WPCT o+W ƅ5fX(}_FPHzϖ k݆ 0EċƏ'- c y=:WvRVZosyVC_V5.d}UNuΩ*((QyI7KVh7QO9G D8٘)-Ԕև\k%2'g.>H_C7Uq _FJc}*X 3J.Vb׸C :2\_RYRPNab` 0  0U( 0} 0` 0% 0 0 0P 0 0 0E 0  0 0 0; 0 0 0 0 0@ 0 0 0 0* 0 0l 0 0 0 ! 0! 0" 0>N# 0# 0$ 0f% 0H& 0*' 0 ( 0( 0) 02z* 0* 0:+ 0Y+ 0_;, 0 , 0- 0&/ B*,1 D/V1 1 1 D+1 01 D/3 04 064 05 0:!6 0^[6 0<6 1e6U6Z7U*7@7= @ @ @ A A A A A 0A 0DB B.CbKC SC 0teC 0tCMD SGgG XJU @lJ JyJ9M'Q "T 6T6T 0NHTHTHT(TTTT^ THP LaserJet 2200 Series PCL 60(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX(1$vOXXUSUS.,h>:i+003|xU3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a) i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0  337=CIOW_eI.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a) 1)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#\  `&Times New Roman(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#*+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,  *5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &  */+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   0AA.Normal  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition T  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(hh&H1  5+ ` hp x 5      5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H2  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H3  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H4  5+ ` hp x 5 XXX 5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H5  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H6  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  2DD0Address  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKP<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard KP<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted  /%  ,Kk %#/KP<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/  <:zBottom of 7C(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?Q%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7F(X75+ ` hp x 5  &  d dB)1dxdSearchTermSR;39436'dxd<:zTop of For7H(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?Q%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7F(X75+ ` hp x 5  B)2dxd0KS.SampleKP<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKP<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB   !"# 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New%2A`Arial 6 \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    2    _ԀTheprimarypurposeofthesematerialsistofocusonprinciplesespeciallyrelevant  toissuessurroundingtheadequacyofthe_CALCRIM_Ԁinstructions,ratherthantoserveasa  primeroninstructionaldutiesgenerally.Foramorecomprehensivetreatmentofthescope  ofatrialcourts_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁinstructionalduties(and,conversely,ofthecategoriesof   pinpointinstructions,requiredonlyuponrequest),seeOConnell&_Soglin_, Preserving  InstructionalErrorforAppellateReview(Mar.2006),availableon_FDAP_Ԁwebsite:g4r 8!oO  5     gX<Xg_www.fdap.org_/downloads/seminarcriminal/_PreservingInstructionalErrorforAppellateReview.pdf_6$oO8  7 #f#gXgX<#   #g#X<XԀ#XX<#  \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    5    _ԀLarav.Ryanwasoneofthoserarecasesmeetingthat absolutecertaintystandard.  Althoughthetrialcourthaderroneouslyinstructedonimpliedmaliceasanalternative  groundforattemptedmurder,thejurorsseparatepremeditationfindingconclusively  establishedthattheyhadrelieduponthelegallyvalidexpressmalicetheory.Lara,455F.3d   at1087.SDU_58StarPageciteas((Cite as: 18 Cal.4th 470, *503, 957 P.2d 869, **891, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, ***202)SDU_42SR;8554SR;8556SR;8562SR;8564(G2$ !XXUSUS.,          0  (#$  0   d- -SDU_14(L2;$ !XXUSUS.,  (L2;$ !XXUSUS.,    \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    1    _ԀPortionsofthisarticlehavebeenadaptedandupdatedfrom StandardsofReview  andPrejudiceforInstructionalErrorbyJ.BradleyOConnell&_Rene_ԀE.Torres(Jan.  1995), StandardsofReversalonAppealinCriminalCasesby_Rene_ԀE.Torres(May2000),  and PreservingInstructionalErrorforAppellateReview,byJ.BradleyOConnell&  JonathanSoglin(March2006).SR;2137  \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    3    _ԀBecauseColemanaroseonafederalhabeaspetition,itwasgovernedbythe_Brecht_  standard,requiringa substantialandinjuriousinfluenceontheverdict,ratherthanthe  Chapmanstandardapplicableondirectappeal.Cf._Brecht_Ԁv._Abrahamson_(1993)507U.S.  619.##SR;2547(A Z(Times New Roman SR;2549 o \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    6    _ԀBecauseBradleyaroseonafederalhabeaspetition,ratherthandirectappeal,itwas  insteadgovernedbythe_Brecht_standard,requiringa substantialandinjuriousinfluenceon  theverdict.Cf._Brecht_Ԁv._Abrahamson_(1993)507U.S.619.  \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    7    _ԀUnfortunately,inalateropinion,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtstated, Anyerror  infailingtoinstructonimperfectdefenseofothersisstatelawerroralone,andthussubject  ...totheharmlesserrortestarticulatedinWatson.Peoplev._Randle_(2005)35Cal.4th987,  1003.The_Randle_opiniondidnotmentiontheunresolveddueprocessissueraisedinJustice  _Kennard_s_Breverman_dissent.Butarguablythebroadstatementin_Randle_wasdictum:  BecausetheCourtfoundtheerrorin_Randle_prejudicialevenunderaWatsonanalysis,itwas   notnecessaryfortheCourttoaddressthefederalconstitutionalquestion.  \$XXUSUS.,   @ @    4    _Seethe9thCircuitsrecentopinionin_Pulido_Ԁv._Chrones_,487_F.3d_Ԁ669(9thCir.2007),  inwhichacertpetitionispresentlypending.(_USSC_Ԁ07544.)SR;2552SDU_16(O$http://www.fdap.org/l> !XXUSUS.,  _   RQ_8dd8  APPELLATESTANDARDSOFREVIEWANDPREJUDICE  FORINSTRUCTIONALERROR: L ToolsforLitigatingInstructionalIssuesinthe_CALCRIM_ԀEra#QRk# H  PreparedbyJ.BradleyOConnellandupdatedbyFran_Ternu s_ _c ]#  1      _   StaffAttorneys,FirstDistrictAppellateProject   January2008##  2 g (33 " 3"     32  I  .3  0    INTRODUCTION 3R݌X (#(# Ќ  0  [_F]rom_Ԁourappellateperspective,ofthemanyandvariedcontentionsoftrialcourt X  errorweareaskedtoreview,nothingresultsinmorecasesofreversibleerrorthan X  mistakesinjuryinstructions.Peoplev._Thompkins_(1987)195Cal.App.3d244,252. X  Generally,anyappellateclaimmustclearthreehurdles!(1)establishingthatits X  cognizableonappeal(_i_..e.,thatitsnotbarredbywaiver),(2)establishingthaterror X occurred,and(3)establishingthattheerrorrequiresreversal.Oneachofthese X subjects,theappellatestandardsgoverninginstructionalclaimsaregenerallymore X favorabletothedefensethanthoseforotherkindsofappellateclaims.These X materialswilltouchverybrieflyon_cognizability_Ԁconcernsandwillfocusprimarily X onthesecondandthirdtopics!thestandardofreviewfordeterminingwhetheran X instruction(ortheomissionorrefusalofaninstruction)waserroneousandthe X standardfordeterminingwhetheraninstructionalerrorwasprejudicialorharmless.X(#(# 0  Mostofthetopicsinthesematerialsarealreadyquitefamiliartoappellate X practitioners.Theprimarypurposeofthesematerialsistohighlightinstructional X standardswhichmaybeespeciallyrelevanttoreviewofissuessurroundingthe X _CALCRIM_Ԁinstructions. X(#(# 0  Aswithanytypeofissue,itisessentialthat,wheneverpossible,appellatecounsel "X characterizeaninstructionaldefectasafederalconstitutionalclaim,ratherthanjust #X statelawerror.First,eveninthecontextofthedirectstateappeal,recognitionofthe $X instructionaldefectasfederalconstitutionalerrorwilltriggeramuchmorefavorable %X  prejudice/harmlesserrorstandard.StatelawerrorsarereviewedundertheWatson &X!  test:Reversalisrequiredonlyifitis"reasonablyprobable"aresultmorefavorable 'X"! tothedefendantwouldhavebeenreachedhadtheerrornotoccurred.Peoplev.  Watson(1956)46Cal.2d818.Butmostfederalconstitutionalerrorsaresubjecttothe  lessforgivingChapmantest!theburdenisonstatetoshow beyondareasonable  doubtthattheerrorhadnoeffectontheverdict.Chapmanv.California(1967)386  U.S.18.Additionally,asdiscussedfurtherinPartIV,somecategoriesof  instructionalerrorarereviewedunderevenmorerigorousteststhanthetraditional   Chapmanformulation. (#(# 0  Second, federalizingtheclaimederrorthroughoutthestateappellateprocessis   necessaryto exhaustionoftheclaimforpurposesofanyfuturefederalhabeas   corpuspetition.Evenassumingtheappellatebriefsotherwisethoroughlyidentifythe   problemswithaninstruction,afailuretospecifythattheerroralsoinfringedafederal   constitutionalrightmayforfeitthedefendantsopportunitytoobtainfederalhabeas   reviewofthatclaim.SeeBaldwinv.Reese(2004)541U.S.27. (#(# " 3"   32  II  .3  0    _COGNIZABILITY_ԀOFINSTRUCTIONALISSUES. 3C݌(#(# Ќ  0  InCaliforniaappellatepractice,the_cognizability_Ԁofaninstructionalissuecanbe  viewedastheflipsideofthesubstantivequestionofthescopeofthetrialcourts  instructionalduties.Atrialcourtmustinstruct_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁonthelegal principles  closelyandopenlyconnectedwiththefactsbeforethecourt,andwhicharenecessary  forthejury'sunderstandingofthecase.Peoplev._Breverman_(1998)19Cal.4th142,  154.Theseincludethereasonabledoubtstandard(CALJIC2.90,_CALCRIM_Ԁ220),  theelementsofthechargedoffense,thedefinitionofany targetoffensenecessary  toatheoryofliability(e.g. naturalandprobableconsequences,#gx#Peoplev.gԀ_Prettyman_  (1996)14#g@#X<XCal.4th#XX<#gԀ248),juryunanimityastotheincidentonwhichtheconvictionis  based(CALJIC17.01;_CALCRIM_Ԁ3500),andlesserincludedoffensessupportedby  substantialevidence.Ifaninstructioncomeswithinthat_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁcategory,the  defendantmaychallengetheadequacyoftheinstructionsonappeal,regardlessof   whetherheobjectedtotheinstructiongiven,requestedaninstruction,orotherwise ! raisedtheissuebelow."