchavehicleincidenttoa t recentoccupantsarrestregardlessoftheoccupantsactualcontroloverthepassenger t compartmenteveniftherewasnopossibilitythatthearresteecouldgainaccesstothe t vehicleatthetimeofthesearch.(Davis,supra.,598F.3dat12611262.) t   Whilethecasewaspendingonappeal,theSupremeCourtdecidedArizonav. t Gant,whichrejectedthis prevailingreadingofBelton.(Id.,at1262.)InGant,theCourt t heldthatofficersmayonlysearchthevehiclespassengercompartment,followingthe t  arrestofarecentoccupant:1)whenthearresteeisunsecuredandwithinreachingdistance t! ofthepassengercompartmentatthetimeofthesearch;or2)whenitisreasonableto t" believethatevidencerelevanttothecrimeofarrestmightbefoundinthevehicle.(See t# Gant,supra.,at1714.)2  #  26      ׀ t$    TheEleventhCircuitheld:1)thatundertheSupremeCourtsretroactivitydoctrine t&!" (seeUnitedStatesv.Johnson(1982)457U.S.537;Griffithv.Kentucky(1987)479U.S. t'"# 314),theruleannouncedinGantappliedtothedefendantscase;and2)thatapplying  Gant,thevehiclesearchviolatedthedefendantsFourthAmendmentrights.Bothrecent  occupants,thedefendantandthedriver,werehandcuffedandsecuredinseparatepatrol  carsbeforetheofficersearchedthevehicle.Moreover,thedefendantwasarrestedfor  givingafalsename.Thepolicecouldnotreasonablyexpecttofindevidenceofthatcrime  inthecar.(Id.,at1263.)     However,theappellatecourtstillneededtodeterminewhethertheexclusionary   ruleshouldapplytotheevidenceseizedduringtheunconstitutionalsearch.Citingthe   NinthCircuitsdecisioninUnitedStatesv.Gonzalez(9thCir.2009)578F.3d1130[Gant   appliesretroactively],andtheTenthCircuitsdecisioninUnitedStatesv.McCane(10th   Cir.2009)573F.3d1037[regardlessofwhetherGantappliesretroactively,thegoodfaith   exceptionprecludesapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule],theEleventhCircuitnotedthat   thecircuitshadsplitonthisissue.     TheEleventhCircuitenteredthefraybyholdingthat theexclusionaryruledoes  notapplywhenthepoliceconductasearchinobjectivelyreasonablerelianceonourwell  settledprecedent,evenifthatprecedentissubsequentlyoverruled.(Id.,at12631264.)  Becausethepoliceofficerwhosearchedthedefendantsvehiclereasonablyreliedon  clear,wellsettledandunequivocalprecedentwhichpermittedtheintrusion,thegood  faithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleapplied. Relyingonacourtofappealswell  settledandunequivocalprecedentisanalogoustorelyingonastatute,orafaciallyvalid  warrant.(Id.,at12671268,citingIllinoisv.Krull(1987)480U.S.340,UnitedStatesv.  Leon(1984)468U.S.897.)    ThiscasepresentsanexusbetweentheCourtsmostsignificantrulingsof2009!  Arizonav.Gant,whichredefinedthecircumstancesunderwhichofficerscouldsearcha  vehicleincidenttoarrest,andHerringv.UnitedStates(2009)129S.Ct.695.InHerring,  theCourtexpandedthegoodfaithexception,holdingthattheexclusionaryruledoesnot   applywiththeofficerconductingthearrestandsearchreasonablyreliedonfalse ! informationresultingfromapoliceemployeesrecordkeepingerrorwhenthaterrorwas " theresultofisolatednegligenceattenuatedfromthearrest.(Herring,supra,at698700.)4  #  27       # Now,bygrantingcertiorariinDavis,theSupremeCourthastheopportunitytofurther $  limitthereachoftheexclusionaryrule. %!!  &""   Giventheirrecentjurisprudence,itseemslikelythattheSupremeCourtwillside  withthegovernmentinthiscaseandholdthatGantappliesretroactively,butthatthe  goodfaithexceptionprecludesexclusionoftheillegallyseizedevidencebecausethe  searchingofficerreasonablyreliedontheprevailingprecedentwhichinterpretedBelton  topermitsuchasearch.Thisoutcomewouldseemtofollow,notjustfromHerring,but  fromtheCourtsearlierprecedentsinIllinoisv.Krull(1987)480U.S.340andUnited   Statesv.Peltier(1975)422U.S.531.     