WPCr> ]c"@{e'f]#,殜e8XMvAhΘH[rRsYFވׄ7>BY3/I^=fN.f'Ffk(:]dp&vi/bSƩc'hkNᏪEu!F (+LVH" ^}1UA0(.r]o{Y#ī kP,`[jwvg 'rMRhn3ݵ֙s-[ 6g6ඪ@¦d}5vJzn}eOfV˕~t.mwab~4gv=ԑ.M0QQ<f>J3e4\F)$&oYI8?z4g/)8vOة˵NuQj&nZ/0s%ytj.M18}Ӧ{RAX#UN % 0Y NF ^ H wT 4X l { m} = 0 0Dn g !7/ 4>U@]a f1"/$U9>&'(sv+W,f@.0>c24K7K7 G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G=G= 0AX= 0kT= 0hh========= BU>HP 4050 BACK HALLWAY0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX(1$OXXUSUS.,lI< un7:i+003|xTU 3  $XXUSUS.,    7    _ ` Inthesematerials,wefocusonlyonCaliforniaappellatecasesandopinions  fromthefederalCourtsofAppeal,ratherthanoutofstatecases.(M(3$ !XXUSUS.,      0  (#$  0   ]  $XXUSUS.,    8    _ ` TheCourtdidnotresolvetheissueofwhetherthepoliceinthiscaseused  excessiveforce,callingitaclosequestion.(_Ankeny_,supra.,at836.)      $XXUSUS.,    2    _ ` Somejusticeshavewantedtogofarther.Forexample,ChiefJusticeBurger  wantedtoabolishtheflawedandineffectiveruleforallbut asmallandlimitedcategory  ofcases.(Stone,supra.,428U.S.at496502[conc._opn_.ofBurger,C.J.].)   $XXUSUS.,    3    _ ` InLeon,theCourtcitedastudywhichpurportedtoquantify theeffectsof  theexclusionaryruleonthedispositionoffelonyarrests.Thestudyfoundthatthe  prospectthatillegallyseizedevidencewillbesuppressedresultsinnonprosecutionor  nonconvictionofbetween0.6%and2.35%ofindividualsarrestedforfelonies.  Moreover,theestimatesmaybehigherforcrimes,suchasdrugoffenses,whichdepend  heavilyonphysicalevidence.(Leon,supra.,at907,n.6.) %  $XXUSUS.,    9    _ ` ThemajorityrejectedthedissentssuggestionthattherulinginEvanswas  premisedonthedistinctionbetweenjudicialerrorsandpoliceerrors,notingthattheCourt  expresslyleftunresolvedtheissueofwhetherevidenceshouldbesuppressedifpolice  personnelwereresponsiblefortheerror.(Herring,supra.,at703,n.3.)   $XXUSUS.,    1    _ ` TwoearlierSupremeCourtcases,_Silverthorne_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1920)251  U.S.385and_Nardone_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1939)308U.S.338,hadheldthatfruitsofthe  illegalsearch,aswellasevidenceseizedduringtheillicitinvasion,shouldbeexcluded.   $XXUSUS.,    14    _ ` Inthesematerials,wefocusonlyonCaliforniaandFederalCourtofAppeal  cases,andnotonoutofstatecases(A Z(Times New Roman    $XXUSUS.,    6    _ ` Tworelatedruleswhichallowtheadmissionofillegallyseizedevidenceare  inevitablediscoveryandtheindependentsourcedoctrine.Undertheinevitablediscovery  doctrine,evidenceisnotexcludediftheprosecutioncanprovethattheincriminating  itemsorinformationwouldinevitablyhavebeendiscoveredbylawfulmeans.(Nixv.  Williams(1984)467U.S.431,443444.)Theindependentsourcedoctrineholdsthat  evidenceisnotsuppressedwhenitwasseizedpursuanttoavalidwarrantandthe   informationuponwhichthewarrantwassecuredcomesfromasourcewholly    independentofanearlierillegalentryandpreviouslyknowntotheofficers.Itdoesnot  matterthattheevidencewasinitiallyobservedduringtheunlawfulentry,solongasthese  observationswerenotthebasisforthewarrant.(_Segura_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1984)468U.S.  796;Murrayv.UnitedStates(1988)487U.S.533.)   $XXUSUS.,    5    _ ` CasesapplyingEvanssawthisdistinctionasdeterminative;applicationof  theexclusionaryruledependedonwhetherthesourceoftheerror,reasonablyreliedupon  bytheofficer,wasacourtemployeeoranadjuncttolawenforcement.(See,e.g.People  v.Willis(2002)28Cal.4th22,3335;PeoplevDowning(1995)33Cal.App.4th1641,  16441645;Peoplev.Ferguson(2003)109Cal.App.4th367,372.)   $XXUSUS.,    13    _ ` TheyrelyonthefollowinglanguageinHerring: Aslaidoutinourcases,  theexclusionaryruleservestodeterdeliberate,recklessorgrosslynegligentconduct,or  insomecircumstances,recurringorsystemicnegligence.(Herring,supra.,at702.) \  $XXUSUS.,    10    _ ` InWeeks,theofficersbrokeintothedefendantshome,searcheditand  confiscatedpaperswithoutawarrantorprobablecause.(Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at386,  393394.)In_Mapp_,officersbrandishedafalsewarrantwhentheyenteredandsearched  thedefendantshome.(_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at644645.) %  $XXUSUS.,    11    _ ` ThissectionsummarizestheanalysisofrenownedFourthAmendment  expert,ProfessorWayneR._Lafave_,assetforthinhisrecentarticle,TheSmellof  Herring:ACritiqueoftheSupremeCourtsLatestAssaultontheExclusionaryRule,  publishedintheSummer2009JournalofCriminalLawandCriminology.\  `&Times New Roman   $XXUSUS.,    15    _ ` ForfurtheranalysisofGant,see TheEvolutionoftheSearchIncidentto  ArrestDoctrine:Arizonav.Gant(2009)129_S.Ct_.1710",postedonthe_FDAP_Ԁwebsite.   $XXUSUS.,    12    _ ` _Lafave_Ԁspeculatesthat attenuationisnotclearlydefinedinHerring  becausethequalificationwasaddedatthelastminute.TheChiefJusticesopinionmay  havebeenoriginallydrafted tofreeallformsofnegligencefromtheexclusionaryrule,  and....theattenuatedqualificationbecameanecessaryaddontogarnertheneededfifth  votefromJusticeKennedy.(_Lafave_,supra.,at771.) i  $XXUSUS.,    17    _ ` ItisinterestingthattheTenthCircuitdidnotrelyonthemostrelevant  SupremeCourtcase,UnitedStatesv._Peltier_.(Seefootnote16,supra.) M  $XXUSUS.,    18    _ ` BannerdoesnotyethaveanofficialCaliforniaReportercitationbecause  theopinionwasmodified,withoutchangingtheresultorreasoning,onJanuary11,2010. \  $XXUSUS.,    19    _ ` TherewasadissentfiledinBanner.Thedissentingjusticeagreedwiththe  NinthCircuitsopinioninGonzalez,thatthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule  shouldnotapplytothiscase,andthatsinceGantappliedretroactivelytorenderthe  searchillegal,theseizedevidenceshouldbesuppressed.#ϑ#   $XXUSUS.,    4    _ ` TheFourthAmendmentandtheexclusionaryrulealsoapplytojuvenile  criminalproceedings.(SeeNewJerseyv.T.L.O.(1985)469U.S.325,338;InreScottK.  (1979)24Cal.3d395;InreAaronC.(1997)59Cal.App.4th1365.) 4  $XXUSUS.,    16    _ ` Actually,inUnitedStatesv._Peltier_(1975)422U.S.531,theCourtheld  thattheexclusionaryruledoesnotapplywhenthesearchingofficerreliedingoodfaith  onavalidstatutesupportedbyfederalappellatecourtprecedentsubsequentlyoverturned  byarecentSupremeCourtcase.(SeeSectionD(3)(a),supra.)   $XXUSUS.,    21    _ ` Remember:theprosecutionbearstheburdenofestablishingthatthegood  faithexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleapplies(seePeoplev.Willis(2002)28Cal.4th22,  3637;Peoplev.Pearl(2009)172Cal.App.4th1280),andthatthetaintofanillegal  searchorseizurewaspurgedbythetimethatevidencewasdiscovered.(SeeBrownv.  Illinois(1975)422U.S.590,603604.)   $XXUSUS.,    20    _ ` Thisisthesecond_Brendlin_opinionissuedbytheCaliforniaSupreme  Court.Thedefendantwasapassengerinacarstoppedforanallegedregistration  violation.Inthefirst_Brendlin_decision,filedin2006,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtheld  thatevenifthetrafficstopwasillegal,thedefendantcouldnotchallengeitbecause,in  theabsenceofadditionalcircumstances,passengersarenotdetainedduringaroutine  trafficstop.(SeePeoplev._Brendlin_(2006)38Cal.4th1107.)TheUnitedStatesSupreme   CourtgrantedcertiorariandreversedtheCaliforniacourt,holdingthatatrafficstop   subjectsapassenger,aswellasadriver,toadetentionwithinthemeaningoftheFourth   Amendment.(_Brendlin_Ԁv.California(2007)127_S.Ct_.2400.)However,thehighcourt   remandedthematterbacktothestatecourttodetermineifevidenceseizedfollowingthe   unlawfuldetentionshouldbesuppressed.(_Brendlin_,supra.,45Cal.4that267.)LMN(Vm$0   (,!$0  0` (#(#  (@$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `  d !XXUSUS.,  _ @ #h# FIRSTDISTRICTAPPELLATEPROJECT  @"TRAININGSEMINAR $ @"##January30,2010 H  @THERISEANDFALLOFTHEEXCLUSIONARYRULE: 4  @@@CANITSURVIVEHUDSON,HERRING,&_BRENDLIN_? D  @"# #Kathryn_Seligman_  $t   8Xdd8_TABLE_ԀOFCONTENTS     (  LVm  LVm0     A.0(#(#Introduction#""J(#.@ @ (#(##1LVm݌  Ќ  M!  M!0  0` (#(#    1.0` ` (#` (#AllAbouttheExclusionaryRule#""J(#.@@3` (#` (##1M!݌   Ќ  M!  M!0  0` (#(#    2.0` ` (#` (#Hudson,Herringand_Brendlin_:ThreeRecentCasesLimitingApplicationof   theExclusionaryRule#""J(#.)` (#` (##2M!݌    Ќ  M!  M!70  0` (#(#    3.0` ` (#` (#PlacingTheseCasesinHistoricalContext:TheRiseandFallofthe   ExclusionaryRule#""J(#.%` (#` (##2M!7R݌   Ќ  M!  M!z0  0` (#(#    4.0` ` (#` (#WhyistheExclusionaryRuleImportant?#""J(#.PP;` (#` (##2M!z݌   Ќ  LVm  LVmz 0     B.0(#(#TheRiseoftheExclusionaryRule:OriginsandDevelopment#""J(#.I(#(##5LVmz ݌  Ќ  M!  M!{ 0  0` (#(#    1.0` ` (#` (#Boydv.UnitedStates(1886)116U.S.616:AShortlivedLate19thCentury  ExclusionaryRule#""J(#.%` (#` (##5M!{ ݌  Ќ  M!  M! 0  0` (#(#    2.0` ` (#` (#Weeksv.UnitedStates(1914)232U.S.383:TheBirthoftheExclusionary  Rule#""J(#. ` (#` (##5M! ݌  Ќ  M!  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(# (##65N__݌   Ќ  N  Na0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   b.0 (# (#Peoplev.Pearl(2009)172Cal.App.4th1280:EvenAfterHerring   theProsecutionBearstheBurdenofProvingThattheGoodFaith   ExceptiontotheExclusionaryRuleApplies#P"P"I(#.^^C (# (##66Naa݌   Ќ  N  Nc0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   c.0 (# (#ApplyingHerringandOtherGoodFaithDecisionstoDeterminethe   RetroactiveApplicationofArizonav.Gant#P"P"I(#.44C (# (##67Ncc݌  Ќ  N  Nd0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   d.0 (# (#TheSixthDistrictBroadlyInterpretsHerringasApplyingtoall  NegligentPoliceMisconduct#P"P"I(#.4 (# (##72Nde݌  Ќ  N  NWf0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (# `   e.0 (# (#TheFirstDistrict,DivisionOneHoldsthattheHerringExceptionto  theExclusionaryRuleOnlyAppliesWhentheNegligentPolice  MisconductwasAttenuatedFromtheArrestandnotWhenthe  ArrestingOfficerMadeanHonestMistakeofLaw#P"P"I(#.H (# (##75NWfrf݌  Ќ  LVm  LVmmh0     G.0(#(#Peoplev._Brendlin_Ԁ(2008)45Cal.4th262:TheDiscoveryofanOutstandingArrest  WarrantDuringanUnlawfulTrafficStopbutBeforetheSearchAttenuatesthe  TaintoftheIllegalDetention#P"P"I(#.-(#(##78LVmmhh݌  Ќ  M!  M!@j0  0` (#(#    1.0` ` (#` (#AnalysisofPeoplev._Brendlin_#P"P"I(#.2` (#` (##78M!@j[j݌   Ќ  M!  M!Yk0  0` (#(#    2.0` ` (#` (#TheImpactof_Brendlin_/CasesApplying_Brendlin_#P"P"I(#.C` (#` (##81M!Yktk݌ " Ќ  LVm  LVml0     H.Conclusion#P"P"I(#. (#(##83LVmll݌ $  Ќ  LVm  LVm`m0       1.0` (#(#CantheExclusionaryRuleSurviveHudson,Herringand_Brendlin_?#P"P"I(#.: : S` (#` (##83LVm`m|m݌ &"" Ќ  M!  M!n0  0` (#(#    2.0` ` (#` (#PracticeTips#P"P"I(#. !` (#` (##83M!nn݌ ($$ Ќ    )%% 8dXd8b  A.Introduction#p#   p#gp#1.AllAbouttheExclusionaryRule @   TheFourthAmendmentguaranteestherighttobefreefromunreasonablesearches 4 andseizuresbutdoesnotspecifyhowthatrightistobeenforced.Between1914and  4 1969,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtformulatedtheexclusionaryrule,requiringthe  4 suppressionofevidencewrongfullyseizedbygovernmentofficialsinviolationofthe  4 FourthAmendment.Thejusticeswhoannouncedtherulevieweditasjudiciallyimplied  4 butconstitutionallymandated.Theexclusionaryrulewasdeemednecessarytoenforce  4  andeffectuatetheprohibitiononunreasonablesearchesandseizures,toassurethatthe 4  courtsarenotcondoningsuchunconstitutionalactivity,andtodeterfutureofficial 4  misconduct.(_Mapp_Ԁv.Ohio(1961)367U.S.643.) 4     `     h      p   IftheconductofstateorfederalofficialsisshowntoviolatetheFourth 4 Amendment,theexclusionaryrulerequiresthatevidenceobtainedasaresultofsuch 4 conductmustbesuppressed;itcannotbeusedinthecriminaltrialoftheindividualwho 4 wasvictimizedbytheillegalsearchandseizure.Theexclusionaryruleappliestoboththe 4 primaryevidence,seizedinthecourseoftheunlawfulgovernmentactivity,andtothe 4 derivativeevidenceobtainedbyexploitationofthatactivity.Primaryevidenceis 4 automaticallysuppressed,whereasderivativeevidenceisexcludedonlyifitistaintedby 4 theunlawfulconductandthattainthasnotbeenpurgedbythepassageoftimeor 4 interveningcircumstances.Theexclusionaryruleappliestoalltypesofevidence! 4 physicalmaterials,verbalstatementsandtestimonyastomattersobservedduringan 4 unlawfulsearchandseizure.(WongSunv.UnitedStates(1963)371U.S.471.) 4   However,theexclusionaryruledoesnotapplyineverycasewhenofficialsviolate 4 adefendantsFourthAmendmentrightsandconsequentlyobtainincriminatingevidence. 4 Bythe1970's,criticsoftherulegainedcontroloftheSupremeCourt,andtheyhave  4 neverrelinquishedit.Inaseriesofopinions,theCourthaslimitedtheapplicationofthe !4 exclusionaryruleanddiminishedthevitalityofFourthAmendmentrights. "4   TheCourthasdeclinedtoapplytheexclusionaryruletoproceedingsotherthan $4  criminaltrials.(See,e.g.UnitedStatesv._Calandra_(1974)414U.S.338;UnitedStatesv. %4!! Janis(1976)428U.S.433;PennsylvaniaBoardofProbationandParolev.Scott(1998) &4"" 524U.S.357.)TheCourthasrefusedtoexcludeillegallyprocuredevidencewhenthe '4## officerwhoconductedthesearchandseizurereasonablyreliedingoodfaithonawarrant (4$$ subsequentlyfoundinvalid,astatutelaterdeclaredunconstitutional,orerroneous )4%% computerdata.(See,e.g.UnitedStatesv.Leon(1984)468U.S.897;Illinoisv._Krull_ *4&& (1987)480U.S.340;Arizonav.Evans(1995)514U.S.1.) +4'' Ї  Tojustifytheserestrictionsontheexclusionaryrule,theSupremeCourtredefined  therulespurposes,rejectingtherationalesofferedbythejusticeswhoformulatedthe  rule.Nolongerwasexclusionofillegallyseizedevidenceaconstitutionalright,necessary  toeffectuatetheFourthAmendmentsguarantyandpreservejudicialintegrity.(See  Weeksv.UnitedStates(1914)232U.S.383;_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at647659.)The  exclusionaryrulewasrecastasajudiciallycreatedutilitarianremedythatssolepurpose   istodeterfuturepolicemisconduct.TheCourtdeclaredthattheruleshouldnotapply   whenitssocialcosts,includingthelossofprobativeandreliableevidence,outweighed   thedeterrentbenefits.(See,e.g.Leon,supra.,468U.S.at906908.)      2.Hudson,Herringand_Brendlin_:ThreeRecentCasesLimitingApplicationofthe   ExclusionaryRule      Thefinalfoursectionsofthesematerials,E,F,G,andH,discussthethreemost   recentcasesrestrictingapplicationoftheexclusionaryruleincriminaltrials.InHudsonv.   Michigan(2006)547U.S.586,theSupremeCourtheldthattheexclusionaryruledoes  notapplytoevidenceseizedfollowingaknocknoticeviolation.InHerringv.United  States(2009)129_S.Ct_.695,theCourtdeclinedtoapplytheexclusionaryrulewhenthe  officerarrestedandsearchedthedefendantinreasonablerelianceonfalseinformation  resultingfromapoliceemployeesnegligentrecordkeepingerror.InPeoplev._Brendlin_  (2008)45Cal.4th262,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtheldthatdiscoveryofanarrest  warrantduringanunlawfultrafficstopdissipatesthetaintoftheillegaldetention.   3.PlacingTheseCasesinHistoricalContext:TheRiseandFalloftheExclusionary  Rule     Hudson,Herringand_Brendlin_arejustthelatestmovesinanongoingassaulton  theexclusionaryrule.Theymustbeanalyzedinthecontextoftherulestumultuous  history.Thenextthreesectionsofthesematerials,B,C,andD,relatethathistory!the   riseandfalloftheexclusionaryrule.TheydescribetheSupremeCourtsrejectionofthe ! rulesconstitutionalbasisandoriginalrationale,aswellasthemajoritysgrowing " hostilitytothesuppressionofillegallyseized,butreliable,evidencewhichhasfacilitated # theprocessthatJusticeBrennancalledthe slowstrangulationoftheexclusionaryrule. $   4.WhyistheExclusionaryRuleImportant?    p     L &!"   Thejusticeswhoformulatedtheexclusionaryruleandthosewhodissentedfrom (#$ latercaseslimitingitsapplicationrecognizedthattheruleisabsolutelynecessaryto )$% effectuateFourthAmendmentrights.Ifillegallyseizedevidencewasnotexcludedfrom *%& criminaltrials,theFourthAmendmentguaranteewouldbeanemptypromise.(Weeksv. +&' UnitedStates(1914)232U.S.383,393;_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at655,660.)    Imaginehowoursystemwouldfunctionwithouttheexclusionaryrule.Apolice  officercoulddetain,arrestorsearchanindividualandhispropertybasedonbias,ahunch  orawhim,withoutreasonablecause.Iftheofficerdiscoveredincriminatingevidence,it  couldbefreelyadmittedattheindividualscriminaltrial.Theofficerwouldhaveno   incentivetocomplywithFourthAmendmentrestrictions.Thevaguepossibilityofcivil   lawsuitsordepartmentaldisciplinewouldnotdeterpolicemisconduct.Byallowingthe   illegallyseizeditemsintoevidenceandupholdingconvictionsbasedonsuchevidence,   thecourtswouldcondoneunconstitutionalactivity.TheFourthAmendmentwouldbe   effectivelynullified.     Probativeevidenceofadefendantsguiltisexcludedbecauseitwassecuredin   violationofhisconstitutionalrights.Thejusticeswhoformulatedtheexclusionaryrule   believedthatitwasbetterforsomeguiltypersonstogofreethanforthecourtstoaccept  andencourageFourthAmendmentviolations:     ` Thecriminalgoesfree,ifhemust,butitisthelawthat     ` setshimfree.Nothingcandestroyagovernmentmore   x      ` quicklythanitsfailuretoobserveitsownlaws,orworse,its     ` disregardofthecharterofitsownexistence.     ` (_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at659.)    EverytimetheSupremeCourtlimitsthereachoftheexclusionaryrule,itdealsa  blowtoourFourthAmendmentrights.JusticeBrennanrecognizedthisinhisdissentfrom  UnitedStatesv.Leon.Hestatedthatinourzealouseffortstocombatcrime,itisalltoo  easyforgovernmentofficialstoseekexpedientsolutions.Limitingorabandoningthe  exclusionaryrule,andtheconsequent relaxationofFourthAmendmentstandardsseems  atempting,costlessmeansofmeetingthepublicsdemandforbetterlawenforcement.   