(#(# 0  Conversely,iftheinstructionisdeemeda pinpointor amplifyinginstruction,the $  courtisonlyrequiredtodeliverituponrequest,andtheabsenceofarequestwillbar %!! raisingtheissueonappeal.Mostcautionaryorlimitinginstructionsaredeemed &""  pinpoint,asaremanymoresubstantiveinstructionswhichrelatemoregeneral '## instructionstocrucialtypesofevidence(e.g.,alibi,factorsrelevanttoeyewitness ($$  identification,materialityofpriorthreatsandviolencetoselfdefense,relevanceof )%% intoxicationtospecificintent,etc.)_R ]#  2      _Ԁ(#(#  A.0  InstructionsGiven.#g#g(#(# 0  Asapracticalmatter,itisusuallypossibletochallengethevalidityofanyinstruction  givenbyvirtueofPen.Code1259: Theappellatecourtmayalsoreviewany   instructiongiven,refusedormodified,eventhoughnoobjectionwasmadetheretoin   thelowercourt,ifthesubstantialrightsofthedefendantwereaffectedthereby.   Although1259onlyauthorizesreviewofinstructionsaffecting substantialrights,   thatdetermination necessarilyrequiresanexaminationofthemeritsoftheclaim"at   leasttotheextentofascertainingwhethertheassertederrorwouldresultinprejudice   iferroritwas.Peoplev.Andersen(1994)26_Cal.App_.4th1241,1249. (#(# 0  Moreover,aninstructionactuallygivenbythetrialcourtisgenerally_reviewable_Ԁon   appeal,evenifthatinstructionordinarilywouldnotcomewithinthecourts_sua_  _sponte_Ԁduties. Evenifthecourthasno_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdutytoinstructonaparticular  legalpoint,whenitdoeschoosetoinstruct,itmustdosocorrectly.Peoplev.Castillo  (1997)16Cal.4th1009,1015;accordPeoplev.Hudson(2006)38Cal.4th1002,  1012.(#(# 0  Theseprinciplesmayproveespeciallyimportanttothereviewofissuessurrounding  _CALCRIM_Ԁinstructions.In_CALJIC_,thebasicinstructionlistingtheelementsofan  offensewouldoftenbefollowedbyseveralinstructionsonmorespecializedpoints;  sometimesthelatterinstructionswouldbeconsideredeither pinpointor   amplifyinginstructionsrequiredonlyonrequest.Incontrast,_CALCRIM_s  approachseemstobetodrawalltheprinciplesapplicabletoaparticularoffenseinto  asingleomnibusinstruction.Forexample,_CALCRIM_sbasicrobberyinstruction,  No.1600,coverspointsspreadoverfour_CALJIC_Ԁinstructions(_CALJIC_Ԁ9.40,9.40.2,  9.40.3,9.41).Insomeinstances,thisstructureshouldmakeiteasiertoraise   instructionalclaims:Becausethetypical_CALCRIM_Ԁinstructionismore ! comprehensivethanits_CALJIC_Ԁcounterpart,itshouldoftenbepossibletoframethe " argumentasachallengetothevalidityoftheinstructionactuallydelivered,rather  thanasacomplaintregardingtheomissionofsomesupplementalinstruction.(#(# 0  B.0` (#(# AmplifyingInstructionsvs.TermsRequiringDefinition` (#` (# 0  Anotheroftstatedprincipleofinstructionalreviewmayposeheadachesfor   challengesto_CALCRIM_Ԁinstructions.Inmanyinstances,thecontroversy   surroundingtheadequacyofaparticular_CALCRIM_Ԁinstructionwillnotinvolveany   genuinedebateoversubstantivelaw.Thatis,therewillnotbeanydisagreement   betweentheprosecutionandthedefenseastowhattheelementsofaparticular   offenseare.Instead,manyargumentswillfocusontheadequacyofthe_CALCRIM_   instructionstocommunicatethesesometimesarcanelegalprinciplestolayjurors!   thatis,howthejurorswilllikelyinterpretthelanguageofparticular_CALCRIM_   instructions.SeePartIIIB,infra(discussingthe reasonablelikelihoodstandard   ofreview).(#(# 0  Theproblemisthis:Ifaninstructionmisstatesthelaw,theissueshouldbe  cognizableunder1259andPeoplev.Castillo,asdiscussedabove.Butitmaybe  moredifficulttochallengeaninstructionwhichis correctasfarasitgoes,but  shouldhavebeenmoreclearorshouldhavefleshedoutapointparticularlyimportant  totheissuesattrial.Suchargumentsmayrunafouloftherulethat,ifthebasic  instructionsareotherwisecorrect,theonusisonthedefensetorequestany   amplifyingor clarifyinginstructions. Generally,apartymaynotcomplainon  appealthataninstructioncorrectinlawandresponsivetotheevidencewastoo  generalorincompleteunlessthepartyhasrequestedappropriateclarifyingor  amplifyinglanguage.Peoplev._Guiuan_(1998)18Cal.4th558,570;seealso,e.g.,  Peoplev._Guerra_(2006)37Cal.4th1067,1134;Peoplev.Andrews(1989)49Cal.3d  200,218;.(#(# 0  Butatrialcourtdoeshavea_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdutytoclarifythemeaningofatermwhich ! hasatechnicalorspecializedlegalmeaningwhichmaynotbeknowntolayjurors. " Significantly,that_definitional_Ԁdutyappliesnotonlytolegaltermsofart,suchas #  assault,butalsotomorecommontermswhichmayhavespecializedmeaningsfor $  purposesofaparticularcriminalstatute: Thatobligationcomesintoplaywhena %!! statutoryterm doesnothaveaplain,unambiguousmeaning,hasa particularand &"" restrictedmeaning[citation],orhasatechnicalmeaningpeculiartothelaworan '## areaoflaw[citation].[Citation.] Awordorphrasehavingatechnical,legal ($$ meaningrequiringclarificationbythecourtisonethathasadefinitionthatdiffers )%% fromitsnonlegalmeaning.[Citations.]Peoplev.Hudson(2006)38Cal.4th1002, *&& 1012,emphasisinoriginal.+''(#(# Ї0  Recentcasesillustratethatapplicationofthoseprinciplescanyieldcounterintuitive  holdingsregardingwhichtermsrequire_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdefinitions.Forexample,the  SupremeCourthasrequired_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdefinitionoftheterm likelyinSexually  ViolentPredator(_SVP_)trials,because likelymaybeusedflexiblytocoverarange  of_expectability_Ԁfrompossibletoprobableand [_n]ot_Ԁallofthesedictionary  definitionsoflikelyareconsistentwiththeparticularandtechnicalmeaningthe   _SVPA_Ԁassignsthatterm.Peoplev._Roberge_(2003)29Cal.4th979,988.Similarly,   theCourtrecentlyrequired_sua_Ԁ_sponte_ԀdefinitionoftherequirementofVehicleCode   2800.1andrelatedstatutesrequiringthatthepursuingpolicecarbe distinctively   marked.In commonparlance,such distinguishingfeaturesasaredlightora   sirenmightbeconsideredsufficient,butundertheCourtsconstruction,thesestatues    requiremarkingsinadditiontothepresenceofaredlightandasiren.Hudson,   supra,38Cal.4that1012.Conversely,however,otherrecentcaseshaveheldthat   certainseeminglytechnicaltermsdidnotrequirefurtherelaboration.Forexample,   inaprosecutionformisappropriationofpublicfunds(Pen.Code424),theterms   authorityoflawand notauthorizedbylawdidnotrequire_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdefinitions,  andtheabsenceofarequestfor clarifyinginstructionswaivedtheissue.Peoplev.  Bradley(2006)142_Cal.App_.4th247,259260;seealso,e.g.,Peoplev.Horning  (2004)34Cal.4th871,908909(no_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdutyforfurtherdefinitionofterm   immediatepresenceinstandardrobberyinstruction).(#(# " 3"   3F2  III  .3  0    STANDARDSOFREVIEW!DETERMININGINSTRUCTIONALERROR 3F*G݌(#(# Ќ  ";"  ;H0  2  A  .3  0` (#(#  DeNovoReview;H.H݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  Incontrasttomanykindsofcommonappellateissues,appellatereviewofan  instructionalissuedoesnotentailanydeferencetothetrialcourt.Instructional  claimsaresubjecttoan independentor denovostandardofreview.Peoplev.  _Manriquez_(2005)37Cal.4th547,581,584."Whetherornottogiveanyparticular   % D %DJinstruction% E %EJԀinanyparticularcaseentailstheresolutionofamixedquestionoflawand ! factthat,webelieve,ishoweverpredominantlylegal.Assuch,itshouldbeexamined " withoutdeference."Peoplev._Waidla_Ԁ(2000)22Cal.4th690,733.#(#(#    `     h      p   ";"  ;L0  2  B  .3  0` (#(#  ReasonableLikelihoodStandardofReviewforAmbiguousInstructions;LM݌%!!` (#` (# Ќ  0  Frequently,thecontroversyoveraparticularinstructiondoesnotinvolveanygenuine '## disputeovertherelevantsubstantivecriminallaw.Instead,thechallengeoften ($$ focusesontheadequacyoftheinstructionslanguagetocommunicatethesubstantive )%% ruletojurors.Consequently,appellatereviewofaninstructionsvalidityturnson *&& expectationsofhowthejurorsarelikelytointerpretthetextandontherisksthat +'' jurorsmayconstruetheinstructioninawaywhichinfringesconstitutionalrights(for  example,bydilutingtheprosecutionsburdentoproveeveryelementbeyonda  reasonabledoubt).TheU.S.SupremeCourthasfashionedthefollowingtest:(#(# 8  8`    ` x` x 0  8` (#(#[_I]n_Ԁreviewinganambiguousinstruction...,weinquire whetherthere  isareasonablelikelihoodthatthejuryhasappliedthechallenged   instructioninawaythatviolatestheConstitution.Estellev.McGuire   (1991)502U.S.62,72,emphasisadded[quoting_Boyde_Ԁv.California   (1990)494U.S.370,380]. ` `  0  This reasonablelikelihoodtestisprobablytheleastunderstoodofthestandards   relevanttoinstructionalissues.Asdiscussedinthefollowingsubsections,therehas   oftenbeenconfusionoverwhichtypesofinstructionalissuesaresubjecttothistest   andwhereexactlythe reasonablelikelihoodinquiryfitsintotheoverallpresentation   andanalysisofaninstructionalclaim.Butitisanessentialsubjectforcriminal  defenseattorneystomaster.Defenseattorneyscriticalofparticular_CALCRIM_  instructionswillrarelybeinapositiontosaythattheinstructionflatlymisstatesthe  law.Instead,mostofthesechallengeswillinvolvedebatesoverhowjurorswilllikely  interpretthe_CALCRIM_Ԁformulations.Consequently, mostofthelitigationoverthe  adequacyofparticular_CALCRIM_Ԁinstructionswillrequireunderstandingthe  nuancesandlimitsofthe reasonablelikelihoodtest(includingrecognizingthe  errorstowhichitshouldnotapply). (#(# ";"  ;X0  2  C  .3  0` (#(#  Applicabilityof ReasonableLikelihoodTesttoState,AsWellasFederal  Constitutional,Claims.;X(Y݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  TheU.S.SupremeCourtoriginallyfashionedthe reasonablelikelihoodtestforthe  determinationoffederalconstitutionalclaims.ButtheCaliforniaSupremeCourthas  alsoelectedtoadoptthe"reasonablelikelihood"testforreviewofstatelaw   instructionalissuesandevenforreviewofallegedprosecutorialmisstatementsofthe ! law:"Webelievethatthenewtestisproperforexamininginstructionsunder " Californialaw.Wealsodeemitfitforuseagainstprosecutorialremarksgenerally." # Peoplev.Clair(1992)2Cal.4th629,663[applyingthetesttoclaimedGriffinerror].