Krull,thebetterknownofthesetwocases,wasdecidedthreeyearsafterUnited   Statesv.Leon(1984)468U.S.897.Leonhadestablishedthegoodfaithexceptionby   holdingthattheexclusionaryruledoesnotapplywhentheofficerconductingthe   challengedsearchreliedingoodfaithonasubsequentlyinvalidatedsearchwarrant.In   Krull,thesearchingofficerreliedonasubsequentlyinvalidatedstatute.Theofficer   conductedanadministrativesearchofanautowreckingyardwhichhadbeenpermitted   bystatuteHowever,onthedayafterthesearchtheSeventhCircuitCourtofAppealruled  thattheauthorizingstatuteviolatedtheFourthAmendment.TheSupremeCourtruledthat  theevidenceseizedduringtheillegalsearchshouldnotbeexcludedastheofficerhad  reasonablyreliedingoodfaithonastatutesubsequentlyfoundunconstitutional.The  statutewasnotclearlyunconstitutional,andtheofficerhadnoreasontoquestionthe  judgmentofthelegislature.    UnitedStatesv.Peltier,acasethattheSupremeCourtdecidedin1975,nineyears  beforeLeon(andcitedinthatsubsequentcase),presentsanevencloseranalogy.In  Peltier,aborderpatrolagentconductedarandomstopandsearchofthedefendants  truck,findingdrugs.Atthetime,thesearchwasauthorizedbystatute,administrative  regulations,andfederalcourtofappealdecisions.Fourmonthsafterthesearch,the  SupremeCourtdecidedAlmeidaSanchezv.UnitedStates(1973)413U.S.266,which  requiredprobablecauseforasearchconductedwithinareasonabledistanceoftheborder.  Eventheprosecutionconcededthatthesearchofthedefendantscarwasunconstitutional   underAlmeidaSanchez.Nevertheless,Peltierheldthattheseizedevidenceshouldnotbe ! excludedbecausethesearchingofficerreliedingoodfaithoncurrentlawastatuteand " lowercourtprecedentsubsequentlyoverturnedbytheSupremeCourt.Thedeterrent # purposeoftheexclusionaryrulenecessarilyassumesthatthepoliceofficerconducting $  thesearchengagesinwillfulornegligentconductdeprivingthedefendantofhisFourth %!! Amendmentrights.However,iftheofficerreasonablybelieves,ingoodfaith,thatthe &"" searchheisabouttoconductislawful,hewillnotbedeterredbytheprospectof '## exclusion.(Peltier,supra.,422U.S.at536542.) ($$   WritingonpendingSupremeCourtcriminalcasesintheSanFranciscoDaily *&& Journal(Thursday,December30,2010; LookingForwardto2011:KeyCriminal +'' ProcedureCases),LoyolaLawSchoolProfessorLaurieL.Levensonpredictedthatthe  SupremeCourtsanticipateddecisioninDaviscouldbeanother blockbuster.Ata  minimum,ProfessorLevensonpostulatesthatDaviscouldleadtofurtherextensionof  thegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule.IftheCourtadoptstheEleventh  Circuitsreasoning,theymayholdthat theexclusionaryruledoesnotapplywhenthe  policeconductasearchinreasonablyobjectiverelianceonwellsettledprecedent,evenif   thatprecedentissubsequentlyoverturned.(Davis,supra.,598F.3dat1264.)Buthow   settleddoesthatprecedenthavetobe?Whatifthereasplitofauthority?Willexclusion   dependonthesearchingofficersreasonableunderstandingofthelaw?Ontheother   hand,ProfessorLevensonwarnsthattheSupremeCourtmaygoevenfurther.Relyingon   languageinHerring,amajorityofjusticesmaybewillingtogoalongwithapushbylaw   enforcement toreduceallexclusionaryruledecisionstoaquestionofwhetherthe   searchingofficersconductwasdeliberate,recklessorgrosslynegligent.Onlythen,will   theremedyofsuppressionbeapplied.    3.Tolentinov.NewYork(SupremeCourtDocketNo.0911556;argumentsetfor  3/21/11)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Tolentino(Ct.ofAppealsofN.Y.2010)14N.Y.3d382:  DMVrecordsacquiredbythepoliceaftertheylearnedthedefendantsnameduringan  unconstitutionaltrafficstoparenotsubjecttosuppressionasthefruitofthepoisonous  tree  Questionpresented:Whetherpreexistingidentityrelatedgovernmentaldocuments,  suchasmotorvehiclerecords,obtainedasadirectresultofpoliceactionviolatingthe  FourthAmendment,aresubjecttotheexclusionaryrule  z   ThiscasewillbearguedonthesamedayasDavisv.UnitedStates,providingthe t SupremeCourtwithanotheropportunitytolimitthereachoftheexclusionaryrule. t However,thismatterinvolvesthefruitofthepoisonoustreedoctrineratherthanthegood t  faithexception. t!   Herearethefacts:ThedefendantwasdrivinginNewYorkCity.Thepolice t# stoppedhimforplayinghismusictooloudly.Duringthetrafficstop,thepolicelearned t$  hisnameandranacomputercheckofDepartmentofMotorVehicle(DMV)files.When t% ! thecheckrevealedthatthedefendantslicensewassuspended,hewasarrestedand t&!" chargedwithunlicensedoperationofamotorvehicleinthefirstdegree. t'"#   Thedefendantarguedthathewasillegallystoppedandmovedtosuppresshis t)$% drivingrecordasthetaintedfruitoftheFourthAmendmentviolation.TheNewYork t*%& CourtofAppealsaffirmedthelowercourtsdenialofthismotion. t+&'   Thedefendantdidnotarguethathisnameoridentitywouldbesubjectto  suppression,eventhoughitwasobtainedbythepoliceduringtheunconstitutionalstop.  