Butasasociety,wewouldpayaheavypriceforsuchexpediencyforithaslongbeen ! recognizedthattheFourthAmendmentrestrictstheexerciseofunrestrainedpowerbythe " policeandthegovernment.(SeeUnitedStatesv.Leon(1984)468U.S.897,959960.) #   Sixtyyearsago,JusticeJacksonofferedthistestamenttotheimportanceofFourth %!! Amendmentrightswhichisoftenquotedbydefendersoftheexclusionaryrule: &""    `     h      p      x    ` These,Iprotest,arenotsecondclassrightsbutbelongin ($$    ` thecatalogofindispensablefreedoms.Amongdeprivations )%%    ` ofrights,noneissoeffectiveincowingapopulation,crushing *&&    ` thespiritoftheindividualandputtingterrorineveryheart. +''    ` Uncontrolledsearchandseizureisthefirstandmosteffective     ` weaponinthearsenalofeveryarbitrarygovernment.Andone     ` needonlybrieflytohavedweltandworkedamongapeople     ` possessedofmanyadmirablequalitiesbutdeprivedofthese     ` rightstoknowthatthehumanpersonalitydeterioratesand     ` dignityandselfreliancedisappearwherehomes,personsand      ` possessionsaresubjectatanyhourtounheraldedsearchand      ` seizurebythepolice.      ` (_Brinegar_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1949)338U.S.160,180181.)     Moreover,ashasoftenbeennoted,enforcementofFourthAmendmentrightsand   deterrenceofunreasonablesearchesandseizuresprotectsallcitizens,notmerelythose   whohavecommittedcrimes.In_Elkins_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1960)364U.S.206,217218,the   CourtrecognizedthisbenefitoftheexclusionaryrulebyquotingagainfromJustice   Jacksonsdissentin_Brinegar_:     ` Onlyoccasionalandmoreflagrantabuses[oftheFourth     ` Amendment]cometotheattentionofthecourts,andthen     ` onlythosewherethesearchandseizureyieldincriminating     ` evidence.....Iftheofficersraidahome,anoffice,orstopand     ` searchanautomobilebutfindnothingincriminating,this     ` invasionofthepersonallibertyoftheinnocenttoooftenfinds     ` nopracticalredress.....Iamconvincedthattherearemany     ` unlawfulsearchesofhomesandautomobilesofinnocent     ` peoplewhichturnupnothingincriminating,inwhichno x      ` arrestismade,aboutwhichcourtsdonothing,andabout     ` whichweneverhear.Courtscanprotecttheinnocentagainst     ` suchinvasionsonlyindirectlyandthroughthemediumof     ` excludingevidenceagainstthosewhofrequentlyareguilty.      ` (_Brinegar_,supra.,338U.S.at181.) !   Finally,theexclusionaryrulepermitsthecourtstofulfilltheirhistoricfunctionas # guardiansoftheFourthAmendment.Theruleallowsforjudicialreviewofpolice $  practices.(UnitedStatesv._Peltier_(1975)422U.S.531,555[_dis.opn_.ofBrennan,J.].) %!! Throughthelitigationofsuppressionmotions,thecourtsdefinetheparametersofa &"" reasonablesearchandseizure. '##  0    ` )%%(#(#    B.TheRiseoftheExclusionaryRule:OriginsandDevelopment #g#   1.Boydv.UnitedStates(1886)116U.S.616:AShortlivedLate19thCentury   ExclusionaryRule     ThegenesisoftheexclusionaryruleisgenerallytracedtoBoydv.UnitedStates,   eventhoughBoydinvolvednoactualsearchandseizure.InBoyd,thedefendantswere   prosecutedforfraudulentlyimportingmerchandiseintotheUnitedStatesinviolationof   customslaws.Inaccordancewithstatutoryprovisions,thedefendantswereorderedto   produceincriminatinginvoicesforthemerchandiseforadmissionintoevidenceattrial.    Underthestatute,ifthedefendantshadnotproducedtheinvoices,thefraudallegations   would betakenasconfessedattrial.(Boyd,supra.,116U.S.at617622.)       TheSupremeCourtheldthatthestatuteauthorizingtheseproceduresviolatedboth   theFourthandtheFifthAmendments.Compellinganindividualtoproduceprivate  paperstobeusedasevidenceagainsthimtoestablishacriminalchargeistheequivalent  ofanunreasonablesearchandseizureprohibitedbytheFourthAmendment.Becausethe  statutecompelledthedefendantto beawitnessagainsthimselfinacriminalcase!by  producingtheincriminatingdocumentsorconfessingthegovernmentsallegations!it  alsoviolatedtheFifthAmendment.Thus,exclusionoftheevidencewasrequiredbyboth  amendments.(Boyd,supra.,at617638.)    TheBoydruledidnotendure.Justeighteenyearslater,inAdamsv.NewYork  (1904)192U.S.585,theSupremeCourtheldthatgamblingparaphernaliaillegallyseized  fromthedefendantspremisescouldbeadmittedintoevidenceathisstatetrial.The  SupremeCourtrestrictedBoydtoitsfacts,notingthatthiscasedidnotinvolvethe  compulsoryproductionofprivatepapers.TheCourtthenreiteratedthecommonlawrule  thatcompetentevidencewasadmissibleinacriminaltrialregardlessofhowitwas  obtained,whetherlawfullyorunlawfully.(Adams,supra.,at586599.)    2.Weeksv.UnitedStates(1914)232U.S.383:TheBirthoftheExclusionaryRule  "   Tenyearslater,theSupremeCourtdecidedWeeksv.UnitedStates,settingforth $  theexclusionaryrulethathaspersistedtothisday.TheCourtheldthatinafederal %!! prosecution,theFourthAmendmentbarredtheuseofevidenceillegallyseizedbyfederal &"" agents.InWeeks,officerssearchedthedefendantshomewithoutawarrant.Incriminating '## paperswereseized,andthedefendantwasprosecutedforunlawfuluseofthemails.The ($$ trialcourtdeniedthedefendantsmotiontoreturntheseizedproperty,anditwasadmitted )%% attrialoverdefenseobjection.(Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at386389.) *&&  +''   Inaunanimousopinion,theSupremeCourtheldthattheincriminatingproperty  shouldhavebeenrestoredtotheaccusedandexcludedfromhiscriminaltrial.According  totheCourt,theexclusionaryruleismandatedbytheFourthAmendmentwhichrestrains  thepowerandauthorityofthecourtsaswellaslawenforcement;bothare entrusted  underourFederalsystemwithenforcementofthelaws.(Weeks,supra.,at391392.)    TheCourtrecognizedthatexclusionofillegallyseizedevidencewasnecessaryto   giveforceandeffecttotheFourthAmendmentsguarantees.Withoutit, theprotection   oftheamendment,declaring[acitizens]righttobesecureagainstsuchsearchesand   seizuresisofnovalueand....mightaswellbestrickenfromtheConstitution.(Weeks,   supra.,at393.)Finally,theCourtemphasizedthattheexclusionaryrulewasnecessaryto   assurejudicialintegrity. Thetendencyofthosewhoexecutethecriminallawsofthe   countrytoobtainconvictionsbymeansofunlawfulsearches....shouldfindnosanctionin   thejudgmentsofthecourts.(Weeks,supra.,at392.)    3.IstheExclusionaryRuleBasedontheFourthorFifthAmendment?     FollowingWeeks,severalSupremeCourtcasesheldthatillegallyseizedevidence  mustbeexcludedfromfederalcriminalprosecutions.(See,e.g._Silverthorne_ԀLumber  _Co.v._ԀUnitedStates(1920)251U.S.385.)Thesecasessawthesuppressionoftainted  evidenceasnecessarytoeffectuateConstitutionalguarantees.However,theCourt  vacillatedastowhetherthesourceoftheexclusionaryrulewastheFourthortheFifth  Amendment.InWeeks,theCourtbasedtheexclusionaryrulesolelyontheFourth  Amendment.Nevertheless,someofthecasesfollowingWeeks,harkenedbacktothe  CourtsearlierreasoninginBoyd,whichhadbasedexclusionofthewrongfullyprocured  evidenceonbothamendments. [_W]hen_Ԁproperlyinvoked,theFifthAmendmentprotects  everypersonfromincriminationbytheuseofevidenceobtainedthroughsearchor  seizuremadeinviolationofhisrightsundertheFourthAmendment.(_Agnello_Ԁv.United  States(1925)269U.S.20,3334;seealso_Gouled_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1921)255U.S.298.)      4.TheFederalStateDistinction  #   Whatwasclear,however,wasthattheexclusionaryruleappliedonlyinfederal % ! criminalprosecutionstoevidenceillegallyseizedbyfederalofficials.TheFourth &!" Amendmentdidnotrestricttheactionsofstateofficials,becauseitsprohibitiononillegal '"# searchesandseizuresdidnotapplytothestates.(SeeNationalStateDepositCo.v.Stead (#$ (1914)232U.S.58,71.)Thus,statepolicecouldsearchpropertywithoutawarrantor )$% probablecauseandturnthatevidenceovertothefederalgovernmenton asilverplatter *%& foruseinafederalprosecution.(See_Lustig_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1948)338U.S.74,7879.) +&' Ї  Inaseriesofcases,theSupremeCourtheldthattheexclusionaryruleforbidthe  admissionofillegallyprocuredevidence,inafederalprosecution,iftheevidencewas  seizedbystatepoliceactingjointlywithfederalofficers.(See_Byars_Ԁv.UnitedStates  (1927)273U.S.28[federalagentparticipatedwithlocalofficersfromthestartofthe  search,lookingforevidenceofafederalcrime];_Lustig_Ԁv.UnitedStates,supra.,338U.S.  at74[federalagentjoinedwithlocalpoliceofficersduringthesearchanddirectedthe   collectionofevidence];_Gambino_Ԁv.UnitedStates,supra.,275U.S.at310[statetroopers   wereworkingonbehalfofthefederalgovernmentwhentheysearchedthedefendants   carforevidencethathewasviolatingtheNationalProhibitionAct].)    5.Wolfv.Colorado(1949)338U.S.25:TheFourthAmendment,butnotthe   ExclusionaryRule,AppliestotheStates      ThirtyfiveyearsafterWeeks,theSupremeCourtdecidedWolfv.Colorado,acase   thatextolledtheimportanceofFourthAmendmentrightsbutdidnotviewthe   exclusionaryruleasanecessarycomponentofthoserights.TheCourtheldthatthe  freedomfromunreasonablesearchesandseizuresisafundamentalrightprotectedfrom  stateviolationsbytheFourteenthAmendmentsDueProcessClause. Thesecurityof  onesprivacyagainstarbitraryintrusionbythepolicewhichisatthecoreoftheFourth  Amendment!isbasictoafreesociety.Itisthereforeimplicitintheconceptofordered  libertyandassuchenforceableagainsttheStatesthroughtheDueProcessClause.(Wolf,  supra.,338U.S.at2728.)However,accordingtoWolf,theexclusionaryruleis not  derivedfromtheexplicitrequirementsoftheFourthAmendment,butis amatterof  judicialimplication.(Wolf,supra.,at29.)Thus,theConstitutiondidnotrequirestate  courtstosuppressthefruitsofsuchviolations.    Ultimately,theCourtsreasonsforholdingthattheexclusionaryruleneednot  applyinstatecourtswas bottomedonfactualconsiderations.(See_Mapp_Ԁv.Ohio(1961)  367U.S.643,651.)TheCourtemphasizedthatthemajorityofstateshadnotadoptedthe   exclusionaryruleasaremedyforFourthAmendmentviolations.TheCourtalsonoted ! thatjurisdictionswithouttheexclusionaryrulehadadoptedother equallyeffective " remediestoprotecttheircitizensrighttoprivacy,includingprivateactionsfordamages # andinternaldisciplineofpoliceofficers.(Wolf,supra.,at3031.) $   6._Elkins_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1960)364U.S.206 : TheExclusionaryRuleAppliesto &!" EvidenceSeizedbyStateOfficersasWellasFederalOfficers  '"#   Thenextsignificantexclusionaryrulecasewas_Elkins_Ԁv.UnitedStates.TheCourt )$% overturnedthesocalled silverplatterdoctrineandheldthatevidenceillegallyseizedby *%& stateofficialswasinadmissibleinafederalcriminaltrial.TheCourtheldthatafterWolf, +&'  thefoundationuponwhichtheadmissibilityofstateseizedevidenceinafederaltrial  originallyrested!thatunreasonablestatesearchesdidnotviolatetheFederal  Constitution!disappeared.Nevertheless,federalcourtscontinuedtoallowthe  admissionofevidenceillegallyseizedbystateofficerswithoutdiscussingWolfsimpact.  (_Elkins_,supra.,364U.S.at213214.)_Elkins_endedthiscontradictionbyholdingthat  evidenceseizedbystateofficersaswellasfederalofficerswouldbeexcludedfrom   federalcriminaltrials.TheCourtnotedthatitmadenodifferencetotheaggrievedvictim   whethertheevidencewasseizedbyastatepoliceofficer,inviolationoftheFourteenth   Amendment,orbyafederalagent,inviolationoftheFourthAmendment: The   Constitutionisfloutedequallyineithercase.(_Elkins_,supra.,at215.)     TheCourtstatedthatonepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleistodeterpolice   misconduct tocompelrespectfortheconstitutionalguarantyintheonlyeffectively   availablewaybyremovingtheincentivetodisregardit.(_Elkins_,supra.,at217.)   However,theCourtemphasizedthattheexclusionaryrulealsopreservesjudicial  integrity.Ifcourtsadmitevidencethathasbeenillegallyseizedandpermitconvictions  basedonsuchevidence,theybecome accomplicesinthewillfuldisobedienceofa  Constitutiontheyaresworntouphold.(_Elkins_,supra.,at223.) 0   (# (# 7._Mapp_Ԁv.Ohio(1961)367U.S.643:TheExclusionaryRuleAppliesinStateand  FederalProceedings     Oneyearlater,in_Mapp_Ԁv.Ohio,theSupremeCourtoverturnedWolfv.Colorado  andheldthattheexclusionaryruleappliedinstateaswellasfederalcriminal  proceedings.Afteradozenyears,theCourtclosed theonlycourtroomdoorremaining  opentoevidencesecuredbyofficiallawlessnessinflagrantabuseoftheFourth  Amendment.(_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at654655.)Inasixtothreemajorityopinion  writtenbyJusticeClark,theCourtmadeitsstrongestargumentonbehalfofthe  exclusionaryruleas logicallyandconstitutionallynecessary...anessentialpartofthe   righttoprivacyguaranteedbytheFourthAmendment.(_Mapp_,supra.,at656.) !   TheCourtviewedextensionoftheexclusionaryruletothestatesasamatterof # judicialduty.Asindependenttribunalsofjustice,thecourtswereempoweredtoguard $  againstencroachmentsuponconstitutionalrightsandenforcetheFourthAmendments % ! guaranteeagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.(_Mapp_,supra.,at647.)TheCourt &!" characterizedtheexclusionaryruleasa constitutionallyrequired!evenifjudicially '"# implied!deterrentsafeguardwithoutwhichtheFourthAmendmentwouldbereduced (#$ to aformofwords.(_Mapp_,supra.,at648.)Asin_Elkins_,theCourtsawtheruleas )$% neededtodeterpolicemisconduct,butitwasalsonecessarytopreservejudicialintegrity *%& byassuringthatthegovernmentdidnotbecomealawbreaker.(_Mapp_,supra.,at659.) +&' Ї  NowthattheFourthAmendmentappliedtothestatesandevidenceillegallyseized  bystateofficialscouldnolongerbeadmittedintoevidenceinfederalcriminaltrials,it  defiedbothcommonsenseandtheConstitutiontopreservetheWolfruleallowingthe  admissionofsuchevidenceinstatetrials.(_Mapp_,supra.,at657.)Finally,the factual  considerationssupportingWolfsrefusaltoapplytheexclusionaryruletostatecourt  proceedingswerenolongercontrolling.By1961,morethanhalfthestates,including   California,hadadoptedtheexclusionaryruleinsomeform.Wolfhadspeculatedthat   otherremedies(e.g.actionsfordamages)couldadequatelysecurecompliancewith   FourthAmendmentrequirements.TheexperienceofCaliforniaandotherstatesshowed   thattheseotherremedieshaveproved worthlessandfutile.(_Mapp_,supra.,at651653.)    8.WongSunv.UnitedStates(1963)371U.S.471:TheExclusionaryRuleSuppresses   theFruitsofUnreasonableSearchesandSeizures      InWongSun,theCourtclarifiedthattheexclusionaryruleappliestoevidence   seizedduringanunlawfulsearchandtothe fruitsoftheillicitpoliceaction.(WongSun,  supra.,371U.S.at484485.)Indeterminingwhetherthefruitsofanunconstitutional  searchorseizureshouldbeexcluded,acourtshouldconsiderwhether,grantingthe  primaryillegality,theevidencehassubsequentlybeendiscovered byexploitationofthat  illegalityorinsteadbymeanssufficientlydistinguishabletobepurgedoftheprimary  taint.(WongSun,supra.,at488.)_ #  1      _    TheCourtalsoheldthattheexclusionaryrulebarsalltypesofillegallyprocured  evidencefromacriminaltrial:physicaltangiblematerials,verbalstatements,and  testimonyastomattersobservedduringanunlawfulinvasion.(WongSun,supra.,at485.)  Exclusionofbothphysicalandverbalevidenceadvancesthepoliciesunderlyingthe  exclusionaryrule!todeterlawlessconductbypoliceofficersandtoclosethedoorsof  thecourtstoanyuseofevidenceunconstitutionallyobtained.(WongSun,supra.,at486.)   9.Davisv.Mississippi(1969)394U.S.721:ThereisnoExceptiontotheExclusionary  !  RuleforReliableandTrustworthyEvidence "   InanopinionwrittenbyJusticeBrennan,whowouldlaterwriteseveralpowerful $  dissentsobjectingtoincursionsonthereachoftheexclusionaryrule,theSupremeCourt % ! heldthatfingerprintsobtainedfromthedefendantduringanillegaldetentionshouldhave &!" beensuppressedfromhisrapetrial.(Davis,supra.,394U.S.at721723.)TheCourt  concludedthatfingerprintstakenfromthedefendant,althoughdifferentfromverbal  statementsorseizedarticles,areevidencesubjecttosuppressioniftakenduringan  unlawfularrestordetention.(Davis,supra.,at724.)    TheCourtrejectedtheMississippiSupremeCourtssuggestionthat fingerprint   evidence,becauseofitstrustworthiness,isnotsubjecttotheproscriptionsoftheFourth   andFourteenthAmendments.(Davis,supra.,at723724.) Ourdecisionsrecognizeno   exceptiontotherulethatillegallyseizedevidenceisinadmissibleattrial,however,   relevantandtrustworthytheseizedevidencemaybeasanitemofproof.TheCourt   emphasizedthat [_t]he_Ԁexclusionaryrulewasfashionedasasanctiontoredressanddeter   overreachinggovernmentalconductprohibitedbytheFourthAmendment.Tomakean   exceptionforillegallyseizedevidence,merelybecauseitistrustworthy wouldfatally   underminethesepurposes.(Davis,supra.,at724.)     JusticeBlackdissentedfromthemajorityopinion,andconcludedwithastatement  thatprovedaharbingerofthingstocome:     ` Thiscaseisbutonemoreinaneverexpandinglistof     ` casesinwhichthisCourthasbeensowidelyblowingup     ` theFourthAmendmentsscopethatitsoriginalauthors     ` wouldbehardputtorecognizetheircreation....Ithinkit     ` ishightimethisCourt,intheinterestoftheadministration     ` ofcriminaljustice,madeanewappraisalofthelanguage     ` andhistoryoftheFourthAmendmentandcutitdownto     ` itsintendedsize.Suchjudicialactionwould,Ibelieve,make     ` ourcitiesasaferplaceformen,womenandchildrentolive.     ` (Davis,supra.,at729730[dis._opn_.ofBlack,J.].)    ******* !     