$ (#(# ";"  ;a]0  2  D  .3  0` (#(#  Natureofthe ReasonableLikelihoodTest!AStandardofReviewfor &!" DeterminingError,NotaPrejudiceTest.;a]]݌'"#` (#` (# Ќ  0  The_Boyde_ԄEstelleformulation! areasonablelikelihoodthatthejuryhasapplied )$% thechallengedinstructioninaway'thatviolatestheConstitution"!soundsvery *%& muchlikeatestforwhetheradefectiveinstructionrequiresreversal.Butitisnt. +&'  The_Boyde_test...isnotaharmlesserrortestatall.Itis,rather,thetestfor  determining,inthefirstinstance,whetherconstitutionalerroroccurredwhenthejury  wasgivenan% d %dXaambiguousinstruction...._Calderon_Ԁv.Coleman(1998)525U.S.141,  146.InColeman,theCourtremandedacapitalcasetotheNinthCircuitbecausethat  courthadreversedthepenaltyuponfindinga reasonablelikelihoodofjuror  misunderstanding,buthadneglectedtotakethenextstepofassessingprejudice.   TheSupremeCourtdidnotoverturntheNinthCircuitsfindingofa reasonable   likelihoodofjurormisunderstanding.Butitheldthatthereviewingcourtmustthen   separatelyanalyzewhetherthatconstitutionalerrorrequiredreversalunderthe   applicableprejudicestandard._e ]#  3      _Ԁ (#(# 0  Colemanoffersaclearlessonforappellatebriefing.Counselmustfirstshowthat   thereisa reasonablelikelihoodaninstructionmisledthejurorsontherelevant   point,butcounselcannotendtheargumentthere.Counselmustthenseparately   addressprejudice/harmlesserrorundertheappropriatestandard.(Asdiscussedin  PartIII,inmostinstances,whichstandardofprejudiceapplieswilldependonthe  natureoftheinstructionalerror.)(#(# ";"  ;g0  2  E  .3  0` (#(#  Limitationofthe ReasonableLikelihoodTesttoAmbiguousInstructions;gg݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  Ambiguousvs.ClearlyErroneousInstructions.Thestatetendstoinvokethe   reasonablelikelihoodtestinresponsetoalmostanyclaimofinstructionalerror.  ButtheU.S.SupremeCourthasrepeatedlydescribed reasonablelikelihoodasthe  standardforreviewingan ambiguousinstruction.Estellev.McGuire,supra,502  U.S.at72;accord,e.g.,_Calderon_Ԁv.Coleman(1998)525U.S.141,146.  Consequently,astheNinthCircuithascautionedonseveraloccasions,the   reasonablelikelihoodtesthasnoapplicationwheretheinstructionwas clearly  erroneousor faciallyincorrect: Thiscourtisnotrequiredtousethereasonable  likelihoodstandardemployedforambiguousjuryinstructionswhenthedisputed   instructioniserroneousonitsface."Hov.Carey(9thCir.2003)332F.3d587,592; ! accordWadev._Calderon_Ԁ(9thCir._1994)_Ԁ29F.3d1312,1321(citedinHo); " _Murtishaw_Ԁv._Woodford_(9thCir.2001)255F.3d926,967968.Forexample,an # instructionwhichomitsanelementoftheoffense(Ho)orwhichallowsthejuryto $   convictbasedonlegallyimpermissiblegrounds(_Murtishaw_)is flatlyor clearly %!! erroneous.Inthatinstance,thereviewingcourtshouldskipany reasonable  likelihoodanalysisandproceedimmediatelytodeterminationofwhethertheclearly  erroneousinstructionrequiresreversalundertheapplicableprejudicestandard.(#(#    `    0  Omittedinstructions.AtleastoneCaliforniacasehasfoundthe reasonable  likelihoodtestinapplicabletoomissionofaninstruction.Peoplev._Elguera_(1992)   8_Cal.App_.4th1214(omissionof_CALJIC_Ԁ2.90,thedefinitionofreasonabledoubt).   But(withoutspecificallydiscussing_Elguera_)severalsubsequentCaliforniacases   haveapplied reasonablelikelihoodanalysistoomissionofaportionofaparticular   _CALJIC_Ԁinstructionortoomissionofoneinstructionamongaseriesofinstructions   onasubject.E.g.,Peoplev._Catlin_(2001)26Cal.4th81,151;Peoplev.Snead   (1993)20_Cal.App_.4th1088. (#(# ";"  ;Yu0  2  F  .3  0` (#(#  ConsiderationofInstructionsasaWhole;Yuu݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  0  Unfortunately,thedistinctionbetween clearlyerroneousand merelyambiguous  instructionsisitselfambiguous. [A]singleinstructiontoajurymaynotbejudged  inartificialisolation,butmustbeviewedinthecontextoftheoverallcharge._Boyde_  v.California(1990)494U.S.370,378,emphasisadded.(#(# 0  ArecentSupremeCourtcasehasmuddiedthewatersfurther.Eventhethreshold  determinationwhethertheinstructionsare ambiguous(ratherthanclearly  erroneous)requiresreviewof thechargeasawhole._Middleton_Ԁv._McNeil_(2004)  541U.S.433,437.In_McNeil_,thetrialcourthadmisinstructedonanaspectof  Californias imperfectselfdefensedoctrine,bystatingthattheperilmustappear  imminent totheslayerasareasonableperson.Inthesubsequentappellateand  habeasproceedings,everyoneagreedthereferencetoa reasonablepersonstandard  wasincorrect,sothatmisinstructionwouldseemtofitwithinthecategoryofclearly  erroneousinstructions,notsubjectto reasonablelikelihoodanalysis.Butthe   SupremeCourtheldotherwiseinsummarilyreversingtheNinthCircuitsgrantof ! habeasrelief.TheSupremeCourtemphasizedthatthesingle reasonableperson " referenceoccurredinthemidstofaseriesofinstructionswhichclearlyand #  repeatedlyinformedthejurythat anhonest(oractual)butunreasonablebeliefin $  theneedtoactinselfdefenseagainstimminentperilwouldrequireaconvictionof %!! manslaughterratherthanmurder.Id.at434436,emphasisinopinion.Consequently, &"" theSupremeCourtviewedtheinstructionsasawholeas atworstambiguousbecause '## theywereinternallyinconsistent.Id.at438.Thatcharacterizationofthedefective ($$ instructionsasmerely ambiguousprovedcrucialin_McNeil_because,asdiscussed )%% below(PartIG),itallowedthereviewingcourttoconsidercounselsarguments *&& (whichcorrectlystatedtheunreasonablebeliefrule)asclearinguptheinstructions.+''(#(# Ї0  Thus,theapparentimportof_McNeil_isthatevenwhenasingleinstructionisplainly  incorrect,thereviewingcourtmustconsidertheinstructionsasawholein  determiningwhethertheywere ambiguous(requiringthecourttoapplythe   reasonablelikelihoodtestoferror)orclearlyerroneous(allowingthecourttoskip   reasonablelikelihoodandtoproceedimmediatelytodeterminationofprejudice).(#(# ";"  ;0  2  G  .3  0` (#(#  TheRoleofCounselsArguments;݌ ` (#` (# Ќ  0  AstheU.S.SupremeCourtobservedin_Boyde_(thecaseinwhichitfirstarticulated   the reasonablelikelihood_test):_Ԁ [_A]rguments_Ԁofcounselgenerallycarrylessweight   withajurythandoinstructionsfromthecourtand arenottobejudgedashaving   thesameforceasaninstructionfromthecourt._Boyde_,supra,494U.S.at384385.   Indeed,underboth_CALJIC_Ԁand_CALCRIM_,jurorsareexpresslyadmonishedthat   theymustfollowthecourtsinstructionsonthegoverninglegalstandardsandthat   theymustdisregardanystatementsbycounselthatareinconsistentwiththe  instructions._CALCRIM_Ԁ200.(#(# 0  Correctstatementsoflawincounselsarguments.Inlightoftherulethatthe  instructionstakeprecedenceovercounselsarguments,thecourts(especiallythe  NinthCircuit)haverepeatedlyheld, Counselsargumentsalonecannotsalvagea  legallyerroneousinstruction._Murtishaw_Ԁv._Woodford_(9thCir.2001)255F.3d926,  969;accordWadev._Calderon_(9thCir.1994)29F.3d1312,1321;Hov.Carey(9th  Cir.2003)332F.3d587,594595.Consequently,evenwhenboththeprosecutors  anddefensecounselsargumentscorrectlystatethelaw,theycannotcurea  misstatementinthecourtsinstructions,atleastwheretheinstructionswereclearand  erroneous.(#(# 0  However,theSupremeCourthasheldthatitisappropriatetoconsidercounsels  correctstatementsindeterminingwhetherthereisa reasonablelikelihoodthejurors   construedambiguousinstructionsinanunconstitutionalmanner._Middleton_Ԁv._McNeil_ ! (2004)541U.S.433.(Asnotedabove,_McNeil_wastheimperfectselfdefensecase " inwhichtheSupremeCourtconsideredtheinstructionsasawholemerely #  ambiguousor inconsistentbecause,thoughone reasonablepersoninstruction $  wasincorrect,therestoftheinstructionscontainednumerouscorrectstatementsof %!! theunreasonablebeliefprinciple.)InapprovingtheCaliforniaappellatecourts &"" considerationoftheattorneyscorrectstatementsasclarifyingtheproperimperfect '## selfdefensestandard,theSupremeCourtcautioned, thisisnotacasewherethejury ($$ chargeclearlysaysonethingandtheprosecutorsaystheopposite;theinstructions )%% wereatworstambiguousbecausetheywereinternallyinconsistent.Nothingin_Boyde_ *&& precludesastatecourtfromassumingthatcounselsargumentsclarifiedan +'' ambiguousjurycharge.Thisassumptionisparticularlyaptwhenitistheprosecutors  argumentthatresolvesanambiguityinfavorofthedefendant._McNeil_,supra,at438,  emphasisinoriginal.