Indeed,theSupremeCourthasheldthe identityofadefendantinacriminalorcivil  proceedingisneveritselfsuppressibleasafruitofanunlawfularrest,evenifitis  concededthatanunlawfularrest,searchorinterrogationoccurred.(Tolentino,supra,14  N.Y.3dat384385,quotingINSv.LopezMendoza(1984)468U.S.1032,1039.)Rather,   thedefendantcontendedthatthepreexistingDMVrecordsaresubjecttosuppression   becausewithouttheallegedillegality,thepolicewouldnothavelearnedhisnameand   beenabletoaccesstheserecords.     TheCourtofAppealrejectedthisargument,relyingonfederalcircuitcasesthat   havedeclinedtosuppresspreexistingimmigrationrecordsdiscoveredduringarecords   checkafterthedefendantgavehisnametolawenforcementofficersduringanillegal   arrestorsearch.Asemphasizedinthesecases,immigrationfileslikeDMVrecordsare   alreadyinthegovernmentspossession,andcouldhavebeendiscoveredevenwithoutthe  unconstitutionalintrusion.Therecordswereobtainedfromasourceindependentofthe  unlawfulseizure. TheexclusionaryruleenjoinstheGovernmentfrombenefittingfrom  evidenceithasunlawfullyobtained;itdoesnotreachbackwardtotaintinformationthat  wasinofficialhandspriortoanyillegality.(Tolentino,supra,at386,quotingUnited  Statesv.Crews(1980)445U.S.463.)    InTolentino,theNewYorkcourtdistinguishedSupremeCourtcasesholdingthat  fingerprintevidenceissubjecttotheexclusionaryrule.(See.e.g.Davisv.Mississippi  (1969)394U.S.721,724;Hayesv.Florida(1985)470U.S.811,815.)First,the  defendantsinthosecaseswereillegallystoppedforthepurposeofobtainingtheir  fingerprintsasevidencethatmightconnectthemtocrimesunderinvestigation.Second,  this identityevidencewasnotpreexisting.Third,thefingerprintswerenotusedto  establishtheidentityofthoseapprehendedbuttomatchtheirprintstolatentprints  recoveredfromcrimescenes!toestablishtheiridentitiesasperpetrators.     Thecourtconcluded: Wemerelyholdthatadefendantmaynotinvokethefruit " ofthepoisonoustreedoctrinewhentheonlylinkbetweenimproperpoliceactivityand # thedisputedevidenceisthatthepolicelearnedthedefendantsname.(Id.,at388.) $    AsProfessorLevensonstatesinherDailyJournalarticleoncasespendingbefore &"" theSupremeCourt,theonlydangerhereisthattheCourtmightusethiscaseasan '## opportunitytofurtherrestraintheapplicationofthefruitofthepoisonoustreedoctrine. ($$   Indeed,policeofficersregularlyperformcomputerizedrecordchecksduringtraffic *&& stops.Twoyearsago,inPeoplev.Brendlin(2008)45Cal.4th262,theCalifornia +'' SupremeCourtheldthatwhen,asaresultofsucharecordcheckconductedinthecourse  ofanunconstitutionaltrafficdetention,thepolicediscoverthatthedriverorpassenger  hasanoutstandingarrestwarrant,hecanmakealawfularrest.Thediscoveryofthe  warrantfromanindependentsourceattenuatesthetaintoftheantecedentillegal  detention,assumingthatthepoliceviolationoftheFourthAmendmentisneither  purposefulnorflagrant.(Brendlin,supra.,at265.)UnderthereasoningofBrendlin,it   wouldseemthatthelicensesuspensiondiscoveredinTolentinoasaresultoftheDMV   recordscheckwouldbeadmissibleinCalifornia,despitetheillegalityoftheinitial   vehiclestop.    % P B.IssuesPendingBeforetheCaliforniaSupremeCourt%P=     1.Peoplev.Branner(SupremeCourtNo.S179730;briefingcompletedon11/10/10,   butcasenotyetcalendaredfororalargument)   DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Branner(2010)180Cal.App.4th308[ThirdDistrict]:A   prolongedtrafficdetention,asdefinedbyPeoplev.McGaughran(1979)25Cal.3d  577,doesnotviolatetheFourthAmendment,becausefederallawpermitsanarrestfor  aminorVehicleCodeoffense.Astothesearchincidenttoarrest,theGantrulesapply  retroactively,butundertheexclusionaryrule,evidenceseizedbythepolicein  reasonablerelianceontheprevailinginterpretationofBeltonisnotsubjectto  suppression. z QuestionsPresented: n 1)DidthiscourtsopinioninPeoplev.McGaughran[citationomitted]survivethe h passageofProposition8? b 2)IsthedefendantentitledtoretroactiveapplicationofArizonav.Gant[citation \ omitted],inwhichthehighcourtlimitedvehiclesearchesincidenttothearrestofa V recentoccupantafterthearresteehasbeensecuredandcannotaccesstheinteriorof P thevehicle. J  3)Ifso,didtheCourtofAppealerrbyapplyingthegoodfaithexceptiontothe D! exclusionaryrule?]  >"   ThefactsofBrannerareasfollows:InDecember2004,officerswereconducting 8$  surveillanceofanapartmentcomplexbecauseofcomplaintsofdrugssalesintheparking 8% ! lot.Theyobservedthedefendantsvehicletravelfromapublicstreetintothecomplex. 8&!" Theofficershadpreviouslyseenthedefendantandhisvehicleatthiscomplex,andthey 8'"# knewhewasaregisterednarcoticsoffender.TheofficersobservedtwoVehicleCode 8(#$ equipmentviolations!thedefendantsrearlicenseplatelightwasnotworkingandoneof 8)$% theheadlightswasmisaligned.Consequently,theofficersinitiatedatrafficstop.During 8*%& theensuingdetention,thepoliceconductedarecordscheckwhichtooklessthanfive 8+&' minutes.Basedoninformationgleanedfromthischeck,theofficersdeterminedthatthe  defendanthadnotreportedachangeofaddress,inviolationofhisdrugregistration  requirements.Theyarrestedhimforthisviolation,placedhiminthebackoftheirpatrol  car,andthensearchedthepassengercompartmentofhisvehicle,findingagunand  cocaine.Theentireencounterfromstoptoarresttookapproximately15minutes.     a.TheUnlawfullyProlongedDetentionIssue      Thedefendantarguedthatthearrestwasillegal,becausetheinformation   supportingthearrestwasgainedduringanundulyprolongeddetention.Thisargument    wasessentiallybasedontheSupremeCourts30yearolddecisioninPeoplev.   McGaughran(1979)25Cal.3d577.Inthatcase,afterstoppingacardrivenbythe   defendantbecausehehaddriveninthewrongdirectiononaonewaystreet,andafter   discussingtheviolationandexaminingthedriverslicenseforthreetofourminutes,the   officerdidnotissueacitationorawarning.Instead,hedetainedthedefendantforan   additionaltenminuteswhileheconductedawarrantcheckwhichrevealedthatboththe  defendantandhispassengerhadoutstandingwarrants.TheSupremeCourtheldthatafter  stoppingthemotoristforatrafficviolationforwhichhecannotbetakenintocustody,and  afterdetaininghimfortheperiodnecessarytoperformthefunctionsarisingfromthe  violation,theofficercannotlawfullydetainhimforanadditionaltimeperiodsolelyfor  thepurposeofconductingawarrantcheck.(McGaughran,supra.,at586.)Theadditional  detentionrequiredreasonablesuspicionofcriminality.(Id.,at587591.)McGaughrandid  acknowledgethatawarrantcheckisnotimproperifitcanbecompletedwithinthetime  necessarytodischargethedutiesofthetrafficstop.(Id.,at584.)    InBranner,theThirdDistrictheldthat theMcGaughranlimitonthetimean  officermaydetainaVehicleCodeviolatorisnolongerthelawinCaliforniaforpurposes  ofFourthAmendmentanalysis.(Branner,supra.,180Cal.App.4that316.)Inother  words,aprolongedtrafficdetentionisnotunconstitutional;thus,evidencediscovered   duringsuchadetentionwillnotbesuppressed. !   ThecourtnotedthatthreeyearsafterMcGaughran,Californiavoterspassed # Proposition8whichaddedaprovisiontothestateConstitutionprecludingthe $  suppressionofrelevantevidenceinacriminalcaseunlesscompelledbyfederallaw. % ! Almosttwentyyearslater,inAtwaterv.CityofLagoVista(2001)532U.S.318,the &!" UnitedStatesSupremeCourtexpandedpoliceofficersfederalconstitutionalauthorityto '"# makeacustodialarrestofthedriverduringaroutinetrafficstop.TheCourtheldthatthe (#$ custodialarrestofanindividualforaveryminoroffense,includingatrafficviolation )$% punishableonlybyafine,didnotviolatetheFourthAmendment.Theverynextyear,the *%& CaliforniaSupremeCourtdecidedPeoplev.McKay(2002)27Cal.4th601.)InMcKay, +&' theCourtheldthatalthoughacustodialarrestofaanindividualforafineonlyVehicle  CodeviolationisprecludedbyCalifornialaw,itisnotunconstitutionalpursuantto  Atwatersinterpretationoffederallaw.Evidenceseizedduringasearchincidenttothat  illegalbutnotunconstitutionalarrestwouldnotbesuppressed.    