Asaconsequenceofthesedecisions,bythelate1960's,theexclusionaryrule " existedinitsmostrobustform.Alltypesofevidencediscoveredbystateorfederal # officersduringorasaresultofanillegalsearchorseizurewouldbeexcludedfromboth $  stateandfederaltrials.However,thisgoldenageoftherulewastobeshortlived.Bythe %!! mid1970's,criticsoftheexclusionaryruleincludedamajorityofSupremeCourtjustices. &"" Fromthenon,JusticeBlackswishwouldcometopass.Allsubsequentcaseswouldlimit '## theapplicationoftheruleunderavarietyofcircumstances. ($$   )%%    C.TheJustificationfortheExclusionaryRule:ChangingRationales ##   ReflectChangingAttitudes #5#     From1974on,everySupremeCourtcaseregardingtheexclusionaryruleincluded @ thesewordsfromUnitedStatesv._Calandra_(1974)414U.S.338,348:Theexclusionary @ rule isajudiciallycreatedremedydesignedtosafeguardFourthAmendmentrights  @ generallythroughitsdeterrenteffect,ratherthanapersonalconstitutionalrightofthe  @ partyaggrieved.Inotherwords,theexclusionofevidenceseizedinviolationofthe  @ FourthAmendmentisnotconstitutionallyrequired.Rather,therulewascreatedbythe  @ Court,andthejusticesarefreetomodifyoreliminateitatanytime.Moreover,therules  @  primarypurposeisremedial!todeterfuturepolicemisconduct. @    Buttheseviewsoftheexclusionaryrulehavenotalwaysprevailed. @  Thejusticeswhoformulatedtheexclusionaryrulebetween1914and1969,believedthat @  therulewasconstitutionallymandated!eitherimplicitintheFourthAmendments @ prohibitiononunreasonablesearchesandseizuresornecessarytoeffectuatethe @ Amendmentsguarantee.Thesejusticesalsobelievedtherulesmainpurposewasto @ maintainjudicialintegrityandassurethatthegovernmentwasnotcondoningor @ benefittingfromlawenforcementsillegalconduct. @   Howdidthisshiftinattitudecomeabout,andhowdidtheSupremeCourtrelyon @ thischangedinterpretationoftheexclusionaryrulesrationaletolimititsapplication? @  1.ThosewhoFormulatedandDefendedtheExclusionaryRulesawitasRequired @ bytheFourthAmendmentasaRightandaRemedy  :   TheSupremeCourtjusticeswhodefinedtheexclusionaryrulerecognizedthe 4 importanceoftheFourthAmendmenttoafreesociety.Thatamendmentguarantees the 4 rightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papersandeffectsagainst  4 unreasonablesearchesandseizures.(Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at391.)Itprotectsthe !4  veryessenceofconstitutionallibertyandsecurityfrom allinvasionsonthepartof "4 governmentanditsemployees.(Weeks,supra.,at389391.)Moreover, [_t]his_Ԁprotection #4 reachesallalike,whetheraccusedofacrimeornot.(Weeks,supra.,at392.) $4    Ascriticsoftheexclusionaryrulenevertireofrepeating,theFourthAmendment &4"" makesnoexpressprovisionfortheexclusionofevidencesecuredinviolationofits '4## commands.Nevertheless,incasesfromWeeksthrough_Mapp_,theSupremeCourt (4$$ recognizedthattherulewasconstitutionallyrequiredevenifjudiciallyimplied.(_Mapp_, )4%% supra.,367U.S.at656.) *4&&  +4''   Thejusticeswhoviewedtheexclusionaryruleasconstitutionallymandatedbased  thisconclusionontwoseparatebutrelatedtheories:1)thatexclusionbythecourtsof  illegallyseizedevidenceispartoftherightguaranteedbytheFourthAmendment;and  2)thatthe ruleisconstitutionallyrequired,notasarightexplicitlyincorporatedinthe  FourthAmendmentsprohibitions,butasaremedynecessarytoensurethatthose  prohibitionsareobservedinfact.(PennsylvaniaBoardofProbationandParolev.Scott   (1998)524U.S.357[dis._opn_.ofStevens,J.].)     ThefirsttheoryholdsthattheFourthAmendmentprohibitsnotonlythe   policeofficersinitialunlawfulseizureofincriminatingevidence,butalsothe    subsequentuseofsuchevidenceinacriminaltrialbytheprosecutorandthecourt.    ThisbroadviewoftheFourthAmendmentwassetforthinWeeksastheprinciple   rationalefortheexclusionaryrule.(SeeWeeks,supra.,232U.S.at391392,398.)     InWeeks,theCourtconcludedthattheFourthAmendmentrestrainsallofthe   federalgovernment,includingthecourts.Allfederalofficialsarechargedwithsupporting  theConstitutionandprotectingthepeopleandtheirpropertyfromunreasonablesearches  andseizures.(Weeks,supra.,at391392.)Thus,boththepoliceofficersunconstitutional  seizureofevidenceandthecourtsuseoftheevidenceconstitutes adenialofthe  constitutionalrightsoftheaccused.(Weeks,supra.,at398;_Mapp_,supra.,at648.)    In_Olmstead_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1928)277U.S.438,theCourtexplained:     ` ThestrikingoutcomeoftheWeeksCaseandthosewhich     ` followeditwasthesweepingdeclarationthattheFourth     ` Amendment,althoughnotreferringtoorlimitingtheuse     ` ofevidenceincourt,reallyforbadeitsintroduction,if     ` obtainedbygovernmentofficersthroughaviolationof     ` theamendment.(_Olmstead_,supra.,at462.)     Bythemid1970's,theSupremeCourthadabandonedtheideathatthe " exclusionaryrulewasconstitutionallyrequiredandhadspecificallyrejectedtheconcept # thattheuseofillegallyseizedevidenceattrialviolatedtheFourthAmendment.(See $  UnitedStatesv._Calandra_(1974)414U.S.338,354;Leon,supra.,468U.S.at906.) % !   Disagreeingwiththisrejectionoftheexclusionaryrulesconstitutionalbasis, '"# JusticeBrennan,dissentinginLeon,clearlyexplainedthetheoryoriginallysetforthin (#$ Weeks.TheFourthAmendment likeotherprovisionsoftheBillofRights,restrainsthe )$% powerofgovernmentasawhole,includinglawenforcement,theexecutiveandthe *%& judiciary.(Leon,supra.,468U.S.at932.)Theamendmentprohibitsnotonlytheinitial +&' unreasonableinvasionandunlawfulseizureoftheevidencebythepolice, whichisdone,  afterall,forthepurposeofsecuringevidence,butalsothesubsequentuseofsuch  evidenceinacriminaltrial.(Leon,supra.,at933934.) Indeed,byadmittingunlawfully  seizedevidence,thejudiciarybecomesapartofwhatisinfactasinglegovernmental  actionprohibitedbythetermsoftheAmendment.(Leon,supra.,at933.)TheFourth  Amendmentguaranteestworights!therightnottohavethepoliceinvadeyourprivacy   byconductinganunreasonableseizure,andtherightnottohavethegovernmentusethat   evidenceagainstyouincourt. Therighttobefreefromtheinitialinvasionofprivacy   andtherightofexclusionarecoordinatecomponentsofthecentralembracingrighttobe   freefromunreasonablesearchesandseizures.(Leon,supra.,at935.)     Underaseparatebutcompatibletheory,thejusticeswhoputforththe   exclusionaryrulereasonedthatitwasrequiredtoeffectuatetheFourth   Amendmentsguarantee. Itisthedutyofthefederalcourtstoenforcethelaws,   maintainconstitutionalrights,andgiveforceandeffecttotheFourthAmendment.  (Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at392.)Commensuratewiththisconstitutionalduty,unlawfully  procuredevidencecannotbeusedinacriminaltrialagainstacitizenaccusedofan  offense.Otherwise,theprotectionoftheFourthAmendment,declaringhisrighttobe  secureagainstsuchsearchesandseizures,isofnovalueand...mightaswellbestricken  fromtheConstitution.(Weeks,supra.,at393.)    ThistheorywasfullyexplainedinMapp.AsJamesMadisonhadpredictedinhis  addresstotheFirstCongressin1789,inourfederalsystem,itisuptothecourts!the   independenttribunalsofjusticetobewatchfulforencroachmentsuponconstitutional  rightsandtoresistsuchencroachments.(Mapp,supra.,367U.S.at647.)TheSupreme  Courtfulfilledthatdutybyformulatingtheexclusionaryrule.Ifunlawfullyseized  evidencewasadmittedincriminaltrials,theFourthAmendmentsassuranceswouldbe a  formofwords,valuelessandundeservingofmentioninaperpetualcharterofinestimable  humanliberties.(_Mapp_,supra.,at655;seealsoSilverthorne,supra.,251U.S.at392.)   Withouttheexclusionaryrule, therighttoprivacyembodiedintheFourthAmendment ! wouldbe anemptypromise.(_Mapp_,supra.,at660.) "   InhisdissentingopinionUnitedStatesv.Leon,JusticeBrennanexplainedthatin $  formulatingtheexclusionaryrule,theCourtfulfilleditsconstitutionaldutytoensurethat %!! FourthAmendmentrightswereprotected.Referringtosocietyszealouseffortstoenforce &"" thecriminallaws,Brennanstatedthat thesometimesunpopulartaskofensuringthatthe '## governmentsenforcementeffortsremainwithinthestrictboundariesfixedbytheFourth ($$ Amendmentwasentrustedtothecourts.(Leon,supra.,468U.S.at929930.) )%%   *&&  2.TheOriginalPurposeoftheExclusionaryRulewastoPreserveJudicialIntegrity     Thejusticeswhodefinedtheexclusionaryrulereasonedthatsuppressionof  unlawfullyseizedevidencewasalsonecessitatedbythe imperativeofjudicialintegrity  (_Elkins_,supra.,364U.S.at222.)Exclusionpreservesjudicialintegritybyensuringthat  judgesdonotcondonealawenforcementofficersviolationoftheFourthAmendmentor   permitthegovernmenttobenefitfromthatillegality.(Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at392.)     Whenjudgesadmitunlawfullyseizedevidenceinacriminaltrial,theylegitimize   theunconstitutionalconductthatproducedtheevidence.Moreover,thegovernment    profitsfromtheillegalitybysecuringaconviction.Byconsideringevidenceseizedin   violationofthedefendantsFourthAmendmentrights,orbyallowingconvictionsto   standbasedonillegallyseizedevidence,thecourtsbecomeaccomplicesinthewillful   disobedienceofthelaw.(_Elkins_,supra.,at223.)AsJustice_Fortas_Ԁwroteinhisdissenting   opinioninAldermanv.UnitedStates: Inrecognitionoftheprinciplethatlawlessnesson   thepartoftheGovernmentmustbestoutlycondemned,thisCourthasruledthatwhen  suchlawlessconductoccurs,theGovernmentmaynotprofitfromitsfruits.(Alderman  v.UnitedStates(1969)394U.S.165,203.)    Acourtthatadmitsunlawfullyseizedevidenceencourages disobediencetothe  FederalConstitutionitisboundtouphold(_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at657),imperils  publictrustingovernment(_Calandra_,supra.,414_U.S.at_Ԁ360361[dis._opn_.ofBrennan,  J.]),andbreedscontemptforthelaw.(_Elkins_,supra.,at223.)    Finally,thejusticeswhodevelopedandsupportedtheexclusionaryrulewerewell  awarethatitembodiedajudgmentthatitisbetterforsomeguiltypersonstogofreethan  forthepolicetoviolatetheConstitution:         ` Theeffortsofthecourtsandtheirofficialstobringthe      ` guiltytopunishment,praiseworthyastheyare,arenotto !    ` beaidedbythesacrificeofthosegreatprinciples "    ` establishedbyyearsofendeavorandsufferingwhichhave #    ` resultedintheirembodimentinthefundamentallawofthe $     ` land.(Weeks,supra.,232U.S.at393.) % !  3.CriticsoftheExclusionaryRuleGainControloftheSupremeCourt  '"#   InWeeks,theSupremeCourtsetforththeexclusionaryruleinaunanimous )$% opinion.However,startingsoonafterWeekswasdecided,commentatorsandjudgeshave *%& criticizedtherule,attackingitspremiseandbemoaningitseffects.Thecriticsprimary +&' b    objectiontotherulewasdistilledinasinglesentencewrittenbyJudge_Cardoza_: The  criminalistogofreebecausetheconstablehasblundered.(Peoplev._Defore_(1926)242  N.Y.13,21[decliningtoapplytheexclusionaryruleinNewYorkstatecriminaltrials].)    Bythe1970's,criticsoftheexclusionaryruleincludedamajorityofSupreme  Courtjustices.Overthelastfiftyyears,opponentsoftherulehaveneverrelinquished   controloftheCourt.Forthemostpart,thesejusticeshavebeencontenttolimitthe   exclusionaryrulesapplication.Inaseriesofdecisions,theyhavedeclinedtoapplythe   ruletoproceedingsotherthancriminaltrials,andrefusedtosuppressevidencewhen   officersconductingthesearchandseizureactedingoodfaith. #  2           Torationalizetheirattackontheexclusionaryrule,thesejusticesinsistedthat   deterrenceoffuturepolicemisconductistherulessolerationale.Theydeniedtherules   constitutionalbasisanddisregardedconcernfortheimperativeofjudicialintegrity.   Ultimately,thesejusticesbalancedthesocialcostsoftheruleagainstthebenefitsof  deterrenceanddeterminedthat applicationoftheruleshouldberestrictedtothose  situationswhereitsremedialobjectivesaremostefficaciouslyserved.(_Calandra_,supra.,  414U.S.at348;Leon,supra.,468U.S.at908.)    Atthesametime,theexclusionaryrulehashaditsdefenders,evenonthe  SupremeCourt.Almosteverymajoritydecisionrestrictingapplicationoftheexclusionary  rulehasgeneratedavigorousdissent.Inthesedissents,justiceshavecastigatedthe  majorityfordisregardingtheexclusionaryruleshistoricalobjectives,andremindedus  thatthedeterrenceofpolicemisconduct,althoughaworthygoal,isnottherulesonly  purpose.Thesedissentingjusticeshavealsochallengedthepremisesunderlyingthe  balancingtest!theprimarymechanismusedbytheCourttolimittheexclusionaryrule.   4.TheAscendencyoftheDeterrenceRationale     InWeeksandtheotherearlycases,thereisnomentionofdeterrenceofpolice ! misconductasthepurposeoftheexclusionaryrule. Inthoseformativedecisions,the " Courtplainlyunderstoodthatexclusionofillegallyobtainedevidencewascompellednot # byjudiciallyfashionedremedialpurposes,butratherbyadirectconstitutionalcommand. $  (Leon,supra.,468U.S.at938939[dis._opn_.ofBrennan,J.].) % !  &!"   TheSupremeCourtfirstsuggestedthatexclusionofillegallyseizedevidence  mightdeterfuturemisconductinWolfv.Colorado.InjustifyingtheCourtsdecisionto  applytheFourthAmendmentbutnottheExclusionaryRuletothestates,theCourtmade  apassingreferencetodeterrenceasonepurposeoftherule: Grantingthatinpracticethe  exclusionofevidencemaybeaneffectivewayofdeterringunreasonablesearches,itis  notforthisCourttocondemn....aStatesrelianceuponothermethodswhich....wouldbe   equallyeffective.(Wolf,supra.,338U.S.at31.)       Elevenyearslater,inholdingthattheexclusionaryrulebarredtheuseofevidence   illegallyseizedbybothstateandfederalofficials,theCourtacknowledgedthedeterrent   purposeoftheruleanditseffectivenessindiscouragingFourthAmendmentviolations.   (Elkins,supra.,364U.S.at217219.)TheCourtnotedthatdeterrenceprotects innocent   peoplewhoarethevictimsofillegalpolicesearchesthatturnupnoincriminating   evidenceandthusdontcometotheattentionofthecourts. Courtscanprotectthe   innocentagainstsuchinvasionsonlyindirectlyandthroughthemediumofexcluding  evidenceobtainedagainstthosewhofrequentlyareguilty.(Elkins,supra.,at217218,  quotingBrinegarv.UnitedStates(1949)338U.S.160,181.)Ultimately,theCourt  emphasizedtheimperativeofjudicialintegrity,statingthattheexclusionaryrulewas  adoptedtopreventthecourtsfrombecoming accomplicesinwillfuldisobedienceofthe  law.(_Elkins_,supra,at223.)    Oneyearlater,inMapp,theCourtagainmentionedtherulesdeterrentpurpose,  characterizingtheruleasa constitutionallyrequiredevenifjudiciallyimplied  deterrentsafeguard.(_Mapp_,supra.,367U.S.at648)However,theCourtagainstressed  therulesothergoals!togivemeaningtotheFourthAmendmentsguarantyand  maintainjudicialintegrity.(Mapp,supra.,at655660.)    Bythemid1970's,astheSupremeCourtlimitedapplicationoftheexclusionary  rule,thedeterrencerationaletookcenterstage.TheCourtcharacterizeddeterrenceasthe   primaryjustification!ifnottheonlyjustification!fortherule.Moreover,theCourt ! focusedexclusivelyondeterringpoliceviolationsofFourthAmendmentrights;itwasno " longerconcernedwithdeterringmisconductbyothergovernmentofficials.(See,e.g. # Calandra,supra.,414U.S.at347348[ therulesprimepurposeistodeterfuture $  unlawfulpolicemisconductandtherebyeffectuatetheguaranteeoftheFourth %!! Amendmentagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures];UnitedStatesv.Janis(1976) &"" 428U.S.433,446[ theprimepurposeoftheexclusionaryrule,ifnotthesoleone,isto '## deterfuturepolicemisconduct];Stonev.Powell(1976)428U.S.465,486[ theprimary ($$ justificationfortheexclusionaryrule..isthedeterrenceofpoliceconductthatviolates )%% FourthAmendmentrights].)  *&&  5.HowtheExclusionaryRuleDetersPoliceMisconduct     Theexclusionaryruleiscalculatedtopreventfuturemisconduct: Itspurposeisto  detertocompelrespectfortheconstitutionalguarantyintheonlyeffectivelyavailable  way!byremovingtheincentivetodisregardit.(Elkins,supra.,364U.S.at217.)  Presumably,iflawenforcementofficersknowthatanyevidenceseizedduringasearch   withoutawarrantand/orprobablecausewillbeexcludedfromasubsequentcriminal   trial,theywillbedisinclinedtoconductthesearch.InLeon,theCourtexplainedthatby   refusingtoadmitevidencegainedasaresultofwillfulornegligentviolationsofthe   FourthAmendment, thecourtshopetoinstillinthoseparticularinvestigatingofficers,or    intheirfuturecounterparts,agreaterdegreeofcaretowardtherightsofanaccused.   (Leon,supra.,488U.S.at919.) h      TheCourtalsoembracedtheideathattheexclusionaryrulewoulddiscourageall   governmentofficialsfromdisrespectingFourthAmendmentvalues:      ` Moreimportantly,overthelongterm,thisdemonstration     ` thatoursocietyattachesseriousconsequencestoviolation     ` ofconstitutionalrightsisthoughttoencouragethosewho     ` formulatelawenforcementpolicies,andtheofficerswho     ` implementthem,toincorporateFourthAmendmentideals     ` intotheirvaluesystem.(Stone,supra.,428U.S.at492.)    Theruledeterspolicemisconduct,inpart,byencouragingimprovedpolice  trainingbymakingofficersawareofthelimitsimposedbytheFourthAmendmentand  emphasizingtheneedtooperatewithinthoselimits.(Leon,supra.,at921.)      Ironically,inElkins,whileexpandingthereachoftheexclusionaryrule,Justice  Stewartpennedthephrasethatwaslaterusedtolimittherulesapplication: Theruleis   calculatedtoprevent,nottorepair.(_Elkins_,supra.,at217.)Fourteenyearslater,the ! Courtexpandedonthisconcept. Thepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleisnottoredress " theinjurytotheprivacyofthesearchvictim,because therupturedprivacyofthe # [victimshome]andeffectscannotberestored.Reparationcomestoolate.(Calandra, $  supra.,414U.S.at347,quotingLinkletterv.Walker(1965)381U.S.618,637.) % !   InLeon,theCourtexplainedthat theexclusionaryruleisneitherintendednor '"# abletocuretheinvasionofthedefendantsrightswhichhehasalreadysuffered.(Leon, (#$ supra.,486U.S.at906.)BecauseexclusioncannotrepairorredressthepastFourth )$% Amendmentviolation,thesuppressionofillegallyseizedevidenceissolelyprophylactic *%& innature!deterringfutureviolations. +&' Ї 6.TheCourtRepudiatestheConstitutionalBasisoftheExclusionaryRule     AstheSupremeCourtinsistedthatdeterrencewastheprimarypurposeofthe  exclusionaryrule,theCourtalsorejectedtheideathatsuppressionofillegallyseized  evidencewasconstitutionallyrequiredornecessarytomaketheFourthAmendment  guaranteemorethananemptypromise.     