(#(# 0  Incorrectstatementsincounselsarguments._McNeil_involvedthequestionof  reviewingcourtslookingtocounsels(especiallytheprosecutors)correctstatements   asclarifyingorcuringmisstatementsintheinstructions.Ofcourse,evenwhenthe   primaryerrorliesintheinstructions,prosecutorsargumentsaresometimesaboon   toappellatedefenders,becausefrequentlythoseargumentsexploitorexacerbatethe   instructionalerror.Consequently,prosecutorialargumentswhichrepeatoreven   magnifytheerroneouspointintheinstructionsarematerialbothtothe reasonable   likelihooddeterminationofwhetheran ambiguousinstructionresultedin   constitutionalerrorandtoassessmentoftheprejudicialimpactofthaterror.E.g.,   Peoplev.Valentine(2001)93_Cal.App_.4th1241,1246( instructionalerror% f %f,as   compounded% h %hԀbytheprosecutor's% l %l1Ԁargument,was% m %m^prejudicial);Peoplev._Esquivel_  (1994)28_Cal.App_.4th1386,1400.SeealsoPeoplev.Morgan(2007)42Cal.4th593  whereprosecutorsargumentbasedonalegallyinadequate#gi #gtheorywhencombined  withinstructionsconsideredsusceptibletothesameinterpretationresultedinreversal.(#(# 0  Conversely,however,wherethecourtsinstructionsarecorrect,amisstatementofthe  lawintheprosecutorsargumentwillrarelyprovideabasisforrelief.Inthat  situation,reviewingcourtswillapplytheusualpresumptionthatthejurorsfollowed  thecourtscorrectinstructionsandwerenotmisledbyanycontrarystatementsin  counselsarguments.Brownv._Payton_(2005)544U.S.133,146147;accord,e.g.  Fieldsv._Woodford_,309F.3d1095,1111(9thCir.2002).(#(# ";"  ;[0  2  H  .3  0` (#(#  OtherCriticalRulesforConstructionofInstructions;[݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  Specificprevailsovergeneral.󀀀Reviewingcourtsassumethatjurorswillbringsome   commonsenseprinciplestobearininterpretingtheinstructionsasawhole.Muchas ! withcontractsandstatutes, ourwellsettledruleofconstruction[is]thatthespecific " controlsoverthegeneral.[Citations.]Gibsonv.Ortiz(9thCir.2004)387F.3d812, # 823,emphasisadded;accord,e.g.,Peoplev.Stewart(1983)145_Cal.App_.3d967,975; $  _LeMons_v.RegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia(1978)21Cal.3d869,878&fn. %!! 8.AstheU.S.SupremeCourtobservedintheleadingcase, Ifitisaspecificruling &"" onavitalissueandmisleading,theerrorisnotcuredbyapriorunexceptionaland '## unilluminatingabstractcharge._Bollenbach_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1946)326U.S.607, ($$ 612.Forexample,in_Conde_Ԁv.Henry(9thCir.1999)198F.3d734,740,acorrect )%% statementofthe immediatepresencerequirementinthe backgrounddefinitions *&& introductiontoapatternrobberyinstructioncouldnotcureanerroneousmodification +'' ofthatdefinitionintheportionoftheinstructionwhichspecificallysetoutthe  elementsofthechargedoffense.(#(# 0  Middeliberationsinstructionscarryparticularweight.Anothercommonsense  principlerecognizedin_Bollenbach_isthatajudgessupplementalinstructionsduring  deliberationscarryexceptionalweight,especiallywhenthejurorshavespecifically   requestedguidanceonapoint. Whenajurymakesexplicititsdifficultiesatrial   judgeshouldclearthemawaywithconcreteaccuracy._Bollenbach_Ԁv.UnitedStates   (1946)326U.S.607,612613. Particularlyinacriminaltrial,thejudgeslastword   isapttobethedecisiveword.Id.at612. Andifjuryinstructionsareimportantin   general,thereisnocategoryofinstructionalerrormoreprejudicialthanwhenthetrial   judgemakesamistakeinrespondingtoajury'sinquiryduringdeliberations.People   v._Thompkins_(1987)195_Cal.App_.3d244,252-253.     (#(# " 3"   3̪2  IV  .3  0    STANDARDSOFPREJUDICEANDHARMLESS_ERROR_ 3̪݌(#(# Ќ  0  InArizonav._Fulminante_(1991)499U.S.279,theSupremeCourtdisavoweddecades  ofpriorcaseswhichhadtreatedadmissionofaninvoluntaryconfessionasanerror  soegregiousthatitcouldneverbedeemedharmless.Instead,the_Fulminante_  majorityheldthatadmissionofaninvoluntaryconfession,likemost trialerrors,was  subjecttotheChapmanstandard.Thatis,areviewingcourtcouldstilldeeman  involuntaryconfession harmlesserrorifthestatesustaineditsburdenofproving  beyondareasonabledoubtthattheerrordidnotcontributetotheverdict.(A  differentlycomposedmajorityconcludedthattheadmissionoftheconfessionwasnot  harmlessundertheChapmanstandardandreversed_Fulminante_smurderconviction.)(#(# 0  Though_Fulminante_didnotinvolveinstructionalerror,itisacrucialopinionbecause  theCourtadoptedanewterminologytodistinguish trialerrorsfromthenarrow  categoryofconstitutionalviolationswhichareexemptfromharmlesserroranalysis.   Under_Fulminante_anditsprogeny,only structuraldefectsaredeemedreversibleper ! se. [_S]tructural_Ԁdefectsintheconstitutionofthetrialmechanismareerrorsthat "  defyanalysisbyharmlesserrorstandardsand transcend[]thecriminalprocess. # _Fulminante_,supra,499U.S.at309311.$ (#(# 0  TheCaliforniaSupremeCourt(inanotherinvoluntaryconfessioncase)hasadopted &"" asimilardistinctionbetween trialerrors,susceptibletoharmlesserroranalysisand '## thosefew structuralerrorsconsideredreversibleperse.Peoplev.Cahill(1993)5 ($$ Cal.4th478.Inthewakeof_Fulminante_andCahill,mosterrors!includingmost )%% instructionalerrors!willbesubjecttosomeformofharmlesserroranalysis.Usually *&& thatwillrequireapplicationoftheChapmanstandard( harmlessbeyondareasonable +'' doubt),iftheerrorcanbecharacterizedasafederalconstitutionalviolation,orthe  CaliforniaWatsonstandard( reasonableprobabilityofamorefavorableoutcome),  ifitisdeemedastatelawerroronly.(#(# ";"  ;0  2  A  .3  0` (#(#  StructuralDefects(ReversiblePerSe);׷݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  Erroneousdefinitionof reasonabledoubt.󀀀Inthe15yearssinceits_Fulminante_   opinion,theU.S.SupremeCourthasaddressedonlyoneinstructionalerrorwhichit   hasdeemeda structuraldefect:deliveryofaconstitutionallydeficientdefinitionof   thereasonabledoubtstandard.Sullivanv.Louisiana(1993)508U.S.275.Unlike   otherconstitutionalinstructionalerrors(includingerrorsdilutingthereasonabledoubt   burdenastoparticularelements),adefectivedefinitionof reasonabledoubt   permeatesthejurorsentireconsiderationofthecaseandcannotbesalvagedthrough   harmlesserrorreview. Thereisnoobject,sotospeak,uponwhichharmlesserror   scrutinycanoperate.Id.at280,emphasisinoriginal.(#(# 0  Omissionof reasonabledoubtdefinition.󀀀WhileSullivaninvolvedaninstruction  misstatingthe reasonabledoubttest,Californiacaselawhasappliedthesamelogic  toomissionofthedefinitionofreasonabledoubt(_CALJIC_Ԁ2.90;seealso_CALCRIM_  220).Peoplev.Crawford(1997)58_Cal.App_.4th815.(#(# 0  Errortantamounttodirectingverdictononlycontestedissue.Sullivanandprevious  SupremeCourtopinionshavelisteddirectingaverdictfortheprosecutionasanother  exampleofanstructuralerrorwhichsovitiatesthejurys_factfinding_Ԁfunctionthatit  canneverberedeemedthroughharmlesserroranalysis.SeeSullivan,supra,508U.S.  at280.Buttheerrorneednottaketheformofaliteral directedverdict(i.e.,the  judgedirectingthejurorstoreturnaguiltyverdict)tocomewithinthatcategory.A  recentNinthCircuitcasefoundastructuraldefectwherethejudgesmidtrial  commentsweretantamounttoadirectedverdictbecausethosecommentseffectively   removedtheonlycontestedissueinthecase.Powellv._Galaza_(9thCir.2003)328 ! F.3d558.(Powellarosefromaprosecutionforfailuretoappear.Thejudgetoldthe " jurorsthatthedefendantstestimonyamountedtoanadmissionofanintenttoevade # theprocessesofthecourt.)$ (#(# ";"  ;00  2  B  .3  0` (#(#  SubmissionofInvalidAlternativeLegalTheory;0]݌&""` (#` (# Ќ  0  Unauthorizedlegaltheory.Appellatepractitionersfrequentlyconfrontsituationsin ($$ whichachargewenttothejuryonacombinationofvalidandinvalidalternative )%% theories!forexample,alegallyunauthorizedfelonymurdertheorybasedonanon *&& qualifyingpredicatefelony,aswellasvalidalternativetheoriesofexpressand +'' impliedmalice.Underbothfederalandstateauthorities,submissionofalegally  unauthorizedtheoryrequiresreversalwhereitisimpossibletodeterminewhetherthe  jurorsrelieduponthatinvalidtheoryoronanalternativelegallypermissibleground.  _Yates_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1957)354U.S.298,312;_Stromberg_Ԁv.California(1931)283  U.S.359,369370;_Zant_Ԁv.Stephens(1983)462U.S.862,880882.InCalifornia,this  isgenerallyknownasthe Green_Guiton_rule,afterPeoplev._Guiton_(1993)4   Cal.4th1116,11281129,andPeoplev.Green(1980)27Cal.3d1,69.Underthis   analysis,areviewingcourtmayaffirmonlywheretherecordaffirmativelyestablishes   thatthejurorsnecessarilyreliedonavalidtheory!forexample,thejurysverdicton   someothercount,enhancementorspecialcircumstancemayestablishthatthejurors   madeallthefindingsnecessarytothevalidtheoryofliability(e.g.,avalidfelony   murderpredicate). (#(# 0  Interestingly,althoughfederalandstatecasesapplyingseeminglysimilarrules!   requiringreversalwheneveritisimpossibletodeterminewhichlegaltheorywasthe  basisforthejurysverdict!theydescribethoserulesrelationshiptoharmlesserror  analysisdifferently.#gΚ#gRecentCaliforniaopinionshavetendedtoharmonizethe_Guiton_Ԅ  GreenrulewithChapmanharmlesserroranalysis.Asonecasesaidofsubmission  ofaninvalidfelonymurderpredicate:(#(# 0  8` (#(#Thetrialcourt'smisinstructionsontheelementsofseconddegree  felonymurderrequirereversalofdefendant'smurderconvictionunless  itappearsbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheinstructionalerrordidnot  contributetothejury'sverdict.[Citations]"Suchareasonabledoubt  ariseswhere,althoughthejurywasinstructedonalternatetheories,  thereisnobasisintherecordforconcludingthattheverdictwasbased  onavalidground.