ApplyingtheserulingstothefactsofBranner,theThirdDistrictreasonedthat the   prolongeddetentionofdefendantforarecordscheckwhiledefendantwasdetainedfor   vehiclecodeoffensesdidnotviolatetheUnitedStatesConstitution,whichwouldhave   permittedtheofficerstoimmediatelyplacedefendantincustody.(Branner,supra.,180   Cal.App.4that317,citingPeoplev.Gomez(2004)117Cal.App.4th531.)Inother   words,becausetheofficerscouldhavemadeacustodialarrestassoonastheyobserved   theVehicleCodeviolations,withoutoffendingthefederalconstitution,thelengthofthe   trafficdetentiondidnotmatter.Forpracticalpurposes,wheneveranofficerhasprobable   causetobelievethatadriverhasviolatedtheVehicleCode,aprolongeddetention   argumentiseffectivelydead.    ItseemslikelythattheSupremeCourtwillfindthatMcGaughranisnolonger  goodlaw,totheextentthatithasbeeninterpretedasplacinglimitsonthescopeofthe  officersactivitiesduringaroutinetrafficstop(e.g.discouragingwarrantchecksduringa  trafficstop).Itiswellestablishedthatofficerscanconductacomputerizedrecordcheck  duringalegitimatetrafficstop.PursuanttocasesdecidedbytheCaliforniacourtsafter  thepassageofProposition8,apoliceofficerwhoinitiatesatrafficstopforaVehicle  Codeviolationmaybrieflydetainthedriverandallpassengerswhilesheexpeditiously  performsthedutiesincidenttothecitationprocess,dutiesthatincluderunningwarrant  andlicensechecks.(SeePeoplev.Miranda(1993)17Cal.App.4th917,92627.)There  arenolimitsonthescopeofalawfultrafficdetention.Theofficercanaskquestions  aboutmattersunrelatedtotheVehicleCodeviolation(e.g.areyoucarryingdrugsor  weapons?),inquireaboutparoleandprobationstatus,orrequestconsenttosearch,so  longastheofficersconductandquestions donotprolongthestopbeyondthetimeit   wouldotherwisetake.(Peoplev.Brown(1998)62Cal.App.4th493,498;seealso ! Peoplev.Gallardo(2005)130Cal.App.4th234,238239.)  #  28      ׀ " Ї  Inotherwords,aslongasshedoesnttaketoolong,theofficercanaskany  questionanddojustaboutanythingduringthetrafficstop.Theonlythingtheofficer  cantdoistosearchthevehiclewithoutconsentorindependentjustification,atleastuntil  theanoccupantisactuallyarrested.(SeeKnowlesv.Iowa(1998)525U.S.113.)Thus,  undercurrentlaw,itisstillpossibletoraisea prolongeddetentionargumentifthe  officerconductingthetrafficstoptakestoolong,becausesheisperformingarecords   checkorwaitingforbackupofficersoradrugdetectiondog.Buthowlongistoolong?   Quitefrankly,prolongeddetentionargumentsrarelysucceed.     Nevertheless,iftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtaffirmstheThirdDistrictsrulingin   Branner,therewouldbenodistinctionbetweenatrafficdetentionandadefactoarrestin   casesinwhichtheofficerhasprobablecausetobelievethatthedrivercommittedany   VehicleCodeviolation.Asapracticalmatter,anylimitsonthelengthofadetention   followingatrafficstopwoulddisappear.     ThisoutcomeseemsinconsistentwithrecentSupremeCourtcasesthatcontinueto  recognizeadistinctionbetweenabriefandlimitedtrafficdetentionandanactualarrest.  (SeeKnowlesv.Iowa(1998)525U.S.113[norighttosearchincidenttoatraffic  detention,whentheofficerelectstoissueacitationratherthanmakingacustodial  arrest].)Moreover,theSupremeCourthasrecentlyreaffirmedthatatrafficstopmay  becomeundulyprolonged.InIllinoisv.Cabellas(2005)543U.S.405,407,theCourt  stated: Aseizurethatisjustifiedsolelybytheinterestinissuingawarningtickettothe  drivercanbecomeunlawfulifitisprolongedbeyondthetimereasonablynecessaryto  completethatmission.Finally,inArizonav.Johnson(2009)129S.Ct.781,theCourtre  affirmedthatduringthelegitimatetrafficstop,thepolicemayaskboththedriverandthe  passengerabout mattersunrelatedtothejustificationforthetrafficstop.These  questions donotconverttheencounterintosomethingotherthanalawfulseizure,so  longasthoseinquiriesdonotmeasurablyextendthedurationofthestop.(Johnson,  supra.,at788,citingMuehlerv.Mena(2005)544U.S.93,100101.)      