TheCourtdefinitivelyrejectedtheideathat theexclusionaryruleisanecessary   corollaryoftheFourthAmendment.(Leon,supra.,468U.S.at905906.)Leon   emphasizedthat [t]heFourthAmendmentcontainsnoprovisionsexpresslyprecluding    theuseofevidenceobtainedinviolationofitscommands,andanexaminationofits   originandpurposemakesclearthatuseofthefruitsofapastunlawfulsearchorseizure   worksnonewFourthAmendmentwrong.(Leon,supra.,at906,quotingCalandra,414   U.S.at354.)Finally,inScott,theSupremeCourtconcludedthattheexclusionaryrule is   prudentialratherthanconstitutionallymandated.(Scott,supra.,524U.S.at363.)    7.TheCourtRejectstheIdeaThatExclusionofIllegallySeizedEvidenceis  ЀNecessarytoPreserveJudicialIntegrity     InUnitedStatesv.Janis,theCourtrecognizedthatpreservingjudicialintegrity  hadbeenrecognizedas arelevant,albeitsubordinatefactorjustifyingjudicialcreation  oftheexclusionaryrule.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at458,n.35.)TheCourtbelieved,  however,thatconsiderationsofjudicialintegritydidnotnecessarilyrequiretheexclusion  ofevidenceseizedinviolationoftheFourthAmendment.Becausetheconstitutional  violationwascompletedlongbeforethe unquestionablyaccurateevidencewas  profferedinthejudicialproceeding,thecourtcouldnotbedeemedanaccomplicetothe  pastviolation.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at458,n.35.)    InStonev.Powell,theCourtacknowledgedthatpreMappdecisionshadcitedthe   beliefthat exclusionofillegallyseizedevidencepreventscontaminationofthejudicial ! processasonereasonsupportingapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule.(Stone,supra.,428 " U.S.at484.)TheCourtnoted,however,thatthisconcernforjudicialintegritywasno # longeraprimaryjustificationasitwouldrequireexclusionofillegallyseizedbuthighly $  probativeevidenceineveryproceeding.(Stone,supra.,at485.)   % !  8.HowtheShifttotheDeterrenceRationaleSupportedRestrictionsonthe '"# ЀApplicationoftheExclusionaryRule:TheDevelopmentoftheBalancingTest  (#$   Thefocusondeterrenceasthesolepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleledthe *%& SupremeCourttoaskfourquestions:1)Istheexclusionofillegalseizedevidencean +&' effectivemeansofdeterringpoliceviolationsoftheFourthAmendment?2)Arethere  othereffectivewaystodeterpolicemisconduct?3)Whatarethesocialcostsofexcluding  illegallyseizedevidencefromcriminaltrials?4)Isthedeterrenceeffectoftheruleworth  thecostofexcludingprobativeevidenceofguilt?TheCourtsanswerstothesefour  questionsjustifiedrestrictionsplacedonapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule.   0  a.IstheExclusionofIllegallySeizedEvidenceanEffectiveMeansofDeterring   PoliceViolationsoftheFourthAmendment?  (#(#   Aretherefewerunlawfulsearchesandseizuresbecauseoftheexclusionaryrule?    Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatitisnexttoimpossibletomeasureanegativeeffect.Asthe   SupremeCourtrecognized,thereisalackofanyconvincingempiricalevidenceonthe   effectsoftheexclusionaryrule.(Calandra,supra.,414U.S.at348,n.5.)     TheCourtstated,inJanis,that althoughscholarshaveattemptedtodetermine   whethertheexclusionaryruleinfactdoeshaveanydeterrenteffect,eachempiricalstudy  onthesubject,initsownway,appearstobeflawed.(Janis,supra.,at449450.)There  areasubstantialnumberofvariablesthatcannotbemeasuredorsubjectedtoeffective  controls.RecordkeepingbeforeMappwas spottyatbest,andsinceMappextendedthe  exclusionaryruletothestates,thereisnoidentifiablecontrolgroup;onecannotmeasure  thenumberofillegalsearchesinstatesthatdonthavetheexclusionaryruleandcompare  thatcalculationtothenumberofillicitsearchesinstatesthathaveadoptedtherule.  Moreover,alesseningofpolicemisconductmightbeduetootherfactors,suchasbetter  policetrainingorimprovedpolicecitizenrelationships.(Janis,supra.,at450452.)    b.AreThereOtherEffectiveWaystoDeterPoliceMisconduct?     In1949,theCourthadcitedtheavailabilityofother equallyeffectivemeansof  deterringFourthAmendmentviolationsasonereasonfornotextendingtheexclusionary   ruletothestates.(Wolf,supra.,338U.S.at3031.)By1961,whentheCourtoverturned ! Wolf,theseotheradministrativeandcivilremediesweredisfavored.Theexperienceof " Californiaandotherstateshadshownthattheseotherremedieswereineffective in # suppressinglawlesssearchesand_seizures._Ԁ(_Elkins_,supra.,364U.S.at220.) $    Bythemidseventies,alternativemethodsofdeterringunreasonablesearchesand &!" seizureswereagaintoutedas lesscostlytosocietalintereststhantheexclusionaryrule. '"# (Janis,supra.,428U.S.at449.)Thesealternativesincludedtortremediesforpolice (#$ violationsofindividualrightsandbetterpolicetraininganddiscipline.(Janis,supra.,at )$% 449,n.21.)Assupportfortheexclusionaryruledecreased,faithinthesealternative *%& measuresconsequentlyincreased. +&' Ї 0  c.WhataretheSocialCostsofExcludingIllegallySeizedEvidencefrom  CriminalTrials? (#(#   Sincetheinceptionoftheexclusionaryrule,itscriticshavefocusedonitscosts  andontheburdenallegedlyimposedoneffectivelawenforcement.Mostsignificantly,  theexclusionaryrulesuppressesrelevantandreliableevidence,renderingitunavailable   totheprosecutioninacriminaltrial.Asaconsequence,theguiltypartymaygofreeand   escapetheconsequencesofhisactions.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at447;Stone,supra.,428   U.S.at489491;Leon,supra.,468U.S.at907908;Scott,supra.,524U.S.at364.)Or   theguiltydefendantmayusethethreatofsuppressiontobargainforafavorablepleadeal    andareducedsentence.(Leon,supra.,at907.) #  3      ׀AstheCourtconcludedinStone:      ` [A]lthoughtheruleisthoughttodeterunlawful      ` policeactivityinpartthroughnurturingrespectfor      ` FourthAmendmentvalues,ifappliedindiscriminately      ` itmaywellhavetheoppositeeffectofgenerating     ` disrespectforthelawandadministrationofjustice.     ` (Stone,supra.,at490491.)    Applicationoftheexclusionaryruleallegedlyimposesothercostsonthecriminal  justicesystem.Becauseoftheneedtoadjudicatemotionstosuppressevidence,the  attentionofthecourtandtheattorneysisdeflectedfromthequestionofthedefendants  guiltorinnocence whichshouldbethecentralconcerninacriminalproceeding.(See  Stone,supra.,428U.S.at489490;Scott,supra.,524U.S.at364.)Finally,accordingto  studiescitedinJanis, theexclusionaryruletendstolessentheaccuracyoftheevidence  presentedincourtbecauseitencouragesthepolicetolieinordertoavoidsuppressionof  evidence.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at447,n.18.)   0  d.IstheDeterrentEffectoftheExclusionaryRuleWorththeCostofExcluding   ProbativeEvidenceofGuilt? !(#(#   Beginninginthe1970's,theCourthasbalancedthesocialcostsofexcluding # illegallyseizedbutrelevantevidencefromtheproceedingsagainsttheprojected  deterrencebenefitsunderthecircumstances.TheCourtconcludedtheruleshouldonly  apply tothoseareas[andsituations]whereitsremedialobjectivesarethoughtmost  efficaciouslyserved.(_Calandra_,supra.,414U.S.at348.)Ifapplicationofthe  exclusionaryrule doesnotresultinappreciabledeterrence,itsuseinaparticular  situationisunwarranted.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at454;Scott,supra.,524U.S.at363.)     TheSupremeCourtplacedtheburdenontheproponentsoftheexclusionaryrule   toprovethatdeterrencewasworththecost:      ` Becausetheexclusionaryruleprecludesconsiderationof      ` reliableprobativeevidence,itimposessignificantcosts....      ` Althoughwehaveheldthesecoststobeworthbearingin      ` certaincircumstances,ourcaseshaverepeatedlyemphasized      ` thattherulescostlytoilupontruthseekingandlaw     ` enforcementobjectivespresentsahighobstacleforthose     ` urgingapplicationoftherule.(Scott,supra.,at364365.)    Incaseaftercase,theSupremeCourthasemployedthisbalancingtestto  rationalizeplacinglimitsontheapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule.   9.TheDissentingJusticesCriticizetheRelianceonDeterrenceandthePremises  UnderlyingtheBalancingTest     From1970onward,theSupremeCourtjusticeswhobelievedthattheexclusionary  rulewasconstitutionallymandatedandnecessarytoeffectuateFourthAmendmentrights  andpreservejudicialintegritywereintheminority.Nevertheless,theyfiledvigorous  dissentingopinionsinthesuccessionofcaseslimitingapplicationoftherule.    ChiefamongthedissenterswasJusticeBrennan.InhisdissentinUnitedStatesv. ! Leon,BrennanprotestedtheCourtscreationofthegoodfaithexceptiontothe " exclusionaryruleandattackedthemajoritysembraceofthedeterrencerationaleasthe # solepurposeoftherule,anditsconsequentadoptionofthebalancingtestinwhich the $  costsofexcludingillegallyobtainedevidenceloomtoexaggeratedheights,while the % ! benefitsofsuchexclusionaremadetodisappearwithamerewaveofthehand.(Leon, &!" supra.,468U.S.at929.) '"#   First,JusticeBrennancriticizedthemajoritysinsistencethatdeterringfuture )$% misconductisthepurposeoftheexclusionaryrule. Aproperunderstandingofthebroad *%& purposessoughttobeservedbytheFourthAmendmentdemonstratesthattheprinciples +&' embodiedintheexclusionaryrulerestuponafarfirmerconstitutionalfoundationthanthe  shiftingsandsoftheCourtsdeterrencerationale.(Leon,supra.,at930.)    Moreover,relianceon thedeterrencetheoryisbothmisguidedandunworkable  (Leon,supra.,at940.),becauseitrequiresthecourttoattempttomeasurewhetherthe  exclusionofillegallyseizedevidenceactuallydiscouragespolicemisconduct. [I]tis   extremelydifficulttodeterminewithanydegreeofprecisionwhethertheincidenceof   unlawfulconductbypoliceisnowlowerthanitwaspriortoMapp.(Leon,supra.,at   942.)Also,theCourtturned thisuncertaintytoitsadvantagebycastingtheburdenof   proofuponproponentsofthe_rule._Ԁ(Leon,supra.,at943.)Nevertheless,JusticeBrennan   contendedthattheexclusionaryruleeffectivelydetersviolationsoftheFourth   Amendment.Theremaynotbeconclusiveempiricaldata,butthetestimonyofthose   actuallyinvolvedinlawenforcementindicatesthattheadoptionoftherulehas   encouragedbetterpolicetrainingandincreasedawarenessofFourthAmendment   requirements.(Leon,supra.,at954,n.13.)    JusticeBrennanalsocriticizedthemajoritysdiscussionofthehighcostsof  excludingillegallyseizedbutreliableevidence:     ` [T]heCourthasfrequentlybewailedthecostof     ` excludingreliableevidence.Inlargepart,this     ` criticismrestsuponarefusaltoacknowledgethe     ` functionoftheFourthAmendmentitself.Ifnothing     ` else,theAmendmentplainlyoperatestodisablethe     ` governmentfromgatheringinformationandsecuring     ` evidenceincertainways.Inpracticalterms,ofcourse,     ` thisrestrictionofofficialpowermeansthatsome     ` incriminatingevidenceinevitablywillgoundetectedif     ` thegovernmentobeystheseconstitutionalrestraints.It      ` isthelossofthatevidencethatisthe priceoursociety !    ` paysforenjoyingthefreedomandprivacysafeguarded "    ` bytheFourthAmendment.....[I]tisnottheexclusionary #    ` rulebuttheAmendmentitselfthathasimposedthiscost. $     ` (Leon,supra.,at941.) %!!   Finally,JusticeBrennannotedthattheclaimthatmanycriminalsgofreebecause '## oftheexclusionaryrulewasnotsupportedbyempiricalevidence.Infact,thestatistics ($$ showedthatveryfewprosecutionsweredroppedoutofconcernthatevidencewillbe )%% suppressedbecauseofaFourthAmendmentviolation,andveryfewsuppressionmotions *&& wereactuallygranted.(Leon,supra.,at950.) +'' Ї  D.TheFalloftheExclusionaryRule:CasesLimitingtheApplicationof  theExclusionaryRule   ï#կ#  Inaseriesofcases,from1969onward,theSupremeCourtlimitedtheapplication 5: oftheexclusionaryrule.Itheldthatonlythosevictimizedbytheillegalsearchorseizure 5 : couldinvoketherule,thattheruleonlyappliedincriminaltrials,thatevidenceseizedby 5 : officersrelyingingoodfaithonasubsequentlyinvalidatedwarrant,statuteorprecedent 5 : wouldnotbeexcludedandthatthefruitsofillicitconductwouldnotbeexcludedifthe 5 : taintoftheillegalitywassufficientlypurged. 5 :  1.TheStandingLimitation : OnlytheSearchVictimmayInvoketheExclusionaryRule  5:    InAldermanv.UnitedStates(1969)394U.S.165,theCourtheldthatonlythe 5:  individualwhoserightswereviolatedbytheunlawfulsearchandseizurecouldinvokethe 5:  exclusionaryrule.Theillegallyobtainedevidencewouldonlybeexcludedfromthat 5: individualscriminaltrial.Thepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleistodeterillegal 5: searches,butthatdoesnotmean thatanythingwhichdetersillegalsearchesisthereby 5: commandedbytheFourthAmendment.Onlyfortheactualvictimoftheunlawful 5: invasiondoesthebenefitofdeterrenceoutweighthecostofsuppressingprobative 5: evidenceandencroachinguponthepublicinterestinprosecutingthoseaccusedofcrimes. 5:    2.TheExclusionaryRuleAppliesOnlyinCriminalTrials# #  4       5:  0  a.UnitedStatesv.Calandra(1974)414U.S.338:TheExclusionaryRuleDoes /4 not  ApplyinGrandJuryProceedings ).(#(#   ThequestionpresentedinCalandrawaswhethergrandjurywitnessescouldrefuse ). toanswerquestionsbasedonevidenceobtainedfromanunlawfulsearchandseizure. ) . (Calandra,supra.,414U.S.at347.)TheSupremeCourtsaidno,becausethe )!. exclusionaryruleshouldnotapplytograndjuryproceedings.(Calandra,supra.,at354.) )".   TheCourtstatedforthefirsttimethat therulesprimepurposeistodeterfuture )$. unlawfulpoliceconductandtherebyeffectuatetheguaranteeoftheFourthAmendment )%.  againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.However, [d]espitethebroaddeterrent )&.!! purpose,theexclusionaryrulehasneverbeeninterpretedtoproscribetheuseofillegally )'."" seizedevidenceinallproceedingsoragainstallpersons.Aswithanyremedialdevice,the  applicationoftherulehasbeenrestrictedtothoseareaswhereitsremedialobjectivesare  thoughtmostefficaciouslyserved.(Calandra,supra.,at347348.)    Indecidingwhetherto extendtheexclusionaryruletograndjuryproceedings,  thecourtweighed thepotentialinjurytothehistoricroleandfunctionsofthegrandjury   againstthepotentialdeterrencebenefitsoftheruleinthiscontext.(Calandra,supra.,at   349.)TheCourtconcludedthattheflexible,nonadversarialnatureofsuchproceedings   wouldbejeopardizedbyapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule,andthattheproceedings   wouldbedelayedwhiletimewasspentadjudicatingFourthAmendmentissues.   (Calandra,supra.,at34950.)Consequently,theCourtconcludedthatthedamagetothe   grandjury fromtheunprecedentedextensionoftheexclusionaryrule.....outweighsthe   benefitofanypossibleincrementaldeterrenteffect.(_Calandra_,supra.,at354.)     JusticePowellwrotethemajorityopinion,andJusticeBrennanfiledadissent,  joinedbyJusticesDouglasandMarshall.Ashewouldinnumerousotherdissents,Justice  Brennancriticizedthemajorityforfocusingondeterrenceasthesolepurposeofthe  exclusionaryrule:     ` Thedowngradingoftheexclusionaryruletoa     ` determinationwhetheritsapplicationinaparticular     ` typeofproceedingfurthersdeterrenceoffuturepolice     ` misconductreflectsastartlingmisconception,unlessit     ` isapurposefulrejection,ofthehistoricalobjectiveand     ` purposeoftherule.....togivecontentandmeaningtothe     ` FourthAmendmentguaranteesandtoassure thatthe     ` governmentwouldnotprofitfromitslawlessbehavior.     ` (Calandra,supra.,at356357.)  0   b.UnitedStatesv.Janis(1976)428U.S.433:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnot ! ApplyinFederalCiviltaxProceedings"(#(#   ThequestionpresentedwaswhetherevidenceobtainedinviolationoftheFourth $  Amendmentwasinadmissibleinafederalciviltaxproceeding.(Janis,supra.,428U.S.at % ! 447.)TheCourtbalancedthecostsofapplyingtheruletobarevidencefromaciviltax &!" proceedingagainstthedeterrencebenefitsofsuchexclusion.TheCourtconcludedthat '"# thecostsofexcludingrelevantandreliableevidenceoutweighedanymarginaldeterrence (#$ achievedinthiscontext.(Janis,supra.,at450454.)Assumingthat theexclusionaryrule )$% isthestrongmedicinethatitsproponentsclaimittobe,thesuppressionofunlawfully *%& obtainedevidenceinfederalandstatecriminaltrialsshouldsufficientlydeterillegal +&' searches.Furtherextensionoftherulewasunwarranted.(Janis,supra.,at453454.)    JusticeBlackmunauthoredthemajorityopinionandJusticesBrennan,Marshall  andStewartdissented.Onceagain,JusticeBrennanprotestedthe slowstrangulationof  theexclusionaryrule,andinsistedtherule isanecessaryandinherentconstitutional  ingredientoftheprotectionsoftheFourthAmendment.(Janis,supra.,at460.)   0   c.Stonev.Powell(1976)428U.S.465:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnotApply   inFederalHabeasProceedings  (#(#   Stonev.PowellisknownforholdingthatFourthAmendmentclaimscannotbe   raisedbystateprisonersinfederalhabeascorpusproceedings.However,thatrulingwas   actuallybasedonweighingtheutilityoftheexclusionaryruleasadeterrentagainstthe   costsofapplyingtheruleinhabeasproceedings,aftertheFourthAmendmentclaimhas   beenfullyadjudicatedattrialandondirectreview.(Stone,supra.,428U.S.at489,493.)     TheCourtemphasizedthecostsoftheexclusionaryrule!diversionofattention  fromthetruthfindingprocessandthesuppressionofreliableandprobative  evidence.(Stone,supra.,at490491.)Theadditionalcontributiontodeterrencethatwould  begainedbyapplyingtheruleinhabeasproceedingsissmallinrelationtothecostsof  exclusion.(Stone,supra.,at493494.)Forpoliceofficers,theriskthatillegallyseized  evidencecouldbeexcludedattrialorthatconvictionscouldbereversedondirectappeal  sufficientlydetersFourthAmendmentviolations.(Stone,supra.,at493.)    JusticePowellwrotethemajorityopinioninStone.JusticesWhite,Brennanand  Marshalldissented.Again,Brennancriticizedthemajorityforitsongoinghostilityto the  continuedvitalityoftheexclusionaryruleaspartandparceloftheFourthAmendments  prohibitionofunreasonablesearchesandseizures.