[Citations.]"Peoplev.Sanchez(2001)86  _Cal.App_.4th970,980,emphasisadded;accord,Peoplev.Smith(1998)  62_Cal.App_.4th1233,1238;Peoplev.Jones(2000)82_Cal.App_.4th   663,670671;Peoplev.Baker(1999)74_Cal.App_.4th243,253;see ! alsoPeoplev.Swain(1996)12Cal.4th593,607."` `  0  Underthisapproach,submissionofaninvalidalternativelegaltheoryisstillsubject $  toharmlesserroranalysis.But,whentherecorddoesnotrevealwhichgroundwas %!! thebasisfortheverdict,thereisareasonabledoubtthattheverdictmayhaverested &"" upontheimproperground.SeeSwain,supra,12Cal.4that607.0x(#(##g#g'##x(#x(# 0  However,therecentCaliforniaSupremeCourtcaseofPeoplev.Morgan(2007)42 )%% Cal.4th593,surprisinglyrevivedtheGreenprinciplethatsubmissionofa legally *&& inadequatetheoryofconvictioncanoccurthroughtheprosecutorsargument,when +'' combinedwithinstructionswhichcouldbesusceptibletothesameinterpretation.  Here,theSupremeCourtreversedakidnapingconviction,relyinginpartonthefact  theprosecutorarguedanincorrectlegaltheory.0p(#(#p(#p(# 0  Incontrast,theNinthCircuitviewssubmissionofanunauthorizedorlegally non  existenttheoryofliabilityasaformof structuraldefect,whichisnotsubjectto   conventionalharmlesserroranalysis.Larav.Ryan(9thCir.2006)455F.3d1080,   1086;Martinezv.Garcia(9thCir.2004)379F.3d1034,1039;_Suniga_Ԁv._Bunnell_(9th   Cir.1993)998F.2d664#g#.Forexample,inMartinezv.Garcia,theCircuitfoundthat   aninvalidtransferredintenttheory _amount[ed_]tostructuralerror,because the   erroneousjuryinstructionsmadeitimpossibletodeterminewhetherthejury   convictedMartinezoftheattemptedmurder...onapremeditationtheory,whichwas   legallypermissible,oronatransferredintenttheory,whichwaslegally   impermissible.Martinez,supra,at1040,1041,emphasisadded._k ]#  4      _ (#(# 0  Notwithstandingthe structuraldefectcategorization,theNinthCircuittoo  recognizesthatsubmissionofaninvalidlegaltheoryisharmlessifthejuryactually  reliedonavalidalternativetheory.But!consistentwiththeCircuitsviewthatthis  isnotordinary trialerrorsubjecttoChapmananalysis!theNinthCircuitcaselaw  addsanimportantglosstoareviewingcourtsdeterminationofwhethersomeother  verdictorinstructionestablishesthejurorsrelianceonavalidground. [_R]eversal_  maynotberequiredif##itis##absolutelycertain#f##ۺ#thatthejuryrelieduponthelegally  correcttheorytoconvictthedefendant.##Larav.Ryan,455F.3dat1085,quoting  #ۨ#Keatingv.Hood,#?#Ԁ191F.3d1053,1063(9thCir.1999);&#۔#_Ficklin_Ԁv._Hatcher_,##Ԁ177F.3d  1147,1152(9thCir.1999)(emphasisinallthreecases)#۠#.(#(# 0  Absolutecertainty(Laraat1086)ofcourse,representsanevenmorerigorous  standardthanChapman.Thatis,itrequiresastillgreaterdegreeofcertitudebefore  areviewingcourtcandeclaretheerrorharmless,becausethecommonunderstanding   isthata reasonabledoubtburdenofproofdoesnotrequire absolutecertainty.Cf. ! Victorv.Nebraska,511U.S.1,1213(1994)( absolutecertaintyisunattainablein " humanaffairs).S ]#  5      ׀#(#(# Ї0  Distinctionbetween legaland factualinsufficiency.󀀀BoththeU.S.Supremeand  CaliforniaSupremeCourtshavedrawnadistinctionbetweentheorieswhichare  invalidbecausetheyarelegallyunauthorized(e.g.,anonqualifyingpredicatefelony  forfelonymurder)andthosewhichareerroneousbecausetheyarelackinginfactual  support.Griffinv.UnitedStates(1991)502U.S.46;Peoplev._Guiton_Ԁ(1993)4  Cal.4th1116.Therulerequiringreversalwheretherecorddoesnotrevealtheactual   basisforthejurysverdictappliesonlywherethedefectwasoneof legal   insufficiency."`[_T]he_Ԁterm"legalerror"meansamistakeaboutthelaw,asopposed   toamistakeconcerningtheweightorfactualimportoftheevidence.'"_Guiton_,supra,   at1125,quotingGriffin,supra,at474. (#(# 0  Wheretheerrorismerelyoneof factualinsufficiency,theoppositeanalysisapplies:   "Iftheinadequacyofproofispurelyfactual,ofakindthejuryisfullyequippedto   detect,reversalisnotrequiredwheneveravalidgroundfortheverdictremains,   absentanaffirmativeindicationintherecordthattheverdictactuallydidrestonthe  inadequateground."_Guiton_,supra,at1129,emphasisadded.(_Guiton_itselfwasa  Health&_Saf_.Code11352case,inwhichtheinstructionsincluded transportation  or saleofcocaineasgroundsforconviction,buttherewasinsufficientevidenceof  acompletedsale.TheSupremeCourtagreedthatsubmissionofthe salealternative  waserror,butvieweditasoneof factualinsufficiency.Becausetherewas  sufficientevidencethat_Guiton_Ԁtransportedcocaine,butinsufficientevidencethathe  soldit,theSupremeCourtassumedthatthejurorsreliedonthefactuallysupported  transportationtheory.)(#(# ";"  ;70  2  C  .3  0` (#(#  OmissionofElementsorDefectsinDescriptionofElements;7d݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  Dueprocessrequirestheprosecutiontoproveeachelementoftheoffensebeyonda  reasonabledoubt.Accordingly,anyinstructionwhichomits,misstates,orotherwise  removesanelementofthechargeviolatesdueprocess,aswellastheSixth   Amendmentrighttojurytrial.SeegenerallyUnitedStatesv._Gaudin_(1995)515U.S. ! 506.Mostsubstantiveerrorsintheinstructionsdefinitionsofchargedoffensescan " becharacterizedaseitheromissionsor_misdescriptions_Ԁoftheelements.#(#(# 0  Omissionofanelement.BoththeU.S.andCaliforniaSupremeCourtshaveheldthat %!! omissionorremovalofanelementisnotastructuraldefectandissubjecttoharmless &"" erroranalysisundertheChapmanstandard._Neder_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1999)527U.S. '## 1;Peoplev.Flood(1998)18Cal.4th470.Both_Neder_andFloodwerecasesinwhich ($$ theinstructionsomittedanelementwhichwasnotreasonablysusceptibletodispute  undertherespectivecircumstancesofthecases!in_Neder_,whetherthefailureto  reportover$5millionsatisfiedthe materialityelementoftaxfraud;and,inFlood,  whethertheuniformedpoliceofficersfromwhomFloodwasfleeingwere peace  officers,asrequiredfor_Veh_.Code2800.3.Predictably,eachopinionfoundthe  instructionalerrorharmlessunderChapman. (#(# 0  Itiseasytorelegatetheholdingsof_Neder_andFloodtothe soundbitethat   Chapmanappliestoomissionofanelementandthentoproceedwithatraditional   Chapmanharmlesserroranalysis.Butthe_Neder_opinion,inparticular,deserves   closerscrutinyforitindicatesthatamuchmorerigorousformofChapmananalysis   appliestothiscategoryoferror: (#(# 0  8` (#(#Inacasesuchasthisone,whereadefendantdidnot,andapparently   couldnot,bringforthfactscontestingtheomittedelement,% T %Tanswering  thequestionwhetherthejuryverdictwouldhavebeenthesameabsent  theerrordoesnotfundamentallyunderminethepurposesofthejury  trialguarantee.[]Ofcourse,safeguardingthejuryguaranteewilloften  requirethatareviewingcourtconductathoroughexaminationofthe  record.If,attheendofthatexamination,thecourtcannotconclude  beyondareasonabledoubtthatthejuryverdictwouldhavebeenthe  sameabsenttheerrorforexample,wherethedefendantcontestedthe  omittedelementandraisedevidencesufficienttosupportacontrary  findingitshouldnotfindtheerrorharmless.[]Areviewingcourt  makingthisharmlesserrorinquirydoesnot..."becomeineffecta  secondjurytodeterminewhetherthedefendantisguilty."[Citation.]  Ratheracourt,intypicalappellatecourtfashion,askswhetherthe  recordcontainsevidencethatcouldrationallyleadtoacontraryfinding  withrespecttotheomittedelement._Neder_,supra,527U.S.at19,   emphasisadded.!` `  0  Underafaithfulreadingof_Neder_,areviewingcourtshouldfindomissionofan # elementharmlessonlyincasessuchasFloodand_Neder_itself,wheretheomitted $  elementwasnotreasonablysusceptibletodispute.But,iftheevidencedoesposea %!! factualquestionconcerningthatelement,theappellatecourt shouldnotfindtheerror &"" harmless.Ifthereisconflictingevidence(orconflictinginferencesfromthe '## evidence)concerningthatelement,thatconflictshouldcompelafindingofprejudice ($$ underthe_Neder_formofChapmanreview,anditwillnotsufficeforthereviewing )%% courttodeclarethat overwhelmingevidencesupportsthecontestedelement.*&&(#(#  +'' 0  Omissionof _subtantially_Ԁallelements?󀀀_Neder_andFloodeachinvolvedomission  ofasinglediscreteelementofthecharge.Previously,inPeoplev.Cummings(1993)  4Cal.4th1233,13111315,theCaliforniaSupremeCourthadreversedrobbery  convictionswheretherobberyinstructionsweresodeficientthattheyomitted   substantiallyall(4outof5)oftheelementsofthatoffense.Inspurningthestates  invitationof harmlesserror,theCourtobservedthat none[ofthepriorU.S.   SupremeCourtcases]suggeststhataharmlesserroranalysismaybeappliedto   instructionalerrorwhichwithdrawsfromjuryconsiderationsubstantiallyallofthe   elementsofanoffenseanddidnotrequirebyotherinstructionsthatthejuryfindthe   existenceofthefactsnecessarytoaconclusionthattheomittedelementhadbeen   proved.Cummings,supra,at1315.Similarly,inanotherpre_Neder_case,theNinth   Circuitfoundastructuraldefectwherethetrialcourtentirelyfailedtoinstructonthe   elementsofacharge.Harmonv.Marshall(9thCir.1995)69F.3d963,966. (#(# 0  InitslaterFloodopinionpermittingChapmanreviewofomissionofasingleelement,  theCaliforniaSupremeCourtwascarefultodistinguishbothitsownCummings  opinionandtheNinthCircuitsHarmondecision. Wehavenooccasioninthiscase  todecidewhethertheremaybesomeinstancesinwhichatrialcourt'sinstruction  removinganissuefromthejury'sconsiderationwillbe% U %U% V theequivalentoffailingto  submittheentirecasetothejuryanerrorthatclearlywouldbeastructuralrather  thanatrialerror.[Citation;footnote comparingCummings,Harmon,andSullivan  v.Louisiana.]Flood,supra,18Cal.4th%VԀat503.