b.GantRetroactivity/GoodFaithExceptionIssue  "   Thearrestandvehiclesearchinthiscaseoccurredin2004,morethanfouryears $  beforeArizonav.Gant.Afterarrestingthedefendantforviolatinghisdrugregistration % ! requirements,theofficerputhiminthebackofapatrolcarandthensearchedhis &!" vehiclespassengercompartment,findingagunandcocainebase. '"#  (#$   TheThirdDistrictrejectedthedefendantscontentionthattheSupremeCourts  recentGantdecisioncompelledsuppressionofthegunanddrugsseizedduringthepost  arrestsearchofthedefendantsvehicle,whilethedefendantwassecuredintheofficers  patrolcar.InGant,theCourtrevisiteditspriorrulinginBelton,whichtheCourt  acknowledgedhad beenwidelyunderstoodtoallowavehiclesearchincidenttothe  arrestofarecentoccupantevenifthereisnopossibilitythearresteecouldgainaccessto   thevehicleatthetimeofthesearch.(Branner,supra,180Cal.App.4that317,citing   Gant,supra,129S.Ct.at1716.)Gantchangedthelawsothatpolicecouldonlysearch   thearresteesvehicleifthearresteewaswithinreachingdistanceofthepassenger   compartmentatthetimeofthesearch,ortheofficerreasonablybelievedthatthevehicle   containedevidenceoftheoffenseofarrest.     TheCourtofAppeal,inBranner,agreedwiththedefendantthatGantapplies   retroactivelybecausehiscasewasstillpendingondirectreview.Thus,thesearchofthe   defendantsvehiclewhilehewassecuredinthebackseatofthepatrolcarviolatedthe  FourthAmendmentunlessifwasreasonablefortheofficertobelievethatevidenceofthe  crimeofarrest(violationofdrugregistrationrequirements)wouldbefoundinthe  vehicle.However,thecourtdeclinedtodecidethatquestion.Instead,itupheldadmission  oftheseizedevidencebyapplyingthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule.    Theofficerwhosearchedthedefendantsvehicleafterarrestinghimandplacing  himinthepatrolcarreasonablyreliedonthethenprevailingviewofBelton,which  permittedasearchofthepassengercompartment,incidenttothearrestofarecent  occupant,evenifthearresteecouldnolongerreachthecompartmentatthetimeofthe  search.ThisunderstandingofBelton,wascommonlyacceptedbyfederalandstate  appellatecourtsandtaughttolawenforcementofficersinpoliceacademiesfor28years.    TheThirdDistrictcontinuedwithadiscussionoftheexclusionaryrulesdeterrent  purposeandtheconsequentevolutionofthegoodfaithexception,whichappliedwhen   suppressionoftheevidencewouldnoteffectivelyadvancethatpurpose.Thecourt ! concludedthatthereasoningofthegoodfaithcases mustbeextendedtotheofficers " searchinthiscase. JustastheofficersinLeon,KrullandEvanscouldnotbefaultedfor # relyingonjudgesdecisionsor[false]informationprovidedbyacourtclerk,surelythe $  officersherecannotbefaultedforactinginconformitywiththeUnitedStatesSupreme %!! CourtsdecisioninBelton,whichformorethanaquartercentury,hadbeenunderstood &"" andappliedbyothercourtstoallowofficerstoconductavehiclesearchincidenttoarrest '## eventhoughthedefendantwasinthebackofthepatrolcar..(Branner,supra,at322.) ($$ Becausetheofficerwhosearchedthecarreasonablyreliedonestablishedprecedent )%% interpretingBelton,excludingtheseizedevidencewouldhavenodeterrenteffect. *&&    +''   InBranner,theCaliforniaSupremeCourthasgrantedreviewonthesameissue  pendingbeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinDavisv.UnitedStates.Althoughthe  CaliforniacourtgrantedthedefendantspetitionforreviewthreemonthsbeforetheU.S.  SupremeCourtgrantedcertiorariinDavis,itisalmostcertainthatDaviswillbedecided  first,asitiscalendaredfororalargumentonMarch21,2011.ThebriefinginBranner  wasjustcompletedandthecasehasnotyetbeensetfororalargument.    2.Peoplev.Troyer(CaliforniaSupremeCourtNo.S180759;arguedon12/7/10)   DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Troyer,unpublishedopinion(ThirdDistrict,1/27/10,   Westlawciteis2010WL891852):Forcibleentryandwarrantlesssearchoflocked    upstairsbedroomwasnotjustifiedbytheprotectivesweeporemergencyaidexceptions   tothewarrantrequirement.   QuestionPresented:Dideithertheprotectivesweepexceptionortheemergencyaid   exceptiontotheFourthAmendmentswarrantrequirementpermitpoliceofficersto   makeaforcibleentryintoalockedbedroomwhilerespondingtoareportofashooting  withinjuriesatthehouse.  