(Stone,supra.,at502503.)  0   d.ImmigrationandNaturalizationServicev.LopezMendoza(1984)468U.S. ! 1032:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnotApplyinCivilDeportationProceedings"(#(#   Thequestionpresentedwaswhetherevidencesecuredfromanundocumented $  immigrantfollowinghisillegalarrestbyanINSagentcouldbeadmittedintoevidenceat % ! hisdeportationhearing.TheCourtansweredyes,decliningonceagaintoapplythe &!" exclusionaryruleinaproceedingotherthanacriminaltrial.TheCourtweighedthelikely '"# deterrencebenefitsofexcludingtheunlawfullyobtainedevidenceagainstthelikelycost, (#$ andconcludedthatthebalancecameoutagainstapplyingtheexclusionaryruleincivil )$% deportationproceedings.(LopezMendoza,supra.,468U.S.at1041.) *%&  +&'   Forreasonsparticulartothedeportationprocess,excludingillegallyseized  evidencefromtheseformalhearings!whichoccurinlessthan3%ofdeportationcases!  wouldbeunlikelytodeterINSagentsviolationsoftheFourthAmendment.(Lopez  Mendoza,supra.,at10431046.)Ontheothersideoftheequation,thesocialcostsof  excludingprobativeevidencefromdeportationproceedingsarehigh.Applicationofthe  exclusionaryrulewouldundulycomplicatetheadministrativenatureofthese   proceedings.Moreover,suppressingrelevantevidencecouldcompelthereleasefrom   custodyofpersonswhowouldthenresumetheircommissionofacrimethroughtheir   continuingunlawfulpresenceinthecountry.(LopezMendoza,supra.,at10461050.)     Thiswasafivetofourdecision.JusticeOConnorwrotethemajorityopinionand   JusticesBrennan,White,MarshallandStevensdissented.   0   e.PennsylvaniaBoardofProbationandParolev.Scott(1998)524U.S.357:   TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnotApplyinParoleRevocationHearings  (#(#   TheSupremeCourtheldthatevidenceobtainedinviolationofaparoleesFourth  Amendmentrightsisadmissibleataparoleboardhearingtoestablishtheparole  violation.TheCourtstressedthestates overwhelminginterestinensuringthata  paroleecomplieswiththeconditionsofhisreleaseandreturnstoprisonifhefailstodo  so.(Scott,supra.,at365.)TheCourtthenweighedthesignificantcostsofexcluding  reliable,probativeevidencefromparolehearings,whichmightallowtheparolee to  avoidtheconsequencesofhisnoncompliance,againstthemarginaldeterrencebenefits.  (Scott,supra.,at364369.) Therulewouldprovideonlyminimaldeterrencebenefitsin  thiscontext,becauseapplicationoftheruleinthecriminaltrialcontextalreadyprovides  significantdeterrenceofunconstitutionalsearches.(Scott,supra.,at365.)    Thiswasafivetofourdecision.JusticeThomasauthoredthemajorityopinion,  andJusticesStevens,Souter,GinsburgandBreyerdissented.JusticeStevensarguedthat   exclusionaryruleis constitutionallyrequired,notasarightexplicitlyincorporatedinthe ! FourthAmendmentsprohibitions,butasaremedynecessarytoensurethatthose " prohibitionsareobservedinfact.(Scott,supra.,at369370.) #  3.TheGoodFaithExceptiontotheExclusionaryRule:TheRuleDoesnotApply % ! WhenAnOfficerConductsanIllegalSearchorSeizureRelyinginGoodFaithona &!" Precedent,Statute,Warrant,orComputerDataSubsequentlyFoundInvalid  '"#   Thegovernmentbearstheburdenofestablishingthatthegoodfaithexception )$% appliesandprecludesapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule.(SeePeoplev.Willis(2002)28 *%& Cal.4th22,3637,citingLeon,supra.,468U.S.at924.)  +&'  0  a.UnitedStatesv.Peltier(1975)422U.S.531:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnot  ApplyWhentheSearchingOfficerReliedinGoodFaithonaStatuteandLower  CourtPrecedentSubsequentlyOverturnedbytheSupremeCourt(#(#   ThiscaseconcernstheretroactiveapplicationofaSupremeCourtcasesetting  forthanewruleofFourthAmendmentlaw,butitisalsothefirstcasetoapplyagood   faithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule.     Thedefendantscarwasstoppedandsearchedbyborderpatrolagentswhofound   marijuanainthevehiclestrunk.Fourmonthsafterthesearch,theUnitedStatesSupreme    CourtdecidedAlmeidaSanchezv.UnitedStates(1973)413U.S.266,holdingthatborder   patrolagentscouldnotsearchacarwithinreasonabledistanceoftheborderwithout   probablecause.Theprosecutionconcededthatthesearchofthedefendantscarwas   unconstitutionalunderAlmeidaSanchez.(Peltier,supra.,422U.S.at532533.)     TheissuepresentedwaswhetherAlmeidaSanchezshouldbeappliedretroactively  tocasespendingonappealwhenitwasdecided.TheSupremeCourtreformulatedthe  questiontoaskwhethertheexclusionaryruleshouldbeappliedtothefruitsofasearch  thatwouldbeillegalunderasubsequenthighcourtdecisionannouncinganewFourth  Amendmentprinciple,whenthelawenforcementofficerswhoconductedthesearch  reliedingoodfaithoncurrentlaw.    Thekeyconsiderationwasthattheagentsstoppedandsearchedthedefendants  caringoodfaithrelianceon avalidlyenactedstatute,supportedbylongstanding  administrativeregulationsandcontinuousjudicialapproval!federalcourtofappeal  opinionsthatauthorizedrandomsearches.(_Peltier_,supra.,at541.)Consequently,  suppressingthe illegallyseizedevidencewouldnotservethepurposesofthe  exclusionaryrule!thedeterrenceofunlawfullawenforcementconductandthe  preservationofjudicialintegrity.(Peltier,supra.,at536542)     Thedeterrentpurposeoftheexclusionaryrulenecessarilyassumesthatthepolice " officerconductingthesearchandseizureengagesinwillfulornegligentconduct # deprivingthedefendantofhisFourthAmendmentrights.Ontheotherhand,iftheofficer $  reasonablybelieves,ingoodfaith,thatthesearchheisabouttoconductislawful,hewill % ! notbedeterredbytheprospectofexclusion.(Peltier,supra.,at539.)TheCourt &!" articulatedthepremiseunderlyingthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule: '"#    ` Ifthepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleistodeterunlawful )$%    ` policeconduct,thenevidenceobtainedfromasearch *%&    ` shouldbesuppressedonlyifitcanbesaidthatthelaw +&'    ` enforcementofficerhadknowledge,ormayproperlybe     ` chargedwithknowledge,thatthesearchwas     ` unconstitutionalundertheFourthAmendment.     ` (Peltier,supra.,at542.)    Asforpreservingjudicialintegrity, theintroductionofevidencewhichhasbeen   seizedbylawenforcementingoodfaithcompliancewiththenprevailingconstitutional   normsdidnotmakethecourtsaccomplicesinthewillfuldisobedienceofaConstitution   theyaresworntouphold.(Peltier,supra.,at536,quotingElkins,supra.,364at223.)     JusticeRehnquistwrotethemajorityopinion,andJusticesDouglas,Brennan,   MarshallandStewartdissented.JusticeBrennanwarnedthatthegoodfaithexception   wouldcomplicatethelitigationofsuppressionmotionsbyaddingalevelofinquiry.The   lowercourtswouldnowneedtodeterminewhattheofficerkneworreasonablyshould   haveknownaboutFourthAmendmentrequirementsatthetimeofthesearchandseizure.  IfthereisaconflictinthelowercourtsovertheinterpretationofSupremeCourt  precedent,howwillthelowercourtevaluatetheofficersgoodfaith?(Peltier,supra.,at  552553,560561.)   0  b.UnitedStatesv.Leon(1984)468U.S.897:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnot  ApplyWhentheOfficerReliedinGoodFaithonaSubsequentlyInvalidated  SearchWarrant(#(#   Inthisseminalcase,theCourtformallyannouncedthegoodfaithexception,  holdingthattheexclusionaryruledoesnotbartheadmissionofevidenceobtainedby  officersactinginreasonablerelianceonasearchwarrantissuedbyaneutralmagistrate  thatisultimatelyfoundtobeunsupportedbyprobablecause. TheCourtconcludedthat   themarginalornonexistent[deterrence]benefitsproducedbysuppressingevidence  obtainedinobjectivelyreasonablerelianceonasubsequentlyinvalidatedsearchwarrant   cannotjustifythesubstantialcostsofexclusion.(Leon,supra.,468U.S.at922.)  !   InLeon,officerswereinvestigatingthedefendantsallegeddrugtrafficking # activities.OfficerRombachappliedforawarranttosearchthedefendantsresidencesfor $  drugrelateditems.A faciallyvalidsearchwarrantwasissuedbyamagistrate.The % ! ensuingsearchesyieldedlargequantitiesofdrugs,andthedefendantswereprosecutedfor &!" federalnarcoticsoffenses.Thedefendantsmovedtosuppressevidenceseizedpursuantto '"# thewarrant.Ingrantingthosemotions,thedistrictcourtfoundthatalthoughOfficer (#$ Rombachhadactedingoodfaith,hisaffidavitwasinsufficienttoestablishprobable )$% causeandthewarrantwasthusinvalid.(Leon,supra.,at901905.) *%&  +&'   TheCourtreiteratedthattheexclusionaryruleoperatesas ajudiciallycreated  remedydesignedtosafeguardFourthAmendmentrightsgenerallythroughitsdeterrent  effect.(Leon,supra.,at906,quotingCalandra,supra.,414U.S.at348.)Thequestionof  whetherevidenceobtainedduringanunlawfulsearchshouldbesuppressedisresolvedby  weighingthe substantialsocialcostsofexcluding inherentlytrustworthytangible  evidenceagainsttherulesdeterrencebenefitsintheparticularsituation.(Leon,supra.,   at906908.)TheCourtnoteditslongstandingconcernwiththecostsofexclusion:      ` Anobjectionablecollateralconsequenceofthisinterference      ` withthecriminaljusticesystemstruthfindingfunctionis      ` thatsomeguiltydefendantsmaygofreeorreceive      ` reducedsentencesasaresultoffavorablepleabargains.      ` Particularly,whenlawenforcementofficershaveactedin      ` objectivegoodfaithortheirtransgressionshavebeenminor,      ` themagnitudeofthebenefitconferredonsuchguilty     ` defendantsoffendsbasicconceptsofthecriminaljustice     ` system.(Leon,supra.,at907908.)    Turningtothesituationbeforeit,theCourtemphasizedthattheerrorinjudgment  whichrenderedthesearchillegalwasmadebythemagistratewhoissuedthesearch  warrant,andnotbythepoliceofficerwhoappliedforthewarrantortheofficerswho  searchedtheresidencesandseizedtheevidence.Theexclusionaryruleissolelydesigned   todeterpolicemisconductratherthantopunishtheerrorsofjudgesandmagistrates.  Moreover,noevidencesuggestedthatjudgesandmagistrateswereinclinedtoignoreor  subverttheFourthAmendment.Finally,therewasnoreasontobelievethat exclusionof  evidenceseizedpursuanttoawarrant[would]haveasignificantdeterrenteffectonthe  issuingjudgeormagistrate.(Leon,supra.,at916917.)    Applyingtheexclusionaryruleinacasewherethejudgeormagistratehad   erroneouslyassessedprobablecausemightdiscouragepoliceofficersfromseeking ! warrantsfromneutralmagistrates,andthiswouldtrulyjeopardizeFourthAmendment " rightsanddisregardtheCourtspreferenceforwarrants.(Leon,supra.,at913914.) #   Theultimatequestionwaswhetherexclusionoftheillegallyseizedevidence %!! woulddetermisconductbytheofficerswhoappliedfororexecutedthewarrantingood &"" faith.TheCourtacknowledgedthatexclusionmightencourageofficersapplyingfor '## warrantstotakemorecareinestablishingprobablecause.Itmightdeterinadequate ($$ presentationsormagistrateshopping.Itmightencourageofficerstocarefullyscrutinize )%% thewarrantandpointoutanyjudicialerrors.However,thesebenefitswere_deeemed_ *&&  speculative.Thus, suppressionofevidenceobtainedpursuanttoawarrantshouldbe +'' orderedonlyonacasebycasebasisandonlyinthoseunusualcasesinwhichexclusion  willfurtherthepurposesoftheexclusionaryrule.(Leon,supra.,at918.)    TheCourtconcludedthattheexclusionaryruleshouldonlyapplywhenthepolice  officerwillfullyornegligentlyviolatedthedefendantsFourthAmendmentrights.This  occursonlywhentheofficerknew ormayproperlybechargedwithknowledgethatthe   searchwasunconstitutionalundertheFourthAmendment.(Leon,supra.,at919,quoting   Peltier,supra.,422U.S.at542.)Simplyput,whenanofficerreasonablyreliesona   searchwarrantissuedbyaneutralmagistrate,hedoesnotknowandcannotreasonablybe   expectedtoknowthatthesearchisunconstitutional.Underthesecircumstances,hewill   notbedeterred.Itisthemagistratesresponsibilitytodeterminewhethertheofficers   affidavithasestablishedprobablecauseand,intheusualcase,anofficercannotbe   expectedtoquestionthemagistratesdetermination.(Leon,supra.,at919921.)     TheCourt,however,didsetforthanexceptiontothegoodfaithexception. [T]he  officersrelianceonthemagistratesprobablecausedeterminationandonthetechnical  sufficiencyofthewarrantheissuesmustbeobjectivelyreasonable.(Leon,supra.,at  922.)Iftheofficerhasnoreasonablegroundsforbelievingthatthewarrantwasproperly  issued,theexclusionaryruleshouldapply. [S]uppressionthereforeremainsan  appropriateremedyunderfourcircumstances:1)theofficermisleadsthemagistrateby  placinginformationintheaffidavitthatheknowsorshouldhaveknownwasfalse;2)the  magistratewhollyabandonedhisjudicialrolesothata reasonablywelltrainedofficer  wouldnotrelyonthewarrant;3)theaffidavitsupportingthewarrantis solackingin  indiciaofprobablecauseastorenderofficialbeliefinitsexistenceentirely  unreasonable;and4)thewarrantissofaciallydeficient(i.e.infailingtoparticularizethe  placetobesearchedorthethingstobeseized)thattheexecutingofficerscannot  reasonablypresumeittobevalid.(Leon,supra.,at923.)    OnthesamedaythattheSupremeCourtissueditsopinioninLeon,italsofileda   decisioninthecompanioncaseofMassachusettsv.Sheppard(1984)468U.S.981.In ! Sheppard,theCourtheldthattheexclusionaryrulewouldnotapplywhentheofficers " conductingaresidentialsearchactedinobjectivelyreasonablerelianceonawarrant # subsequentlyfoundinvalidbecauseitdidnotparticularlydescribetheitemstobeseized. $  Inthesecircumstances,thecriticalerrorwasmadebythejudgeandnotbythepolice %!! officerswhoappliedforandexecutedthewarrant.Becausetheexclusionaryrulewas &"" designedtodeterunlawfulsearchesbypoliceofficersandnottodeterorpunish '## magistrates,theevidenceseizedinrelianceontheinvalidwarrantwouldnotbe ($$ suppressed.(_Sheppard_,supra.,at990991.) )%%   JusticeWhitewrotethemajorityopinionsinbothLeonandSheppard.Justice +'' Brennanfiledadissentingopinioninbothcases,joinedbyJusticeMarshall,andJustice  StevenswroteaseparatedissentinLeon.    JusticeBrennansdissentinLeonandSheppardisanextraordinarydocument.  Brennancriticized theCourtsgradualbutdeterminedstrangulationofthe[exclusionary]  rule.(Leon,supra.,468U.S.at928929.)Hechallengedthemajorityforignoringthe   ruleshistoricalpurposeandconstitutionalbasis.Hecritiquedthemajoritysinsistence   thatdeterrenceisthesolepurposeoftheruleandobjectedtothepremisesunderlyingthe   costbenefitanalysisreliedupontodenysuppressionofevidenceseizedinviolationof   theFourthAmendment.(Leon,supra.,at928951;seealsoSectionC9,supra.)     Finally,JusticeBrennanspecificallycriticizedthegoodfaithexceptionandthe   majoritysassumptionthatexcludingevidenceseizedinrelianceuponawarrant   unsupportedbyprobablecausewouldnotdeterfutureillegalsearches.Brennanasserted   thatsuppressingthisillegallyseizedevidencewouldencouragepolicedepartmentsto  instructtheirofficerstodevotegreatercareandattentiontoprovidingsufficient  informationtoestablishprobablecausewhenapplyingforawarrant,andtocarefully  reviewthewarrantonceithasbeenissued.Hearguedthatthegoodfaithexceptionwould   tendtoputapremiumonpoliceignoranceofthelaw.(Leon,supra.,at955.)  0   c.Illinoisv.Krull(1987)480U.S.340:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnotApply  toEvidenceObtainedbyanOfficerwhoReasonablyReliedonaStatute(#(# 0  AuthorizingtheSearchWhichwasSubsequentlyFoundUnconstitutional (#(#   InKrull,officersconductedanadministrativesearchofanautowreckingyardand  foundseveralstolencars.Theyardsoperatorswerecriminalprosecuted.Thesearchwas  authorizedbystatute.Onthedayafterthesearch,theSeventhCircuitCourtofAppeal  ruledthatthestatuteviolatedtheFourthAmendmentTheSupremeCourtconsidered  whethertheevidenceillegallyseizedfromtheyardshouldbesuppressedwhenthe   officershadreasonablyreliedingoodfaithuponthestatuteauthorizingthesearchwhich ! wassubsequentlyfoundunconstitutional.(Krull,supra.,480U.S.at342344.) "   TheCourtconcludedthatthegoodfaithdoctrinesetforthinLeonwasapplicable $  tothepresentcase.Itmadenodifferencethattheofficerhadsearchedinobjectively % ! reasonablerelianceonastatute,ratherthanawarrant,subsequentlyfoundinvalid: &!"    ` Unlessastatuteisclearlyunconstitutional,anofficer (#$    ` cannotbeexpectedtoquestionthejudgmentofthe )$%    ` legislaturethatpassedthelaw.Ifthestatuteis *%&    ` subsequentlydeclaredunconstitutional,excluding +&'    ` evidenceobtainedpursuanttoitpriortosuchajudicial     ` declarationwillnotdeterfutureFourthAmendment     ` violationsbyanofficerwhohassimplyfulfilledhis     ` responsibilitytoenforcethestatuteaswritten.To     ` paraphrasetheCourtscommentinLeon:Penalizing     ` theofficerforthe[legislatures]error,ratherthanhisown,      ` cannotlogicallycontributetothedeterrenceofFourth      ` Amendmentviolations.(_Krull_,supra.,at349350.)     Theexclusionaryruleisaimedatdeterringpoliceofficers,notlegislators.   Legislatorsarenotadjunctsofthelawenforcementteam.Theytakeanoathtoupholdthe   Constitution,andtheydontintentionallypassactsauthorizingpoliceconductinviolation   oftheFourthAmendment.Finally,thereisnoreasontobelievethatapplyingthe   exclusionaryruleinthiscontextwoulddeterlegislatorsfromenactingunconstitutional   statutes.(Krull,supra.,at350352.)    AsinLeon,theCourtheldthatthegoodfaithexceptiontotheexclusionaryrule  wouldnotapplyifthelawenforcementofficersrelianceonthesubsequentlyinvalidated  statutewasnotobjectivelyreasonable!i.e.ifareasonableofficershouldhaveknown  thatthestatutewasunconstitutional.(Krull,supra.,at355.)    JusticeBlackmunwrotethemajorityopinion.JusticeOConnorwroteadissenting  opinion,joinedbyJusticesBrennan,MarshallandStevens.OConnorprotestedthe  majoritysextensionoftheLeondoctrinetoanofficerwhoreliedingoodfaithonan  unconstitutionalstatuteratherthananinvalidwarrant.Shebelievedthat statutes  authorizingunreasonablesearcheswerethecoreconcernoftheFramersoftheFourth  Amendmentaswellasthejusticeswhosetforththeexclusionaryrule.