(#(# ";"  ;c0  2  D  .3  0` (#(#  Offensesvs.Enhancements;c݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  _Apprendi_!federalconstitutionalsignificanceofenhancements.InPeoplev._Wims_  (1995)10Cal.4th293,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtheldthatfailuretoinstructon  aweaponenhancementwasmerelystatelawerror,subjecttotheWatson reasonable  probabilitytestofprejudice,becausetherewasnofederalconstitutionalrighttojury   trialonasentenceenhancement.AstheCaliforniaSupremeCourthassubsequently ! acknowledged,the_Wims_holdingcouldnotsurvive_Apprendi_Ԁv.NewJersey(2000) " 530U.S.466,whichheldthattheSixthAmendmentrighttojurytrialappliedtoany # nonrecidivistenhancementwhichincreasedthesentenceabovethemaximum $  otherwiseallowedfortheconvictionoffensealone.SeePeoplev._Sengpadychith_ %!! (2001)26Cal.4th316.&""(#(# 0  Inthewakeof_Apprendi_,aninstructionalerrorconcerningtheelementsofan ($$ enhancementwillusuallybereviewedunderthesamefederalconstitutional )%% principles,includingChapman_Neder_harmlesserroranalysis,asacomparableerror *&& involvingtheelementsofanoffense.Butthereareseveralquirkswhichmaytake +'' someenhancementsoutofthescopeofthoseprotections,whichflowfromlimitations  oruncertaintiesintheU.S.SupremeCourts_Apprendi_jurisprudence.(#(# 0  Relationofenhancementtomaximumsentenceforoffense.AstheCalifornia  SupremeCourtobservedinapost_Apprendi_opinion,theapplicabilityoftheSixth  Amendmenttoasentencingenhancement!andhencetheapplicabilityoffederal   constitutionalprinciples(includingChapmanreview)toaninstructionalerroronthat   charge! dependsonwhethertheenhancementprovisionincreasesthemaximum   possiblepenaltyfortheunderlyingcrime.Peoplev._Sengpadychith_(2001)26   Cal.4th316,324.Aconventionaldeterminatesentenceenhancement,whichconcerns   thecircumstancesofthecurrentoffense(e.g.,weaponuse,inflictionofgreatbodily   injury,etc.)andconsistsof anadditionaltermofimprisonmentaddedtothebase   term(Cal.RulesofCourt,rule4.405_(c_)(enhancementdefinition))plainlycomes   within_Apprendi_becauseitcanresultinasentenceinexcessoftheuppertermforthe   underlyingconviction.(#(# 0  Todate,however,theU.S.SupremeCourthasadheredtoadistinctionbetween  _Apprendi_typeenhancementswhichincreasethemaximumpunishmentand   mandatoryminimumprovisionswhichincreasetheminimumsentenceavailable.  Atleastundercurrentlaw,thelatterprovisionsdonotimplicatetheSixthAmendment  because,thoughthosefindingsmaysubstantiallyelevatethelowendofthe  sentencingrangeforanoffense,theydonotincreasethemaximumterm.SeeHarris  v.UnitedStates(2002)536U.S.545.(#(# 0  Peoplev._Sengpadychith_(2001)26Cal.4th316,dramaticallyillustratestheanomalies  flowingfromthisdistinction,becausethesameinstructionalerrorregardingthegang  enhancement(Pen.Code186.22)wassubjecttodifferentstandardsofprejudice,  dependingontherelationshipbetweentheenhancementandthesentencingonthe  respectivecounts.Withrespecttomostunderlyingoffenseswithdeterminateterms,   section186.22functionsasaconventionalenhancementbyaddinganadditionalterm, ! consecutivetothesentenceontheoffenseitself.(_Subd_.(b)(1).)Foranothercategory " offelonies,thestatuteauthorizesanindeterminatetermof lifeinlieuofthe # otherwiseapplicabledeterminateupperterm.(_Subd_.(b)(4).)Becauseboththose $  provisionsincreasedthemaximumtermfortheunderlyingcounts,the_Apprendi_jury %!! rightapplied,sotheChapmanstandardofprejudicedidaswell.But,forcrimes &"" alreadypunishablebylife,thestatutebarsparole untilaminimumof15calendar '## years% W %W'havebeenserved."(_Subd_.(b)(5).) [_F]or_Ԁthesefelonies,thegangenhancement ($$ provisiondoesnotincreasethelifetermfortheunderlyingoffense.Consequently,in )%% thiscategoryofcasesinstructionalerroronanelementofthegangenhancement *&& provisiondoesnotviolatethefederalConstitution[citing_Apprendi_],butonly +'' Californialaw,makingtheerror_reviewable_Ԁunderthestandardwearticulatedin  Watson[citation]._Sengpadychith_,supra,26Cal.4that327,emphasisinoriginal.(#(# 0  The PriorConvictionException._Apprendi_anditsprogenyapplyonlytosentencing  provisions otherthanthefactofapriorconvictionwhichincreasethetermbeyond  thestatutorymaximumprescribedfortheunderlyingoffense._Apprendi_Ԁv.NewJersey   (2000)530U.S.466,488489,emphasisadded;_Blakely_Ԁv.Washington(2004)542   U.S.296,301;UnitedStatesv.Booker(2005)543U.S.220,244.Thisisknownas   the _Almendarez_ԄTorresexception,after_Almendarez_ԄTorresv.UnitedStates(1998)   523U.S.224.Thoughthereareclearly5votestooverrule_Almendarez_ԄTorres(see   JusticeThomasconcurrencein_Apprendi_),theSupremeCourthassofardeclined   invitationstotakeuptheissue.Consequently,asmattersstandnow,afailureto   requirejurydeterminationofsuchrecidivistenhancementsas strikes, serious   felonyenhancements,andpriorprisontermenhancementsgenerallydoesnotpose   afederalconstitutionalviolation.But,evenleavingasidewhetherthe_Almendarez_Ԅ  Torresexceptionwillremaingoodlaw,thereisconsiderableuncertaintyoverthe  scopeofthatexception!i.e.,overtheprecisedividinglinebetween_Apprendi_and  _Almendarez_ԄTorres.(#(# 0  TheCaliforniaSupremeCourt,however,hasreadthe_Almendarez_ԄTorresexception  broadly:Whentheleastadjudicatedelementsofaprioroffensedonotautomatically  qualifyitasa seriousor violentfelony,determinationoftheenhancement  allegationfrequentlyrequiresconsiderationofadditionalmaterialsfromthe record  ofconvictionshowingthefactualdetailsoftheprioroffense.SeegenerallyPeople  v._Guerrero_(1988)44X<XCal.3d#XXԀtoinstruct% [ %[[>Ԁonanaffirmative  defense.[Citation]Peoplev._Salas_(2006)37Cal.4th967,984;seealsoPeoplev.  Simon(1995)9Cal.4th493,507fn.11.Inthepast,thatCourtreviewederroneous   failuretoinstructonadefenseunderthestrict _Sedeno_test,whichrequiredreversal   unlessthejurynecessarilyresolvedtheomittedquestionunderother,correct   instructions.Peoplev._Sedeno_(1974)10Cal.3d703;see,e.g.,Peoplev.Stewart   (1976)16Cal.3d133,141142;Peoplev._Lemus_(1988)203_Cal.App_.3d470,478   480.However,theCaliforniaSupremeCourthasrecentlyrepudiatedthe_Sedeno_test   inothercontexts,anditisdoubtfulthatitwouldpreserveitsuseforomitteddefenses.   Cf.Peoplev.Flood(1998)18Cal.4th470(federalChapmanreviewofomissionof   anelement);Peoplev._Breverman_(1998)19Cal.4th142(stateWatsonreviewof   omissionofalesserincludedoffense).(#(# 0  TheCaliforniacourtshavenotresolvedwhetherthereisanyfederalconstitutional  righttoinstructionsonanaffirmativedefense.However,thereisnoquestionover  thematterinthefederalcircuits. Asageneralproposition,adefendantisentitledto  aninstructionastoanyrecognizeddefenseforwhichthereexistsevidencesufficient  forareasonablejurytofindinhisfavor.[Citations]Mathewsv.UnitedStates  (1988)485U.S.58,63.AlthoughMathewswasadirectappealfromafederal  criminalconvictionanddidnotexplicitlycouchitsholdinginconstitutionalterms,  federalcourtshavereadit(andotherSupremeCourtopinions)asrecognizingadue  processentitlementtoinstructionsonthe defensetheoryofthecase:(#(# 8  0`   Thus,thestatecourt'sfailuretocorrectlyinstructthejuryonthe  defensemaydeprivethedefendantofhisdueprocessrighttopresent  adefense.[Citations].Thisissobecausetherighttopresentadefense   "wouldbeemptyifitdidnotentailthefurtherrighttoaninstruction ! thatallowedthejurytoconsiderthedefense."[Citation.]Bradleyv. " Duncan(9thCir.2002)315F.3d1091,1099.#` `  0  Indeed,inBradley,theNinthCircuitdeemedtheconstitutionalmagnitudeoftheright %!! toinstructionsonthedefensetheoryofthecaseassowellestablishedthatthe &"" defendantpetitionerwasentitledtoreliefevenunderthe_AEDPA_Ԁstandardgoverning '## federalhabeasreviewofastateconviction!thatis,itfoundthestateappellatecourts ($$ _affirmance_ԀofBradleysconvictionrepresentedan unreasonableapplicationof )%% clearlyestablishedfederallaw.Bradley,supra,at11001101(see28U.S.C. *&& 2254(d)(1)).+''(#(# Ї0  Assumingthatthereisadueprocessrighttoinstructionsonadefensetheory  supportedbytheevidence,anerroneousrefusalofaninstructiononanaffirmative  defenseshouldatleastbesubjecttoChapmanprejudicereview,whentheerroris  raisedondirectappeal._i ]#  6      _ԀHowever,manyfederalcasessuggestthatanevenless  forgivingstandardthanChapmanapplies.Underthosecases,thedenialofrequested  instructionsonadefensetheorywhichhasevidentiarysupportisprejudicialerror,   unlessotherinstructionsadequatelycoveredthatdefense.(E.g.,UnitedStatesv.Ruiz   (11thCir.1995)59F.3d1151,11541155;UnitedStatesv.Allen(2ndCir.1997)127   F.3d260,265;UnitedStatesv._Montanez_(1stCir.1997)105F.3d36,39.) Theright   tohavethejuryinstructedastothedefendantstheoryofthecaseisoneofthose   rightssobasictoafairtrialthatfailuretoinstructwherethereisevidencetosupport   theinstructioncanneverbeconsideredharmlesserror.UnitedStatesv.Escobarde   Bright(9thCir.1984)742F.2d1196,1201. (#(# 0  Althoughthesecircuitcasesgenerallypredate_Neder_Ԁv.UnitedStates(1999)527  U.S.1,theyparallelthe_Neder_opinionscautionarynotesonthelimitsofharmless  errorreviewofomittedelements.As_Neder_stated,omissionofanelementcannot  beheldharmlesswherethatelementwascontested._Neder_,supra,at19.Because  atrialcourthasadutytoinstructonallelementsoftheoffenseineverycase,there  willbecases,suchas_Neder_itself,inwhichaomissionofanelementwillbeharmless  becausethatelementwasnotsusceptibletodispute.However,sincethedutyto  instructonanaffirmativedefenseonlyarisesifthereisevidentiarysupportforthat  defense,anerroneousrefusalshouldrarelyifeverbesalvageablethroughharmless  erroranalysis.