z   ThisisapeoplesappealfromanunpublishedThirdDistrictdecisionreversingthe t trialcourtsdenialofamotiontosuppressevidence.Herearethefacts:Apoliceofficer t receivedaradiocallthatamanhadpossiblybeenshottwiceatadesignatedresidence t andthattheperpetratorswerepossiblydrivingatwodoorChevrolet.Whentheofficer t arrivedatthehouse,hedidnotseethedescribedvehicle.Hedidfindtwoinjuredand t bleedingpeopleonthehousesfrontporch!awomanwhoappearedtohavebeenshot t andamanbleedingprofuselyfromaheadinjury.Thebleedingmanidentifiedtwo t suspects,aWhitemaleandablackmale,andsaidtheyhaddrivenaway.Hewas t equivocalaboutwhethertherewasanyoneinthehouse.Theofficersawdropletsor t smudgesofbloodonthefrontdoorandinferredthatableedingindividualhadwalkedin t oroutofthatdoor.Theofficerdidnotseeorhearanythinggoingoninsidethehousebut t  decidedtoenter.Aftertheofficerthreatenedtokickdownthelockedfrontdoor,the t! bleedingman!whohaddeclinedconsenttoenter!handedoverthekeys.Fourpolice t" officersthenenteredthetwostoryhouseandsawnosignsofstruggleorblood.They t# searchedthefirstfloorandfoundnothingofinterest.Theybegantosearchthesecond t$  floorandencounteredalockedbedroomdoor.Afterannouncinghispresenceand t% ! receivingnoresponse,oneofficerbrokedownthedoor.Assoonasheenteredthe t&!" bedroom,theofficersmelledastrongodorofmarijuanaandsawaglassjarfilledwith t'"# marijuanaandascale.Officersthenobtainedawarrant,searchedthehousemore t(#$ thoroughlyandfoundmoremarijuanaandagun. t)$%   t*%&   Thegunandmarijuanawerelinkedtothedefendantandduringhisprosecution,he   filedamotiontosuppressevidencewhichwasdenied.Thetrialcourtfoundthatthe  officerswarrantlessentryandsearchoftheupstairsbedroomwasjustifiedbythe  emergencyaidexception.TheCourtofAppealreversed.    First,theappellatecourtfoundthatthewarrantlessentryintothehomewasnot   justifiedasaprotectivesweep.AccordingtoMarylandv.Buie(1990)494U.S.325,to   justifyawarrantlesssearchasaprotectivesweep,theprosecutionmustshow:1)thatthe   intrusionwasaquickandlimitedsearchofthepremises,incidenttoanarrestand   conductedtoprotectthesafetyofthepoliceandothers;and2)thatthecircumstances   supportedtheofficersreasonablebeliefthattheareatobesweptharboredanindividual   posingadangertothoseonthearrestscene.TheThirdDistrictheldthatevenassuminga   protectivesweepisnotlimitedtoarrestsituations,therewereinsufficientfactssupporting   aprudentofficersreasonablebeliefthattherewereoneormoredangerouspersonsinside   thehouse.Thesuspectsdescribedcarwasgone.Thebleedingmansaidtheshootershad  fled.Thedoorwaslockedandtheofficercouldnothearorseeanythinginsidethehouse.    Second,theThirdDistrictheldthatalthoughtheemergencyaidexceptionjustified  theofficersentryintothehome,itdidnotjustifytheirentryintothelockedupstairs  bedroom.UndertheemergencyaidexceptionsetforthinBrighamCityv.Stuart(2006)  547U.S.398,officersmayenterandsearchahomewithoutawarrantwhentheyhavean  objectivelyreasonablebeliefthatanoccupantisseriouslyinjuredorimminently  threatenedwithsuchinjury.Underthefactsofthecurrentcase(twobleedingpeople,  bloodonthedoor),theThirdDistrictagreedthattheofficershadtherighttoenterthe  hometolookforanothervictim.Butoncetheyentered,theydidnotseeanybloodor  signsofastruggle.Eveniftheyhadtherighttosearchtheupperflooraswellasthefirst  floor,therewasnojustificationforkickinginthelockeddoorofthesecondstory  bedroom.Thefactsdidnotsupportareasonablebeliefthattherewasapersoninsidethat  bedroomwhowasinneedofaid.  #  29           !   Onejusticefiledadissent,assertingthattheemergencyaidexceptionappliedand   thatthepolicehadactedreasonablyineveryway,includingtheirforcedentryintothe  lockedbedroom.  3. Peoplev.Schmitz(SupremeCourtNo.S186707;petitionforreviewgranted12/1/10)  DecisionBelow:Peoplev.Schmitz(2010)187Cal.App.4th722[FourthDistrict,   DivisionThree]:Theofficersnonconsensualsearchoftheentirepassenger   compartmentofthedefendantscarcouldnotbejustifiedonthebasisoftheparole   searchconditionofthefrontseatpassenger,becausethepassengerdidnothave   commonauthorityovertheentirevehicle.    QuestionsPresented:Whenconductingavehiclesearchauthorizedbyapassengers   parolecondition,canthepolicesearchanyareasofthevehiclesinteriorthatappear   reasonablyaccessibletothepassenger?      