(Krull,supra.,  480U.S.at362364.)Incomparisontoaninvalidwarrantwhichonlyauthorizesasingle  search,anunconstitutionalstatutemayaffectthousandsormillionsand posesagreater   threattoliberty.(_Krull_,supra.,at365.)Thus,itisimportanttodiscouragelegislators ! frompassingstatuteswhichviolatetheFourthAmendment.(Krull,supra,at366.) "  0  d.Arizonav.Evans(1995)514U.S.1:TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnotApply  $   WhenAnOfficerReasonablyReliesonComputerizedDataThatisIncorrect % ! duetoaClericalErrorMadebyaCourtEmployee &!"(#(#   Thiscasebeganwitharoutinetrafficstop.Afterlearningfromthedefendant (#$ driverthathislicensehadbeensuspended,theofficerenteredthedefendantsnameintoa )$% computerlocatedinhispatrolcar.Thecomputerindicatedanoutstandingwarrantforthe *%& defendantsarrest.Afterarrestingthedefendantonthiswarrant,theofficersearchedhis +&' vehicleandfoundmarijuana.Itwassubsequentlydeterminedthatthedefendantsarrest  warranthadbeenquashed17daysbeforehisarrest.Inhisdrugprosecution,thedefendant  filedamotiontosuppressevidence,arguingthathisarrestwasinvalid.Duringhis  suppressionhearing,acourtclerktestifiedthatsomeoneinherofficehadfailedto  complywith standardprocedurebycallingthesheriffsofficeandinformingthemthat  thedefendantsarrestwarranthadbeenquashed.Thatiswhythequashedwarrantstill   showeduponthepolicecomputer.(Evans,supra.,514U.S.at45.)     Becausethepoliceofficerwhoarrestedthedefendanthadreasonablyreliedin   goodfaithontheerroneouscomputerrecord, [a]pplicationoftheLeonframework   supportsacategoricalexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleforclericalerrorsofcourt   employees.(Evans,supra.,at1516.)Significantly,theCourtdidnotdecidewhetherthe   goodfaithexceptionwouldstillapplyifpolicepersonnelratherthancourtemployees   wereresponsiblefortheerrorrelieduponbythearrestingofficer.BecausetheStatehad   notmadethatargument,theissuewasnotadequatelypresentedfortheCourts  consideration.(Evans,supra.,at16,n.5.) #  5            TheCourtappliedthereasoningofLeon: [T]heexclusionaryrulewashistorically  designedasameansofdeterringpolicemisconduct,notmistakesbycourtemployees.  (Evans,supra.,at14.)Therewasnoevidenceestablishingthatcourtemployeesare  inclinedtoignoreorsubverttheFourthAmendment,orthatexclusionwould havea  significanteffectoncourtemployeesresponsibleforinformingthepolicethatawarrant  hadbeenquashed.Becausecourtemployeesarenot adjunctstolawenforcement  engagedinferretingoutcrime, theyhavenostakeintheoutcomeofparticularcriminal  prosecutions.Thethreatofexclusionwouldnotdeterthemfromfailingtoassurethat  informationinthepolicecomputerswasproperlyupdated.(Evans,supra.,at15.)    Mostimportantly,excludingevidenceunderthesecircumstanceswouldnotalter  thebehaviorofthearrestingofficerwhoreliesingoodfaithoncomputerdataindicating   thatanindividualhasanoutstandingwarrant.Iftheofficerdoesnotarresttheindividual ! underthesecircumstances,hewouldbederelictinhisduty.(Evans,supra.,at15.) "   ChiefJusticeRehnquistwrotethemajorityopinion.JusticesOConnorandSouter $  filedseparateconcurringopinionsandJusticesStevensandGinsburgeachfileddissents.  JusticeOConnorinsistedthatitwouldnotalwaysbereasonableforpoliceofficersto  relyonarecordkeepingsystem,particularlyifthesystemhadnomechanismtoensure  itsaccuracyovertime.Althoughpolicecouldenjoythebenefitsconferredbycomputer  basedrecordkeepingsystems,theyshouldnotrelyblindlyonsuchtechnology. Withthe  benefitsofmoreefficientlawenforcementmechanismscomestheburdenof   correspondingconstitutionalresponsibilities.(Evans,supra.,at1718.)     JusticeStevensdissentinvokedthespiritofJusticeBrennan.Hecriticizedthe   majoritysviewthattheexclusionaryrulehasthelimitedpurposeofdeterringpolice   misconduct. Boththeconstitutionaltextandthehistoryofitsadoptionandinterpretation   identifyamoremajesticconception.TheAmendmentconstrainsallagentsofthe   sovereign,notmerelythepolice,and [t]heremedyforitsviolationimposescostsonthat   sovereign,motivatingittotrainallofitspersonneltoavoidfutureviolations.The   governmentshouldnotbepermittedtoprofitfromthenegligentmisconductofits  employees,whethertheyworkforthecourtorthepolice.(Evans,supra.,at1819.)   4.TheFruitofthePoisonousTree:TheFruitsofanIllegalSearchorSeizurearenot  ExcludedWhenTimeorInterveningCircumstancesHavePurgedtheTaint      `   Ifpoliceofficersconductanunconstitutionalsearch,incriminatingevidence  discoveredduringthatsearch!theprimaryevidence!willautomaticallybesuppressed  atthedefendantscriminaltrial.(See,e.g.Gouledv.UnitedStates(1921)255U.S.298;  Elkinsv.UnitedStates(1960)364U.S.206;Mappv.Ohio(1961)367U.S.643.)  However,ifofficersunlawfullydetainthedefendant,andhethenconsentstoasearchof  hiscaroradmitsheiscarryingcontrabandinthevehicle,thequestionofwhetherto  excludeevidencesubsequentlyseizedfromthatvehicleismorecomplex.Thisderivative  evidencewillonlybeexcludedfromthedefendantstrialifitwastaintedbytheunlawful  conductandthattaintwasnotdissipatedbytimeorinterveningcircumstances.(See,e.g.   Nardonev.UnitedStates(1939)308U.S.338,340341;WongSunv.UnitedStates ! (1963)371U.S.471,488;Brownv.Illinois(1975)422U.S.590,603604.) #  6       " Ї 0  a.EarlyCasesHoldingThattheExclusionaryRuleAppliestotheFruitofthe  UnconstitutionalConduct : Silverthorne,NardoneandWongSun (#(#   InSilverthorneLumberCo.v.UnitedStates(1920)251U.S.385,392,theCourt  heldthatknowledgeofincriminatingevidence gainedbytheGovernmentsownwrong  (theFourthAmendmentviolation)couldnotbeadmittedinthecriminalproceeding.In   Nardonev.UnitedStates,theCourtconcludedthatonceithasbeenestablishedthatthe   officersactedillegally,thedefendantmustbegiventheopportunitytoprove thata   substantialportionofthecaseagainsthimwasthefruitofthepoisonoustree.The   burdenthenshiftstothegovernmenttoconvincethecourtthat itsproofhadan    independentorigin,orthattheconnectionbetweentheillicitactandthegovernments   proofbecame soattenuatedastodissipatethetaint.(_Nardone_,supra.,308U.S.at341.)     InWongSunv.UnitedStates,thedefendantssoughttosuppressincriminating   statementsmadetofederalagentsfollowingtheirillegalarrests.TheCourtheldthatone   defendantsstatementwasthe fruitoftheagentsconductanddidnotresultfroman  interveningactoffreewillsufficienttopurgethetaint;itwasinadmissibleatthe  defendantscriminaltrial.Asforaseconddefendantsstatement,interveningtimeand  eventsbetweentheunlawfularrestandthedefendantsstatementpurgedthetaintofthe  illegalseizure;hisstatementwasgivenafterhereturnedvoluntarilytothestationafew  daysfollowinghisarrest.(WongSun,supra.,371U.S.at484488,491.)    TheCourtreiteratedthattheexclusionaryruleextendstotheindirectaswellasthe  directproductsoftheunlawfulsearchorseizure.(WongSun,supra.,at484485.)The  Courtdefinedtheissueaswhether theconnectionbetweenthelawlessconductofthe  policeandthediscoveryofthechallengedevidencehasbecomesoattenuatedasto  dissipatethetaint.(WongSun,supra.,at487,quotingNardone,supra.,at341.)The  Courtemphasizedthatbutforcausationwasnotasufficientbasisforexclusion:     ` Weneednotholdthatallevidenceis[the]fruitofthe !    ` poisonoustreesimplybecauseitwouldnothavecome "    ` tolightbutfortheillegalactionsofthepolice.Rather, #    ` themoreaptquestion....iswhethergrantingtheestablishment $     ` oftheprimaryillegality,theevidencetowhich...objectionis % !    ` madehasbeencomeatbyexploitationofthatillegalityor     ` insteadbymeanssufficientlydistinguishabletobepurgedof     ` theprimarytaint.(WongSun,supra.,at487488.)   0  b.Brownv.Illinois(1975)422U.S.590:TheThreeFactorTestforDetermining  ifTheTaintwasPurged (#(#   InBrownv.Illinois,theSupremeCourtrejectedalowercourtsholdingthat   Mirandawarningsarealwayssufficienttoattenuatethetaintofanunconstitutionalarrest   sothatthedefendantssubsequentstatementwouldbeadmissibleattrial.Instead,the    Courtsetforththreefactorstoconsiderindeterminingwhethertheconfessionwas   obtainedbyexploitationoftheillegalarrest.(Brown,supra.,at602603.)     InBrown,thedefendantwasarrestedtakentothepolicestationwherehewasread   hisMirandarightsandinterrogated.Lessthantwohoursafterhisarrest,heconfessed.   Sometimelater,hewasreinformedofhisMirandarights.Hegaveasecondconfession,  substantiallyinaccordwithhisfirststatement.Priortotrial,thedefendantsmotionto  suppressthetwostatementsasthefruitsofhisillegalarrestwasdenied.Bothwere  admittedattrial,andthedefendantwasconvicted.Onappeal,theIllinoisSupremeCourt  heldthatthedefendantsarrestwasunsupportedbyprobablecauseandthusunlawful.  However,thetwoconfessionswereproperlyadmittedbecausethegivingofMiranda  warningsbrokethecausalconnectionbetweentheillegalarrestandthestatements,  purgingthetaintoftheunconstitutionalseizure.(Brown,supra.,at593597.)    TheU.S.SupremeCourtrejectedtheideathattheMirandawarningswere  sufficienttorendertheconfessionsanactoffreewillunaffectedbytheunconstitutional  arrest.(Brown,supra.,at602603.)Thepurposeoftheexclusionaryruleistoprotectthe  FourthAmendmentsguaranteesby deterringlawlessconductbyfederalofficialsandby  closingthedoorsofthefederalcourtstoanyuseofevidenceunlawfullyobtained.   (Brown,supra.,at599,citingWongSun,supra.,371U.S.at486.)Allowingaperse ! exceptiontotheexclusionaryruleforstatementsmadefollowingMirandawarnings " woulddefeatthesepurposes.Policeofficerswouldbeencouragedtoarrestwithout # probablecausesotheycouldsecuresuspectsforinterrogation,knowingthatiftheygave $  Mirandawarningspriortoquestioning,anysubsequentstatementscouldbeadmissibleat % ! trial. AnyincentivetoavoidFourthAmendmentviolationswouldbeevisceratedby &!" makingthe[Miranda]warnings,ineffect,acureall.(Brown,supra.,at602603.) '"#   Thequestionofwhetheraconfessionmadesubsequenttoanillegalarrestshould )$% beexcludedasthetaintedfruitoftheseizuremustbedecidedonthefactsofeachcase; *%& nosinglefactisdispositive.ThegivingofMirandawarningsisanimportantfactorto +&' consider,butnottheonlyfactor.TheCourtemphasizedthreeother relevantfactorsthat  courtsshouldconsiderindeterminingevidencewasobtainedbyexploitationoftheillegal  arrest:1)[_t]he_Ԁtemporalproximityofthearrestandtheconfession;2)thepresenceof  interveningcircumstances;and3)particularly,thepurposeandflagrancyoftheofficial  conduct.Theprosecutionbearstheburdenofestablishingthattheevidenceisadmissible  !i.e.thatthetaintwasdissipated.(Brown,supra.,at603604.)     Assessingthesethreefactorsinthecasebeforeit,theCourtheldthatthe   defendantsconfessionsshouldhavebeenexcludedasthefruitoftheillicitarrest.   Brownsfirststatementwasseparatedfromhisarrestbylessthantwohours,andthere   werenosignificantinterveningevents.Thesecondstatementwasclearlythefruitofthe   first.Finally,theillegalseizure hadaqualityofpurposefulness.Theimproprietyofthe   arrestwasobvious.Thedetectivesarrestedthedefendantforinvestigatorypurposes,in   thehopethatsomethingmightturnup.Theegregiousmannerinwhichtheofficersmade   thearrest!breakingintothedefendantshousewhenhewasnotpresentandthen  arrestinghimatgunpointwhenhereturnedgavetheappearanceof havingbeen  calculatedtocausesurprise,frightandconfusion.(Brown,supra.,at592593;604605.)    JusticePowellwroteaconcurringopinioninBrown,joinedbyJusticeRehnquist.  Contendingthataprimarypurposeoftheruleistodeterpolicemisconductbyremoving  possibleincentivesforillegalarrests,JusticePowellarguedthatwhentheconnection  betweentheillicitarrestandtheseizureoftheincriminatingevidencewassufficiently  attenuated,exclusionoftheevidencewouldnotbeworththecost:     ` [I]nsomecircumstances,strictadherencetotheFourth     ` Amendmentexclusionaryruleimposesgreatercostonthe     ` legitimatedemandsoflawenforcementthancanbejustified     ` bytherulesdeterrentpurposes.Thenotionofthedissipation     ` ofthetaintattemptstomarkthepointatwhichthedetrimental      ` consequencesofillegalpoliceactionbecomesoattenuatedthat !    ` thedeterrenteffectoftheexclusionaryrulenolongerjustifies "    ` itscosts.(Brown,supra.,at608609.) #   c.CasesApplyingtheBrownFactors:DunawayandTaylor  %!!    `    In Dunawayv.NewYork(1979)442U.S.200 , theCourtheldthatthepolice '"# violatedthedefendantsFourthAmendmentrightswhen,withoutprobablecause,they (#$ pickedhimupandtransportedhimtothestationforinterrogation.Afterwaivinghis )$% Mirandarights,thedefendantconfessedhisinvolvementinarobberymurder.The *%& SupremeCourtconcludedthatthedefendantsconfessionwasthetaintedfruitofthe +&' illegalseizureandshouldhavebeenexcludedfromhiscriminaltrial.    TheCourtclaimedthat [t]hesituationinthiscaseisvirtuallyareplicaofthe  situationinBrown.(_Dunaway_,supra.,at218.)ThegivingofMirandawarningsdidnot  dissipatethetaintoftheofficersillegalconduct.Neitherthepassageoftimenor  interveningeventsbroketheconnectionbetweenthedefendantsillegaldetentionandhis   confession.AsinBrown,theofficersseizedthedefendantwithoutprobablecause inthe   hopethatsomethingmightturnup.Itdidnotmatterthattheofficersdidnotthreatenor   abusethedefendantorcoercehisconfession.(Dunaway,supra.,at218219.)     Inhisconcurringopinion,JusticeStevenspointsoutproblemswithtwoofthe   Brownfactors,giventhatthefocusshouldbeonwhetherthedefendantwasmotivatedto   confessbytheillegalarrestorbyothercircumstances. Thetemporalrelationship   betweenthearrestandtheconfessionmaybeanambiguousfactor.Ifthereareno   interveningcircumstances,aprolongeddetentionmaywellbeamoreseriousexploitation  ofanillegalarrestthanashortone.(Dunaway,supra.,at220.)Asfortheflagrancyof  thepolicemisconduct, [a]midnightarrestwithdrawngunswillbeequallyfrightening  whetherthepoliceactedrecklesslyoringoodfaith.(Dunaway,supra.,at220.)    In Taylorv.Alabama(1982)457U.S.687 ,thepolicearrestedthedefendant  withoutawarrantorprobablecause.Thedefendantwastakentothepolicestationwhere  hewasfingerprinted,readhisMirandarightsandquestioned.Hewasplacedinalineup,  whichdidnotyieldanidentification.Duringabreakinquestioning,hewasalloweda  shortvisitwithhisgirlfriend,afterwhich,heconfessed.(Taylor,supra.,at688689.)    ApplyingtherulesdevelopedinBrownandDunaway,theSupremeCourtheldthat  theconfessionshouldhavebeenexcludedfromevidenceatthedefendantsrobberytrial.  Thestatehadnotmetitsburdenofprovingthattimeorinterveningeventsbrokethe  causalconnectionbetweentheillegalarrestandtheconfessionsothatitwouldbedeemed    anactoffreewill.Itdidnotmatterthatsixhourselapsedbetweenthedefendants ! arrestandhisconfession,asopposedtothetwohourgapinbothBrownandDunaway. " Moreover,thegivingoftheMirandawarningsanddefendants5to10minutevisitwith # hisgirlfriendwereinsufficienttobreaktheconnectionbetweentheillegalarrestandthe $  defendantsconfession.Neitherevent couldpossiblyhavecontributedtohisabilityto %!! considercarefullyandobjectivelyhisoptionsandtoexercisehisfreewill.Finally,the &"" officersconductwassufficientlyflagrantandpurposeful. AsinDunaway,thepolice '## effectuatedaninvestigatoryarrestwithoutprobablecause,basedonanuncorroborated ($$ informantstip,and_involuntarilyy_Ԁtransported[thedefendant]tothestationinthehope )%% thatsomethingwouldturnup.Itdidnotmatterthatthepolicedidnotphysicallyabuse *&& thedefendantduringorafterthearrest.(Taylor,supra.,at690693.)  +''  0  d.NewYorkv.Harris(1990)495U.S.14 : TheExclusionaryRuleDoesnot  ApplytoaStatementTakenOutsidetheHomeFollowingaWarrantless(#(#   InHome  ArrestasLongasthePolicehadProbableCause     ThiscaseportendedtheSupremeCourtssubsequentopinioninHudsonv.  Michigan(2006)547U.S.586.Inholdingthatthedefendantspostarrestconfession   wasadmissible,theCourtfocusedonwhetherexclusionwouldpromotethegoalsofthe   specificFourthAmendmentruleviolatedbythewarrantlessinhomearrest,andwhether   suppressionwasnecessarytodeterfutureviolationsofthisrule.     InHarris,thepolicehadprobablecausetobelievethedefendanthadcommitteda   murder.Withoutobtaininganarrestwarrant,theywenttohishomeanddemandedentry.   Onceinside,thepolicesecuredawaiverofthedefendantsMirandarights,andhe   confessedtothemurder.Hewasarrestedinsidehisapartment.Hewasthentakentothe   policestationandagainreadhisMirandarights.Hesignedawritteninculpatory   statement.TheissuebeforetheSupremeCourtwaswhetherthissecondconfessionwas  properlyadmittedattrial.TheCourtheldthatitwas;theexclusionaryruledidnotapply.  (Harris,supra.,495U.S.at1516.)    ItwasundisputedthatthepoliceviolatedtheruleofPaytonv.NewYork(1980)  495U.S.573andtheFourthAmendmentbyenteringthedefendantshomeandarresting  himthereinwithoutawarrantorconsent.Thus,anyevidenceobtainedbythepolicewhile  theywereinsideofthedefendantshome,includinghisfirststatement,wasproperly  suppressed.Butthatdidnotmeanthattheconfessionobtainedbytheofficersoutsideof  thehome,followinghisillegalarrest,neededtobeexcluded,particularlybecausethe  policehadprobablecausetoarrestthedefendant.Theycouldhavearrestedhimoutside  ofhishomewithoutviolatingthelaw.(Harris,supra.,at1620.)    Thesecondoutofhomestatementwasproperlyadmittedattrial,because   exclusionofthatevidencewouldnotservethepurposesofthePaytondoctrineorthe ! exclusionaryrule. ThepenaltiesvisitedupontheGovernment,andinturnuponthe " public,becauseitsofficershaveviolatedthelawmustbearsomerelationtothepurposes # whichthelawistoserve.