(#(# ";"  ;ZX0  2  F  .3  0` (#(#  OmissionorRefusalofInstructionsonLesserIncludedOffenses;ZXX݌` (#` (# Ќ  0  _Breverman_:abandonmentofthestate_Sedeno_standard.FormerlyCaliforniacourts  reviewederrorsintheomissionortherefusaloflesserincludedoffenseinstructions   underanespeciallyrigorousprejudicestandardknownasthe _Sedeno_test.People ! v._Sedeno_Ԁ(1974)10Cal.3d703,721._Sedeno_wasessentiallyareversalpersetest " withanarrowlydrawnexception.Where_Sedeno_wasapplicable,aninstructional # errorrequiredreversalunlessthequestionposedbytheomittedinstructionwas $  necessarilyresolvedbythejury,adverselytothedefense,underother,correct %!! instructionsandverdicts._Sedeno_wasprincipallygroundedinthestateconstitutional &"" righttojurydeterminationofeverymaterialfact(Peoplev.Modesto(1963)59Cal.2d  722,730)(though,priortoPeoplev.Flood(1998)18Cal.4th470,theCalifornia  SupremeCourthadalsosometimesemployed_Sedeno_aspartofitsreviewofsuch  federalconstitutionalissuesasdefectiveinstructionsonelements).(#(# 0  InPeoplev._Breverman_Ԁ(1998)19Cal.4th142,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt   reaffirmeditslongstandingrulethatatrialcourtmustinstruct_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁonanylesser   includedoffensesupportedbysubstantialevidence.But,_Breverman_Ԁsubstantially   alteredtheprejudiceanalysisforthatspeciesoferrorbyoverrulingthe_Sedeno_   standard.After_Breverman_,thestatelawerrorinomittingalesserincludedoffense   instructionismerelysubjecttotheWatsonstandard,requiringreversalonlyifthere   isa reasonableprobabilitytheoutcomewouldhavebeendifferent. (#(# 0  Federalconstitutionalimplicationsoflesseroffenseinstructions.The_Breverman_   majorityalsoheldthatthereisnogeneralrighttolesserincludedoffenseinstruction  innoncapitalcases.Thereisalimitedfederalconstitutionalrighttoalesserincluded  offenseinstructionundersomecircumstancesincapitalcases.Beckv.Alabama  (1980)447U.S.625.Butthe_Breverman_majoritynotedthattheU.S.SupremeCourt  hadgiventhatrightaverynarrowconstructioneveninthecapitalcontext(e.g.,_Schad_  v.Arizona(1991)501U.S.624;Hopkinsv.Reeves(1998)524U.S.88)andhasnever  extendedtheBeckanalysistononcapitalcases.Inthisrespect,theCalifornia  SupremeCourtsviewisconsistentwiththatoftheNinthCircuit. Underthelawof  thiscircuit,thefailureofastatetrialcourttoinstructonlesserincludedoffensesin  anoncapitalcasedoesnotpresentafederalconstitutionalquestion.[Citation.]  _Windham_Ԁv._Merkle_Ԁ(9thCir.1998)163F.3d1092,1106.(#(# 0  Nonetheless,_Breverman_doesnotruleoutallpotentialgroundsfor federalizingthe  denialoflesserincludedoffenseinstructions._Breverman_specificallyaddressed!and  rejected!anargumentforextensionofBeckv.Alabamatononcapitalcases,andthat   istheonlyfederalconstitutionalissuewhichthe_Breverman_opiniondecided.There ! aretwootherpotentialfederalconstitutionalbasesforsuchinstructions:"(#(# 0  Uniquerelationshipbetweenvoluntarymanslaughterandmalice.󀀀The_Breverman_ $  majoritydeclinedtodecidewhethertheomissionofimperfectselfdefense %!! instructionsresultedinincompleteinstructionsonthechargedoffenseofmurder &"" becausethemajoritybelievedthatissuewasnotpresentedinthebriefing. '## _Breverman_,supra,19Cal.4that170171&_fns_.1819.ButJustice_Kennard_Ԁdid ($$ addressthatissueinherdissent.Shefoundthat,dueto theuniquerelationship )%% betweenmurderandvoluntary_manslaughter,_Ԁanerroneousfailuretoinstructonheat *&& ofpassionorimperfectselfdefenseviolateddueprocess.Because,underCalifornia +'' law,heatofpassionorimperfectselfdefensenegatesmaliceaforethought,afailure  toinstructthejurorsonthatdoctrineresultsinincompleteinstructionsonthemalice  elementofthechargedcrimeofmurder,contrarytoUnitedStatesv._Gaudin_(1995)  515U.S.506.Theerroralsorelievestheprosecutionofitsburden,under_Mullaney_  v.Wilbur(1975)421U.S.684,ofprovingbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthe  defendantdidnotkillintheheatofpassionorinimperfectselfdefense.See   _Breverman_,supraat187191(_Kennard_,J.,dissenting_opn_.).Justice_Kennard_s   dissentprovidesablueprintforthisargument.Additionally,becausethemajority   opiniondidnotaddressthe_Gaudin_Ԅ_Mullaney_Ԁissueonthemerits,the_Breverman_   opinionshouldnotbarraisingthatclaiminaCaliforniacourt.j ]#  7       (#(# 0  Interestingly,theU.S.SupremeCourtsopinionin_Middleton_v._McNeil_(2004)541   U.S.433,appearstoprovidesomeimplicitsupportforadueprocessargumentalong   thelinessketchedinJustice_Kennard_s_Breverman_dissent.Asdiscussedearlier,in   _McNeil_,theSupremeCourtfoundthatanerrorintheimperfectselfdefense  instructionsdidnotrequirereversalbecause,consideringtheinstructionsasawhole  andtheattorneysarguments,therewasno reasonablelikelihoodthejurors  misunderstoodthatdoctrine.ButtheveryfactthattheSupremeCourtwasaddressing  theadequacyofthoseinstructionsinthefirstplacereflectsitsapparentrecognition  thatdueprocessrequiredcorrectinstructionsonimperfectselfdefense. Ina  criminaltrial,theStatemustproveeveryelement% ` %`:zoftheoffense,andajuryinstruction  violatesdueprocessifitfailstogiveeffecttothatrequirement._McNeil_,supra,at  437.(#(# 0  EvenassumingthatJustice_Kennard_Ԁwascorrectinher_Breverman_dissent,thesame   uniquecharacteristicsofimperfectselfdefenseandheatofpassionwhichsupport  thatdueprocessanalysisalsoeffectivelyrestrictthatargumenttoomissionsofthose  groundsforvoluntarymanslaughter.Itishardtothinkofanyothercontextinwhich  theomissionoflesseroffenseinstructionsalsoresultsinincompleteinstructionson   theelementsofthechargedgreateroffense.(Forexample,assumingthatthecourt ! instructsadequatelyonthedefinitionof deadlyweapon,anerroneousfailureto " submitsimpleassaultasalesserincludedoffensedoesnotresultinincomplete  instructionsontheelementsofassaultwithadeadlyweapon.)(#(# 0  Denialofinstructionson defensetheoryofthecase.󀀀Thereisanother,potentially  broader,groundforfederalizingsomelesserincludedoffenseissues.Asnoted  earlier,federalcasesrecognizeadueprocessrighttoinstructionsonthe defense   theoryofthecase.E.g.,Bradleyv.Duncan(9thCir.2002)315F.3d1091.That   conceptisnotlimitedtoaffirmativedefenseslikeselfdefenseorentrapment.The   NinthCircuithasrecognizedthat the defensetheoryofthecasemayrequire   instructionsonalesserincludedoffense, wherethedefenseevidenceandarguments    aredirectedtoadistinctionbetweenthechargedandthelesseroffense._Conde_Ԁv.   Henry(9thCir.1999)198F.3d734._Conde_arosefromakidnapforrobbery   prosecution.TheNinthCircuitheldthatthedenialofdefenserequestedinstructions   onthelesseroffenseofsimplekidnapingdeprivedthedefendantofhis well   establishedconstitutionalright toadequateinstructionsonthedefensetheoryofthe  case.Id.at739.(Tobesure,therewereothercloselyrelatederrorsin_Conde_,  includingadefectintheinstructionsononeelementofrobbery.Butthestructureof  theopinionindicatesthattheNinthCircuitviewedthedenialofrequestedlesser  offenseinstructionsasadueprocessviolationinitsownright.)(#(# 0  TheCaliforniaSupremeCourthasnotruledoutthepossibilitythatrefusalofa  requestedlesserincludedoffenseinstructioncouldviolatedueprocessasadenialof  instructionsonthe defensetheory._Breverman_involvedatrialcourtsfailureto  deliver_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁinstructionsonagroundforalesseroffenseverdict.Thesamewas  trueofaclaimrejectedinarecentcapitalcase.TheCourtacknowledgedsuchfederal   defensetheoryopinionsas_Conde_Ԁv.HenryandDuncanv.Bradley,butfoundthem  distinguishable. Inthesecases,unlikethepresentone,theinstructionatissuewas  requestedbythedefense.Thecasesdonotsupportthepropositionthatatrialcourt's  failuretoinstructonalesserincludedoffense#Ӊ#_sua_Ԁ_sponte_##Ԁdeniesdueprocess.People   v.Rogers(2006)39Cal.4th826,872.!(#(# 0  WhileRogersfallsshortofanexplicitendorsementofthe_Conde_ defensetheory # viewofrequestedlesseroffenseinstructions,itdoesdemonstratethattheissue $  remainsopeninCalifornia#۝#.Thus,contrarytotheAttorneyGeneralscommonrefrain, %!! _Breverman_isnotthefinalwordonthefederalconstitutionalimplicationsofrefusal &"" oflesseroffenseinstructions.EspeciallyinlightofRogersd_iscussion_Ԁof_Conde_and '## otherfederalcases,_Breverman_doesnotforecloseaCaliforniaappellatecourtfrom ($$ findingconstitutionalerrorandapplyingChapmantoarefusalofrequestedlesser )%% offenseinstructions.*&&(#(#  +'' 0  G.0` (#(#EvidenceEvaluationInstructionsAffectingFederalConstitutional  Rights!ChapmanReview` (#` (# 0  Instructionsontheelementsofcrimesandtheoriesofliabilityarenottheonly  instructions(orinstructionalomissions)whichmayposefederalconstitutionalissues.  Justasevidentiaryrulingsbeforeandduringtrialfrequentlyinvolveconstitutional   issues(e.g.,unlawfulsearch,selfincrimination,confrontation,etc.),theinstructions   relatingtothatevidenceanditspermissibleusesmayraisefederalissuesaswell.   