ThestatefiledapetitionforreviewinthiscaseaftertheCourtofAppeal z overturnedthetrialcourtsdenialofthedefendantsmotiontosuppressevidencefoundin z therearpassengerareaofhisvehicle.Herearethefacts:Adeputysheriffobservedthe z defendantdrivehiscarintoasmallalley,makeaUturn,andtheproceedbacktothe z mainstreet.Thinkingthedrivermightbelost,thedeputypulledherpatrolcarintothe z alley.Asthedefendantscarnearedthedeputysvehicle,shestopped,andthedefendant z stoppedhiscaraswell,paralleltothedeputy.Thedeputysawthreeadultsandasmall z childinthecar.Inresponsetothedeputysquestion,thedefendantsaidhewasnotlost; z hejustwantedtomakeaUturn.Thedeputythengotoutofhercar,approachedthe z defendantandaskedifhemindedshowingherhisdriverslicense.Asthedefendantwas z retrievinghislicense,thedeputynoticedthathisarmswerecoveredwithabscesses, z indicativeofpossibledruguse.Sheaskedthedefendantifhewasonprobationorparole. z Hesaid no.Thedeputythendirectedthesamequestiontotheotheroccupants,andthe z malefrontseatpassengersaidhewasonparole.Atthatpoint,thedeputycalledforback z  upandaskedthedefendantforpermissiontosearchhisvehicle.Hedidnotanswer. z! Thereafter,thedeputyaskedalltheoccupantstogetoutofthecarandconductedasearch z" basedonthefrontseatpassengersparolestatus.Shesearchedtheentirepassenger z# compartmentandfoundtwosyringesinachipbagontherearfloor,methamphetaminein z$  apairofshoes,alsoontheflooroftherearpassengerarea,andasyringecapinapurse z% ! belongingtothefemalebackseatpassenger.Thedefendantwasprosecutedfor z&!" unauthorizedpossessionofthesyringes,aswellasotheroffenses. z'"#   First,thecourtfoundthatthedeputysinteractionwiththedefendant!throughthe z)$% timewhenshelearnedofthefrontseatpassengersparolestatus!wasconsensual.The z*%& defendantdriver(andtheotheroccupants)werenotdetainedwithinthemeaningofthe z+&' FourthAmendment.Second,thedefendantdidnotconsenttoasearchofhiscar.Hewas  askedforconsentanddidnotreply. [H]issilencecannotbeconstruedasacquiescence  orimpliedconsent.(Schmitz,supra.,187Cal.App.4that729.)    Finally,thecourtheldthatthefrontseatpassengersadmittedparolestatusdidnot  givethedeputytherighttosearchthedefendantsentirepassengercompartment,because   therewasnoshowingthattheparoleepassengerhadapossessoryorownershipinterestin   thecarorcommonauthorityoverallareasofthecarsinterior.Thepassengersparole   statuscouldnotoverridethedriversrighttorefuseconsentorobliteratehisreasonable   expectationofprivacyinhisvehicle.     Ifaparoleeoraprobationer,subjecttoasearchcondition,sharesahomewith   others,officerscansearchallportionsofthehomeoverwhichtheparoleeorprobationer   hassuperiororcommonauthority,completeorjointcontrol.Thecourtnotedthatwhile   therearenumerouscasesapplyingthe commonauthoritystandardtosituations  involvingthesearchofresidentialpremisessharedbetweenaparoleeorprobationerand  anotherperson,theycouldfindnocasesinvolvingthesearchofacarratherthana  residence.(Schmitz,supra.,at731.)    TherulesetforthinUnitedStatesv.Matlock(1974)415U.S.164,andappliedto  probationsearchesofsharedresidencesinPeoplev.Woods(1999)21Cal.4th668,states  that thecommonauthorityoverpropertywhichconfersthepowertoauthorizeitssearch  isfoundedonmutualuseofthepropertybypersonsgenerallyhavingjointaccessor  controlformostpurposessothatitisreasonabletorecognizethatanyoftheco  inhabitantshastherighttopermittheinspectioninhisownrightandthatothershave  assumedtheriskthatoneoftheirnumbermightpermitthecommonareatobe  searched.(Schmitz,supra.,at732,quotingMatlock,supra.,at172,fn.7.)    Thecourtthenappliedthisruletothefactsofthedefendantscase.Therewasno   evidencethatthedefendanthadcededtotheparoleepassengeranyauthorityoverthecar ! atall,includingtheauthoritytopermitsearchesofallportionsofthevehicle,specifically " includingthebackseat.Norcouldthedeputyhavereasonablyassumedthatthepassenger # hadsuchauthorityoverthevehicle.Consequently,theofficercouldnotsearchtheentire $  vehiclebaseduponthepassengersparolestatus.