(Harris,supra.,at17.)ThepurposeofthePaytonruleisto $  protecttheintegrityofthehomeandbarthepolicefromcrossingthethresholdwithouta % ! warrantorconsent,eveniftheyhaveprobablecausetoarrest.Thepurposeofthe &!" exclusionaryruleistodeterpolicemisconduct,includingviolationsofPayton.The '"# purposesofbothrulesareservedbythesuppressionofevidencegatheredbytheofficers (#$ duringtheillegalinhomearrest.Thisissufficienttodeterthepolicefromviolating )$% Paytonasthey knowthatawarrantlessentrywillleadtothesuppressionofanyevidence *%& found,orstatementstaken,insidethehome.(Harris,supra.,at2021.) +&' Ї  TheCourtfoundnoneedtoapplytheBrownattenuationanalysis: Attenuation  analysisisonlyappropriatewhere,asathresholdmatter,courtsdeterminethatthe  challengedevidenceisinsomesensetheproductoftheillegalgovernmententry.Here,  incontrasttoBrown,DunawayandTaylor,thepolicehadprobablecausetoarrestthe  defendantpriortoillegalenteringhishome.Thus,hissubsequentstatementatthestation  wasnotcomeatbyexploitationoftheunlawfulentry.(Harris,supra.,at19.)     Inthisfivetofouropinion,JusticeMarshallfiledadissent.Heemphasizedthat   thepolicehadillegallyarrestedthedefendantinsideofhishome.Thus,thequestion   beforetheCourtwaswhetherthedefendantsstatementatthestationhouse,madean   hourafterhisunconstitutionalarrest,wasthetaintedfruitoftheofficersillicitconduct.   AccordingtoMarshall,themajorityansweredthisquestion byadoptingabroadand   unprecedentedprinciple!thatasuspectsstatementmadefollowinganunlawfulin   homearrestwasadmissibleifthepolicehadprobablecauseandthestatementwastaken   outsideofthehome.(Harris,supra.,at2122.)    JusticeMarshallaccusedthemajorityofignoringthedeterrentpurposeofthe  exclusionaryruleandcreatinganincentiveforthepolice,armedwithprobablecause,to  circumventthewarrantprocess,enterthesuspectshomeinviolationofPayton,makean  illegalinhomearrest,andthendragthesuspectoutsidetotakehisstatement.Once  outside,thesuspect, shakenbytheenormousinvasionofprivacyhehasjustundergone,  maywellsaysomethingincriminating.(Harris,supra.,at22,3132.)    Incontrast,theattenuationanalysisdevelopedinWongSun,Brown,Dunawayand  Taylor,arosefrom anunderstandingofhowextensiveexclusionmustbetodeter  violationsoftheFourthAmendment!thatitmustextendtothederivativeevidence  obtainedbyexploitationoftheillegalpoliceconduct.TheCourtshouldhaveappliedthe  Brownattenuationanalysistothefactsofthiscase,andifithadconsideredthethree  relevantfactors,thestatementtakenfromthedefendantatthepolicestationonehour   afterhisarrestwouldhavebeensuppressed._(Harris,_Ԁsupra.,at2325.) !   0    (#(#    '##    E.Hudsonv.Michigan(2006)547U.S.586:TheExclusionaryRuleDoes  notApplytoEvidenceSeizedFollowingaKnockNoticeViolation     1.AnalysisofHudsonv.Michigan  af   JustafewmonthsafterChiefJusticeRobertsandJusticeAlitojoinedtheSupreme [ ` Court,theCourtissueditsopinioninHudson,furtherlimitingapplicationofthe [ ` exclusionaryrule.TheCourtadoptedarareperserule,holdingthatevidenceseized [ ` duringasearchfollowinganunconstitutionalknocknoticeviolationneednotbe [ ` suppressedinacriminaltrial. [`  _   `  _  Hudsonisafivetofouropinion.JusticeScaliawrotethemajorityopinion,joined [`  byChiefJusticeRoberts,JusticeThomas,JusticeAlitoandJusticeKennedy.Justice [`  Kennedywroteaseparateconcurringopinion.JusticeBreyerwroteadissentingopinion, [`  joinedbyJusticesStevens,SouterandGinsberg. [`   a.TheMajorityOpinion  [`   InHudson,policeofficersobtainedavalidwarrantauthorizingasearchofthe UZ defendantshome.Uponarrivingatthehousetoexecutethewarrant,theofficers UZ announcedtheirpresencebutonlywaitedthreetofivesecondsbeforeenteringthe UZ residencethroughtheunlockeddoor.Subsequently,theofficerssearchedthehomeand UZ seizedevidenceleadingtothedefendantsprosecutionfordrugsandgunpossession. UZ   TheCourtheldthatalthoughtheofficershadviolatedknocknoticerulesandmade UZ anunconstitutionalentryintothedefendantshome,theevidencesubsequentlyseized UZ neednotbeexcludedinthisoranyothercriminalcase.Evidenceobtainedfollowingan UZ entrymadeinviolationofknocknoticemaybefreelyadmittedattrial.Otherremedies U Z aresufficienttoremedyanddeterknocknoticeviolations,whichgotothemannerof U!Z entryandnotthepoliceofficersrighttosearch. U"Z   Preliminarily,theCourtconfirmedthatcompliancewithlongstandingknock U$Z noticerulesisstillconstitutionallymandated.The commonlawprinciplethatlaw U%Z  enforcementofficersmustannouncetheirpresenceandprovideresidentsanopportunity U&Z!! toopenthedoorbeforeenteringwasnotonlyrequiredbystatutebutcommandedbythe U'Z"" FourthAmendment.(SeeWilsonv.Arkansas(1995)514U.S.927.)(Hudson,supra.,at U(Z## 589.)However,thatdidnotmeanthatprobativeevidencesecuredpursuanttoavalid U)Z$$ warrantfollowingthisillegalentryshouldbesuppressed. U*Z%%  U+Z&&   TheCourtredefinedexclusionofunlawfullyseizedevidenceasanexception  ratherthanarule. Suppressionofevidence,however,hasalwaysbeenourlastresort,not  ourfirstimpulse.(Hudson,supra.,at591.)Throughtheyears,ratherthanlimiting  applicationoftheexclusionaryrule, [w]ehavebeencautiousagainstexpandingit.  Admittedly,thiswasnotalwaysthecase. ExpansivedictainMapp,forexample,  suggestedwidescopefortheexclusionaryrule.....Butwehavelongsincerejectedthat   approach.NolongerwouldtheCourtreflexivelyapplytherulewheneverevidencewas   seizedduringorfollowingaFourthAmendmentviolation.(Hudson,supra.,at591.)     TheCourtdrewalinebetweentheofficersentryintothehomeandtheir   subsequentsearch,stressingthatwithaknocknoticeviolation,itisonlythe mannerof   entrythatisillegal.Thepolicearearmedwithavalidsearchwarrantandthushavethe   righttosearchthehouseandseizeevidencedescribedinthewarrantdespitethis    preliminarymisstep.(Hudson,supra.,at592.)     Noevidenceisdiscoveredduringaknocknoticeviolation.Thus,theCourt  consideredwhethertheevidenceseizedfromthehomeshouldbeexcludedasthetainted  fruitofthatviolation.TheCourtconcludedthatwithaknocknoticeviolation,theillegal  mannerofentryisnotthebutforcauseofobtainingtheevidence. Whetherthat  preliminarymisstephadoccurredornot,thepolicewouldhaveexecutedthewarrantthey  hadobtainedandwouldhavediscoveredthegunanddrugsinsidethehouse.(Hudson,  supra.,at592.)Consequently,theCourtdidnotapplythetraditionalattenuationanalysis  ofWongSunandBrownv.Illinoistodeterminewhethertheevidencewasobtainedby  exploitationoftheknocknoticeviolation.Instead,theCourtappliedadistincttypeof  attenuationanalysisadoptedfromNewYorkv.Harris(1990)495U.S.14:     ` [A]ttenuationcanoccur...whenthecausalconnection     ` isremote.Attenuationalsooccurswhen,evengivena     ` directcausalconnection,theinterestprotectedbythe      ` constitutionalguaranteethathasbeenviolatedwouldnot !    ` beservedbysuppressionoftheevidenceobtained.The "    ` penaltiesvisitedupontheGovernment,andinturnupon #    ` thepublic,becauseitsofficershaveviolatedthelawmust $     ` bearsomerelationtothepurposeswhichthelawistoserve. %!!    ` (Hudson,supra.,at593,citingHarris,supra.,495U.S.at14.) &""   InHarris,theCourthaddeclinedtosuppressaconfessionobtainedafterthepolice ($$ hadtakenthedefendantoutofthehomefollowinganillegalwarrantlessentryandarrest )%% madeinviolationofPaytonv.NewYork(1980)445U.S.573.TheCourthadstressed *&& thattheofficershadprobablecauseforthearrestandheldthatexcludingtheconfession +'' wouldnotservethepurposeofthePaytonrule,whichwastoprotecttheintegrityofthe  homeandbarofficersfromcrossingthethresholdwithoutawarrant.Thatpurposewas  adequatelyservedbysuppressingallevidencegatheredbytheofficersinsidethehome.  Moreover,suppressionoftheinhomeevidenceadequatelydeterredfutureviolationsof  Payton.(Harris,supra.,495at1721.)    InHudson,theCourtheldthatevidencefoundinthehomefollowingaknock   noticeviolationshouldnotbeexcluded,becausesuppressionwouldnotvindicatethe   interestsprotectedbytheknockandannouncerequirements.Unlikethewarrantand   probablecauserequirements,knocknoticerulesdonotprotectindividualsrightsto   shieldtheirpersons,houses,andeffectsfromgovernmentscrutiny.Rather,theinterests   protectedbyknocknoticerulesare:1)toprotectlifeandlimbfromtheviolencethatmay   beprovokedbyanunannouncedentry;2)toavoidthedestructionofpropertyoccasioned   byaforcibleentry;and3)toprotectelementsofprivacyanddignitythatmightbe   adverselyaffectedbyasuddenunexpectedpoliceentrance;knocknoticegivesresidents  theopportunitytoprepareforthepoliceentrybypullingonclothesandcollecting  themselvesbeforeansweringthedoor.Theseinterests,violatedbytheunlawfulmanner  ofentry, havenothingtodowiththeseizureofevidenceandwouldnotbeservedby  excludingthatevidencefromtrial.Onceavalidsearchwarranthasissued,theresidents  havenorighttopreventthegovernmentfromenteringandsearchingthehome,orfrom  seeingandtakingevidencedescribedinthewarrant.(Hudson,supra.,at594.)    TheCourtthenengagedinamoretypicalexclusionaryruleanalysis,focusingon  thedeterrentpurposeoftherule.TheCourtassertedthat theexclusionaryrulehasnever  beenappliedexceptwhereitsdeterrencebenefitsoutweighitssubstantialsocialcosts.  (Hudson,supra.,at594595,quotingLeon,supra.468U.S.at907.)TheCourtassessed  the considerablesocialcostsincurredwhenthecourtsexcludeevidencefollowinga  knocknoticeviolation.Ofcourse,thereisthecostthatalwaysresultsfromthe  suppressionofrelevantincriminatingevidence!allowingdangerouscriminalstobe   releasedintosociety.(Hudson,supra.,at595.) !   Butthentherearecostsparticulartothiscontext:1)Providingtheremedyof # suppressiontocriminaldefendantsencourages aconstantfloodofsuppressionmotions $  allegingpolicefailuretocomplywithknocknotice. Thecostsofenteringthislottery %!! wouldbesmall,butthejackpotenormous:suppressionofallevidence,amountingin &"" manycasestoagetoutofjailfreecard.2)Litigatingknocknoticeclaimsisdifficult '## becausetherulesarepurposelyvague.3)Toavoidthislitigation,policeofficerswillwait ($$ toolongbeforeenteringaresidence, producingpreventableviolenceagainstofficersin )%% somecases,andthedestructionofevidenceinmanyothers.#a##\#Ԁ(Hudson,supra.,at595.) *&&  +''   Weighedagainstthesesocialcosts,excludingthefruitsofaknocknoticeviolation  haslittledeterrenteffect.Policeofficersarmedwithalawfulsearchwarranthavelittle  incentivetoviolateknocknotice.Presumably,thepolicedontwanttoendanger  themselvesorothersbyburstinginandprovokingaviolentresponse,eventhoughthey  mightpreventthedestructionofevidencetriggeredbyanannouncementoftheirintended  entry.Thus,#G### massivedeterrenceishardlyrequired.####Ԁ(Hudson,supra.,at595596.)     Moreover,thereareotherwaystodeterknocknoticeviolations.Victimscanfile   civillawsuitsfordamagesorcivilrightsactionsforwhichattorneysfeesareavailable.   TheCourtclaimedthat thelowercourtsareallowingknockandannouncesuitstogo   forwardunimpededbyassertionsofqualifiedimmunity.(Hudson,supra.,at596.)   Finally,theprospectofinternaldepartmentdisciplineandbetterpolicetraining   discourageofficersfromviolatingknocknotice.(Hudson,supra.,at598599.)     ReadingHudson,onesensesthatJusticeScaliadoesnotthinkviolationsofknock  noticerulesrankveryhighonthescaleofFourthAmendmentintrusions.Afterall,these  rulesaffectonlythe mannerofentryandnottheofficersrighttosearchandseize  evidence,whichhasbeenvalidatedbyawarrantsupportedbyprobablecause.Justice  Scaliareferredtoaknocknoticeviolationasa preliminarymisstep(Hudson,supra.,at  592),andhecharacterizedtherightprotectedbyknocknoticerequirementsas theright  nottobeintrudeduponinonesnightclothes.(Hudson,supra.,at597.)      b.JusticeKennedysConcurringOpinion     Inashortconcurringopinion,JusticeKennedyemphasizesthreepoints.First,the  Courtsopinionlimitingapplicationoftheexclusionaryrule,appliesonlytoknocknotice  violations. [T]hecontinuedoperationoftheexclusionaryrule,assettledanddefinedby  ourprecedents,isnotindoubt.(Hudson,supra.,at603.)###τ#Ԁ    Second,theCourtsopinionshouldnotbereadassuggestingthatviolationsof ! longstandingandconstitutionallyrequiredknocknoticerulesare trivialorbeyondthe " lawsconcern.(Hudson,supra.,at602603.)Thebasicrightsinquestion!onesprivacy # andsecurityinonesownhome!arecentraltotheFourthAmendmentsguarantees.If $  policeofficerspersistinviolatingthesanctityofthehomebyignoringtherequisitesof % ! lawfulentry,thenthegovernmentshouldfortifyproceduresfortrainingpoliceofficers &!" andenhancedisciplinaryprocedureswithdetailedlegislation.Theseefforts,alongwith '"# theavailabilityofcivilremedies,shouldbesufficienttodeterandpunisheventhemost (#$ seriousknocknoticeviolations.(Hudson,supra.,at603.) )$%   Third,JusticeKennedyviewedtheissueinHudsonasinvolvingattenuation. +&'  [T]hecausallinkbetweenaviolationoftheknockandannouncerequirementandalater  searchistooattenuatedtoallowsuppression.Theevidenceisdiscoverednotbecauseof  afailuretoknockandannounce,butbecauseofasubsequentsearchconductedpursuant  toalawfulwarrantsupportedbyprobablecause.####Ԁ(Hudson,supra.,at603604.)    c.JusticeBreyersDissent      JusticeBreyerwroteastrongdissent.Heassertedthatthemajorityopinion    destroysthestrongestlegalincentivetocomplywiththeConstitutionsknocknotice   requirements.(Hudson,supra.,at605.)Aslongrecognized,the drivingpurpose    underlyingtheexclusionaryruleistodeterthepolicefromviolatingcitizensFourth   Amendmentrights.(Hudson,supra.,at608.)Theonlyeffectivewaytodeterknock   noticeviolationsistosuppressevidenceseizedduringthesearchfollowingtheillegal   entry.Ifthepoliceknowthattheycanenterahomeillegally,withoutriskingsuppression   oftheevidencefoundinside,theywillhavenoreasontocomplywithknocknoticewhen   asurpriseentrywouldbetacticallyadvantageous.(Hudson,supra.,at609.)Noknock  entrieswillundoubtedlyincrease,andresidentswillhavenorecoursebuttosufferthese  invasionsuponpropertyandprivacy.    Asrecognizedinmanyexclusioncases,othermechanismsforenforcingFourth  Amendmentrightshaveprovedworthlessandfutile.(Hudson,supra.,at607608.)The  vagueprospectofcivildamageorcivilrightslawsuitsisneitherareasonabledisincentive  topolicemisconductnoraviableremedyforvictimizedhomeoccupants.JusticeBreyer  notedthat [t]hecasesreportingknockandannounceviolationsarelegion....sufficiently  frequentandserioustoindicateawidespreadpattern.Yetthemajorityfailedtoturnupa  singlereportedcase inwhichaplaintiffhascollectedmorethannominaldamagesby  claimingaknocknoticeviolation.Indeed,asthegovernmentconceded,inmostcases  damagesmaybevirtuallynonexistent.Civilactionsareexpensive,timeconsuming,not  readilyavailable,andrarelysuccessful.(Hudson,supra.,at610611.)     JusticeBreyerchallengedthemajoritysclaimthatanillegalentry,madein " violationofknocknotice,isnotthebutforcauseoftheofficerssubsequentseizureof # incriminatingevidence.Inthepresentcase, [a]lthoughthepolicemighthaveentered $  Hudsonshomelawfully,theydidnotinfactdoso.Theirunlawfulbehaviorinseparably % ! characterizestheiractualentry;thatentrywasanecessaryconditionoftheirpresencein &!" Hudsonshome,andtheirpresenceinHudsonshomewasanecessaryconditionoftheir '"# findingandseizingtheevidence.Onecannotseparatethe mannerofentryfromthe (#$ relatedsearch.(Hudson,supra.,at615.) )$%   Thedissentcriticizedthemajoritysredefinitionof attenuationasoccurring +&'  when,givenadirectcausalconnection,theinterestprotectedbytheconstitutional  guaranteethathasbeenviolatedwouldnotbeservedbythesuppressionoftheevidence  obtained.(Hudson,supra.,at620.)JusticeBreyerarguedthatthemajorityminimizedthe  interestsprotectedbyknocknotice.Theserulesexistnotonlytoprotecthomeowners  fromdamageddoorsandtoprotectoccupantsfromsurpriseandtheindignityofbeing   intrudeduponinonesnightclothes.TherulesprotectcoreFourthAmendmentvalues!   thesanctityofoneshomeandtheprivaciesoflife.(Hudson,supra.,at620621.)     JusticeBreyerstatedthatthemajorityopinionrepresentedasignificantdeparture   fromtheCourtsprecedentsintwoareas.First,themajoritydisregardedalonglineof   precedentaffirmingthehistoricalimportanceofknocknoticerequirements,andthe   Courtsownopinionholdingthatfailuretocomplywiththeserulesrendersthe   subsequentsearchandseizureconstitutionallydefective.(Hudson,supra.,at605606.)     Second,andmoreimportantly,themajorityrulingignoredprecedentsrecognizing  thattheexclusionaryrulewasessentialtoeffectuateFourthAmendmentprotections.By  suppressingevidenceseizedfollowingaFourthAmendmentviolation,theCourtassured  thatthegovernmentcouldnotretainandusetheevidencetoitsbenefitinacriminaltrial.  ThesecasesgavemeaningtotheConstitutionalpromise.(Hudson,supra.,at607608.)    Butevenassumingthatdeterrencewasthepurposeoftheexclusionaryrule,the  Courthadpreviouslydeclinedtoapplytheexclusionaryruleonlywhensuppressionofthe  evidencewouldnotresultinappreciabledeterrence!e.g.whenthepoliceofficerrelied  onadefectivewarrantingoodfaith;orwhentheprosecutionprofferedtheevidencein  proceedingsotherthancriminaltrials.Neitheroftheseexceptionsapplywhenanofficer  knowinglyornegligentlyviolatesknocknoticerequirements,withoutreasonablyrelying  onanotherserrorormisjudgment,andthegovernmentintroducesthesubsequently  seizedevidenceatthedefendantscriminaltrial.(Hudson,supra.,at612613.)    Finally,thedissentwarnedthatthemajoritysanalysiswilllikelyleadtodenying ! theexclusionaryremedytodefendantswhohavesufferedotherFourthAmendment " violations.Scaliafoundthattheconsiderablesocialcostsofapplyingtheexclusionary # ruletoknocknoticeviolationsoutweighedthedeterrencebenefits.Buttheconsiderable $  socialcostscitedbyScaliaexistineverycriminalcasewhenillegallyseizedevidenceis %!! suppressed.Ineverycase wheretheconstableblunders,aguiltydefendantmaybeset &"" free.