Wheretheevidentiaryrulingwaserroneous,therelatedinstructionsmaycompound   theerror.Perhapsmoreimportantly,evenwhendamagingevidenceislegitimately   admissibleonsomelegitimateground(e.g.,impeachment),theremaystillbean   instructionalissueifthejurorsreceivedincorrectorinadequateguidanceonthe   purposesforwhichtheycouldconsidertheevidence. (#(# 0  Instructionalerrorswhichimplicatefederalconstitutionalrightsaregenerallysubject  tothetraditionalChapmantest("harmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt").The  exampleslistedbelowaresimplyillustrative.Anyinstructionalerrorwhichallows  jurorstouseevidence(orothertrialcircumstances)foranunconstitutionalpurpose  shouldbeacandidateforChapmanprejudicereview:(#(# ""  :0  0` (#(#2  1  .3  0 ` (#` (#  ݀Instructionson OtherOffenses:g݌ (# (# Ќ  0   ` (a)Ingeneral,useof"otheroffenses"evidenceasproofofadefendant's  "character"orcriminalpropensityoffendsfederaldueprocessbecauseofthehistoric  commonlawproscriptionsagainstsuchevidence._McKinney_Ԁv.Rees(9thCir.1993)  993F.2d1378[evidentiaryerror].InPeoplev._Garceau_Ԁ(1993)6Cal.4th140,186  187,theCaliforniaSupremeCourt"assumedwithoutdeciding"thataninstruction  whichexplicitlyauthorizedjurorstoconsider"otheroffenses"evidenceasproofof  thedefendant's"character"was_reviewable_ԀundertheChapmanstandard.Butthe   CaliforniaSupremeCourtrejecteda_McKinney_typedueprocesschallengetoanew ! statute,_Evid_.Code1108,whichexpresslyallowsuseofprioroffensesas "  propensityevidenceinsexoffensecases.Peoplev._Falsetta_(1999)21Cal.4th903. # TheCaliforniacourtshaveappliedsimilarreasoninginupholdingaparallelstatute $  allowing propensityevidenceindomesticviolencecases,_Evid_.Code1109.See %!! Peoplev.Jennings(2000)81_Cal.App_.4th1301,1312;Peoplev.Price(2004)120 &"" _Cal.App_.4th224,240.However,outsidethecontextofthesediscretelegislatively '## recognizedcategoriesofcrimes!sexoffensesanddomesticviolence!thelaw ($$ continuestoprohibituseof otheroffensesevidenceasproofofcriminalprop_ensity_. )%% Consequently,aninstructionallowingconsiderationof otheroffensesforthat *&& purposewouldstillraisedueprocessconcerns,justifyingChapmanreview.+''(#(# Ї0   ` (b)Eveninsexoffenseordomesticviolencecaseswhereconsiderationof   otheroffensesasproofofpropensityispermissible(under_Evid_.Code1108,  1109,and_Falsetta_),theinstructionsguidingthejurorsuseofthatevidencedeserve  especiallyclosescrutiny.BoththeNinthCircuitandsomeCaliforniaappellatecourts  foundthatthepre1999patterninstructions,_CALJIC_Ԁ2.50.01and2.50.1,violateddue  processbecause,readincombination,theyeffectivelyauthorizedaroutetoconviction   onevidencefallingshortofthereasonabledoubtstandard._CALJIC_Ԁ2.50.1allowed   proofofotheroffensesunderapreponderancestandard,andthepre1999versionof   2.50.01,inturn,allowedjurorstoinferthedefendantsguiltofthecurrentlycharged   offensefromthepropensityshownbyhispriorconviction. Therefore,theinterplay   ofthetwoinstructionsallowedthejurytofindthatGibsoncommittedtheuncharged   sexualoffensesbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceandthustoinferthathehad   committedthechargedactsbaseduponfactsfoundnotbeyondareasonabledoubt,   butbyapreponderanceoftheevidence.Gibsonv.Ortiz(9thCir.2004)387F.3d   812,822,emphasisinoriginal;seealsoPeoplev._Vichroy_(1999)76_Cal.App_.4th92;  Peoplev._Orellano_(2000)79_Cal.App_.4th179;Peoplev.Frazier(2001)89  _Cal.App_.4th30;butcontrast,e.g.,Peoplev.VanWinkle(1999)75_Cal.App_.4th133;  Peoplev._Jeffries_(2000)83_Cal.App_.4th15(eachupholdingpre1999_CALJIC_  2.50.01andrelatedinstructions,findingnoreasonablelikelihoodjurorsconstrued  instructionsasawholetoallowconvictionofcurrentcrimeonevidenceshortofproof  beyondreasonabledoubt).However,the1999revisionof_CALJIC_Ԁ2.50.01addeda  paragraphexplainingthat,evenifjurorsfoundbyapreponderancethatthedefendant  committedpriorsexualoffenses, thatisnotsufficientbyitselftoprovebeyonda  reasonabledoubtthat[he][she]committedthecharged_crime[s_].TheCalifornia  SupremeCourtheldthatthisrevisedversionof2.50.01,whenconsideredtogether  withalltheinstructions,posednoriskofaconstructionallowingconvictiononless  thanproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.Peoplev._Reliford_(2003)29Cal.4th1007.(#(# 0   ` _(c_)Asalways,counselshouldbevigilantinreviewinganyunusual   modificationsofthe otheroffensepatterninstructionsoranyuseofthose ! instructionsbeyondthespecificpurposeforwhichtheyweredesigned.Onerecent " opinionheldthat_Evid_.Code1108,1109,applyonlytounchargedsexoffensesor # domesticviolenceincidents,nottootherchargesinthecurrentcase.Peoplev. $  _Quintanilla_(2005)132_Cal.App_.4th572,founderrorwherethetrialcourtmodified %!! _CALJIC_Ԁ2.50.02and2.50.1,toallowthejurorstousethevariousdomesticviolence &"" chargesaspropensityevidenceinconsideringtheotherdomesticviolencechargesin '## thesamecase.(However,the_Quintanilla_courtfoundtheinstructionalerrorharmless ($$ underChapman.))%%(#(# ""  k0  0` (#(#2  2  .3  0 ` (#` (#  OtherlimitationsonConsiderationofEvidencek݌+'' (# (# Ќ  0   ` (a)Necessityofinstructionlimitinguseofunconstitutionallyobtained  evidenceforimpeachmentpurposesonly.SeegenerallyPeoplev.May(1988)44  Cal.3d309[adoptingthefederalruleallowingimpeachmentwithanun_Mirandized_  statement].Denialofalimitinginstruction(suchas_CALJIC_Ԁ2.13.1or_CALCRIM_  356)issubjecttotheChapmanstandard.Peoplev.Duncan(1988)204_Cal.App_.3d   613,620622. (#(# 0   ` (b)Instructional_Bruton_error.Anontestifyingcodefendant'sextrajudicial   statementisadmissibleinajointtrial,providedthatthestatementdoesn'texplicitly   refertotheotherdefendantandthecourtclearlyinstructsthejurorstoconsiderthe   statementastothe_declarant_Ԁcodefendantonlyandnotastotheotherdefendant.   Richardsonv.Marsh(1987)481U.S.200.Presumably,instructionswhichallowed   thejurorstoconsidertheextrajudicialstatementagainstbothdefendantswould   triggerChapmanreview,justasotherformsof_Bruton_errordo.(#(# ""  ú0  0` (#(#2  3  .3  0 ` (#` (#  InferencesfromotherCircumstancesatTrialú݌ (# (# Ќ  0   ` (a)InstructionalGriffinerroraninstructionauthorizinganadverseinference  fromadefendant'sexerciseofhisFifthAmendmentprivilegenottotakethestand.  Peoplev.Vargas(1973)9Cal.3d470,477478;Peoplev.Diaz(1989)208  _Cal.App_.3d338[eachapplyingChapman].(#(# 0   ` (b)Presumably,thesamegoesfor"Cartererror"refusalofadefense  requestedinstruction(suchas_CALJIC_Ԁ2.60&2.61or_CALCRIM_Ԁ355)explicitly  admonishingjurorsnottodrawanysuchinferencefromthedefendant'sfailuretotake  thestand.Carterv.Kentucky(1981)450U.S.288;Jamesv.Kentucky(1984)466  U.S.341[leavingopenquestionofharmlesserror].(#(# 0   ` _(c_)Wherethedefendantisshackledattrialandtherestraintsarevisibletothe ! jurors,thecourtmust_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁdeliveraninstruction(suchas_CALJIC_Ԁ1.04or " _CALCRIM_Ԁ202&337)admonishingthemto"disregardthismatterentirely."People # v.Duran(1976)16Cal.3d282,291292,296n.15[stating_sua_Ԁ_sponte_Ԁrule,butnot $  resolvingapplicableprejudicestandard];Peoplev.Jackson(1993)14_Cal.App_.4th %!! 1818,18271830[applyingChapman];Peoplev._Jacla_Ԁ(1978)77_Cal.App_.3d878, &"" 890891[same].'##(#(# 0   ` (d)RetroactiveapplicationofCaliforniaSupremeCourtcasesoverrulingprior )%% standards(e.g.,Carloserrorre:intentforfelonymurderspecialcircumstance) *&& _violative_Ԁofdueprocessasunforeseeablejudicialenlargementofcriminalliability. +'' Peoplev.Johnson(1993)6Cal.4th1,4445;Peoplev._Fierro_(1991)1Cal.4th173,  227;Peoplev.Farley(1996)45_Cal.App_.4th1697,17041709;Inre_Baert_Ԁ(1988)  205_Cal.App_.3d514,519520.(#(# 0  H.0` (#(#EverythingElsetheStateWatsonStandard` (#` (# 0  Allinstructionalerrorswhichdon'tfitintooneofthecategoriesabovearesubjectto   thestateWatsontesttheburdenisontheappellanttoshowthatit'sreasonably   probablethattheoutcomewouldhavebeenmorefavorablewithouttheerror.People   v.Watson(1956)46Cal.2d818.Someofthemorecommoninstructionalissues   subjecttoWatsonarelistedbelow: (#(# ! ! (#33 " 3"  0  0` (#(# 3 2#  1  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Accompliceinstructions.E.g.,Peoplev.Gordon(1973)10Cal.3d460,   470473. 3 m݌  (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 3{2#  2  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Cautionaryinstructions(e.g.,oraladmissions,_CALJIC_Ԁ2.70,2.71,etc.;  _CALCRIM_Ԁ358.).E.g.,Peoplev._Heishman_Ԁ(1988)45Cal.3d147,166. 3{݌ (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 3s2#  3  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Identificationinstructions(_CALJIC_Ԁ2.91,2.92;_CALCRIM_Ԁ315)and  mostotherdefenserequested"pinpointinstructions"drawingthe  jurors'attentiontoparticularaspectsoftheevidence.Peoplev.Wright  (1988)45Cal.3d1126. 3s݌ (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 32#  4  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Dewberryerror,failuretoinstructspecificallyontheapplicationof  thereasonabledoubtruletothechoicebetweengreaterandlesser  offenses.Peoplev.Dewberry(1959)51Cal.2d548. 3݌ (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 32#  5  .3  0 ` (#` (#  _Kurtzman_error!instructionswhichmisinformjurorsthattheycan't  "consider"alesseroffenseuntiltheyhaveactuallyreturnedaverdictof   acquittalonthegreatercharge.Peoplev._Berryman_Ԁ(1993)6Cal.4th ! 1048,10761077n.7. 3݌" (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 3'2#  6  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Mostotherevidenceandinferencerelatedinstructions,including $  consciousnessofguiltfromflight,suppressionofevidence,etc. 3't݌%!! (# (# Ќ  " 3"  0  0` (#(# 32#  7  .3  0 ` (#` (#  Errorsin"housekeeping"instructions(e.g.,jurornotetaking,etc.).