(Hudson,supra.,at614.) '##   ($$  2.TheImpactofHudson/CasesApplyingHudson  #  7           ##TheimmediateimpactofHudsonisobvious.Acriminaldefendantcannolonger  raiseaknocknoticeviolationclaiminamotiontosuppressevidence.Moreover,the  opinionsurelytakestheteethoutofknocknoticeenforcement.AsJusticeBreyerstatesin  thedissentingopinion: Todaysopinion.....weakens,perhapsdestroys,muchofthe   practicalvalueoftheConstitutionsknockandannounceprotection.Ifevidence   discoveredfollowinganillegalentrywillbeadmittedatacriminaltrial,policeofficers   willhavelittlereasontoknock,announcetheirpresenceandwaitseveralsecondsbefore   burstingin.Thetheoreticalpossibilityofcivillawsuitsorinternalpolicediscipline,    sometimeinthefuture,willnotassurecompliance.#D##w#     InthethreeandonehalfyearssinceHudsonwasdecided,thelowercourts!for   themostpart!haveheededthelimitationsurgedbyJusticeKennedyinhisconcurring   opinion.MostofthecasesapplyingHudsontodenythesuppressionofevidencehave   beenknocknoticecases,inwhichincriminatingevidencewasdiscoveredfollowingthe  knocknoticeviolation.    TwocasesfromtheNinthCircuithaveappliedHudsontoupholdtheadmissibility  ofevidencesecuredafterdistincttypesofFourthAmendmentviolations!anentryto  serveasearchwarrantaccomplishedbytheuseofexcessiveforce(UnitedStatesv.  Ankeny(9thCir.2007)502F.3d829);andanofficersfailuretoservethedefendantwith  theactualsearchwarrantduringthesearch.(UnitedStatesv.Hector(9thCir.2007)474  F.3d1150.)However,inbothofthesecases,asinHudson,theofficershadavalid  warrant,supportedbyprobablecause,entitlingthemtoenterandsearchtheresidence.  Twocases,fromtheTenthandSixthCircuits,havedeclinedtoapplyHudsonsruleand  rationaletoevidenceseizedfollowingillegalresidentialsearcheswhentheofficersdid  notviolateknocknoticeanddidnothaveanindependentrighttoenterandsearch.(See  UnitedStatesv.Cos(10thCir.2007)498F.3d1115[evidencesuppressedfollowing   illegalentrywhenthirdpartydidnothaveactualorapparentauthoritytoconsent];United ! Statesv.Hardin(6thCir.2008)539404[evidenceexcludedwhenofficersenter " apartmenttoservearrestwarrantwithoutreasonablebeliefthatdefendantinside].) #   TheonlyothercaseextendingHudsonwasUnitedStatesv.FariasGonzalez(11th % ! Cir.2009)556F.3d1181.Inthatcase,theEleventhCircuitemployedthecostbenefit &!" balancingtestusedbytheSupremeCourtincasesfromCalandrathroughHudson.The '"# courtbalancedthecostsofexcludingevidence(fingerprintsandphotos)foraspecific  purposeattrial(toprovetheundocumentedimmigrantsidentity)againstthedeterrence  benefitsinthisparticularcontext.Thisisanunprecedentedapplicationofthebalancing  testwhichshouldbeconfinedtoitsfacts.   0  a.ApplyingHudsontoEvidenceSeizedFollowingCaliforniaandFederal   KnockNoticeViolations  (#(#   TwomonthsafterHudson,theCaliforniaCourtofAppeal(FirstDistrict,Division   Five)publishedInreFrankS.(2006)142Cal.App.4th145,holdingthatthe    incriminatingevidencefoundonthedefendantfollowingaknocknoticeviolationneed   notbesuppressedfromhiscriminaltrial.TheCourtheldthatthereasoningandruleof   Hudsonapplied,eventhoughinthiscase,theofficersenteredtheresidencenottoexecute   asearchwarrant,buttoarrestthedefendant,aparolee,foraparoleviolation.     FollowingHudson,therehavebeenseveralfederalCourtofAppealscasesholding  thatevidenceseizedfollowinganunconstitutionalentryintoaresidence,madein  violationofknocknoticerequirements,neednotbesuppressed.InUnitedStatesv.  Pelletier(1stCir.2006)469F.3d194,theCourtheldthatHudsonprecludesthe  suppressionofevidenceseizedfollowingaknocknoticeviolationcommittedwhile  executingaparoleviolationarrestwarrant.InUnitedStatesv.Smith(6thCir.2008)526  306,theCourtheldthatevidencefoundduringalawfulparolesearchneednotbe  suppressedeventhoughtheofficersviolatedknocknoticerulesinenteringtheresidence.  SeveralcircuitshaveheldthatunderHudson,evidenceisadmissibleifitwasseized  followingaresidentialentrythatviolatedknocknoticerulesdefinedbyfederalstatute.  (SeeUnitedStatesv.Bruno(5thCir.2007)487F.3d304;UnitedStatesv.Acosta(2dCir.  2007)502F.3d54;UnitedStatesv.Southerland(D.C.Cir.2006)466F.3d1083.)   0  b.UnitedStatesv.Hector(9thCir.2007)474F.3d1150:NoSuppressionof   EvidenceSeizedPursuanttoaValidSearchWarrant,WhenthePoliceFailedto ! ServetheDefendantWiththeWarrantDuringtheSearch "(#(#    `     h      p       InUnitedStatesv.Hector(9thCir.2007)474F.3d1150,theNinthCircuitapplied $  Hudsontoanother preliminarymisstepintheexecutionofavalidwarrant.Thepolice % ! hadacquiredavalidwarranttosearchthedefendantsapartment.Duringthesearch,the &!" officersfailedtoservethedefendantwithacopyofthesearchwarrant.Theydiscovereda '"# handgunandcocaineinthedefendantshome.(Hector,supra.,474F.3dat11521153.) (#$   TheissuesbeforetheNinthCircuitwere:1)whethertheofficersviolatedthe *%& defendantsFourthAmendmentrightsbyfailingtopresenthimwithacopyofthevalid +&' warrantatthetimeofthesearch;and2)whethertheclaimedFourthAmendment  violationmeritedthesuppressionofevidenceseizedpursuanttothesearchwarrant.  (Hector,supra.,at1151.)TheNinthCircuitdidnotresolvethefirstissuebecausethey  foundthattheevidenceseizedduringthesearchauthorizedbythevalidwarrantneednot  beexcludedfromthedefendantstrial.(Hector,supra.,at1154.)    TheCourtappliedHudson,andfoundthatthefailuretoservethesearchwarrant   wasnotthebutforcauseofthediscoveryoftheincriminatingevidence. Thecausal   connectionbetweenthefailuretoservethewarrantandtheevidenceseizedishighly   attenuated,indeednonexistentinthiscase.(Hector,supra.,at1155.)Regardlessof   whetherthepolicehadshownthedefendantthevalidwarrant,theystillwouldhave   executeditanddiscoveredtheevidenceinsidetheapartment.(Hector,supra.,at1155.)     TheCourtalsoassessedtheconsiderablecostsofexcludingrelevantevidence   obtainedpursuanttoavalidwarrantagainstthedeterrencebenefitsofsuppressingthe  evidenceduetothisparticularviolation.Becauseofficershavelittleincentivetofailto  presentvalidsearchwarrantstohomeoccupants, resorttothemassiveremedyof  suppressingevidenceofguilt[was]unjustifiedinthiscase.(Hector,supra.,at1155.)#ϖ ##T #   0  c.UnitedStatesv.Ankeny(9thCir.2007)502F.3d829:EvidenceSeized  FollowinganEntrytoaResidenceDuringWhichtheOfficersUsedExcessive  ForceNeednotbeSuppressed (#(#   InUnitedStatesv.Ankeny(9thCir.2007)502F.3d829,inanopinionwrittenby  JudgeGarber,theNinthCircuitappliedHudsoninamannerthatsparkedastrongdissent  andcriticismfromcommentators.ThecourtheldthatHudsonprecludesthesuppression  ofevidenceseizedafterofficersuseexcessiveandunreasonableforcetoenterahomein  ordertoexecuteasearchwarrant.    InAnkeny,thePortlandPolicereceivedadomesticviolenceandweapons ! complaintregardingthedefendantwhohadseveraloutstandingwarrantsandanextensive " criminalhistory.Theofficersdecidedtoarrestthedefendantatthehousewherehewas # living,ratherthanonthestreetbecauseofhisrecordofviolenceandhostilitytothe $  police.Thepoliceobtainedawarrantforaninhomearrestandsearch,andtheydecided % ! toexecuteitintheearlymorninghours.Atotalof44officersexecutedthewarrantat &!" 5:30a.m.Theyyelled, police,searchwarrant,whilepoundingonthedoorandbroke '"# downthedooronesecondlater.Afterentering,theysawthedefendantsleepingona (#$ reclinernearthefrontdoor.Officersorderedhimtogetdownandthrewaflashbang )$% deviceintothecenteroftheroomwhichexploded,causingfirstandseconddegreeburns *%& tothedefendantsfaceandupperbody.Otherofficersshotoutthewindowswithrubber +&' bulletsandthrewasecondflashbangdeviceintothesecondfloor,causingafire.  Extensivedamagedonetothehousecostmorethan$14,000torepair.Officersfound  gunsinproximitytothedefendantandhewasprosecutedforillegalfirearmpossession.  (Ankeny,supra.,502F.3dat832834.)    Thedefendantfiledamotiontosuppresstheevidencefoundinthehouse,alleging   thattheofficersentryintothehomewasunconstitutionalbecause:1)thepoliceviolated   knocknoticerules;and2)theyusedexcessiveforcerenderingthesubsequentsearch   unreasonable.TheNinthCircuitquicklydisposedofthefirstclaim,holdingthat   regardlessofwhethertheofficershadviolatedknocknotice,suppressionwasforeclosed   bytheSupremeCourtsdecisioninHudson.(Ankeny,supra.,at835.)TheCourtalso   appliedHudsontoholdthatevenifthemanneroftheofficersentrywasunconstitutional   duetoexcessiveforce,evidenceseizedsubsequenttothisentrywouldnotbeexcluded   fromevidence. #  8      ׀Theunreasonablyentryandthediscoveryofevidence lackthecausal   nexusthatisrequiredtoinvoketheexclusionaryrule.(Ankeny,supra.,at836838.)    TheNinthCircuitheldthattheexclusionaryruleappliesonlywhentheFourth  Amendmentviolationisthebutforcauseoftheofficersprocuringoftheevidence.In  thepresentcase,theofficersdiscoveryofthedefendantsgunswas notcausallyrelated  tothemannerofexecutingthewarrant.Thepolicehadavalidwarrantandtheguns  werenothidden. Evenwithouttheuseofaflashbangdevice,rubberbullets,oranyof  theothermethodsthatDefendantchallenges,thepolicewouldhaveexecutedthewarrant  theyhadobtained,andwouldhavediscoveredthe[evidence]insidethehouse.(Ankeny,  supra.,at838,quotingHudson,supra.,547U.S.at592.)Thus,exclusionoftheevidence  foundinsidethehomewasnotwarranted.    JudgeReinhardtfiledadissentinAnkeny,vigorouslyprotestingthemajoritys  extensionofHudsontocreate ablanketexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleforsearches  executedwithexcessiveforcewhenevertheofficerspossessavalidwarrant.(Ankeny,   supra.,502F.3dat847.)ReinhardtclaimedthatsuppressionwasappropriateinAnkeny ! becauseitwasnota preliminarymisstepduringtheentrybutthemannerofthesearch " whichledtothediscoveryoftheincriminatingevidence.(Ankeny,supra.,at842.) #   AcknowledgingthatHudsonheldthat suppressionisnolongeraremedyfor %!! constitutionalviolationsoftheknockandannouncerequirements,JudgeReinhardt &"" notedthatthemajoritywasdividedonthebasisforthisholding.JusticeKennedy,whose '## concurringopinionprovidedthemajoritysfifthvote,gavetherulinganarrowreading.  KennedydidnotjoinintheportionofJusticeScaliasopinionwhichattemptedtolink  HudsonsrejectionofsuppressionasaremedyforviolatingtheFourthAmendments  knocknoticerequirementstoabroadertrendabandoningtheexclusionaryruleinother  contexts.Instead,JusticeKennedycautionedthat thecontinuedoperationofthe  exclusionaryrule,assettledanddefinedbyourprecedents,isnotindoubt,andthatthe   Hudsonrulingonlyappliedtothediscoveryofevidencefollowingknocknotice   violations.(Ankeny,supra.,at842843,quotingHudson,supra.,547U.S.at603.)   Moreover,JusticeKennedyconcurredwiththemajorityopiniononlyduetoattenuation!   becausethecausallinkbetweenaviolationoftheknockandannouncerequirementand   alatersearchistooattenuatedtoallowsuppressionofthesubsequentlydiscovered   evidence.(Ankeny,supra.,at843,Hudson,supra.,at603604.)     JudgeReinhardtaddressedattenuationinAnkeny.Heclaimedthattheofficers   usedexcessiveforcenotonlyinthemannerofentrybutduringthesearchitself,andit  wasthatsearch, permeatedwithillegality,thatleddirectlytothediscoveryofthe  incriminatingevidence. Theprincipalexcessiveforcewasdirectedagainstpersons,not  property,andtheforcewasappliedaftertheofficershadenteredthedwellingandwerein  theprocessofexecutingthesearchwarrant.(Ankeny,supra.,at844,n.1.)Thus,this  caseisverydifferentfromHudson,wheretheFourthAmendmentviolationoccurred  beforetheofficersenteredtheresidenceandwasfollowedbyalawfulsearchlastingfive  hourswhichuncoveredtheincriminatingevidence.Inthiscase,thediscoveryoftheguns  wascausallyrelatedtotheunconstitutionalsearch.(Ankeny,supra.,at844.)    Next,JudgeReinhardtarguedthatthecostbenefitanalysisappliedinHudson  favoredsuppressionofevidencesecuredduringa militarystylesearchconductedwith  excessiveforce.Thecostsofexclusionwereminor.Excessiveforceclaimsariseonly  rarely,anditisrelativelyeasyforcourtsto discernwhichextraordinarytacticsconstitute  excessiveforce.(Ankeny,supra.,at845.)Moreover, inthecontextofasearchexecuted   withexcessiveforce...thebenefitsofdeterrencearetremendous!avoidingunnecessary ! destructionofprivatepropertyandreducingtheriskofseriousinjuryanddeathtoallwho " occupythehome,includinginnocentchildren. Certainly,therightnottobesetafireor # killedinonesnightclothesisfarmoregraveandworthyorprotectionthattherightnot $  tobeintrudeduponinthatattire.(Ankeny,supra.,at846.)JudgeReinhardtcautioned %!! thatthisrulingcouldencouragetheexcessiveuseofforceandleadtodireand &"" unfortunateconsequences.(Ankeny,supra.,at847.) '##  0   #S,##,# (#(# #@Q##ςQ#  *&&  0  d.UnitedStatesv.FariasGonzalez(11thCir.2009)556F.3d1181 : Evidence  ObtainedDuringanUnlawfulSearchandSeizureareAdmissibleOnlytoProve  theDefendantsIdentity (#(#   Inthisunusualcase,theEleventhCircuitappliedHudsons costbenefitbalancing  testtothefruitsofaFourthAmendmentviolationthatdidnotinvolvethemannerof   executingavalidsearchwarrant.TheCourtheldthatevidenceobtainedduringan   unlawfulsearchandseizuremaybeadmissibleinacriminaltrialforonepurpose!to   provethedefendantsidentity!butpresumablynotforotherpurposes.     InFariasGonzalez,twoImmigrationandCustomsEnforcementagentswere   patrollinganapartmentcomplexinAtlantaforpossiblegangactivity.Theyapproached   thedefendantbecausehehadpossiblegangtattoosandidentifiedthemselvesaspolice.   Afterthedefendantdeniedgangaffiliation,oneagentliftedthedefendantsshirttolook   atthetattoosonhisupperarm.Theagents,whowerevisiblyarmed,thenaskedthe   defendantforidentification.TheyaccompaniedhimintohisapartmenttogethisID.  Insidetheapartment,thedefendantprovideddriverslicensesinthenameof Norberto  Gonzalezandclaimedhehadbeentoprison.Theagentstoldthedefendanttotakeoff  hisshirtandtookphotographsofhistattoos.Arecordscheckrevealednoinformationfor  NorbertoGonzalez.Aftertheagentstookthedefendantsfingerprints,theylearnedthat  hewasFariasGonzalezandhadpreviouslybeendeported.Hewasprosecutedfor  illegallyreenteringthecountry.However,thecourtdeclinedtosuppressthe identifying  information,includingthefingerprintsandphotographs.(_Farias_ԄGonzalez,supra.,556  F.3dat11821184.)    TheEleventhCircuitfoundthatthedefendanthadbeenillegallydetainedand  searched(whentheofficerslifteduphisshirt)atthetimethattheofficersprocuredthe  incriminatingevidence.#Q#ԀNevertheless,the identityrelatedevidence(thefingerprintsand  photographs)shouldnotbeexcludedfromthecriminalprosecutionifofferedsolelyto   provethedefendantsidentity.(FariasGonzalez,supra.,at1187.) !   TheCourtofAppealreachedthisconclusionbyapplyingthe costbenefit # balancingtestattributedtoHudson(althoughactuallyusedbytheSupremeCourtsince $  Calandra.)#n\#TheCourtfoundthatthesocialcostsofexcludingevidenceofthe % ! defendantsidentityfromacriminalprosecutionwereconsiderable.Ifthedefendantwere &!" permittedto hidewhoheis,thegovernmentmightnotconsiderhiscriminalhistory, '"# whichcouldprecludethepropersentencingorallowthedefendanttoescapepunishment (#$ forcertaincrimesoravoidthecourtsjurisdiction,particularlyinadeportationcase. )$% (FariasGonzalez,supra.,at#^#Ԁ11861188.) *%&  +&'   Ontheotherhand,thedeterrencebenefitsofsuppressingidentityrelatedevidence  wouldbeminimal.Lawenforcementagentswouldhavelittleincentivetoillegallydetain  orsearchanindividualtogainevidenceofhisidentitybecausetheycaneasilyfindout  whoheiswithoutviolatingtheFourthAmendment.Forexample,policeofficerscan  requireanindividualtoidentifyhimselfduringavalidTerrystoporobtainfingerprints  andphotographswithoutconductingasearch.(FariasGonzalez,supra.,at#Ja#Ԁ11881189.)#<#Ԁruleapplied.Thegovernmentasserted  thattheJune2006searchofthevehiclesgloveboxwasconductedingoodfaithunder  thethenprevailinginterpretationof#χ<#Belton#Ϙ=#.Consequently,theexclusionaryruleshould  notapply.Thegovernmentreliedon#=#Herring#ϐ>#Ԁwhichpurportedlyheldthat whetherthe  exclusionaryruleshouldbeappliedtoasearchinviolationoftheFourthAmendment  turnsontheculpabilityofthepoliceandthepotentialofexclusiontodeterwrongful  policeconduct.(Gonzalez,supra.,at1132,quotingHerring,supra.,129S.Ct.at698.)#>#    TheNinthCircuitdeclinedtoapply#@#Ԁthegoodfaithexceptiontothissituation.The  courtnotedthat#*A#Herring#A#Ԁandothergoodfaithcasesappliedtheexceptiontosearches   conductedinrelianceonawarrantsubsequentlyfoundinvalidorastatutesubsequently ! foundunconstitutional. "    ` NeithertheSupremeCourtnorourcourt,however,has $  #B#   ` appliedthegoodfaithexceptiontothescenarioweface:a %!! #ϤC#   ` searchconductedunderathenprevailinginterpretationof &"" #ND#   ` aSupremeCourtruling,butrenderedunconstitutionalbya '## #D#   ` subsequentSupremeCourtrulingannouncedwhilethe  #ϠE#   ` defendantsconvictionwasondirectreview.  #BF#   ` (#F#Gonzalez,supra#BG#.,578F.3dat1132.)$ #  16        #ϖG##VH#  TheNinthCircuitconcludedthatthiscasepresentedaretroactivityissuecontrolled  bylongstandingprecedentholdingthat adecisionof[theSupremeCourt]construing   theFourthAmendmentistobeappliedretroactivelytoallconvictionsthatwerenotyet   finalatthetimethedecisionwasrendered.(#ϙH#Gonzalez,supra#`J#.,at1132,citing#ϴJ#United   Statesv.Johnson# K#Ԁ(1982)457U.S.537,562;#}K#Griffithv.Kentucky#K#Ԁ(1987)479U.S.314,   328.)Thus,the#6L#Gant#ϵL#Ԁruleappliestoallsearchesconductedincasesinwhichthe   defendantsconvictionwasnotfinalbyApril21,2009,andevidencediscoveredduring   thosesearchesmustbeexcluded.#L#   # N#  In UnitedStatesv.McCane(10thCir.2009)573F.3d1037 ,thecourtdeclinedto   suppressevidencerecoveredinasearchillegalunderGant,whentheofficerssearched  thecartwoyearsbeforeGantingoodfaithrelianceonpreGantprecedents.ԀTheparties  agreedthatunder#O#Gant#